Plotino - Tratado 43,6 (VI, 2, 6) — Partir da unidade e da multiplicidade da alma

6 —¿Quiere decir que no lo tiene fuera de su esencia con el resultado de que el alma es, en parte, en el sentido de ser, y, en parte, en el de ser tal? Pero si es en el sentido de ser tal y esta «talidad» es extrínseca, síguese que el todo constitutivo del ser del alma no es esencia. Es esencia en parte: una parte del alma es esencia, pero el todo no es esencia Además, el ser del alma sin lo restante ¿qué puede ser sino piedra?

No, este ser del alma tiene que ser intrínseco como «fuente y principio». Mejor dicho, todo cuanto ella misma es debe serle intrínseco. Luego también la vida, y ambos, ser y vida, deben ser una sola cosa.

—¿Quiere decir que ha de ser una como una razón una?

—Más bien, es uno el sustrato, pero de tal modo uno que sea a la vez dos cosas y aún más, todas cuantas es el alma originariamente.

—Luego o es esencia y vida o sujeto poseedor de vida. Ahora bien, si es sujeto poseedor de vida, el poseedor no está, por sí mismo, incluido en la vida, y la vida no está incluida en su esencia. Pero si lo uno no incluye lo otro, hay que decir que ambos son uno solo.

—En realidad, es uno y múltiple, es tantas cosas cuantas son las que se dejan ver en la unidad; es uno para sí mismo, pero múltiple con respecto a las demás cosas. Es, sí, uno, pero que se hace múltiple mediante una especie de movimiento; es todo uno, pero múltiple porque trata como de contemplarse a sí mismo. Su propio ser como que no aguanta el ser uno pudiendo ser todas las cosas que es. Mas la contemplación es la causa de que aparezca múltiple, para poder pensar. Porque si aparece uno, es que no pensó, sino que es ya aquello que es.

VI. Mais ne peut-on pas dire que l’âme n’a point par son essence tout ce qu’elle a, en ce sens qu’on doit distinguer en elle d’un côté l’être et de l’autre telle manière d’être? — Si l’âme a telle manière d’être, et que cette manière d’être lui vienne du dehors, le tout ne sera plus en effet l’essence de l’âme en tant qu’âme; il ne sera l’essence de l’âme que partiellement et non en totalité. Ensuite, que sera l’être de l’âme sans les autres choses qui constituent son essence? L’être sera-t-il pour l’âme le même que pour la pierre? Ne faut-il pas plutôt admettre que cet être de l’âme tient à son essence même, qu’il en est comme la source et le principe, ou plutôt qu’il est tout ce qu’est l’âme, et par conséquent vie, enfin que dans l’âme l’être et la vie ne font qu’un?

Dirons-nous que cette unité ressemble à celle d’une raison [d’une forme (12)] ? Non, La substance de l’âme est une ; mats cette unité n’exclut pas la dualité, la pluralité même: car elle admet tous les attributs essentiels de l’âme.

Doit-on dire que l’âme est à la fois essence et vie, ou bien qu’elle possède la vie? Dire que l’âme possède la vie, ce serait dire que ce qui possède n’est pas par essence doué de vie, ou que la vie n’est pas dans son essence. Si l’on ne peut dire que l’une des deux possède l’autre, il faut reconnaître que les deux ne font qu’un, ou que l’âme est une et multiple, embrassant dans son unité tout ce qui apparaît en elle; qu’elle est une en elle-même, mais multiple par rapport aux autres choses; que, bien qu’étant une par elle-même, elle se fait elle-même multiple par son mouvement ; que, bien que formant un tout qui est un, elle cherche à sa considérer dans sa multiplicité. C’est ainsi que l’Être ne reste pas un, parce que sa puissance embrasse toutes choses comme son existence, C’est la contemplation qui le fait apparaître comme multiple, parce qu’il doit être multiple pour penser. S’il n’apparaît que comme un, c’est qu’il n’a pas encore pensé et qu’il n’est encore réellement qu’un (13).

THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL DERIVES FROM ITS BEING; ADDING LIFE TO ESSENCE.

6. However, could we not say that the soul does not have all that she has through her being, in this sense, that in her we must distinguish on one hand essence, and on the other some kind of essence? If the soul possess such a kind of essence, and if this kind of essence come to her from without, the whole will no longer be the being of the soul so far as she is soul; only partially will it be the being of the soul, and not in totality. Besides, what would be the essence of the soul without the other things which constitute her being? Will the essence be the same for the soul as for the stone? Will we not rather have to insist that this essence of the soul derives from her very being; that this essence is her source and principle; or rather, that it is all that the soul is, and consequently is life; and finally that in the soul life and essence fuse ?

SOUL UNITY DOES NOT RESEMBLE THE UNITY OF A REASON, INCLUDING PLURALITY.

Shall we say that this unity resembles that of a "reason" (of a form) ? No. The substance of the soul is one; but such unity does not exclude duality or even plurality; for it admits of all the attributes essential to the soul.

THE SOUL IS BOTH BEING AND LIFE.

Should we say that the soul is both being and life, or that she possesses life? To say that the soul possesses life would mean that the possessor is not* inherently alive, or that life does not inhere in her "being." If then we cannot say that one of the two possesses the other, we shall have to recognize that both are identical, or that the soul is both one and manifold, in her unity embracing all that appears in her; that in herself she is one, but manifold in respect to other things; that, although she be one by herself, she makes herself multiple by her movement; that, while forming a whole which is one, she seeks to consider herself in her multiplicity. So Essence also does not remain unitary, because its potentiality extends to all it has become. It is contemplation that makes it appear manifold, the necessary thought has multiplied it. If it appear as one only, it is only because it has not yet thought, and it really is still only one.

6. But must it not draw on some source external to its essence, if it is to be conditioned, not only by Being, but by being an entity of a particular character? But if it is conditioned by a particular character, and this character is external to its essence, its essence does not comprise all that makes it Soul; its individuality will determine it; a part of Soul will be essence, but not Soul entire.

Furthermore, what being will it have when we separate it from its other components? The being of a stone? No: the being must be a form of Being appropriate to a source, so to speak, and a first-principle, or rather must take the forms appropriate to all that is comprised in Soul’s being: the being here must, that is, be life, and the life and the being must be one.

One, in the sense of being one Reason-Principle? No; it is the substrate of Soul that is one, though one in such a way as to be also two or more - as many as are the Primaries which constitute Soul. Either, then, it is life as well as Substance, or else it possesses life.

But if life is a thing possessed, the essence of the possessor is not inextricably bound up with life. If, on the contrary, this is not possession, the two, life and Substance, must be a unity.

Soul, then, is one and many - as many as are manifested in that oneness - one in its nature, many in those other things. A single Existent, it makes itself many by what we may call its motion: it is one entire, but by its striving, so to speak, to contemplate itself, it is a plurality; for we may imagine that it cannot bear to be a single Existent, when it has the power to be all that it in fact is. The cause of its appearing as many is this contemplation, and its purpose is the Act of the Intellect; if it were manifested as a bare unity, it could have no intellection, since in that simplicity it would already be identical with the object of its thought.