Plotino - Tratado 9,10 (VI, 9, 10) — A visão do Uno é além do conhecimento intelectual

10. — Mas então, como se dá que não permaneçamos lá?

— É porque não se está ainda inteiramente fora daqui. Mas haverá um momento onde a contemplação será contínua para aquele que não estará mais impedido por qualquer obstáculo corporal. A princípio, não é a faculdade que viu que está impedida, mas esta outra faculdade que, quando aquela que viu cessa de ver, permanece ativa na ciência que se exerce nas demonstrações, nas provas e no raciocínio conduzido pela alma. Mas o ato de ver e a faculdade que vê não são mais a razão, mas são superiores à razão, eles se encontram antes da razão, e além dela, como está também isto que é visto. E, posto que aquele que vê se vê então ele mesmo, no momento que vê, ele se verá tal qual é, ou melhor, ele será unido a ele mesmo tal qual é, e se perceberá tal qual é, tornado simples. Mas talvez não é preciso dizer «ele se verá», mas de preferência «ele é visto», se todavia é preciso dizer que há duas coisas, isto que vê e isto que é visto, e não que estas duas coisas não senão uma, o que seria uma proposição audaciosa. Pois, então, no momento que ele vê, aquele que vê não vê, não distingue e não se representa duas coisas; mas, sendo por assim dizer convertido em outro, não é mais ele mesmo, nem para ele mesmo, ele pertence ao isto que está lá, e, sendo convertido em uno, pertence ao Uno, como se tivesse feito coincidir o centro com o centro. Pois mesmo aqui em baixo, quando dois centros coincidem, eles são uno e não se tornam dois senão se ele se separam. Eis porque falamos agora como de um outro; e eis porque é tão difícil falar da contemplação: como afirmar, com efeito, que é outro, quando se o contemplou, não se o viu como sendo outro, mas como se fazendo uno consigo mesmo?

10. But how comes the soul not to keep that ground?

Because it has not yet escaped wholly: but there will be the time of vision unbroken, the self hindered no longer by any hindrance of body. Not that those hindrances beset that in us which has veritably seen; it is the other phase of the soul that suffers and that only when we withdraw from vision and take to knowing by proof, by evidence, by the reasoning processes of the mental habit. Such logic is not to be confounded with that act of ours in the vision; it is not our reason that has seen; it is something greater than reason, reason’s Prior, as far above reason as the very object of that thought must be.

In our self-seeing There, the self is seen as belonging to that order, or rather we are merged into that self in us which has the quality of that order. It is a knowing of the self restored to its purity. No doubt we should not speak of seeing; but we cannot help talking in dualities, seen and seer, instead of, boldly, the achievement of unity. In this seeing, we neither hold an object nor trace distinction; there is no two. The man is changed, no longer himself nor self-belonging; he is merged with the Supreme, sunken into it, one with it: centre coincides with centre, for on this higher plane things that touch at all are one; only in separation is there duality; by our holding away, the Supreme is set outside. This is why the vision baffles telling; we cannot detach the Supreme to state it; if we have seen something thus detached we have failed of the Supreme which is to be known only as one with ourselves.

