MacKenna / Stephen MacKenna

Matérias

• Plotino - Tratado 20,3 (I, 3, 3) — O filósofo
  26 de março de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

  Tradução desde MacKenna
  3. O metafísico, equipado por este mesmo caráter, já voou e não como aqueles outros, em necessidade de desengajamento, incitado por si mesmo em direção ao supernal mas duvidando do caminho, necessita somente um guia. Ele deve ser apresentado, então e instruído, um voluntarioso peregrino por seu próprio temperamento, tudo exceto auto-dirigido.
  A Matemática, que como um estudante por natureza ele assimilará muito facilmente, será prescrita para treiná-lo a abstrair (…)

• Plotino - Tratado 14,1 (II, 2, 1) — O movimento do céu imita aquele do Intelecto
  17 de janeiro de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

  Míguez
  1. ¿Por qué se mueve (el cielo) con un movimiento circular? Porque imita a la inteligencia. ¿Y a quién corresponde este movimiento, al alma o al cuerpo? ¿Por qué? ¿Acaso porque el alma está en sí misma y porque procura con todo celo el acercarse a sí misma? ¿O porque está en si misma, pero no continuamente? ¿Consideramos que al moverse mueve consigo al cuerpo? Pero entonces convendría que alguna vez dejase de transportarlo, cesando en ese movimiento; y así, debiera hacer que las (…)

• Plotino - Tratado 37,1 (II, 7, 1) — Exame preliminar das aporias da mistura
  19 de janeiro de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

  Míguez
  1. Consideremos ahora lo que se llama la mezcla total de los cuerpos. Si se mezcla un líquido a otro líquido, ¿es posible que cada uno de ellos penetre totalmente a través del otro o que el primero lo haga a través del segundo? Ninguna de las dos soluciones ofrece diferencia apreciable.
  Dejemos aparte a quienes estiman la mezcla como una simple vecindad de partículas, lo cual sería, más que una mezcla, una verdadera reunión, dado que, en la mezcla, todo debe resultar homogéneo, y (…)

• Plotino - Tratado 27,30 (IV, 3, 30) — A memória depende da faculdade representativa (3)
  14 de janeiro de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

  Míguez
  30. Pero, ¿y qué decir del recuerdo de nuestros pensamientos? ¿Hay también una imagen de ellos? Si es verdad que una pequeña imagen acompaña todo pensamiento, su misma persistencia, que vendrá a ser como un reflejo del pensamiento, explicará el recuerdo del objeto conocido; en otro caso, tendríamos que buscar una nueva explicación.
  Tal vez sea precisamente la expresión verbal del pensamiento la que deba ser recibida en la imaginación. Porque el pensamiento es algo indivisible y si (…)

• Plotino - Tratado 48,1 (III, 3, 1) — As razões são o ato de uma alma total
  20 de janeiro de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

  Míguez
  1- ¿Qué hemos de pensar, por tanto, de estas cosas? Afirmaremos que la razón universal lo comprende todo, tanto los males como los bienes, pues unos y otros son partes de ella. Y no porque la razón los produzca, sino porque los tiene consigo. Las razones son el acto de un alma universal, y las partes (de estas razones) son el acto de las partes (de esta alma). Siendo así que esta alma única tiene partes, las razones también contarán con ellas e, igualmente, las obras de estas (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads VI,6
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  Tractate 34 Sixth Ennead. Sixth tractate. On numbers.
  1. It is suggested that multiplicity is a falling away from The Unity, infinity being the complete departure, an innumerable multiplicity, and that this is why unlimit is an evil and we evil at the stage of multiplicity.
  A thing, in fact, becomes a manifold when, unable to remain self-centred, it flows outward and by that dissipation takes extension: utterly losing unity it becomes a manifold since there is nothing to bind part to (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Princípio do Todo
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  Principle of all

