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Plotino - Tratado 2,1 (IV,7,1) - somos inteira ou parcialmente imortais?

quinta-feira 30 de dezembro de 2021, por Cardoso de Castro

  

tradução

1. Se cada um de nós é imortal ou se é inteiramente destruído, ou ainda se algumas de suas partes vão à dispersão e à destruição, enquanto outras, que são estas que somos nós mesmos, subsistem sempre, eis o que se pode descobrir em examinando a coisa conforme à natureza. Certamente, o homem não poderia ser algo de simples: há nele uma alma, e também um corpo, que seja nosso instrumento ou que se seja ligado a nós de outra maneira. De qualquer forma que seja, aceitamos fazer uma tal distinção e observamos isto que são a natureza e a realidade de cada um dos dois termos. Tratando-se do corpo, é claro que sendo ele mesmo composto não poderia razoavelmente ter o poder de perdurar: além do mais, a sensação testemunha que ele se divide e se dispersa, e que ele é passível de todas as espécies de destruições enquanto cada um de seus elementos constitutivos se move para o lugar que lhe é próprio, destruindo um outro, se transformando em um outro ou o rechaçando, sobretudo quando a alma que os reúne, não está mais presente em sua massa [ógkos]. E mesmo quando cada elemento se isola e se unifica, ele não é um [hen], posto que ele é suscetível de se dividir em uma forma e em uma matéria, que são os constituintes necessários donde mesmo os corpos simples são originários. E é preciso ainda adicionar, posto que são corpos, que eles possuem uma grandeza, que eles são divisíveis, que eles podem ser reduzidos em elementos menores e ser assim submetidos à destruição. Desta maneira, se o corpo é uma parte de nós mesmos, nós não somos inteiramente imortais. E se se trata de um instrumento que nos foi confiado por um certo tempo, deve por natureza existir somente esta duração de tempo. Mas a parte mais importante de nós, é o homem ele mesmo, se é verdade que esta parte deve ter a respeito do corpo o estatuto que é aquele da forma em relação à matéria, ou ainda aquele do usuário em relação ao instrumento; nos dois casos de figura, a alma é o si [hautós].

Míguez

1. ¿Cada uno de nosotros es inmortal o, por el contrario, perece enteramente? ¿Son únicamente algunas partes de nosotros las que se dispersan y destruyen, mientras otras — aquellas que verdaderamente nos constituyen a nosotros mismos — subsisten por toda la eternidad? He aquí algo que hemos de aprender, si verificamos la investigación de acuerdo con la naturaleza.

El hombre no es, en modo alguno, un ser simple, sino que hay en él un alma e, igualmente, un cuerpo, ya sea éste un instrumento del alma, ya se refiera a ella de cualquier otro modo. Si damos por buena esta división, hemos de considerar entonces la naturaleza y la esencia del alma y del cuerpo. En cuanto al cuerpo, decimos que es algo compuesto, porque según la razón no puede subsistir, y la sensación, por su parte, lo ve descomponerse, disolverse y aceptar pérdidas de todas clases, con el retorno de sus mismos componentes al punto del que provienen. Así, un cuerpo destruye a otro, lo transforma y lo hace perecer, sobre todo cuando el alma, que establece los lazos de amistad, no se encuentra presente en sus masas.

Aun considerando por separado cada una de las cosas que nace, podemos afirmar que no es una, puesto que admite la división en forma y en materia. Y esto se da necesariamente en los cuerpos simples, que responden también a tal ordenación. Los cuerpos, por lo demás, tienen una determinada magnitud y se dividen y fragmentan al mínimo, aceptando con ello su propia destrucción. Si, pues, el cuerpo es una parte de nosotros mismos, no somos enteramente inmortales; y si, por el contrario, es un instrumento, se nos habrá concedido por la naturaleza para un tiempo determinado. Con todo, lo más importante del hombre será, sin duda, el hombre mismo, que deberá ser considerado como una forma con respecto a la materia, o como el ser que se sirve de un instrumento con respecto a este mismo instrumento. Ya lo tomemos en uno u otro sentido, el hombre mismo es el alma.

MacKenna

1. Whether every human being is immortal or we are wholly destroyed, or whether something of us passes over to dissolution and destruction, while something else, that which is the true man, endures for ever - this question will be answered here for those willing to investigate our nature.

