Página inicial > Antiguidade > Neoplatonismo > Plotino (séc. III) > Enéada V > Enéada V, 9 (5) > Plotino - Tratado 5,4 (V, 9, 4) — O Intelecto é superior à Alma

Plotino - Tratado 5,4 (V, 9, 4) — O Intelecto é superior à Alma

quarta-feira 15 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

  

Míguez

4. ¿Por qué, pues, hemos de ascender sobre el alma, dejando de considerarla como el término primero? En primer lugar, la Inteligencia es diferente del alma y superior a ella, y, por naturaleza, lo superior es el término primero. Porque no es verdad, como creen algunos, que el alma engendra la Inteligencia, una vez llegada a su perfección. ¿Cómo, entonces, un ser en potencia podría estar en acto, si no existe causa alguna que le lleve al acto? Porque, sí lo fiamos al azar, sería también posible que no pasase al acto. Conviene admitir, por tanto, que los seres primeros están en acto y que no sólo se bastan a sí mismos sino que son perfectos. Los seres imperfectos son posteriores a ellos y reciben su perfección de los mismos seres que los generan, como de padres que llevan a su estado perfecto a unos hijos que han nacido imperfectos. Son, de este modo, una materia con relación al ser primero que los ha creado, materia que, al recibir la forma, culmina en un ser perfecto. Si, pues, el alma está sujeta a las pasiones, debe haber algo que sea impasible, ya que, en otro caso, todo perecería con el tiempo. Conviene por consiguiente, que exista algo anterior al alma. Como, de otra parte, el alma se encuentra en el mundo y hemos de admitir que existe algo que está fuera del mundo, se sigue también de aquí que debe existir algo anterior al alma. Porque, si lo que se encuentra en el mundo está en un cuerpo y en una materia, nada permanece como idéntico a sí mismo, de tal modo que ni el hombre ni las razones seminales serán eternos e idénticos a sí mismos. Se advierte, pues, por estos y muchos otros argumentos que la Inteligencia debe ser anterior al alma.

Bouillet

IV. Pourquoi, arrivés à l’Ame, ne nous y arrêtons-nous pas et ne la regardons-nous pas comme le premier principe? C’est que l’Intelligence est une puissance différente de l’Ame et meilleure qu’elle ; or, ce qui est meilleur est antérieur par sa nature. Qu’on ne croie pas, comme le font quelques-uns (18), que ce soit l’Ame qui, arrivée à son état de perfection, engendre l’Intelligence. Comment ce qui est en puissance pourra-t-il être en acte, s’il n’y a un principe qui le fasse passer de la puissance à l’acte ? Car si ce passage s’opérait par hasard, il pourrait ne pas avoir lieu. Il faut donc accorder le premier rang à ce qui est en acte, qui n’a besoin de rien, qui est parfait, et placer au second rangles choses imparfaites. Celles-ci sont rendues parfaites par les principes qui les ont engendrées, lesquels remplissent à leur égard un rôle paternel, en rendant parfait ce que dans l’origine ils avaient engendré imparfait. Ce qui est ainsi engendré est matière par rapport au principe créateur, puis devient parfait en recevant de lui la forme. D’ailleurs, l’Ame subit la passion ; or il faut qu’il y ait quelque chose d’impassible, sans quoi tout serait dissous par le temps; il doit donc y avoir un principe antérieur à l’Ame. Ensuite, l’Ame est dans le monde ; or, il doit y avoir quelque chose qui demeure hors du monde, qui soit par conséquent supérieur à l’Ame : car, puisque ce qui est dans le monde est dans le corps, dans la matière, s’il n’y avait rien hors du monde, rien ne resterait permanent; dans ce cas, la raison [séminale] de l’homme et toutes les autres raisons ne sauraient être éternelles, ni permanentes. Des considérations précédentes, auxquelles on pourrait en joindre beaucoup d’autres, il résulte qu’il est nécessaire d’admettre qu’au-dessus de l’Ame existe l’Intelligence.

