Plotino - Tratado 47,16 (III, 2, 16) — Se tudo está bem disposto, como poderia haver males?

16- Pero, si esto es así, ¿cómo existe todavía el mal? ¿Dónde se encuentran la injusticia y el error? ¿Cómo, si todo está bien, pueden realizarse actos injustos y cometerse errores? ¿Y por qué se dan seres desgraciados, si no han cometido faltas ni han sido injustos? ¿Cómo, en estas condiciones, diremos que hay unos hechos de acuerdo con la naturaleza y otros contrarios a ella, cuando todo lo que ocurre está conforme con la naturaleza? ¿Cómo se puede ser impío hacia el ser divino si lo hecho por él es tal como se dice? Concebiríamos entonces a Dios como el autor de un drama cuyo personaje principal le injuria y le llena de reproches. Volvamos de nuevo a la cuestión y afirmemos con mas seguridad qué es verdaderamente la razón y por qué ha de ser tal como es. Atrevámonos a ello y quizá la suerte se ponga de nuestra parte: en efecto, la razón de que hablamos no es la inteligencia pura o inteligencia en sí, ni tampoco el alma pura, aunque realmente dependa de ella; es, si acaso, cual una luz resplandeciente salida de ambas, esto es, de la inteligencia y del alma; de la inteligencia, diremos, y del alma que se adapta a ella se origina esta razón, que es como una cierta vida que dispone de una razón secreta. Toda vida, aun la más vil, es un acto [1]; pero este acto no es semejante al del fuego, sino que se presenta como un movimiento del que a veces no tenemos percepción, aunque no se produzca a la ligera. Aquellas cosas en las que él está presente y que, de algún modo, participan de él, se ven dotadas rápidamente de razón, o lo que es lo mismo, reciben una forma, pues ese acto conforme a la razón tiene el poder de informar las cosas según la vida que hay en ella, moviéndolas, además, para que sean capaces de recibir una forma. Se trata, por tanto, de un acto realmente artístico, como el movimiento que realiza el danzante; porque el danzante tiene plena semejanza con esta vida artística, ya que es el arte el que le mueve, en paralelo perfecto con la vida. Quede dicho esto para explicar así cualquier clase de vida. Y añadamos que esta razón proveniente de la inteligencia una y de la vida una, ambas rigurosamente perfectas, no es ella misma una vida ni una inteligencia una, ya que ni es perfecta en todas partes ni se da por entero a las cosas a las que se da. Muy al contrario, oponiendo unas partes a otras las crea incompletas, originando de este modo la lucha y el conflicto entre ellas. Así, es un todo uno, pero no constituye una verdadera unidad; pues se encuentra en guerra consigo misma en sus propias partes, y su unidad y trabazón semejan a las de un drama, que tiene también unidad a pesar de sus múltiples conflictos. El drama, en efecto, reúne todos los conflictos armónicamente, por la minuciosa exposición que realiza el autor; en el universo, en cambio, el conflicto entre las partes separadas proviene de la razón única, de modo que resulta mejor comparar su armonía con la de los contrarios e investigar por qué se dan contrarios en las razones de las cosas. Si hay en la música razones especiales que hacen armónicos los sonidos agudos y graves, y si estas razones son tendentes a la armonía total, que constituye una razón mayor de la que aquéllos son las partes más pequeñas, lo mismo puede decirse del universo en el que vemos también cosas contrarias: así, lo blanco y lo negro, lo cálido y lo frío, el animal con alas y el animal sin ellas, el que tiene pies y el que no los tiene, el ser razonable y el ser irracional; todos ellos, sin embargo, son las partes de un animal único, al que llamamos universo. Y el universo, añadiremos, está de acuerdo consigo mismo, aunque sus partes se encuentren frecuentemente en conflicto. Ello es debido a que el universo se conduce racionalmente, pero en él su unidad, o la unidad de la razón que contiene, proviene de sus mismos contrarios; esta contrariedad da precisamente su organización al universo y, en cierto modo, le facilita su propio ser. Porque si la razón del universo no fuese múltiple, tampoco seria un todo y ni siquiera una razón; por ser razón, encierra diferencias, de las cuales la mayor es la contrariedad. De modo que si hay realmente seres diferentes, y si es la razón la que los hace así, es claro que los hará lo más diferentes posible y, en ningún caso, menos de lo que puedan ser. Llevando la diferencia al punto más alto, los hará necesariamente contrarios. Y será una razón perfecta, no sólo por hacer los seres diferentes, sino por llevar su diferencia hasta la misma contrariedad.

XVI. Si ce que nous avançons est vrai, comment y aura-t-il encore méchanceté, injustice, péché? Car, si tout est bien, comment y a-t-il des agents qui soient injustes et qui pèchent? Si nul n’est injuste ni ne pèche, comment y a-t-il des hommes malheureux? Comment pourrons-nous dire que certaines choses sont conformes à la nature et que d’autres lui sont contraires, si tout ce qui est engendré, si tout ce qui se fait est conforme à la nature? Enfin, comment l’impiété sera-t-elle encore possible à l’égard de Dieu, si c’est lui qui fait toutes choses telles qu’elles sont, s’il ressemble à un poète qui introduirait dans son drame un personnage chargé de railler et de critiquer l’auteur?

