Plotino - Tratado 9,5 (VI, 9, 5) — O Uno é absolutamente simples e é o princípio de todas as coisas

5. Quem quer que imagine que os seres são governadas pela fortuna e pelo azar, e que devem sua coesão a causas corporais, está longe de deus e da noção do Uno. Nosso discurso não se dirige a esses, mas àqueles que estabelecem uma natureza distinta dos corpos e que remontam até a alma. Mas é preciso ainda que tenham bem compreendido a natureza da alma, e suas outras características, principalmente que ela vem do intelecto e que possui a virtude em participando à razão que vem do intelecto. Após isso, é preciso admitir que há um Intelecto diferente do intelecto que raciocina e que se chama «racional»; que os raciocínios já estão de certa maneira na extensão e no movimento; que as ciências propriamente ditas são razões na alma que se tornaram claras porque o intelecto se tornou, na alma, causa das ciências. E quando, à maneira de um objeto sensível apreendido por uma percepção, se viu o intelecto que se eleva além da alma da qual é o pai, porque é um mundo inteligível, é preciso dizer que é Intelecto em repouso e movimento imóvel ao mesmo tempo, pois contém todas as coisas nele mesmo e que é todas as coisas, como uma multiplicidade indistinta e no entanto distinta. Pois as coisas que se encontram no intelecto não são distintas como o são as razões, quando se as pensa uma por uma, e no entanto elas não estão confundidas nele, pois cada uma delas procede separadamente; é também o caso nas ciências: todas suas partes são indivisíveis, mas cada uma delas é separada das outras. Esta multiplicidade que está totalmente junta, o mundo inteligível, logo é o que está junto do Primeiro, e seguindo nosso argumento existe necessariamente se se admite que a Alma existe. Esta multiplicidade a porta na Alma, mas ela não é certamente o Primeiro, porque ela não é nem una nem simples, enquanto o Uno é simples e é o princípio de todas as coisas. Ora, o que precede o que há de mais precioso entre os seres — se é verdade que algo deve existir antes do intelecto, que, mesmo se deseja ser um, não é uno, mas apresenta a aparência do uno, porque não conhece a dispersão, mas resta realmente unido a ele mesmo sem se separar dele mesmo, posto que vem imediatamente depois do Uno, embora tenha tido a audácia de se afastar dele de alguma maneira — esta coisa maravilhosa que é antes dele, é o Uno, que não é um ser. Não digamos «Uno», para evitar de dar o uno como atributo a um sujeito outro que ele. Em verdade, nenhum outro nome lhe convém. Mas posto que certamente é preciso lhe dar um nome, convém chamá-lo «Uno», como se o faz comumente, e não como se fosse uma coisa, depois em seguida «uno». Por esta razão, é difícil de conhecê-lo, e é de preferência conhecido a partir disto que o engendra, a saber a realidade, pois é o intelecto que conduz à realidade. E sua natureza é tal que é a fonte das melhores coisas, o poder que engendra as coisas que são, permanecendo nele mesmo, sem ser diminuído e sem se encontrar entre as coisas que dele derivam. Isso que ainda é anterior a estas coisas, é necessário chamar «Uno», a fim de que com este nome possamos designá-lo uns aos outros, em nos levando a uma noção indivisível e em buscando a unificar nossa alma. Nós não o chamaremos uno e indivisível, como o fazemos com o ponto ou a unidade, pois «uno» tomado neste sentido designa os primeiros elementos da quantidade, que não poderia existir sem a realidade que preexiste nem sem o que precede a realidade. Logo não é na direção daqui de baixo que é preciso dirigir nosso pensamento, mesmo se é verdadeiro que o ponto e unidade são sempre semelhantes às realidades que são simples e que fogem longe da multiplicidade e da divisão.

5. Those to whom existence comes about by chance and automatic action and is held together by material forces have drifted far from God and from the concept of unity; we are not here addressing them but only such as accept another nature than body and have some conception of soul.

Soul must be sounded to the depths, understood as an emanation from Intellectual-Principle and as holding its value by a Reason-Principle thence infused. Next this Intellect must be apprehended, an Intellect other than the reasoning faculty known as the rational principle; with reasoning we are already in the region of separation and movement: our sciences are Reason-Principles lodged in soul or mind, having manifestly acquired their character by the presence in the soul of Intellectual-Principle, source of all knowing.

