MacKenna / Stephen MacKenna

Matérias

• Plotino - Tratado 53,12 (I, 1, 12) — Isso que somos e isso que somos responsáveis (3)
  20 de fevereiro de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

  traduzindo MacKenna
  12. Mas se a Alma é sem pecado, como podem haver expiações? Aqui certamente há uma contradição; por um lado a Alma está acima de toda culpa; por outro, ouvimos de seu pecado, sua purificação, sua expiação; está condenada ao mundo inferior, passa de corpo em corpo.
  Podemos qualquer visão a vontade: elas são facilmente reconciliáveis.
  Quando falamos da Alma sem pecado, fazemos Alma e Alma-Essencial uma única coisa: é a simples Unidade indivisível.
  Por Alma sujeita (…)

• Plotino - Tratado 33,1 (II, 9, 1) — Só existem três realidades inteligíveis
  19 de janeiro de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

  Míguez
  1. Nos ha parecido que la naturaleza del Bien es simple y primitiva, porque todo lo que no es primitivo no es simple. Esta naturaleza nada contiene en sí misma y es algo uno que no se diferencia tampoco de lo que llamamos el Uno. Porque el Uno no es algo de lo que se diga a continuación que es uno, cosa que no se dice igualmente del Bien.
  Cuando hablemos del Uno o del Bien, conviene que pensemos en una misma naturaleza; si realmente afirmamos es una, nada en verdad le atribuimos, (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: perception
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  The faculty of perception in the Soul cannot act by the immediate grasping of sensible objects, but only by the discerning of impressions printed upon the Animate by sensation: these impressions are already Intelligibles while the outer sensation is a mere phantom of the other [of that in the Soul] which is nearer to Authentic-Existence as being an impassive reading of Ideal-Forms. Enneads I,1,
  When we have done evil it is because we have been worsted by our baser side – for a man is many (…)

• Plotino - Tratado 19,4 (I, 2, 4) — O efeito da purificação
  29 de janeiro de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

  nossa tradução
  da versão de MacKenna
  4. Chegamos, então, à questão se a Purificação é o todo desta qualidade humana, virtude, ou meramente a precursora a partir da qual segue a virtude? A virtude implica no estado de purificação alcançado ou o mero processo é suficiente para tal, a Virtude sendo algo de menor perfeição do que a pureza realizada que é praticamento o Termo?
  Ser purificado é ter purgado tudo de estranho: mas o Bem é algo mais.
  Assim antes da impureza entrar havia o Bem, (…)

• Plotino - Tratado 1,9 (I,6,9) - A alma torna-se integralmente luz
  18 de setembro de 2021, por Cardoso de Castro

  Baracat
  9. E o que vê essa visão interior? Recém-desperta, não pode ver completamente as coisas radiantes . É preciso, então, acostumar a própria alma a ver primeiro as belas ocupações; em seguida, as belas obras, não essas que as artes realizam, mas as dos chamados homens bons; depois, vê tu a alma dos que realizam as belas obras . Como verias o tipo de beleza que uma alma boa possui? Recolhe-te em ti mesmo e vê; e se ainda não te vires belo, como o escultor de uma estátua que deve (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads VI,6
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  Tractate 34 Sixth Ennead. Sixth tractate. On numbers.
  1. It is suggested that multiplicity is a falling away from The Unity, infinity being the complete departure, an innumerable multiplicity, and that this is why unlimit is an evil and we evil at the stage of multiplicity.
  A thing, in fact, becomes a manifold when, unable to remain self-centred, it flows outward and by that dissipation takes extension: utterly losing unity it becomes a manifold since there is nothing to bind part to (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Princípio do Todo
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  Principle of all

