Página inicial > Antiguidade > Neoplatonismo > Plotino (séc. III) > Enéada VI > Enéada VI, 4 (22) > Plotino - Tratado 22,14 (VI, 4, 14) — A mesma alma basta a todos os viventes
Plotino - Tratado 22,14 (VI, 4, 14) — A mesma alma basta a todos os viventes
terça-feira 29 de março de 2022, por
Igal
14. Mas, si en todas partes se da la misma alma, ¿cómo es que cada cuerpo tiene su alma propia: ¿Y cómo es posible que existan almas buenas y almas malas? Una misma alma es suficiente para todos los cuerpos, dado que contiene a todas las almas y a todas las inteligencias. Pero ello es debido a que se trata de un alma única e infinita en la que se dan todas las cosas. Y aunque se establezca una distinción entre las almas, esto no equivale en modo alguno a una separación. ¿Cómo, pues, comprender la infinitud de esta alma? Dícese que es infinita porque contiene a la vez todas las cosas, toda vida, toda alma y toda inteligencia. Y es una precisamente porque no está separada de las demás almas por límite alguno. No corresponde al alma única poseer una sola vida, sino un número infinito de vidas; pero entendamos esta infinitud como única, por el hecho de que todas las almas se dan a la vez, pero no porque se agrupen en una sola; ya que lo que ocurre es que reciben su principio de una sola alma y permanecen justamente en ésa de la que reciben su principio, o aún mejor, no tienen principio alguno y fueron siempre como ahora son. Aquí no cabe hablar de generación, ni tampoco de división, pues el alma sólo parece divisible al ser que la recibe. En el alma la existencia se da desde hace largo tiempo y ya desde un principio. Todo lo que es engendrado se aproxima a ella, parece como que la toca e incluso que queda suspendido. Pero, ¿y en cuánto a nosotros? ¿Qué diremos de nosotros? ¿Somos, acaso, esa alma o lo que se aproxima a ella y es engendrado en el tiempo? Antes de nuestra generación nosotros nos encontrábamos en esta alma, unas veces como hombres y otras veces como dioses; éramos almas puras e inteligencias unidas a la totalidad del ser, partes, por tanto, de un mundo inteligible, ni separadas, ni cortadas, sino realmente pertenecientes a ese todo. Aún ahora no nos encontramos separados; a ese hombre inteligible que nosotros éramos se ha acercado otro hombre que desea existir y que nos ha encontrado. Porque no estábamos fuera del universo y de ahí que nos haya envuelto, uniéndose a ese hombre inteligible que era entonces cada uno de nosotros. (Nos ilustrará el sonido único y la palabra única que son escuchados y recibidos por el oído; es el oído el que se convierte entonces en oído en acto, poseedor del sonido que actúa por su presencia.) Nos hemos convertido ya así en un acoplamiento de dos hombres, y no somos ahora el ser único que éramos antes; en ocasiones somos el hombre que se ha añadido últimamente, cuando el hombre primero deja de actuar y, en cierto sentido, no está siquiera presente [1].
Bouillet
XIV. Mais si une seule et même Ame est en chacun, comment chacun a-t-il son âme propre? Comment telle âme est-elle bonne, et telle autre mauvaise? — C’est que l’Ame universelle communique la vie à chacun, qu’elle contient toutes les âmes et toutes les intelligences (61). Elle possède à la fois l’Unité et l’infini : elle renferme en son sein toutes les âmes, distinctes d’elle chacune, mais non séparées (62); sinon, comment l’Ame posséderait-elle l’infini? On peut encore dire que l’Ame universelle contient toutes choses à la fois, toutes les vies, toutes les âmes, toutes les intelligences, que celles-ci ne sont pas circonscrites chacune par des limites, et que c’est pour cela qu’elles forment une unité En effet .il fallait qu’il y eût dans l’Ame universelle une vie non-seulement une, mais encore infinie, et cependant une : il fallait que cette vie une fût une en tant qu’elle était toutes les vies, que celles-ci ne se confondissent pas dans cette unité, mais qu’elles en partissent et qu’en même temps elles restassent là d’où elles étaient parties ; ou plutôt, elles ne sont point parties du sein de l’Ame universelle, elles ont toujours subsisté dans le même état. En effet, rien n’est engendré dans l’Ame universelle : elle ne se divise pas réellement, elle ne paraît divisée qu’à l’égard de ce qui la reçoit; tout demeure en elle tel qu’il a toujours été. 333 Mais ce qui est engendré [c’est-à-dire le corps] s’approche de l’Ame, paraît s’unir à elle et dépend d’elle.
Et nous, que sommes-nous ? Sommes-nous l’Ame universelle, ou bien ce qui s’approche d’elle et qui est engendré dans le temps [c’est-à-dire le corps]? — Non [nous ne sommes pas des corps]. Avant que la génération [des corps] fût opérée, nous existions déjà là-haut, nous étions les uns des hommes, les autres même des dieux, c’est-à-dire nous étions des âmes pures, des intelligences suspendues à l’Essence universelle ; nous formions des parties du monde intelligible, parties qui n’étaient pas circonscrites ni séparées, mais qui appartenaient au monde intelligible tout entier. Maintenant même, en effet, nous ne sommes pas séparés du monde intelligible (63); mais à l’homme intelligible s’est joint en nous un homme qui a voulu être autre que lui [c’est-à-dire l’homme sensible qui a voulu être indépendant (64)], et nous trouvant (car nous n’étions pas hors de l’univers), il nous a entourés et s’est ajouté à l’homme intelligible qui était alors chacun de nous (65).