Déterminons donc avec plus de clarté ce qu’est la Raison [de l’Univers] et montrons qu’elle doit être telle qu’elle est. Admettons l’existence de cette Raison pour arriver plus vite à notre but. Cette Raison [de l’univers] n’est point l’Intelligence pure, absolue. Elle n’est point non plus l’Âme pure, mais elle en dépend. C’est un rayon de lumière qui jaillit à la fois de l’Intelligence et de l’Âme unie à l’Intelligence. Ces deux principes engendrent la Raison, c’est-à-dire une Vie rationnelle tranquille (116). Or, toute vie est acte (117), même celle qui occupe le dernier rang. Mais l’acte [qui constitue la Vie de la Raison] n’est pas semblable à l’acte du feu. L’acte de la Vie [propre à la Raison], même sans le sentiment, n’est pas un mouvement aveugle. Toutes les choses qui jouissent de la présence de la Raison et y participent, de quelque façon que ce soit, reçoivent aussitôt une disposition rationnelle, c’est-à-dire reçoivent une forme :, car l’Acte qui constitue la Vie [de la Raison] peut donner des formes, et, pour lui, se mouvoir, c’est former des êtres. Son mouvement, est donc plein d’art, comme celui d’un danseur. Un danseur, en effet, nous donne l’image de cette vie pleine d’art ; c’est l’art qui le meut, parce que l’art même est sa vie. Cela soit dit pour faire comprendre ce qu’est la vie, quelle qu’elle soit.

Procédant de l’Intelligence et de la Vie, qui possèdent à la fois la plénitude et l’unité, la Raison n’a point l’unité et la plénitude de l’Intelligence et de la Vie ; par conséquent, elle ne communique pas la totalité et l’universalité de son essence aux êtres auxquels elle se communique. Elle oppose donc les parties les unes aux autres et les grée défectueuses ; par là, elle constitue, elle engendre la guerre et la lutte. Ainsi, la Raison est l’unité universelle (εἷς πᾶς), parce qu’elle ne pouvait être l’unité absolue (ἕν) : car, si elle implique lutte parce qu’elle a des parties, elle implique aussi unité et harmonie; elle ressemble à la raison d’un drame, dans lequel l’unité contient une foule de contraires (δράματος λόγος εἷς, ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πολλὰς μάχας) (118). Mais, dans un drame, l’harmonie de l’ensemble résulte de ce que les contraires sont coordonnés dans l’unité de l’action, tandis que, dans la Raison universelle, c’est de l’unité que naît la lutte des contraires. Aussi convient-il de comparer la Raison universelle à l’harmonie que forment des sons contraires, et d’examiner pourquoi les raisons des êtres contiennent ainsi des contraires. Dans un concert, ces raisons produisent des sons graves et des sons aigus, et, en vertu de l’harmonie qui constitue leur essence, font concourir ces sons divers à l’unité., c’est-à-dire à l’harmonie même, raison suprême dont elles ne sont que des parties (119) ; de même, nous devons voir dans l’univers des oppositions, le blanc et le noir, le chaud et le froid, les animaux qui ont des ailes et ceux qui ont des pieds, les êtres raisonnables et les êtres dépourvus de raison. Toutes ces choses sont des parties de l’Animal un et universel. Or, si les parties de l’Animal universel sont souvent en lutte les unes avec les autres, celui-ci est dans un accord parfait avec lui-même parce qu’il est universel, et il est universel par la Raison qui est en lui. Il faut. donc que l’unité de cette Raison soit composée de raisons opposées, parce que leur opposition même constitue eu quelque sorte son essence. Si la Raison [du monde] n’était pas multiple, elle ne serait plus universelle, elle n’existerait même plus. Puisqu’elle existe, la Raison doit donc renfermer jupe différence en elle-même ; or, la plus grande différence, c’est l’opposition. En effet, si la Raison renferme en elle-même une différence et produit des choses différentes, la différence qui existe dans ces choses est plus grande que celle qui existe dans la Raison ; or, la différence portée au plus haut degré constitue l’opposition ; la Raison doit donc, pour être parfaite, faire naître de son essence même des choses non seulement différentes, mais encore opposées.

DOES THIS POINT OF VIEW DESTROY SIN AND JUSTICE?

16. If the above considerations be true, what about wickedness, injustice, and sin? For if everything be well, how can there be agents who are unjust, and who sin? If no one be unjust, or sinful, how can unhappy men exist? How can we say that certain things conform to nature, while others are contrary thereto, if everything that is begotten, or that occurs, conforms to nature? Last, would that point of view not do away entirely with impiety towards the divinity, if it be the divinity that makes things such as they are, if the divinity resemble a poet, who would in his drama introduce a character whose business it was to ridicule and criticize the author?

THIS PROBLEM SOLVED BY REASON BEING DERIVED FROM INTELLIGENCE.

