2. The born lover, to whose degree the musician also may attain and then either come to a stand or pass beyond has a certain memory of beauty but, severed from it now, he no longer comprehends it: spellbound by visible loveliness he clings amazed about that. His lesson must be to fall down no longer in bewildered delight before some, one embodied form; he must be led, under a system of mental discipline, to beauty everywhere and made to discern THE ONE Principle underlying all, a Principle (…)
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MacKenna / Stephen MacKenna
Matérias
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MacKenna-Plotinus: the One
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro -
MacKenna-Plotinus: faith
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThis natural tendency must be made the starting-point to such a man; he must be drawn by the tone, rhythm and design in things of sense: he must learn to distinguish the material forms from the Authentic-Existent which is the source of all these correspondences and of the entire reasoned scheme in the work of art: he must be led to the Beauty that manifests itself through these forms; he must be shown that what ravished him was no other than the Harmony of the Intellectual world and the (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads V,9
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 5 Fifth Ennead. Ninth tractate. The intellectual-principle, the ideas, and the authentic existence.
1. All human beings from birth onward live to the realm of sense more than to the Intellectual.
Forced of necessity to attend first to the material, some of them elect to abide by that order and, their life throughout, make its concerns their first and their last; the sweet and the bitter of sense are their good and evil; they feel they have done all if they live along pursuing (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: emanation
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroBut it has been observed that the Couplement, too especially before our emancipation is a member of this total We, and in fact what the body experiences we say We experience. This then covers two distinct notions; sometimes it includes the brute-part, sometimes it transcends the brute. The body is brute touched to life; the true man is the other, going pure of the body, natively endowed with the virtues which belong to the Intellectual-Activity, virtues whose seat is the Separate Soul, the (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: triad
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroSuccession or repetition gives us Number dyad, TRIAD, etc. and the extent traversed is a matter of Magnitude; thus we have Quantity of Movement in the form of number, dyad, TRIAD, decade, or in the form of extent apprehended in what we may call the amount of the Movement: but, the idea of Time we have not. That definite Quantity is merely something occurring within Time, for, otherwise Time is not everywhere but is something belonging to Movement which thus would be its substratum or (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads IV,3
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 27 Fourth Ennead. Third tractate. Problems of the soul (1).
1. The soul: what dubious questions concerning it admit of solution, or where we must abide our doubt - with, at least, the gain of recognizing the problem that confronts us - this is matter well worth attention. On what subject can we more reasonably expend the time required by minute discussion and investigation? Apart from much else, it is enough that such an enquiry illuminates two grave questions: of what sphere the (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads II,7
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 37 Second Ennead. Seventh tractate. On complete transfusion.
1. Some enquiry must be made into what is known as the complete transfusion of material substances.
Is it possible that fluid be blended with fluid in such a way that each penetrate the other through and through? or - a difference of no importance if any such penetration occurs - that one of them pass completely through the other?
Those that admit only contact need not detain us. They are dealing with mixture, not (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: belief
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe belief is that the planets in their courses actually produce not merely such conditions as poverty, wealth, health and sickness but even ugliness and beauty and, gravest of all, vices and virtue and the very acts that spring from these qualities, the definite doings of each moment of virtue or vice. We are to suppose the stars to be annoyed with men - and upon matters in which men, moulded to what they are by the stars themselves, can surely do them no wrong. 616 Enneads: II III. 1
The (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: aspirations
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroNone the less, in spite of physical resemblance and similar environment, we observe the greatest difference in temperament and in ideas: this side of the human being, then, derives from some quite other Principle [than any external causation or destiny]. A further confirmation is found in the efforts we make to correct both bodily constitution and mental aspirations. Enneads III,1,5
How then do we explain desire and other forms of aspiration? Aspiration must be a motion having its origin (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: hypostasis
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroFor what could be added to the fullest life to make it the best life? If anyone should answer, “The nature of Good” [The Good, as a Divine HYPOSTASIS], the reply would certainly be near our thought, but we are not seeking the Cause but the main constituent. Enneads I,4,3
In what substantial-form [HYPOSTASIS] then is all this to be found not as accident but as the very substance itself? For if Evil can enter into other things, it must have in a certain sense a prior existence, even though (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: principle
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroAnd this very examining principle, which investigates and decides in these matters, must be brought to light. Enneads I,1,
And the principle that reasons out these matters? Is it We or the Soul? We, but by the Soul. Enneads I,1,
Thus much to show that the principle that we attain Likeness by virtue in no way involves the existence of virtue in the Supreme. But we have not merely to make a formal demonstration: we must persuade as well as demonstrate. Enneads I,2,
There is the likeness (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads IV,5
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 29 Fourth Ennead. Fifth tractate. Problems of the soul (3). [also entitled "On sight"].