Guthrie

WHY OUR ASCENT CANNOT STOP WITH THE SOUL.

4. Why should we not, on arriving at the Soul, stop there, and consider her the first principle? Because Intelligence is a power different from the Soul, and better than the Soul; and what is better must, by its very nature, precede (the worst). The Stoics are wrong in thinking that it is the Soul which, on reaching her perfection, begets Intelligence. How could that which is potential pass into actualization unless there were some principle that effected that transition? If this transition were due to chance, it could not have occurred at all. The first rank must therefore be assigned to that which is in actualization, which needs nothing, which is perfect, while imperfect things must be assigned to the second rank. These may be perfected by the principles that begot them, which, in respect to them, play a paternal part, perfecting what they had originally produced that was imperfect. What is thus produced is matter, as regards the creating principle, and then becomes perfect, on receiving its form from it. Besides, the Soul is (often) affected; and we need to discover some thing that is impassible, without which everything is dissolved by time; therefore there is need of some principle prior to the soul. Further, the Soul is in the world; now there must be something that resides outside of the world, and which consequently would be superior to the Soul; for since that which inheres in the world resides within the body, or matter, if nothing existed outside of the world, nothing would remain permanent. In this case, the (seminal) reason of man, and all the other reasons could be neither permanent nor eternal. The result of all these considerations, as well as of many others that we could add thereto, is the necessary assertion of the existence of Intelligence beyond the Soul.

Taylor

IV. Why, therefore, is it necessary to ascend to soul, and yet not admit that it is the first of things ? Is it not because in the first place, indeed, intellect is different from, and more excellent than soul? But that which is more excellent is prior by nature. For soul when perfect, does not, as some fancy it does, generate intellect. For whence will that which is in capacity become in energy, unless there is a cause which leads into energy? Since if it becomes in energy casually, it is possible that it may not proceed into energy. Hence, it is necessary that first natures should be established in energy, and that they should be unindigent and perfect. But imperfect natures are posterior to them. The progeny also of imperfect, are perfected by first natures, who after the manner of fathers give perfection to what posterior natures generated imperfect from the beginning. That, likewise, which is generated, has at first the relation of matter to the maker of it, but is afterwards rendered perfect by the participation of form. But if it is necessary that soul should be connected with passion, and if it is likewise necessary that there should be something impassive, or all things would perish in time; it is necessary that there should be something prior to soul. And, if soul is in the world, but it is necessary there should be something beyond the world, on this account also it is necessary that there should be something prior to soul. For if that which is in the world, is in body and matter, nothing would remain the same [if that which is mundane only existed]. So that man, and all productive principles, would not be perpetual, nor always the same. Hence, that it is necessary intellect should be prior to soul, may be surveyed from these and many other arguments.

MacKenna

4. But, soul reached, why need we look higher; why not make this The First?

A main reason is that the Intellectual-Principle is at once something other and something more powerful than Soul and that the more powerful is in the nature of things the prior. For it is certainly not true, as people imagine, that the soul, brought to perfection, produces Intellect. How could that potentiality come to actuality unless there be, first, an effective principle to induce the actualization which, left to chance, might never occur?

The Firsts must be supposed to exist in actuality, looking to nothing else, self-complete. Anything incomplete must be sequent upon these, and take its completion from the principles engendering it which, like fathers, labour in the improvement of an offspring born imperfect: the produced is a Matter to the producing principle and is worked over by it into a shapely perfection.

And if, further, soul is passible while something impassible there must be or by the mere passage of time all wears away, here too we are led to something above soul.

Again there must be something prior to Soul because Soul is in the world and there must be something outside a world in which, all being corporeal and material, nothing has enduring reality: failing such a prior, neither man nor the Ideas would be eternal or have true identity.

These and many other considerations establish the necessary existence of an Intellectual-Principle prior to Soul.


Ver online : Plotino