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Objeto Intelectual
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  It might be argued that the Intellectual-Principle is the Contemplator and therefore that the Living-Being contemplated is not the Intellectual-Principle but must be described as the Intellectual Object so that the Intellectual-Principle must possess the Ideal realm as something outside of itself. Enneads III,9,1
  No: even though the Intellectual-Principle and the Intellectual Object are distinct, they are not apart except for just that distinction. Enneads III,9,1
  Nothing in the (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Uno Princípio
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  The born lover, to whose degree the musician also may attain - and then either come to a stand or pass beyond - has a certain memory of beauty but, severed from it now, he no longer comprehends it: spellbound by visible loveliness he clings amazed about that. His lesson must be to fall down no longer in bewildered delight before some, one embodied form; he must be led, under a system of mental discipline, to beauty everywhere and made to discern the One Principle underlying all, a Principle (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: formlessness
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  Matter becomes mistress of what is manifested through it: it corrupts and destroys the incomer, it substitutes its own opposite character and kind, not in the sense of opposing, for example, concrete cold to concrete warmth, but by setting its own formlessness against the Form of heat, shapelessness to shape, excess and defect to the duly ordered. Thus, in sum, what enters into Matter ceases to belong to itself, comes to belong to Matter, just as, in the nourishment of living beings, what is (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: ideal forms
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  If sensation is apprehension by means of the soul’s employment of the body, intellection cannot be a similar use of the body or it would be identical with sensation. If then intellection is apprehension apart from body, much more must there be a distinction between the body and the intellective principle: sensation for objects of sense, intellection for the intellectual object. And even if this be rejected, it must still be admitted that there do exist intellections of intellectual objects (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: para o Bem
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  towards the Good

• MacKenna-Plotinus: nobler principle
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  Until these people light upon some nobler principle than any at which they still halt, they must be left where they are and where they choose to be, never understanding what the Good of Life is to those that can make it theirs, never knowing to what kind of beings it is accessible. Enneads I,4,
  Now it may be observed, first of all, that we cannot hold utterly cheap either the indeterminate, or even a Kind whose very idea implies absence of form, provided only that it offer itself to its (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: principle
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  And this very examining principle, which investigates and decides in these matters, must be brought to light. Enneads I,1,
  And the principle that reasons out these matters? Is it We or the Soul? We, but by the Soul. Enneads I,1,
  Thus much to show that the principle that we attain Likeness by virtue in no way involves the existence of virtue in the Supreme. But we have not merely to make a formal demonstration: we must persuade as well as demonstrate. Enneads I,2,
  There is the likeness (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads IV,5
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  Tractate 29 Fourth Ennead. Fifth tractate. Problems of the soul (3). [also entitled "On sight"].
  1. We undertook to discuss the question whether sight is possible in the absence of any intervening medium, such as air or some other form of what is known as transparent body: this is the time and place.
  It has been explained that seeing and all sense-perception can occur only through the medium of some bodily substance, since in the absence of body the soul is utterly absorbed in the (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: one principle
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  The born lover, to whose degree the musician also may attain – and then either come to a stand or pass beyond – has a certain memory of beauty but, severed from it now, he no longer comprehends it: spellbound by visible loveliness he clings amazed about that. His lesson must be to fall down no longer in bewildered delight before some, one embodied form; he must be led, under a system of mental discipline, to beauty everywhere and made to discern the One Principle underlying all, a Principle (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads I,7
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  Tractate 54 First Ennead. Seventh tractate. On the primal good and secondary forms of good [otherwise, "On happiness"].
  1. We can scarcely conceive that for any entity the Good can be other than the natural Act expressing its life-force, or in the case of an entity made up of parts the Act, appropriate, natural and complete, expressive of that in it which is best.
  For the Soul, then, the Good is its own natural Act.
  But the Soul itself is natively a "Best"; if, further, its act be (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: good or evil
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  But, to begin with, it is surely unsound to deny that good of life to animals only because they do not appear to man to be of great account. And as for plants, we need not necessarily allow to them what we accord to the other forms of life, since they have no feeling. It is true people might be found to declare prosperity possible to the very plants: they have life, and life may bring good or evil; the plants may thrive or wither, bear or be barren. Enneads I,4,1
  What, then, is the evil (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: animated body
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  But how do we explain likings and aversions? Sorrow, too, and anger and pleasure, desire and fear – are these not changes, affectings, present and stirring within the Soul? This question cannot be ignored. To deny that changes take place and are intensely felt is in sharp contradiction to obvious facts. But, while we recognize this, we must make very sure what it is that changes. To represent the Soul or Mind as being the seat of these emotions is not far removed from making it blush or turn (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Matter and Form
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  The same fact is clearly established by decay, a process implying a compound object; where there is decay there is a distinction between Matter and Form. Enneads II,4,6
  They must, therefore, consist of Matter and Form-Idea - Form for quality and shape, Matter for the base, indeterminate as being other than Idea. Enneads II,4,6
  This implies the distinction of Matter and Form in it - as there must be in all actual seeing - the Matter in this case being the Intelligibles which the (…)