[10] Mais pourquoi l’âme qui s’est élevée là-haut n’y de- 561 meure-t-elle pas? C’est qu’elle n’est pas encore tout à fait détachée des choses d’ici-bas. Mais un temps viendra où elle jouira sans interruption de la vue de Dieu : c’est quand elle ne sera plus troublée par les passions du corps (54). La partie de l’âme qui voit Dieu n’est pas celle qui est troublée [l’âme irraisonnable], mais l’autre partie [l’âme raisonnable] ; or elle perd la vue de Dieu quand elle ne perd pas cette science qui consiste dans les démonstrations, dans les conjectures et les raisonnements. Dans la vision de Dieu, en effet, ce qui voit n’est pas la raison, mais quelque chose d’antérieur, de supérieur à la raison; si ce qui voit est encore uni à la raison, c’est alors comme l’est ce qui est vu. Celui qui se voit, lorsqu’il voit, se verra tel, c’est-à-dire simple, sera uni à lui- même comme étant tel, enfin se sentira devenu tel. Et même il ne faut pas dire qu’il verra, mais qu’il sera ce qui est vu, si toutefois on peut encore distinguer ici ce qui voit et ce qui est vu, et affirmer que ces deux choses n’en font pas une seule ; mais cette assertion serait téméraire : car dans cet état, celui qui voit ne voit pas à proprement parler, ne distingue pas, ne s’imagine pas deux choses ; il devient tout autre, il cesse d’être lui, il ne conserve rien de lui-même. Absorbé en Dieu, il ne fait plus qu’un avec lui, comme un centre qui coïncide avec un autre centre : ceux-ci en effet ne font qu’un en tant qu’ils coïncident, et ils font deux en tant qu’ils sont distincts. C’est dans ce sens que nous disons ici que l’âme est autre que Dieu. Aussi ce mode de 562 vision est-il fort difficile à décrire. Comment en effet dépeindre comme différent de nous Celui qui, lorsque nous le contemplions, ne nous apparaissait pas comme autre que nous-mêmes, mais comme ne faisant qu’un avec nous?

WHY DOES THE SOUL AFTER REACHING YONDER NOT STAY THERE?

10. Why does the soul which has risen on high not stay there? Because she has not yet entirely detached herself from things here below. But a time will come when she will uninterruptedly enjoy the vision of the divinity, that is, when she will no longer be troubled by the passions of the body. The part of the soul that sees the divinity is not the one that is troubled (the irrational soul), but the other part (the rational soul). Now she loses the sight of the divinity when she does not lose this knowledge which consists in demonstratings, conjectures and reasonings. In the vision of the divinity, indeed, that which sees is not the reason, but something prior and superior to reason; if that which sees be still united to reason, it then is as that which is seen. When he who sees himself sees, he will see himself as simple, being united to himself as simple, and will feel himself as simple. We should not even say that he will see, but only that he will be what he sees, in case that it would still here be possible to distinguish that which sees from that which is seen, or to assert that these two things do not form a single one. This assertion, however, would be rash, for in this condition he who sees does not, in the strict sense of the word, see; nor does he imagine two things. He becomes other, he ceases to be himself, he retains nothing of himself. Absorbed in the divinity, he is one with it, like a centre that coincides with another centre. While they coincide, they form but one, though they form two in so far as they remain distinct. In this sense only do we here say that the soul is other than the divinity. Consequently this manner of vision is very difficult to describe. How indeed could we depict as different from us Him who, while we were contemplating Him, did not seem other than ourselves, having come into perfect at-one-ment with us?

X. How does it happen, therefore, that the soul does not abide there? Is it not because she has not yet wholly migrated from hence ? But she will then, when her vision of deity possesses an uninterrupted continuity, and she is no longer impeded or disturbed in her intuition by the body. That however which sees divinity, is not the thing which is disturbed, but something else; when that which perceives him is at rest from the vision. But it is not then at rest according to a scientific energy, which consists in demonstrations, in credibilities, and a discursive process of the soul. For here vision, and that which sees, are no longer reason, but greater than and prior to reason. And in reason, indeed, they are as that is which is perceived. He therefore who sees himself, will then, when he sees, behold himself to be such a thing as this, or rather he will be present with himself thus disposed, and becoming simple, will perceive himself to be a thing of this kind. Perhaps, however, neither must it be said that he sees, but that he is the thing seen; if it is necessary to call these two things, i.e. the perceiver and the thing perceived. But both are one; though it is bold to assert this. Then, indeed, the soul neither sees, nor distinguishes by seeing, nor imagines that there are two things; but becomes as it were another thing, and not itself. Nor does that which pertains to itself contribute any thing there. But becoming wholly absorbed in deity, she is one, conjoining as it were centre with centre. For here concurring, they are one; but they are then two when they are separate. For thus also we now denominate that which is another. Hence this spectacle is a thing difficult to explain by words. For how can any one narrate that as something different from himself, which when he sees he does not behold as different, but as one with himself ?