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Plotino - Tratado 39,17 (VI, 8, 17) — Sequência da refutação da existência "por azar" do Bem
domingo 19 de junho de 2022, por
Míguez
17. Otra cuestión: afirmamos que las cosas que se encuentran en el universo y el universo mismo son como son por un libre designio de quien los ha hecho. Nos parece comó si hubiese habido ahí un cálculo, una previsión digna de tenerse en cuenta, una acción en fin que hace suponer úna providencia. Ahora bien, como todas las cosas existen y son engendradas siempre de la misma manera en este universo, cabe concebir que sus razones se dan siempre en quienes las producen y que están fijas en un orden de rango superior. De este modo, los seres inteligibles estarán más allá de toda providencia y voluntad de elección, y todo cuanto se halla en el ser quedará en él por siempre fijo y dotado de inteligencia.
Si concedemos el nombre de providencia a esta manera de ser, no hemos de olvidar, sin embargo, que se trata de una inteligencia que precede a este mundo nuestro y que, fija como está, es origen de él y hace que él exista según ella [1]. Mas, si una inteligencia de esta naturaleza es anterior a todas las cosas y además principio de ellas, no puede deber su ser al azar, porque, aun siendo múltiple, se muestra conforme consigo misma y se ordena por entero a la unidad. De esta multitud ordenada, que encierra en sí todas las razones del universo, no podemos decir que se deba al azar o a algo accidental, pues muy lejos está de eso y, mejor aún, es realmente todo lo contrario; es racional en la medida que irracional es el azar. Si tiene un principio anterior a ella, es evidente que este principio guandará relación con ella. Y es claro además que su principio racional se conformará a El y que ella será como El quere que sea, esto es, como su verdadera potencia.
He aquí un principio continuo, una unidad que es un todo y razón de todo. Esta unidad es el número, unidad mayor y más poderosa que todo lo que ha sido engendrado por ella, pues nada hay que la aventaje y supere. Ni su ser ni su cualidad pueden provenirle de ningún otro ser. Ya El es por sí mismo lo que es y está vuelto a sí mismo, interiorizado en sí mismo. Nada tiene que ver con lo exterior o con los otros seres.
Bouillet
XVII. En voici encore une preuve. Nous disons que le monde et les êtres qu’il contient sont ce qu’ils seraient si leur production eût été l’effet d’une détermination volontaire de leur auteur, ce qu’ils seraient encore si Dieu, faisant usage d’une prévision et d’une prescience basée sur le raisonnement, eût réalisé son œuvre selon la Providence (54). Or, comme de toute éternité ces êtres sont ou deviennent ce qu’ils sont, il doit y avoir également de toute éternité dans les êtres coexistants (55) des raisons qui subsistent dans un plan plus parfait [que celui de notre univers] (56); par conséquent, les intelligibles sont au-dessus de la Providence, du choix, et toutes les choses qui sont dans l’Être y subsistent éternellement d’une existence tout intellectuelle. Si l’on donne le nom de Providence au plan de l’univers, que du moins l’on conçoive bien que l’Intelligence immanente est antérieure à l’univers, que celui-ci procède d’elle et lui est conforme (57).
Puisque l’Intelligence est ainsi antérieure a toutes choses, puisque celles-ci ont pour principe une telle Intelligence, ce n’est pas non plus par hasard que l’Intelligence est ce qu’elle est : car, si d’un côté elle est multiple, d’un autre côté elle est dans un accord parfait avec elle-même, en sorte qu’elle forme une unité par la coordination des éléments qu’elle renferme. Un tel principe qui est a la fols multiple et multitude coordonnée, qui renferme toutes les raisons en les embrassant dans sa propre universalité, ne saurait être ce qu’il est par l’effet de la fortune et du hasard ; ce principe doit avoir une nature tout opposée, qui diffère de la contingence autant que la raison diffère du hasard, lequel consiste dans le défaut de raison. Si au-dessus de l’Intelligence est le Principe [par excellence], l’Intelligence, telle que nous l’avons décrite, est voisine de ce Principe, elle lui est conforme, elle participe de lui, elle est telle qu’il le veut, telle que le veut sa puissance. Dieu, étant indivisible, est donc raison une qui embrasse tout (εἷς πάντα λόγος), nombre un, [Dieu] un plus grand et plus puissant que tout ce qu’il a engendré ; il n’y a enfin rien de plus grand, de plus puissant que lui. Il ne tient donc d’autrui ni l’être ni le privilège d’être tel qu’il est. II est donc par lui-même ce qu’il est pour lui-même et en lui-même, sans aucune relation avec le dehors ni avec aucun autre être, mais tourné tout entier vers lui-même.
Guthrie
PROVIDENCE, THE PLAN OF THE UNIVERSE, IS FROM ETERNITY.
