Plotino - Tratado 2,2 (IV,7,2) - Se a alma é incorpórea, devemos estudar a incorporalidade

2. Qual é então a natureza [physin] que possui esta parte?

Se é um corpo [soma], ela deve ser inteiramente decomponível, pois todo corpo é um composto [syntheton]. E se ela não é um corpo, mas de uma outra natureza [physeos], deve-se examiná-la da mesma maneira ou de uma outra. O que é preciso examinar em primeiro lugar, é em que se divide este corpo que se chama "alma" [psyche] [segundo a Stoa]. Posto que a vida [zoe] está necessariamente na alma e que este corpo, a alma, é composto de dois corpos ou mais, então é necessário que cada um destes dois corpos ou de todos estes corpos tenham uma vida de mesma natureza, ou que um a possua ou o outro não, ainda que cada um dos dois ou que cada um de todos não a possua. Se se supõe que a vida é a propriedade de um dentre eles, é este último que será ele mesmo a alma.

Mas qual é o corpo que possui a vida por ele mesmo? [Fedro 245c-246a]

Por eles mesmos, o fogo [pyr], o ar [aer], água [hydor] são com efeito inanimados [apsycha]. E quando a alma está presente em não importa qual dentre eles, ele não recebe então a vida senão por procuração; ora, de fato não existe outro corpo que aqueles que se enumeraram. E aqueles que pensam que existe outros elementos [stoicheia] que aqueles mantiveram que se tratava de corpo, não de almas, e que não possuíam a vida. Ora, se nenhum dentre eles não possui a vida, é absurdo de supor que sua composição a produziu; e se cada um a possuía, um só aí bastaria. Melhor ainda, é impossível que a composição de corpo produza a vida e que coisas desprovidas de intelecto engendrem o Intelecto [noûs]. Eles não dirão além do mais que estes corpos são misturados de não importa que maneira. E por outro lado, é necessário colocar um elemento ordenador [taxis] e uma causa de mistura [krasis], de sorte que esta causa [aition] terá nível de alma. E isso não porque o corpo é composto, pois mesmo um corpo simples não poderia ter existência se a alma não estivesse no universo (se todavia é verdade que, o que produz um corpo, é a vinda de uma razão [logos] na matéria [hyle], e que uma razão não pode vir de alhures senão de uma alma).

2. Pero, ¿qué naturaleza tiene el alma? Si es un cuerpo, podrá descomponerse en su totalidad, porque todo cuerpo es compuesto. Si no es un cuerpo, y sí algo de naturaleza distinta, convendrá examinar esta naturaleza de la misma manera o de alguna otra.

Más, ante todo, deberá considerarse en qué puede descomponerse ese cuerpo al que llamamos alma. Porque, como la vida pertenece necesariamente al alma, si ese cuerpo que es el alma está compuesto de dos o más, o bien cada uno de ellos tiene una vida que le es connatural, o bien — en el caso de que sean dos — uno la posee y el otro no, o incluso no la posee ninguno de ellos. Si la vida pertenece a uno de los dos, ese cuerpo será precisamente el alma. Pero, ¿qué podría ser realmente un cuerpo que tiene la vida por sí mismo? Porque tanto el fuego, como el aire o la tierra son por sí mismos seres inanimados, con lo cual si el alma asienta en alguno de estos seres, la vida de la que cada uno disponga le resultará siempre algo extraño. Ahora bien, no hay otros cuerpos más que los citados, y si para algunos existen otros elementos, no los considerarán como almas, sino como cuerpos, y como cuerpos que carecen de vida. Pero si ninguno de ellos posee la vida, absurdo sería decir que su encuentro la produce. Porque si cada uno de ellos la poseyese, tendríamos ya suficiente con un cuerpo. Además, mucho más difícil sería que una reunión de cuerpos produjese la vida y que seres sin inteligencia engendrasen la inteligencia. Podría argüirse, sin duda, que no se trata aquí de una mezcla de escaso valor. Pero convendría presuponer entonces un ordenador y una causa de esta mezcla, la cual tendría la consideración de alma. Porque es claro que no podría existir ningún cuerpo compuesto, e incluso ningún cuerpo simple, si no existe a la vez el alma universal, siendo como es la razón que se incorpora a la materia la encargada de producir un cuerpo. Y una razón, ya es sabido, no proviene de otra cosa que de un alma.

IF THE SOUL IS INCORPOREAL, WE MUST STUDY INCORPOREALITY.

2. What then is the nature of the soul ? If she is a body, she can be decomposed, as every body is a composite. If, on the contrary, she is not a body, if hers is a different nature, the latter must be examined; either in the same way that we have examined the body, or in some other way.