Supposez un seul son, une seule parole : ceux qui lui 334 prêtent l’oreille l’entendent et la reçoivent chacun de son côté; l’ouïe passe dans chacun d’eux à l’état d’acte et perçoit ce qui agit sur elle (66). Nous sommes ainsi devenus deux hommes à la fois [l’homme intelligible et l’homme sensible qui s’est ajouté à lui] ; nous ne sommes plus l’un des deux seulement, comme auparavant, ou plutôt, nous sommes quelquefois encore l’un des deux seulement, l’homme qui s’est ajouté au premier; c’est ce qui a lieu toutes les fois que le premier homme sommeille en nous et n’est pas présent en un certain sens [parce qu’alors nous ne réfléchissons pas aux conceptions de l’intelligence (67)].
Guthrie
NOTHING IN THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IS BEGOTTEN; IT ONLY SEEMS SO.
14. But if one and the single Soul be in each person, how does each have his own soul? How then can one soul be good, while the other is evil? The universal Soul communicates her life to each, for she contains all the souls and all the intelligences. She possesses simultaneously unity and infinity; in her breast she contains all the souls, each distinct from her, but not separated; otherwise how could the Soul possess the infinite? It might still be objected that the universal Soul simultaneously contains all things, all lives, all souls, all the intelligences; that these are not each circumscribed by limits, and that that is the reason they form a unity. Indeed, there had to be in the universal Soul a life not only one, but infinite, and yet single; this one life had to be one so far as it was all lives, as these did not get confused in this unity, but that they should originate there, while at the same time they should remain located in the place from where they had started; or rather, they never left the womb of the universal Soul, for they have always subsisted in the same state. Indeed, nothing was begotten in the universal Soul; she did not really divide herself, she only seems divided in respect to what receives her; everything within her remains what it has always been. But that which was begotten (namely, the body) approaches the Soul, and seems to unite with her, and depends on her.
RELATION OF MAN TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.
And what are we? Are we the universal Soul, or are we what approaches her, and what is begotten in time (that is, the body) ? No: (we are not bodies). Before the generation of the bodies had been accomplished, we existed already on high; some of us were men, others of us were even divinities—that is, we were pure souls, intelligences connected with universal Being; we formed parts of the intelligible world, parts that were neither circumscribed nor separated, but which belonged to the entire intelligible world. Even now, indeed, we are not separated from the intelligible world; but the intelligible Man in us has received, and is joined by a man who desired to be different from the former (that is, the sense-man desired to be independent), and finding us, for we were not outside of the universe, he surrounded us, and added himself to the intelligible man who then was each one of us.
WE ARE NOT ALWAYS BOTH MEN, AS WE SHOULD BE.
Now suppose a single sound or word; those who listen to it hear it and receive it, each in his own way; hearing passes into each of them in the condition of an actualization, and perceives what is acting on it. We thus became two men at once (the intelligible Man, and the sense-man who added himself to the former); we are no longer, as before, only one of the two; or rather, we are sometimes still only one of them, the man who added himself to the first. This occurs every time that the first Man slumbers in us, and is not present, in a certain sense (when we fail to reflect about the conceptions of intelligence).
MacKenna
14. But, admitting this one soul at every point, how is there a particular soul of the individual and how the good soul and the bad?
The one soul reaches to the individual but nonetheless contains all souls and all intelligences; this, because it is at once a unity and an infinity; it holds all its content as one yet with each item distinct, though not to the point of separation. Except by thus holding all its content as one-life entire, soul entire, all intelligence - it could not be infinite; since the individualities are not fenced off from each other, it remains still one thing. It was to hold life not single but infinite and yet one life, one in the sense not of an aggregate built up but of the retention of the unity in which all rose. Strictly, of course, it is a matter not of the rising of the individuals but of their being eternally what they are; in that order, as there is no beginning, so there is no apportioning except as an interpretation by the recipient. What is of that realm is the ancient and primal; the relation to it of the thing of process must be that of approach and apparent merging with always dependence.
But we ourselves, what are We?
Are we that higher or the participant newcomer, the thing of beginnings in time?
Before we had our becoming Here we existed There, men other than now, some of us gods: we were pure souls, Intelligence inbound with the entire of reality, members of the Intellectual, not fenced off, not cut away, integral to that All. Even now, it is true, we are not put apart; but upon that primal Man there has intruded another, a man seeking to come into being and finding us there, for we were not outside of the universe. This other has wound himself about us, foisting himself upon the Man that each of us was at first. Then it was as if one voice sounded, one word was uttered, and from every side an ear attended and received and there was an effective hearing, possessed through and through of what was present and active upon it: now we have lost that first simplicity; we are become the dual thing, sometimes indeed no more than that later foisting, with the primal nature dormant and in a sense no longer present.
Ver online : Plotino
[1] Plotino continúa y adapta a su espiritualismo las tesis del Parménides. La presencia del ser -o mejor dicho, del alma- se explica muy bien por la comparación con el sonido; porque también el sonido -un sonido único- puede ser recibido por múltiples oídos. Sin embargo, el alma no se orienta en modo alguno al cuerpo, sino que es éste el que marcha hacia ella.
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