Thus we come to see Intellectual-Principle almost as an object of sense: the Intellectual Kosmos is perceptible as standing above soul, father to soul: we know Intellectual-Principle as the motionless, not subject to change, containing, we must think, all things; a multiple but at once indivisible and comporting difference. It is not discriminate as are the Reason-Principles, which can in fact be known one by one: yet its content is not a confusion; every item stands forth distinctly, just as in a science the entire content holds as an indivisible and yet each item is a self-standing verity.

Now a plurality thus concentrated like the Intellectual Kosmos is close upon The First - and reason certifies its existence as surely as that of soul - yet, though of higher sovereignty than soul, it is not The First since it is not a unity, not simplex as unity, principle over all multiplicity, must be.

Before it there is That which must transcend the noblest of the things of Being: there must be a prior to this Principle which aiming towards unity is yet not unity but a thing in unity’s likeness. From this highest it is not sundered; it too is self-present: so close to the unity, it cannot be articulated: and yet it is a principle which in some measure has dared secession.

That awesome Prior, The Unity, is not a being, for so its unity would be vested in something else: strictly no name is apt to it, but since name it we must there is a certain rough fitness in designating it as unity with the understanding that it is not the unity of some other thing.

Thus it eludes our knowledge, so that the nearer approach to it is through its offspring, Being: we know it as cause of existence to Intellectual-Principle, as fount of all that is best, as the efficacy which, self-perduring and undiminishing, generates all beings and is not to be counted among these its derivatives, to all of which it must be prior.

This we can but name The Unity, indicating it to each other by a designation that points to the concept of its partlessness while we are in reality striving to bring our own minds to unity. We are not to think of such unity and partlessness as belong to point or monad; the veritable unity is the source of all such quantity which could not exist unless first there existed Being and Being’s Prior: we are not, then, to think in the order of point and monad but to use these - in their rejection of magnitude and partition - as symbols for the higher concept.

[5] Quiconque s’imagine que les êtres sont gouvernés par la fortune et le hasard et dépendent de causes matérielles est très éloigné de Dieu et de la conception de l’Un. Ce n’est pas à de tels hommes que nous nous adressons, mais à ceux qui admettent qu’il y a une autre nature que les corps, et qui s’élèvent au moins jusqu’à l’âme. Pour ceux-là, ils doivent s’appliquer à bien comprendre la nature de l’âme, apprendre, entre autres vérités, qu’elle procède de l’intelligence, et que c’est en participant à celle-ci par la raison qu’elle possède la vertu ; ils doivent ensuite reconnaître qu’il existe une intelligence supérieure à l’intelligence qui raisonne, c’est-à-dire à la raison discursive (νοῦς λογιστικός), que les raisonnements impliquent un intervalle [entre les notions] et un mouvement [par lequel l’âme parcourt cet intervalle], que les connaissances scientifiques sont aussi des raisons de la même nature [des notions rationnelles], des raisons propres à l’âme, mais qui sont devenues claires, parce qu’à l’âme s’est ajoutée l’intelligence qui est la source des connaissances scientifiques. Par l’intelligence [qui lui appartient], l’âme voit l’Intellect divin, 546 qui est en quelque sorte sensible pour elle en ce sens qu’il se laisse percevoir par elle, l’Intellect, dis-je, qui domine sur l’âme et qui est son Père (14), c’est-à-dire le Monde intelligible, Intellect calme qui se meut sans sortir de sa quiétude, qui renferme tout en son sein et qui est tout, qui est à la fois multitude indistincte et multitude distincte : car les idées qu’il contient ne sont pas distinctes comme les raisons [les notions rationnelles] qui sont conçues une à une (15); toutefois elles ne se confondent pas: chacune d’elles apparaît comme distincte des autres, de même que dans une science toutes les notions, bien que formant un tout indivisible, ont cependant chacune leur existence à part (16). Cette multitude des idées prise dans son ensemble constitue le Monde intelligible : celui-ci est ce qu’il y a de plus près du Premier; son existence est invinciblement démontrée par la raison, comme la nécessité de l’existence de l’âme elle-même; mais, quoique le Monde intelligible soit quelque chose de supérieur à l’âme, il n’est cependant pas encore le Premier, parce qu’il n’est ni un, ni simple, taudis que l’Un, le Principe de tous les êtres, est parfaitement simple.