A. — THE SOUL IS NOT CORPOREAL (AS THE STOICS THOUGHT).

(a.) (Neither a material molecule, nor a material aggregation of material atoms could possess life and intelligence.) First, let us consider the nature of this alleged soul-body. As every soul necessarily possesses life, and as the body, considered as being the soul, must obtain at least two molecules, if not more (there are three possibilities): either only one of them possesses life, or all of them possess it, or none of them. If one molecule alone possesses life, it alone will be the soul. Of what nature will be that molecule supposed to possess life by itself? Will it be water (Hippo), air (Anaximenes, Archelaus, and Diogenes), earth, or fire (Heraclitus  , Stobaeus?) But those are elements that are inanimate by themselves, and which, even when they are animated, possess but a borrowed life. Still there is no other kind of body. Even those (philosophers, like the Pythagoreans) who posited elements other (than water, air, earth and fire) still considered them to be bodies, and not souls, not even attributing souls to them. The theory that life results from the union of molecules of which, nevertheless, none by itself possesses life, is an absurd hypothesis. If further any molecule possesses life, then a single one would be sufficient.

NEITHER MIXTURE NOR ITS PRINCIPLE WILL EXPLAIN LIFE AS A BODY.

The most irrational theory of all is that an aggregation of molecules should produce life, that elements without intelligence should beget intelligence. Others (like Alexander of Aphrodisia) insist that to produce life these elements must be mingled in a certain manner. That would, however, imply (as thought Galien and Hippocrates) the existence of a principle which produces order, and which should be the cause of mixture or, temperament (Eneada-II, 7, 1), and that should alone deserve being considered as soul. No simple bodies could exist, much less composite bodies, unless there was a soul in the universe; for it is (seminal) reason which, in adding itself to matter, produces body (Eneada-II, 7, 3). But surely a (seminal) reason could proceed from nowhere except a soul.

2. But of what nature is this sovereign principle?

If material, then definitely it must fall apart; for every material entity, at least, is something put together.

If it is not material but belongs to some other Kind, that new substance must be investigated in the same way or by some more suitable method.

But our first need is to discover into what this material form, since such the soul is to be, can dissolve.

Now: of necessity life is inherent to soul: this material entity, then, which we call soul must have life ingrained within it; but [being a composite as by hypothesis, material] it must be made up of two or more bodies; that life, then, will be vested, either in each and all of those bodies or in one of them to the exclusion of the other or others; if this be not so, then there is no life present anywhere.

If any one of them contains this ingrained life, that one is the soul. But what sort of an entity have we there; what is this body which of its own nature possesses soul?

Fire, air, water, earth, are in themselves soulless - whenever soul is in any of them, that life is borrowed - and there are no other forms of body than these four: even the school that believes there are has always held them to be bodies, not souls, and to be without life.

None of these, then, having life, it would be extraordinary if life came about by bringing them together; it is impossible, in fact, that the collocation of material entities should produce life, or mindless entities mind.

No one, moreover, would pretend that a mere chance mixing could give such results: some regulating principle would be necessary, some Cause directing the admixture: that guiding principle would be - soul.

Body - not merely because it is a composite, but even were it simplex - could not exist unless there were soul in the universe, for body owes its being to the entrance of a Reason-Principle into Matter, and only from soul can a Reason-Principle come.

II. What, therefore, is the nature of this thing [soul] ? If indeed it is a body, it is in every respect capable of being analyzed. For every body is a composite. But if it is not a body, but of another nature, that also must be considered either after the same, or after another manner. In the first place, however, it must be considered into what body this body which they call soul ought to be analyzed. For since life is necessarily present with soul, it is also necessary that this body which is supposed to be soul, if it consists of two or more bodies, should have a connascent life in both, or in each of them ; or that one of these should have life, but the other not, or that neither should be vital. If, therefore, life is present with one of them only, this very thing will be soul. Hence, what body will this be which has life from itself ? For fire, air, water and earth, are of themselves inanimate; and with whichever of these soul is present, the life which it uses is adventitious. There are not, however, any other bodies besides these. And those to whom it appears that there are other bodies the elements of these, do not assert that they are souls, or that they have life. But if it should be said, that though no one of these bodies possesses life, yet the congress of them produces life, he who says this would speak absurdly. And if each of them has life, one will be sufficient. Or rather, it is impossible that a coacervation of bodies should produce life, and things void of intellect generate intellect. Moreover, neither will these, in whatever manner they may say they are mixed, generate either intellect or soul. Hence, it is necessary there should be that which arranges, and which is the cause of the mixture; so that this will have the order of soul. For that which is compounded will not be that which arranges and produces the mixture. But neither will there be a simple body in the series of things, without the existence of soul in the universe ; if reason [or a productive principle] acceding to matter, produces body. For reason cannot proceed from any thing else than from soul.