Plotino - Tratado 42,2 (VI, 1, 2) — A realidade

2 Preguntémonos, pues, de nuevo: ¿Hay que pensar que son géneros? ¿Y cómo puede la sustancia ser un solo género? Porque hay que empezar, decididamente, por la sustancia. Ahora bien, es imposible que sea un solo género, el de la sustancia, común a la inteligible y a la sensible; algo distinto, predicado de ambas, que no sería ni cuerpo ni incorpóreo; de lo contrario, o el cuerpo sería incorpóreo o lo incorpóreo cuerpo.

Más aún, con respecto a las sustancias mismas del mundo sensible, hay que inquirir qué hay de común a la materia, a la forma y al compuesto de ambas. Porque dicen que todas estas cosas son sustancias, y que, sin embargo, no tienen igual derecho a serlo, dado que la forma se dice ser más sustancia que la materia. Y tienen razón. Pero habrá otros que digan que la materia lo es más.

Por otra parte, las llamadas «sustancias primeras» ¿qué pueden tener en común con las «segundas», dado que las segundas reciben de las primeras su denominación de «sustancias»? Y, en general, es imposible decir en qué consiste la sustancia, pues no porque uno dé cuenta de la propiedad de la sustancia, ya ha captado su quididad. Tal vez, ni siquiera lo de que es «una sola cosa y la misma numéricamente, susceptiva de los contrarios», convenga a todas las sustancias.

II. [Substance (08).] Examinons encore si ces dix divisions sont des genres et comment la substance (οὐσία) peut former un genre: car c’est par elle qu’il faut absolument commencer.

Nous venons de dire que la substance intelligible et la substance sensible ne sauraient former un seul genre (09). Sinon, il y aurait au-dessus de la substance intelligible et de la substance sensible une autre chose qui s’affirmerait également des deux et qui ne serait ni corporelle ni incorporelle : car, si elle était incorporelle, le corps serait incorporel ; si elle était corporelle, l’incorporel serait corporel.

D’abord, qu’y a-t-il de commun à la matière, à la forme et à l’ensemble de la forme et de la matière? Car les Péripatéticiens (10) donnent également le nom de substances à ces trois choses, tout en reconnaissant qu’elles ne sont pas substance au même degré : ils disent que la forme est plus substance que la matière (11), et ils ont raison ; ils ne soutiendraient pas que la matière est plus substance [comme le font les Stoïciens]. Ensuite, qu’y a-t-il de commun entre les substances premières et les substances secondes, puis que les secondes doivent aux premières le nom de substances qu’on leur donne (12)?

En général, qu’est-ce que la substance ? C’est une question à laquelle les Péripatéticiens ne sauraient répondre : car, en indiquer la propriété [comme ils le font], ce n’est pas définir ce qu’elle est essentiellement, et il semble que la propriété d’être une chose susceptible d’admettre successivement les contraires, tout en restant identique et numériquement une (13), ne saurait convenir à toutes les substances [aux substances intelligibles].

2. Let us further examine if these ten divisions be kinds, and how being could form a kind; for we are forced to begin our study here.

INTELLIGIBLE AND SENSE-BEING COULD NOT FORM A SINGLE KIND.

We have just said that intelligible being and sense-being could not form a single kind. Otherwise, above both intelligible being, and sense-being, there might be some third entity which would apply to both, being neither corporeal nor incorporeal; for if it were incorporeal, the body would be incorporeal; and if it were corporeal, the incorporeal would be corporeal.

QUESTIONS RAISED BY ARISTOTELIAN THEORIES.

In the first place, what common element is there in matter, form, and the concretion of matter and form? The (Aristotelians) give the name of "being" alike to these three entities, though recognizing that they are not "being" in the same degree. They say that form is more being than is matter, and they are right; they would not insist (as do the Stoics) that matter is being in the greater degree. Further, what element is common to the primary and secondary beings, since the secondary owe their characteristic title of "being" to the primary ones?

WHAT IS "BEING" IN GENERAL?

In general, what is being? This is a question to which the (Aristotelians) could find no answer; for such mere indication of properties is not an essential definition of what it is, and it would seem that the property of being a thing that is susceptible of successively admitting their contraries, while remaining identical, and numerically one, could not apply to all (intelligible) beings.

2. But are we really obliged to posit the existence of such genera?

Take Substance, for Substance must certainly be our starting-point: what are the grounds for regarding Substance as one single genus?

It has been remarked that Substance cannot be a single entity common to both the Intellectual and the Sensible worlds. We may add that such community would entail the existence of something prior to Intellectual and Sensible Substances alike, something distinct from both as predicated of both; and this prior would be neither body nor unembodied; for it were one or the other, body would be unembodied, or the unembodied would be the body.

This conclusion must not however prevent our seeking in the actual substance of the Sensible world an element held in common by Matter, by Form and by their Composite, all of which are designated as substances, though it is not maintained that they are Substance in an equal degree; Form is usually held to be Substance in a higher degree than Matter, and rightly so, in spite of those who would have Matter to be the more truly real.

There is further the distinction drawn between what are known as First and Second Substances. But what is their common basis, seeing that the First are the source from which the Second derive their right to be called substances?

But, in sum, it is impossible to define Substance: determine its property, and still you have not attained to its essence. Even the definition, "That which, numerically one and the same, is receptive of contraries," will hardly be applicable to all substances alike.