Qu’est donc le principe supérieur à ce qu’il y a de plus élevé parmi les êtres, à l’Intelligence [à l’Intellect et au Monde intelligible]? Il faut en effet qu’il y ail un principe au-dessus de l’Intelligence : celle-ci aspire bien à être l’Un, mais elle n’est pas l’Un, elle a seulement la forme de l’Un : car, considérée en elle-même, elle n’est pas divisée, 547 mais elle est véritablement présente à elle-même; elle ne se démembre point, parce qu’elle est voisine de l’Un, quoiqu’elle ait osé s’éloigner de lui (17). — Ce qui est au-dessus de l’Intelligence, c’est l’Un même, merveille incompréhensible, dont on ne peut dire même qu’il est être, pour ne point faire de lui l’attribut d’une autre chose, et auquel aucun nom ne convient véritablement. S’il faut cependant le nommer, on peut convenablement l’appeler en général l’Un, mais en comprenant bien qu’il n’est pas d’abord quelque autre chose, et ensuite un. C’est pour cela que l’Un est si difficile à connaître en lui-même; il est plutôt connu par ce qui naît de lui, c’est-à-dire par l’Essence, parce que l’intelligence conduit à l’Essence. La nature de l’Un est en effet d’être la source des choses excellentes, la puissance qui engendre les êtres, tout en demeurant en elle-même, sans éprouver aucune diminution, sans passer dans les êtres auxquels elle donne naissance (18). Si nous appelons ce principe l’Un, c’est pour nous le désigner les uns aux autres en nous élevant à une conception indivisible et en amenant notre âme à l’unité. Mais, quand nous disons que ce principe est un et indivisible, ce n’est pas dans le même sens que nous le disons du point [géométrique] et de la monade [de l’unité arithmétique] : car ce qui est un de la manière dont le sont le point et la monade est principe de quantité et n’existerait point s’il n’y avait avant lui l’Essence elle Principe qui est encore avant l’Essence. Ce n’est donc point à cette espèce d’un qu’il faut appliquer notre pensée ; nous croyons cependant que le point et la monade ont de l’analogie avec l’Un (19) par leur simplicité ainsi que par l’absence de toute multiplicité.

HOW SUCH AS RISE AS FAR AS THE SOUL MAY ACHIEVE FAITH IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.

5. Such as imagine that beings are governed by luck or chance, and that they depend on material causes are far removed from the divinity, and from the conception of unity. It is not such men that we are addressing, but such as admit the existence of a nature different from the corporeal one, and who at least rise (to an acknowledgment of the existence of) the Soul. These should apply themselves to the study of the nature of the soul, learning, among other truths, that she proceeds from Intelligence, and that she can achieve virtue by participating in Intelligence through reason. They must then acknowledge the existence of an Intelligence superior to the intelligence that reasons, namely, to discursive reason. They must (also realize) that reasonings imply an interval (between notions), and a movement (by which the soul bridges this interval). They must be brought to see that scientific knowledge consists also of reasons of the same nature (namely, rational notions), reasons suitable to the soul, but which have become clear, because the soul has received the succession of intelligence which is the source of scientific knowledge. By intelligence (which belongs to her), the soul sees the divine Intellect, which to it seems sensual, in this sense that it is perceptible by intelligence, which dominates the soul, and is her father; that is, the intelligible world, a calm intellect which vibrates without issuing from its tranquility, which contains everything, and which is all. It is both definite and indefinite manifoldness, for the ideas it contains are not distinct like the reasons (the rational notions), which are conceived one by one. Nevertheless, they do not become confused. Each of them becomes distinct from the others, just as in a science all the notions, though forming an indivisible whole, yet each has its own separate individual existence. This multitude of ideas taken together constitutes the intelligible world. This is the (entity) nearest to the First. Its existence is inevitably demonstrated by reason, as much as the necessity of the existence of the Soul herself; but though the intelligible world is something superior to the Soul, it is nevertheless not yet the First, because it is neither one, nor simple, while the one, the principle of all beings, is perfectly simple.

THE SUPREME IS ONE ONLY IN A FIGURATIVE SENSE.

