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Plotino - Tratado 39,16 (VI, 8, 16) — Exposição dos atributos positivos do Bem
domingo 19 de junho de 2022, por
Míguez
16. Parece, decíamos, que el Bien se encuentra en todas partes y que no se encuentra en ninguna. De ello convendrá sacar consecuencias provechosas sobre lo que aquí estamos investigando. Porque, si de hecho no se encuentra en ninguna parte, ya no le acontece por accidente el estar en algún sitio; y si se encuentra en todas partes, esa ubicación supone algo tan grande como El. De manera que, en realidad, hablar de todas partes y de sí mismo es hablar de una sola cosa, ya que ese todo es él mismo, que da su ser a las cosas situándolas en todas partes, Al ocupar el rango más alto y ser él mismo la realidad suprema, convierte a todas las cosas en esclavas suyas. Pero no es El el que por acaso se une a las cosas, sino que son las cosas las que se unen a El o se sitúan a su alrededor, como si se tratase de meros accidentes. El no mira hacia ellas, sino que son ellas las que miran hacia El.
Hay en El una tendencia a interiorizarse, a amarse a sí mismo y a amar con ello su propia claridad. Así, son una sola cosa él mismo y lo que es objeto de su amor. Con lo cual queda dicho que se debe a sí mismo la existencia, si lo que realmente ama es un acto permanente y una especie de inteligencia. Pues la Inteligencia es el efecto de un acto y él mismo, de este modo, es ese efecto. Pero como este acto no es producido por ningún otro, resultará ser evidentemente el producto de sí mismo. No será, por tanto, lo que es por accidente, sino según su acto.
Concebiremos su existencia como si realmente se apoyase en sí mismo y a la vez mirase a sí mismo. No atribuyamos, pues, su ser a nada accidental, ya que El es como quiere ser, y no hay aquí una voluntad por azar ni por accidente. Una voluntad que desea lo mejor no podría en modo alguno deberse al - azar.
Una prueba de que esta inclinación hacia sí mismo, que es su acto, y este aislamiento en sí mismo constituyen el ser que es, vendría dada tan sólo con suponer lo contrario. Porque es claro que si se inclina hacia fuera dejará ya de ser lo que es. El acto que dirige hacia sí es su mismo ser y El y su acto conforman una sola cosa. Su existencia es debida a la unión inseparable que mantiene con su acto. Mas, si su acto no ha tenido un origen , sino que es desde siempre, y es al modo de una vigilia que no difiere del que tiene el cometido de la vigilancia, si podemos estimarlo como una vigilia y una inteligencia por encima de todas las demás, él mismo tendrá que adaptarse por fuerza a esta realidad. Pues esa vigilia está más allá de la esencia, de la inteligencia o de la vida racional inteligible; no es otra cosa que él mismo. Nos hallamos, por consiguiente, ante un acto que supera a la inteligencia, al pensamiento y a la vida. La inteligencia, el pensamiento y la vida provienen justamente de El y no de ningún otro ser. Y El tiene naturalmente el ser por sí mismo y de sí mismo; no es lo que es por accidente; es nada menos que como quiere ser.
Bouillet
XVI. Comme nous admettons et qu’il semble évident que Dieu est partout et nulle part, il est nécessaire de bien saisir et de bien comprendre le sens de cette conception, en l’appliquant au sujet de nos recherches. Puisque Dieu n’est nulle part, nulle part il n’est fortuitement; puisqu’il est partout, partout il est tout ce qu’il est. Il est donc lui-même ce qu’on nomme partout (τὸ πανταχοῦ) et de toutes parts (τὸ πάντη) ; il n’est pas contenu dans ce qu’on nomme partout, il est cela même, et il donne l’existence à tous les autres êtres parce que tous se trouvent contenus dans Celui qui est partout (51). Possédant le rang suprême, ou plutôt étant lui-même suprême (ὑπέρτατος), il a toutes choses sous son obéissance. Il n’est pas contingent pour elles ; ce sont elles qui sont contingentes pour lui, ou plutôt qui se rapportent à lui : car Lui, il ne les regarde pas; ce sont elles qui le regardent. Quant à Lui, il se porte en quelque sorte vers les profondeurs les plus intimes de lui-même, s’aimant lui-même, aimant la pure clarté qui le constitue, étant lui-même ce qu’il aime, c’est-à-dire se donnant l’existence à lui-même (ὑποστήσας ἑαυτόν), parce qu’il est un acte immanent (ἐνέργια μένουσα), et que ce qu’il y a de plus aimable en lui constitue une sorte d’intelligence (οἷον νοῦς). Cette intelligence étant une œuvre (ἐνέργημα), il est lui-même une œuvre ; mais comme il n’est pas l’œuvre d’un autre principe, il est l’œuvre de lui-même; il est donc, non comme le fait le hasard, mais comme il agit. Si l’on peut dire qu’il existe surtout parce qu’il est a lui-même son propre fondement, qu’il se regarde lui-même, que son existence consiste à se regarder lui-même (si je puis