We know that man is not a thing of one only element; he has a soul and he has, whether instrument or adjunct in some other mode, a body: this is the first distinction; it remains to investigate the nature and essential being of these two constituents.

Reason tells us that the body as, itself too, a composite, cannot for ever hold together; and our senses show us it breaking up, wearing out, the victim of destructive agents of many kinds, each of its constituents going its own way, one part working against another, perverting, wrecking, and this especially when the material masses are no longer presided over by the reconciling soul.

And when each single constituent is taken as a thing apart, it is still not a unity; for it is divisible into shape and matter, the duality without which bodies at their very simplest cannot cohere.

The mere fact that, as material forms, they have bulk means that they can be lopped and crushed and so come to destruction.

If this body, then, is really a part of us, we are not wholly immortal; if it is an instrument of ours, then, as a thing put at our service for a certain time, it must be in its nature passing.

The sovereign principle, the authentic man, will be as Form to this Matter or as agent to this instrument, and thus, whatever that relation be, the soul is the man.

Guthrie

IS THE SOUL IMMORTAL?

1. Are we immortal, or does all of us die? (Another possibility would be that) of the two parts of which we are composed, the one might be fated to be dissolved and perish, while the other, that constitutes our very personality, might subsist perpetually. These problems must be solved by a study of our nature.

THE BODY AS THE INSTRUMENT OF THE SOUL.

Man is not a simple being; he contains a soul and a body, which is united to this soul, either as tool, or in some other manner (As pilot, perhaps, Eneada-IV, 3, 21). This is how we must distinguish the soul from the body, and determine the nature and manner of existence ("being") of each of them.

THE BODY IS COMPOSITE, AND THEREFORE PERISHABLE.

As the nature of the body is composite, reason convinces us that it cannot last perpetually, and our senses show it to us dissolved, destroyed, and decayed, because the elements that compose it return to join the elements of the same nature, altering, destroying them and each other, especially when this chaos is abandoned to the soul, which alone keeps her parts combined. Even if a body were taken alone, it would not be a unity; it may be analyzed into form and matter, principles that are necessary to the constitution of all bodies, even of those that are simple (Eneada-II, 4, 6). Besides, as they contain extension, the bodies can be cut, divided into infinitely small parts, and thus perish (Eneada-II, 7, 1). Therefore if our body is a part of ourselves (Eneada-I, 1, 10), not all of us is immortal; if the body is only the instrument of the soul, as the body is given to the soul only for a definite period, it still is by nature perishable.

THE SOUL IS THE INDIVIDUALITY, AS ITS FORM, AND AS A SKILLED WORKMAN.

The soul, which is the principal part of man, and which constitutes man himself (Eneada-I, 9, 8), should bear to the body the relation of form to matter, or of a workman to his tool; in both cases the soul is the man himself.

Taylor

I. Whether each [part] of us is immortal, or the whole perishes, or one part of us is dissipated and corrupted, but another part perpetually remains, which part is the man himself, may be learnt by considering conformably to nature as follows: Man, indeed, is not something simple, but there is in him a soul, and he has also a body, whether it is annexed to us as an instrument, or after some other manner. However this may be, it must be admitted, that the nature and essence of each of these must be thus divided. Since the body, therefore, is itself a composite, reason shows that it cannot remain [perpetually the same] ; and sense likewise sees that it is dissolved and wastes away, and receives all-various destructions; since each of the things inherent in it tends to its own [i.e. to the whole form from which it was derived], and one thing belonging to it corrupts another, and changes and perishes into something else. This, too, is especially the case when the soul, which causes the parts to be in friendly union with each other, is not present with the corporeal masses. If each body, likewise, is left by itself, it will not be one, since it is capable of being dissolved into form and matter, from which it is also necessary that simple bodies should have their composition. Moreover, as being bodies they have magnitude, and consequently may he cut and broken into the smallest parts, and through this are the recipients of corruption. Hence, if body is a part of us, we are not wholly immortal. But if it is an instrument [of the soul] it is necessary that being given for a certain time, it should be naturally a thing of this kind. That, however, which is the most principal thing, and the man himself, will be that with reference to the body which form is with reference to matter, since this according to form is as body to matter; or according to that which uses, the body has the relation to it of an instrument. But in each way soul is the man himself.


Ver online : Enéada IV, 7 (2)