1. We undertook to discuss the question whether sight is possible in the absence of any intervening medium, such as air or some other form of what is known as transparent body: this is the time and place.
It has been explained that seeing and all sense-perception can occur only through the medium of some bodily substance, since in the absence of body the soul is utterly absorbed in the (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads V,2
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 11 Fifth Ennead. Second tractate. The origin and order of the beings. Following on the first.
1. The One is all things and no one of them; the source of all things is not all things; all things are its possession - running back, so to speak, to it - or, more correctly, not yet so, they will be.
But a universe from an unbroken unity, in which there appears no diversity, not even duality?
It is precisely because that is nothing within the One that all things are from it: in (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: soul (Enneads III)
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroAs for Things of Process or for Eternal Existents whose Act is not eternally invariable we must hold that these are due to Cause; Causelessness is quite inadmissible; we can make no place here for unwarranted “slantings,” for sudden movement of bodies apart from any initiating power, for precipitate spurts in a SOUL with nothing to drive it into the new course of action. Such causelessness would bind the SOUL under an even sterner compulsion, no longer master of itself, but at the mercy of (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Princípio-Intelectual
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThus it is not easy, without knowledge and the training of habit, to quiver with any very real rapture over the notion of becoming ‘wholly identified with the Intellectual-Principle’; when it is understood and at each moment deeply realized that ‘The Intellectual-Principle’ is the highest accessible ‘Person’ of the Godhead, is very God, is the Supreme Wisdom immanent within the human soul and yet ineffably superior to all the Universe besides, then perhaps we may feel the great call to the (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads I,7
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 54 First Ennead. Seventh tractate. On the primal good and secondary forms of good [otherwise, "On happiness"].
1. We can scarcely conceive that for any entity the Good can be other than the natural Act expressing its life-force, or in the case of an entity made up of parts the Act, appropriate, natural and complete, expressive of that in it which is best.
For the Soul, then, the Good is its own natural Act.
But the Soul itself is natively a "Best"; if, further, its act be (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads IV,6
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 41 Fourth Ennead. Sixth tractate. Perception and memory.
1. Perceptions are no imprints, we have said, are not to be thought of as seal-impressions on soul or mind: accepting this statement, there is one theory of memory which must be definitely rejected.
Memory is not to be explained as the retaining of information in virtue of the lingering of an impression which in fact was never made; the two things stand or fall together; either an impression is made upon the mind and (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads VI,2
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 43 Sixth Ennead. Second tractate. On the kinds of being (2).
1. We have examined the proposed "ten genera": we have discussed also the theory which gathers the total of things into one genus and to this subordinates what may be thought of as its four species. The next step is, naturally, to expound our own views and to try to show the agreement of our conclusions with those of Plato.
Now if we were obliged to consider Being as a unity, the following questions would be (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Princípio
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroNo; from the organized body and something else, let us say a light, which the Soul gives forth from itself, it forms a distinct Principle, the Animate; and in this Principle are vested Sense-Perception and all the other experiences found to belong to the Animate. Enneads I,1,
But does not Likeness by way of Virtue imply Likeness to some being that has Virtue? To what Divine Being, then, would our Likeness be? To the Being – must we not think? – in Which, above all, such excellence seems to (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads I,1
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 53 The First Ennead First tractate.
The animate and the man.
1. Pleasure and distress, fear and courage, desire and aversion, where have these affections and experiences their seat?
Clearly, either in the Soul alone, or in the Soul as employing the body, or in some third entity deriving from both. And for this third entity, again, there are two possible modes: it might be either a blend or a distinct form due to the blending.
And what applies to the affections applies also (…)