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Plotino - Tratado 5,8 (V, 9, 8) — O Intelecto e as Formas
quarta-feira 15 de junho de 2022, por
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8. Si, pues, el pensamiento es pensamiento de algo interior, este objeto interior será una forma y la idea misma. ¿Qué es entonces la idea? Sin duda, una inteligencia y una sustancia intelectual; de modo que cada idea no es algo que difiera de la Inteligencia, sino que es una inteligencia. La Inteligencia total comprende, por tanto, todas las ideas, y cada una de éstas es a su vez cada una de las inteligencias. De igual manera, la ciencia total comprende todos los teoremas, y cada uno de éstos es una parte de la ciencia total, pero no una parte separada localmente de las otras, sino una parte que, en todo, tiene su fuerza particular. Esta Inteligencia está en sí misma y se posee a sí misma, eternamente saciada en su quietud. Si nos imaginásemos la Inteligencia como anterior al ser, tendríamos que decir que realiza y engendra los seres con su acción y su pensamiento. Pero puesto que, necesariamente, hemos de imaginarnos al ser como anterior a la Inteligencia, tendremos que admitir también que los seres se encuentran en el pensamiento y que el acto y el pensamiento están tan cerca de los seres como lo está el acto del fuego del fuego mismo, a fin de que, en el interior de sí mismos, tengan a su lado a la Inteligencia como su acto propio. Pero el ser es igualmente un acto. Por tanto, el acto de la Inteligencia y el acto del ser son un acto único, y mejor aun la Inteligencia y el ser son una y la misma cosa.
Así, pues, el ser y la Inteligencia son una naturaleza única; por lo cual lo son también no sólo los seres sino el acto del ser y la Inteligencia. En tal sentido, los pensamientos, la idea, la forma del ser y su acto constituyen asimismo una naturaleza única, porque, ciertamente, somos nosotros los que los Imaginamos separados y colocados los unos delante de los otros. Una cosa es, por tanto, la inteligencia que divide y otra muy distinta la Inteligencia indivisible, que no divide el ser ni los seres todos.
Bouillet
VIII. Puisque la pensée (νόησις) est une chose essentiellement une (29), la forme (εἶδος), qui est l’objet de la pensée, et l’idée (ἴδεα), sont une seule et même chose. Quelle est cette chose? l’intelligence et l’essence intellectuelle : car aucune idée n’est étrangère à l’intelligence; chaque forme est intelligence, et l’Intelligence tout entière est toutes les formes ; chaque forme particulière est une intelligence particulière. De même la science, prise dans sa totalité, est toutes les notions qu’elle embrasse ; chaque notion est une partie de la science totale; elle n’en est point séparée localement, et elle existe en puissance dans le tout (30). L’Intelligence demeure en elle-même, et, en se possédant tranquillement elle-même, elle est la plénitude éternelle de toutes choses. Si on la concevait antérieure à l’Être, il faudrait dire que c’est son action, sa pensée qui a produit et engendré les êtres. Mais, comme il faut au contraire admettre que l’Être est antérieur à l’Intelligence, on doit, dans le principe pensant, concevoir d’abord les êtres, ensuite l’acte et la pensée, comme à l’essence du feu vient se joindre l’acte du feu, en sorte que les êtres ont l’intelligence innée (31) comme leur acte. Or l’être est un acte; donc l’être et l’intelligence sont un seul acte, ou plutôt tous deux ne font qu’un (32). Ils ne forment par conséquent qu’une seule nature, comme les êtres, l’acte de l’être et l’intelligence ; dans ce cas, la pensée est l’idée (εἶδος), la forme (μορφή), l’acte de l’être. En séparant par la pensée l’être et l’intelligence, nous concevons un des principes comme antérieur à l’autre. L’intelligence qui opère cette séparation est en effet différente de l’être dont elle se sépare (33); mais l’Intelligence qui est inséparable de l’Être et qui ne sépare pas de l’être la pensée est l’être même est toutes choses.
Guthrie
THOUGHT IS THE FORM, SHAPE THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE BEING.