17. Here is another proof of it. We have stated that the world and the “being” it contains are what they would be if their production had been the result of a voluntary determination of their author, what they would still be if the divinity exercising a prevision and prescience based on reasoning, had done His work according to Providence. But as (these beings) are or become what they are from all eternity, there must also, from eternity — within the coexistent beings, exist (”seminal) reasons” which subsist in a plan more perfect (than that of our universe); consequently, the intelligible entities are above Providence, and choice; and all the things which exist in Essence subsist eternally there, in an entirely intellectual existence. If the name “Providence” be applied to the plan of the universe, then immanent Intelligence certainly is anterior to the plan of the universe, and the latter proceeds from immanent Intelligence, and conforms thereto.
THE SUPREME, ASSISTED BY INTELLIGENCE, WOULD HAVE NO ROOM FOR CHANCE.
Since Intelligence is thus anterior to all things, and since all things are (rooted) in such an Intelligence as principle, Intelligence cannot be what it is as a matter of chance. For, if on one hand, Intelligence be multiple, on the other hand it is in perfect agreement with itself, so that, by co-ordination of the elements it contains, it forms a unity. Once more, such a principle that is both multiple and co-ordinated manifoldness, which contains all (”seminal) reasons” by embracing them within its own universality, could not be what it is as a result of fortune or chance. This principle must have an entirely opposite nature, as much differing from contingency, as reason from chance, which consists in the lack of reason. If the above Intelligence be the (supreme) Principle, then Intelligence, such as it has been here described, is similar to this Principle, conforms to it, participates in it, and is such as is wished by it and its power. (The Divinity) being indivisible, is therefore a (single) Reason that embraces everything, a single (unitary) Number, and a single (Divinity) that is greater and more powerful than the generated (universe); than He, none is greater or better. From none other, therefore, can He have derived His essence or qualities. What He is for and in Himself, is therefore derived from Himself; without any relation with the outside, nor with any other being, but entirely turned towards Himself.
MacKenna
17. Or consider it another way: We hold the universe, with its content entire, to be as all would be if the design of the maker had so willed it, elaborating it with purpose and prevision by reasonings amounting to a Providence. All is always so and all is always so reproduced: therefore the reason-principles of things must lie always within the producing powers in a still more perfect form; these beings of the divine realm must therefore be previous to Providence and to preference; all that exists in the order of being must lie for ever There in their Intellectual mode. If this regime is to be called Providence it must be in the sense that before our universe there exists, not expressed in the outer, the Intellectual-Principle of all the All, its source and archetype.
Now if there is thus an Intellectual-Principle before all things, their founding principle, this cannot be a thing lying subject to chance - multiple, no doubt, but a concordance, ordered so to speak into oneness. Such a multiple - the co-ordination of all particulars and consisting of all the Reason-Principles of the universe gathered into the closest union - this cannot be a thing of chance, a thing "happening so to be." It must be of a very different nature, of the very contrary nature, separated from the other by all the difference between reason and reasonless chance. And if the Source is precedent even to this, it must be continuous with this reasoned secondary so that the two be correspondent; the secondary must participate in the prior, be an expression of its will, be a power of it: that higher therefore [as above the ordering of reason] is without part or interval [implied by reasoned arrangement], is a one - all Reason-Principle, one number, a One greater than its product, more powerful, having no higher or better. Thus the Supreme can derive neither its being nor the quality of its being. God Himself, therefore, is what He is, self-related, self-tending; otherwise He becomes outward-tending, other-seeking - who cannot but be wholly self-poised.
Ver online : Plotino
[1] Idea muy plotiniana de una inteligencia que no es providencia reflexiva en el sentido que podían darle Platón y los estoicos. Es inteligencia anterior a las cosas y principio de ellas, más por necesidad que por razonamiento.
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- Plotino - Tratado 39,4 (VI, 8, 4) — Objeção: não é possível conceder a liberdade aos seres inteligíveis
- Plotino - Tratado 39,5 (VI, 8, 5) — Que relação estabelecer entre virtude e liberdade?
- Plotino - Tratado 39,6 (VI, 8, 6) — Prosseguimento da interrogação sobre a relação virtude-liberdade
- Plotino - Tratado 39,7 (VI, 8, 7) — Introdução do "discurso temerário" e primeiros elementos de refutação
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- Plotino - Tratado 39,12 (VI, 8, 12) — Experiência da liberdade em nós
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- Plotino - Tratado 39,14 (VI, 8, 14) — Refutação da existência contingente do Bem
- Plotino - Tratado 39,15 (VI, 8, 15) — Movimento de ascensão espiritual
- Plotino - Tratado 39,16 (VI, 8, 16) — Exposição dos atributos positivos do Bem
- Plotino - Tratado 39,18 (VI, 8, 18) — Imagens e expressões que significam aquilo que é o Bem
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