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Plotino - Tratado 5,9 (V, 9, 9) — A unidade do Intelecto e as Formas
quarta-feira 15 de junho de 2022, por
Míguez
9. ¿Qué son, entonces, en esa Inteligencia una, las cosas que nosotros separamos al pensarlas? Conviene que las presentemos inmóviles, como si contemplásemos en la unidad de una ciencia todo lo que esta ciencia contiene. Este mundo visible es un ser animado que contiene en sí mismo todos los seres animados, pero que obtiene su ser y todo lo que él es de otro mundo que, a su vez, hay que referir a la Inteligencia. Es necesario, pues, que la Inteligencia contenga en sí misma el modelo del mundo y que sea ella también un mundo inteligible, ese mundo al que llama Platón en el Timeo el Animal en sí. Porque, una vez dada una razón seminal animada y la materia que recibe esta razón, necesariamente se producirá un ser animado. Y, del mismo modo, una vez dada la naturaleza intelectual que contiene en sí todas las potencias, si nada lo impide y ningún ser se interpone entre ella y el ser que puede recibirla, necesariamente ese ser quedará ordenado y la naturaleza actuará de ordenadora. Verdaderamente nuestro mundo ordenado contiene las formas ya divididas, esto es, en un lugar un hombre y en otro el sol; allí, en cambio, lo que está en la unidad es todo.
Bouillet
IX. Quelles sont donc les choses contenues dans l’unité de l’Intelligence et que nous divisons en les pensant? Il faut les énoncer sans en troubler le calme, et contempler ce que contient l’Intelligence par une science qui reste en quelque sorte dans l’unité. Puisque ce monde sensible est un animal qui embrasse tous les animaux, puisqu’il tient son existence et son essence d’un principe différent de lui-même [de l’Ame universelle], principe qui relève à son tour de l’Intelligence, il est nécessaire que l’Intelligence elle-même contienne l’archétype universel, qu’elle soit ce monde intelligible dont Platon dit dans le Timée : « L’Inteliigence voit les idées comprises dans l’Animal qui est (34). » Comme, dès que la raison [séminale] d’un animal existe avec la matière propre à la recevoir, il est nécessaire que cet animal soit engendré ; de même, dès qu’il y a une nature intellectuelle, toute-puissante, que nul obstacle n’arrête (puisque rien ne s’interpose entre elle et la substance capable de recevoir la forme), il est nécessaire que cette dernière substance soit embellie par l’Intelligence; mais elle ne présente qu’à l’état de division la forme qu’elle reçoit, en sorte qu’elle nous montre d’un côté l’homme [par exemple], d’un autre côté le soleil, tandis que l’Intelligence possède tout dans l’unité.
Guthrie
INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE UNIVERSAL ARCHETYPE.
9. What then are the things contained within the unity of Intelligence which we separate in thinking of them? They must be expressed without disturbing their rest, and we must contemplate the contents of Intelligence by a science that somehow remains within unity. Since this sense-world is an animal which embraces all animals, since it derives both its general and special existence from a principle different from itself, a principle which, in turn, is derived from intelligence, therefore intelligence must itself contain the universal archetype, and must be that intelligible world of which Plato (well) says; "Intelligence sees the ideas contained within the existing animal. Since an animal, whose (seminal) reason exists with the matter fit to receive it, must of course be begotten, so the mere existence of a nature that is intellectual, all-powerful, and unhindered by any obstacle — since nothing can interpose between it and the (substance) capable of receiving the form — must necessarily be adorned (or, created) by intelligence, but only in a divided condition does it reveal the form it receives, so that, for instance, it shows us on one hand a man, and on the other the sun, while intelligence possesses everything in unity.
Taylor
IX. What then are the things in this one intellect, which we divide in our conceptions of it ? For it is necessary to exhibit them quiescent, and to survey them proceeding from thence, as if from science subsisting in unity. This world, therefore, being an animal comprehending in itself all animals, and possessing its existence, and the quality of its existence from something different from itself, that also from which it is derived being referred to intellect — this being the case, it is necessary that the archetypal universe should be in intellect; and that this intellect should be the intelligible world, which Plato [in the Timaeus] says exists in that which is animal itself. For as where there is reason [or a productive principle] which is a certain animal, and where also there is at the same time matter which receives the spermatic reason, it is necessary that an animal should be generated; after the same manner, an intellectual nature being present, which is all-powerful, and has nothing to impede its energy, (nothing existing between this, and that which is able to receive it) it is necessary that the recipient should be adorned, and that intellect should adorn. And that, indeed, which is adorned, possesses distributed forms, here man, and there the sun. But in the adorning cause all things are in one.
MacKenna
9. What, then, is the content - inevitably separated by our minds - of this one Intellectual-Principle? For there is no resource but to represent the items in accessible form just as we study the various articles constituting one science.
This universe is a living thing capable of including every form of life; but its Being and its modes are derived from elsewhere; that source is traced back to the Intellectual-Principle: it follows that the all-embracing archetype is in the Intellectual-Principle, which, therefore, must be an intellectual Kosmos, that indicated by Plato in the phrase "The living existent."
Given the Reason-Principle [the outgoing divine Idea] of a certain living thing and the Matter to harbour this seed-principle, the living thing must come into being: in the same way once there exists - an intellective Nature, all powerful, and with nothing to check it - since nothing intervenes between it and that which is of a nature to receive it - inevitably the higher imprints form and the lower accepts, it. The recipient holds the Idea in division, here man, there sun, while in the giver all remains in unity.
Ver online : Plotino
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- Plotino - Tratado 5,5 (V, 9, 5) — Que pensa o Intelecto?
- Plotino - Tratado 5,6 (V, 9, 6) — O Intelecto e as coisas que são
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- Plotino - Tratado 5,10 (V, 9, 10) — As Formas e o mundo inteligível
- Plotino - Tratado 5,11 (V, 9, 11) — Há Formas dos produtos da técnica?
- Plotino - Tratado 5,12 (V, 9, 12) — Há Formas dos indivíduos?
- Plotino - Tratado 5,13 (V, 9, 13) — Há Formas de coisas que não se encontram no sensível?
- Plotino - Tratado 5,14 (V, 9, 14) — Há Formas das coisas sem valor e compostos acidentais?