8. Since the thought is something essentially one (?), the form, which is the object of thought, and the idea are one and the same thing. Which is this thing? Intelligence and the intellectual "being," for no idea is foreign to intelligence; each form is intelligence, and the whole intelligence is all the forms; every particular form is a particular intelligence. Likewise science, taken in its totality, is all the notions it embraces; every notion is a part of the total science; it is not separated from the science locally, and exists potentially in the whole science. Intelligence resides within itself, and by possessing itself calmly, is the eternal fulness of all things. If we conceived it as being prior to essence, we would have to say that it was the action and thought of Intelligence which produced and begot all beings. But as, on the contrary, it is certain that essence is prior to Intelligence, we should, within the thinking principle, first conceive the beings, then actualization and thought, just as (the nature) of fire is joined by the actualization of the fire, so that beings have innate intelligence as their actualization. Now essence is an actualization; therefore essence and intelligence are but a single actualization, or rather both of them fuse. Consequently, they form but a single nature, as beings, the actualization of essence, and intelligence. In this case the thought is the form, and the shape is the actualization of the being. When, however, in thought we separate essence from Intelligence, we must conceive one of these principles as prior to the other. The Intelligence which operates this separation is indeed different from the essence from which it separates; but the Intelligence which is inseparable from essence and which does not separate thought from essence is itself essence and all things.
Taylor
VIII. If, therefore, intelligence is truly one, that form which is the object of its perception and idea itself are one. What therefore is this ? Intellect and an intellectual essence, each idea not being different from intellect, but each is intellect. And, in short, intellect is all forms; but each form is each intellect; just as the science which ranks as a whole is all the theorems [of the several sciences] Each theorem, however, is a part of whole science, not as separated by place ; but each possesses power in the whole. This intellect, therefore, is in itself, and possesses itself in quiet, being always exuberantly full. Hence, if intellect were conceived to subsist prior to being, it would be requisite to say that intellect, by energizing and intellectually perceiving, generated and perfected beings. But since it is necessary to conceive being to be prior to intellect, it is requisite to admit that beings are established in that which is intellective, but that energy and intelligence are posterior to beings; just as the energy of fire is posterior to fire. Hence, since beings are established in intellect, they possess in themselves their own energy. Being, likewise, is energy; or rather, both are one. Hence, too, both being and intellect are one nature; and on this account also, beings, the energy of being, and an intellect of this kind, are one. Such intellections, also, are form, and the morphe and energy of being. In consequence, however, of these being divided by us, we conceive some of them to be prior to others. For the intellect which makes this division, is different from them. But impartible intellect and which does not divide, is being and all things.
MacKenna
8. If, then, the Intellection is an act upon the inner content [of a perfect unity], that content is at once the Idea [as object: eidos] and the Idea itself [as concept: idea].
What, then, is that content?
An Intellectual-Principle and an Intellective Essence, no concept distinguishable from the Intellectual-Principle, each actually being that Principle. The Intellectual-Principle entire is the total of the Ideas, and each of them is the [entire] Intellectual-Principle in a special form. Thus a science entire is the total of the relevant considerations each of which, again, is a member of the entire science, a member not distinct in space yet having its individual efficacy in a total.
This Intellectual-Principle, therefore, is a unity while by that possession of itself it is, tranquilly, the eternal abundance.
If the Intellectual-Principle were envisaged as preceding Being, it would at once become a principle whose expression, its intellectual Act, achieves and engenders the Beings: but, since we are compelled to think of existence as preceding that which knows it, we can but think that the Beings are the actual content of the knowing principle and that the very act, the intellection, is inherent to the Beings, as fire stands equipped from the beginning with fire-act; in this conception, the Beings contain the Intellectual-Principle as one and the same with themselves, as their own activity. Thus, Being is itself an activity: there is one activity, then, in both or, rather, both are one thing.
Being, therefore, and the Intellectual-Principle are one Nature: the Beings, and the Act of that which is, and the Intellectual-Principle thus constituted, all are one: and the resultant Intellections are the Idea of Being and its shape and its act.
It is our separating habit that sets the one order before the other: for there is a separating intellect, of another order than the true, distinct from the intellect, inseparable and unseparating, which is Being and the universe of things.
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