m’exprimer ainsi), il est l’auteur de lui-même. Il est donc, non ce qu’il s’est trouvé être fortuitement, mais ce qu’il veut être lui-même, et comme sa volonté n’a elle-même rien de fortuit, il est encore sous ce rapport indépendant de la contingence : car, puisque sa volonté est la volonté de ce qu’il y a de meilleur dans l’univers, elle ne saurait être fortuite. Que son inclination vers lui-même (νεῦσις πρὸς αὑτόν), inclination qui est son acte, et que son immanence en lui-même (νονὴ ἐν αὑτῷ) le fassent être ce qu’il est, c’est ce qu’on reconnaîtra aisément si l’on suppose un moment le contraire. En effet, que Dieu incline vers ce qui est hors de lui, il cessera d’être ce qu’il est. Être ce qu’il est, voilà son acte par rapport à lui-même; lui et cet acte ne font qu’un. Il se donne ainsi l’existence parce que l’acte qu’il produit est inséparable de lui. Si donc l’acte de Dieu n’a pas commencé d’être, s’il est au contraire de toute éternité (52), s’il consiste dans une action vigilante (ἐγρήγορσις (53]], identique à celui qui est vigilant, si de plus cette action vigilante est une supra-intellection éternelle (ὑπερνόησις ἀεὶ οὖσα), Dieu est ce qu’il se fait par son action vigilante. Celle-ci est supérieure à l’essence, à l’intelligence, à la vie sage ; elle est Lui. Il est donc un acte supérieur a la vie, à l’intelligence, à la sagesse : celles-ci procèdent de lui, de lui seul. C’est donc de lui-même et par lui-même qu’il a l’être; par conséquent, il est non ce qu’il s’est trouvé être fortuitement, mais ce qu’il a voulu être.
Guthrie
THE SUPREME AS EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE; AS INCLINATION AND IMMANENCE.
16. As we assert, and as it seems evident that (the Divinity) is everywhere and nowhere, it is necessary thoroughly to grasp and understand this conception, as it applies to the subject of our studies. Since (the Divinity) is nowhere, He is nowhere fortuitously; since He is everywhere, He is everywhere what He is. He himself is therefore what is named omnipresence, and universality. He is not contained within omnipresence, but is omnipresence itself, and He imparts essence to all the other beings because they are all contained within Him who is everywhere. Possessing the supreme rank, or rather Himself being supreme, He holds all things in obedience to Himself. For them He is not contingent; it is they that are contingent to Him, or rather, that connect with Him; for it is not He who contemplates them, but they who look at Him. On His part, He, as it were, moves towards the most intimate depths within Himself, loving Himself, loving the pure radiance of which He is formed, Himself being what He loves, that is, giving Himself a hypostatic form of existence, because He is an immanent actualization, and what is most lovable in Him constitutes the higher Intelligence. This Intelligence being an operation, He himself is an operation; but as He is not the operation of any other principle, He is the operation of Himself; He therefore is not what chance makes of Him, but what He actualizes. He is the author of Himself, inasmuch as He exists particularly because He is His own foundation, because He contemplates Himself, because, so to speak, He passes His existence in contemplating Himself. He therefore is, not what He fortuitously found Himself to be, but what He himself wishes to be, and as His will contains nothing fortuitous, He is even in this respect independent of contingency. For, since His will is the will of the Best that is in the universe, it could not be fortuitous. If one were to imagine an opposite movement, one will easily recognize that His inclination towards Himself, which is His actualization, and His immanence in Himself make of Him what He is. Indeed, should (the divinity) incline towards what is outside of Himself, He would cease being what He is. His actualization, in respect to Himself, is to be what He is; for He and that actualization coincide. He therefore gives Himself a hypostatic form of existence, because the actualization that He produces is inseparable from Himself. If then the actualization of (the divinity) did not merely commence, but if, on the contrary, it dated from all eternity; if it consist in an exciting action, identical to Him who is excited; and if, besides this exciting action, He be ever-being super-intellection, then (the divinity) is what He makes himself by His exciting action. The latter is superior to “Being,” to Intelligence, and to the Life of Wisdom; it is Himself. He therefore is an actualization superior to Life, Intelligence and Wisdom; these proceed from Him, and from Him alone. He therefore derives essence from Himself, and by Himself; consequently, He is, not what He fortuitously found Himself to be, but what He willed to be.