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Objeto Intelectual
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  It might be argued that the Intellectual-Principle is the Contemplator and therefore that the Living-Being contemplated is not the Intellectual-Principle but must be described as the Intellectual Object so that the Intellectual-Principle must possess the Ideal realm as something outside of itself. Enneads III,9,1
  No: even though the Intellectual-Principle and the Intellectual Object are distinct, they are not apart except for just that distinction. Enneads III,9,1
  Nothing in the (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Uno Princípio
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  The born lover, to whose degree the musician also may attain - and then either come to a stand or pass beyond - has a certain memory of beauty but, severed from it now, he no longer comprehends it: spellbound by visible loveliness he clings amazed about that. His lesson must be to fall down no longer in bewildered delight before some, one embodied form; he must be led, under a system of mental discipline, to beauty everywhere and made to discern the One Principle underlying all, a Principle (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: formlessness
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  Matter becomes mistress of what is manifested through it: it corrupts and destroys the incomer, it substitutes its own opposite character and kind, not in the sense of opposing, for example, concrete cold to concrete warmth, but by setting its own formlessness against the Form of heat, shapelessness to shape, excess and defect to the duly ordered. Thus, in sum, what enters into Matter ceases to belong to itself, comes to belong to Matter, just as, in the nourishment of living beings, what is (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: ideal forms
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  If sensation is apprehension by means of the soul’s employment of the body, intellection cannot be a similar use of the body or it would be identical with sensation. If then intellection is apprehension apart from body, much more must there be a distinction between the body and the intellective principle: sensation for objects of sense, intellection for the intellectual object. And even if this be rejected, it must still be admitted that there do exist intellections of intellectual objects (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: para o Bem
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  towards the Good

• MacKenna-Plotinus: nobler principle
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  Until these people light upon some nobler principle than any at which they still halt, they must be left where they are and where they choose to be, never understanding what the Good of Life is to those that can make it theirs, never knowing to what kind of beings it is accessible. Enneads I,4,
  Now it may be observed, first of all, that we cannot hold utterly cheap either the indeterminate, or even a Kind whose very idea implies absence of form, provided only that it offer itself to its (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: principle
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  And this very examining principle, which investigates and decides in these matters, must be brought to light. Enneads I,1,
  And the principle that reasons out these matters? Is it We or the Soul? We, but by the Soul. Enneads I,1,
  Thus much to show that the principle that we attain Likeness by virtue in no way involves the existence of virtue in the Supreme. But we have not merely to make a formal demonstration: we must persuade as well as demonstrate. Enneads I,2,
  There is the likeness (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads IV,5
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  Tractate 29 Fourth Ennead. Fifth tractate. Problems of the soul (3). [also entitled "On sight"].
  1. We undertook to discuss the question whether sight is possible in the absence of any intervening medium, such as air or some other form of what is known as transparent body: this is the time and place.
  It has been explained that seeing and all sense-perception can occur only through the medium of some bodily substance, since in the absence of body the soul is utterly absorbed in the (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: one principle
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  The born lover, to whose degree the musician also may attain – and then either come to a stand or pass beyond – has a certain memory of beauty but, severed from it now, he no longer comprehends it: spellbound by visible loveliness he clings amazed about that. His lesson must be to fall down no longer in bewildered delight before some, one embodied form; he must be led, under a system of mental discipline, to beauty everywhere and made to discern the One Principle underlying all, a Principle (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads I,7
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  Tractate 54 First Ennead. Seventh tractate. On the primal good and secondary forms of good [otherwise, "On happiness"].
  1. We can scarcely conceive that for any entity the Good can be other than the natural Act expressing its life-force, or in the case of an entity made up of parts the Act, appropriate, natural and complete, expressive of that in it which is best.
  For the Soul, then, the Good is its own natural Act.
  But the Soul itself is natively a "Best"; if, further, its act be (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: good or evil
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  But, to begin with, it is surely unsound to deny that good of life to animals only because they do not appear to man to be of great account. And as for plants, we need not necessarily allow to them what we accord to the other forms of life, since they have no feeling. It is true people might be found to declare prosperity possible to the very plants: they have life, and life may bring good or evil; the plants may thrive or wither, bear or be barren. Enneads I,4,1
  What, then, is the evil (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: animated body
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  But how do we explain likings and aversions? Sorrow, too, and anger and pleasure, desire and fear – are these not changes, affectings, present and stirring within the Soul? This question cannot be ignored. To deny that changes take place and are intensely felt is in sharp contradiction to obvious facts. But, while we recognize this, we must make very sure what it is that changes. To represent the Soul or Mind as being the seat of these emotions is not far removed from making it blush or turn (…)

• MacKenna-Plotinus: Matter and Form
  1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro

  The same fact is clearly established by decay, a process implying a compound object; where there is decay there is a distinction between Matter and Form. Enneads II,4,6
  They must, therefore, consist of Matter and Form-Idea - Form for quality and shape, Matter for the base, indeterminate as being other than Idea. Enneads II,4,6
  This implies the distinction of Matter and Form in it - as there must be in all actual seeing - the Matter in this case being the Intelligibles which the (…)