The principle that is superior to what is highest among beings, to Intelligence (or intellect, or intelligible world) (may well be sought after). There must indeed be some principle above Intelligence; for intelligence does indeed aspire to become one, but it is not one, possessing only the form of unity. Considered in itself, Intelligence is not divided, but is genuinely present to itself. It does not dismember itself because it is next to the One, though it dared to withdraw therefrom. What is above Intelligence is Unity itself, an incomprehensible miracle, of which it cannot even be said that it is essence, lest we make of it the attribute of something else, and to whom no name is really suitable. If however He must be named, we may indeed call Him in general Unity, but only on the preliminary understanding that He was not first something else, and then only later became unity. That is why the One is so difficult to understand in Himself; He is rather known by His offspring; that is, by Being, because Intelligence leads up to Being. The nature of the One, indeed, is the source of excellent things, the power which begets beings, while remaining within Himself, without undergoing any diminution, without passing into the beings to which He gives birth. If we call this principle Unity, it is only for the mutual convenience of rising to some indivisible conception, and in unifying our soul. But when we say that this principle is one and indivisible, it is not in the same sense that we say it of the (geometric) point, and of the (arithmetical unity called the) monad. What is one in the sense of the unity of the point or the monad, is a principle of quantity, and would not exist unless preceded by being and the principle which precedes even that being. It is not of this kind of unity that we must think; still we believe that the point and the monad have analogy with the One by their simplicity as well as by the absence of all manifoldness and of all division.

V. Whoever fancies that beings are governed by fortune and chance, and are held together by corporeal causes, is very remote from God, and the conception of the one. Our arguments, likewise, are not addressed to these, but to those who admit that there is another nature besides bodies, and who ascend [at least] as far as to soul. It is necessary, therefore, that these should be well acquainted with the nature of soul, both as to other things, and to its being derived from intellect; from which also participating of reason, it possesses virtue. After these things, however, he should admit the subsistence of another intellect, different from that which reasons, and which is denominated rational. He should likewise consider reasonings to subsist now as it were in interval and motion, and sciences to be such-like reasons in the soul, with an [evolved] and manifest subsistence; in consequence of intellect which is the cause of sciences being now infused "into the soul. Hence in this case, the soul has as it were a sensible perception of intellect, through apprehending it incumbent on soul, and containing in itself the intelligible world, a tranquil intellect, and a quiet motion, and having and being all things, — a multitude without separation, and again a separate multitude. For it is. neither separated like the reasons [i.e. forms or ideas in the human soul] which are perceived by our intellect one at a time, [and not simultaneously,] nor is it a confused multitude. For each of the forms contained in it proceeds separate from the rest; in the same manner as in the sciences, where all things subsisting in an impartible nature, at the same time each is separate from the rest. This multitude, therefore, subsisting at once is the intelligible world, which is immediately united to the first principle of things, and which the same reason that demonstrates the existence of soul says has a necessary subsistence. This, however, has a more principal subsistence than soul, yet is not the first of things, because it is not [profoundly] one, and simple. But the one, and the principle of all things, is simple. Hence that which is prior to the most honourable thing among beings, if it is necessary there should be something prior to intellect, which wishes indeed to be one, yet is not one, but has the form of one, because intellect is not in itself dispersed, but is truly present with itself, and does not, in consequence of its proximity to the one, divulse itself, though in a certain respect it dares to depart from the one; — that, I say, which is prior to intellect and is the one, is a prodigy, and is not being, lest here also the one should be predicated of another thing, to which no name is in reality adapted. But if it is necessary to give it a name, it may appropriately be called in common one, yet not as being first something else, and afterwards one. It is indeed on this account difficult to be known; but is principally to be known from its offspring essence. And intellect leads to essence. The nature also of the one is such, that it is the fountain of the most excellent things, and a power generating beings, abiding in itself without diminution, and not subsisting in its progeny. But we denominate it the one from necessity, in order that we may signify it to each other by a name, and may be led to an impartible conception, being anxious that our soul may be one. We do not, however, here speak of the one and the impartible in such a way as when we speak of a point or the monad. For that which is after this manner one, is the principle of quantity, which could not subsist unless essence had a prior existence, and also that which is antecedent to essence. It is necessary therefore to project the dianoetic power to these; but we should consider the monad and a point as having an analogical similitude to the one, on account of their simplicity, and their flying from multitude and division.