MacKenna
16. We maintain, and it is evident truth, that the Supreme is everywhere and yet nowhere; keeping this constantly in mind let us see how it bears on our present enquiry.
If God is nowhere, then not anywhere has He "happened to be"; as also everywhere, He is everywhere in entirety: at once, He is that everywhere and everywise: He is not in the everywhere but is the everywhere as well as the giver to the rest of things of their being in that everywhere. Holding the supreme place - or rather no holder but Himself the Supreme - all lies subject to Him; they have not brought Him to be but happen, all, to Him - or rather they stand there before Him looking upon Him, not He upon them. He is borne, so to speak, to the inmost of Himself in love of that pure radiance which He is, He Himself being that which He. loves. That is to say, as self-dwelling Act and Intellectual-Principle, the most to be loved, He has given Himself existence. Intellectual-Principle is the issue of Act: God therefore is issue of Act, but, since no other has generated Him, He is what He made Himself: He is not, therefore, "as He happened to be" but as He acted Himself into being.
Again; if He preeminently is because He holds firmly, so to speak, towards Himself, looking towards Himself, so that what we must call his being is this self-looking, He must again, since the word is inevitable, make Himself: thus, not "as He happens to be" is He but as He Himself wills to be. Nor is this will a hazard, a something happening; the will adopting the Best is not a thing of chance.
That his being is constituted by this self-originating self-tendence - at once Act and repose - becomes clear if we imagine the contrary; inclining towards something outside of Himself, He would destroy the identity of his being. This self-directed Act is, therefore, his peculiar being, one with Himself. If, then, his act never came to be but is eternal - a waking without an awakener, an eternal wakening and a supra-Intellection - He is as He waked Himself to be. This awakening is before being, before Intellectual-Principle, before rational life, though He is these; He is thus an Act before Intellectual-Principle and consciousness and life; these come from Him and no other; his being, then, is a self-presence, issuing from Himself. Thus not "as He happened to be" is He but as He willed to be.
Ver online : Plotino
- Plotino - Tratado 39,1 (VI, 8, 1) — Exposição do objeto da pesquisa
- Plotino - Tratado 39,2 (VI, 8, 2) — A que faculdade da alma reportar o que depende de nós?
- Plotino - Tratado 39,3 (VI, 8, 3) — A verdadeira liberdade situa-se no intelecto
- Plotino - Tratado 39,4 (VI, 8, 4) — Objeção: não é possível conceder a liberdade aos seres inteligíveis
- Plotino - Tratado 39,5 (VI, 8, 5) — Que relação estabelecer entre virtude e liberdade?
- Plotino - Tratado 39,6 (VI, 8, 6) — Prosseguimento da interrogação sobre a relação virtude-liberdade
- Plotino - Tratado 39,7 (VI, 8, 7) — Introdução do "discurso temerário" e primeiros elementos de refutação
- Plotino - Tratado 39,8 (VI, 8, 8) — A impotência do discurso relativo ao Bem
- Plotino - Tratado 39,9 (VI, 8, 9) — Sequência da refutação do advir acidental do Bem
- Plotino - Tratado 39,10 (VI, 8, 10) — Sequência da refutação do advir acidental do Bem
- Plotino - Tratado 39,11 (VI, 8, 11) — O Bem escapa a todas as categorias da ontologia
- Plotino - Tratado 39,12 (VI, 8, 12) — Experiência da liberdade em nós
- Plotino - Tratado 39,13 (VI, 8, 13) — Início do discurso positivo a respeito do Bem
- Plotino - Tratado 39,14 (VI, 8, 14) — Refutação da existência contingente do Bem
- Plotino - Tratado 39,15 (VI, 8, 15) — Movimento de ascensão espiritual
- Plotino - Tratado 39,17 (VI, 8, 17) — Sequência da refutação da existência "por azar" do Bem
- Plotino - Tratado 39,18 (VI, 8, 18) — Imagens e expressões que significam aquilo que é o Bem
- Plotino - Tratado 39,19 (VI, 8, 19) — Superioridade da contemplação direta do Bem
- Plotino - Tratado 39,20 (VI, 8, 20) — Duas aporias relativas à auto-produção do Bem
- Plotino - Tratado 39,21 (VI, 8, 21) — O Bem é "inteiramente vontade"