Let us, therefore, more clearly define the Reason (of the universe), and let us demonstrate that it should be what it is. To reach our conclusion more quickly, let us grant the existence of this Reason. This Reason (of the universe) is not pure, absolute Intelligence. Neither is it the pure Soul, but it depends therefrom. It is a ray of light that springs both from Intelligence and from the Soul united to Intelligence. These two principles beget Reason, that is, a rational quiet life. Now all life is an actualization, even that which occupies the lowest rank. But the actualization (which constitutes the life of Reason) is not similar to the actualization of fire. The actualization of the life (peculiar to Reason), even without feeling, is not a blind movement. All things that enjoy the presence of Reason, and which participate therein in any manner soever, immediately receive a rational disposition, that is, a form; for the actualization which constitutes the life (of the Reason) can impart its forms, and for that actualization motion is to form beings. Its movement, like that of a dancer, is, therefore, full of art. A dancer, indeed, gives us the image of that life full of art; it is the art that moves it, because the art itself is its life. All this is said to explain the nature of life, whatever it be.

THE UNITY OF REASON IS CONSTITUTED BY THE CONTRARIES IT CONTAINS.

As reason proceeds from Intelligence and Life, which possesses both fulness and unity, Reason does not possess the unity and fulness of Intelligence and Life. Consequently, Reason does not communicate the totality and universality of its essence to the beings to which it imparts itself. It, therefore, opposes its parts to each other, and creates them defective; whereby, Reason constitutes and begets war and struggle. Thus Reason is the universal unity, because it could not be the absolute unity. Though reason imply struggle, because it consists of parts, it also implies unity and harmony. It resembles the reason of a drama, whose unity contains many diversities. In a drama, however, the harmony of the whole results from its component contraries being co-ordinated in the unity of action, while, in universal Reason, it is from unity that the struggle of contraries arises. That is why we may well compare universal Reason to the harmony formed by contrary sounds, and to examine why the reasons of the beings also contain contraries. In a concert, these reasons produce low and high sounds, and, by virtue of the harmony, that constitutes their essence, they make these divers sounds contribute to unity, that is, to Harmony itself, the supreme Reason of which they are only parts. In the same way we must consider other oppositions in the universe, such as black and white, heat and cold, winged or walking animals, and reasonable and irrational beings. All these things are parts of the single universal Organism. Now if the parts of the universal Organism were often in mutual disagreement, the universal Organism, nevertheless, remains in perfect accord with itself because it is universal, and it is universal by the Reason that inheres in it. The unity of this Reason must therefore be composed of opposite reasons, because their very opposition somehow constitutes its essence. If the Reason (of the world) were not multiple, it would no longer be universal, and would not even exist any longer. Since it exists, Reason must, therefore, contain within itself some difference; and the greatest difference is opposition. Now if Reason contain a difference, and produce different things, the difference that exists in these things is greater than that which exists in Reason. Now difference carried to the highest degree is opposition. Therefore, to be perfect, Reason must from its very essence produce things not only different, but even opposed.

16. But if all this is true, what room is left for evil? Where are we to place wrong-doing and sin?

How explain that in a world organized in good, the efficient agents [human beings] behave unjustly, commit sin? And how comes misery if neither sin nor injustice exists?

Again, if all our action is determined by a natural process, how can the distinction be maintained between behaviour in accordance with nature and behaviour in conflict with it?

And what becomes of blasphemy against the divine? The blasphemer is made what he is: a dramatist has written a part insulting and maligning himself and given it to an actor to play.

These considerations oblige us to state the Logos [the Reason-Principle of the Universe] once again, and more clearly, and to justify its nature.

This Reason-Principle, then - let us dare the definition in the hope of conveying the truth - this Logos is not the Intellectual Principle unmingled, not the Absolute Divine Intellect; nor does it descend from the pure Soul alone; it is a dependent of that Soul while, in a sense, it is a radiation from both those divine Hypostases; the Intellectual Principle and the Soul - the Soul as conditioned by the Intellectual Principle engender this Logos which is a Life holding restfully a certain measure of Reason.

Now all life, even the least valuable, is an activity, and not a blind activity like that of flame; even where there is not sensation the activity of life is no mere haphazard play of Movement: any object in which life is present, and object which participates in Life, is at once enreasoned in the sense that the activity peculiar to life is formative, shaping as it moves.

Life, then, aims at pattern as does the pantomimic dancer with his set movements; the mime, in himself, represents life, and, besides, his movements proceed in obedience to a pattern designed to symbolize life.

Thus far to give us some idea of the nature of Life in general.

But this Reason-Principle which emanates from the complete unity, divine Mind, and the complete unity Life [= Soul] - is neither a uniate complete Life nor a uniate complete divine Mind, nor does it give itself whole and all-including to its subject. [By an imperfect communication] it sets up a conflict of part against part: it produces imperfect things and so engenders and maintains war and attack, and thus its unity can be that only of a sum-total not of a thing undivided. At war with itself in the parts which it now exhibits, it has the unity, or harmony, of a drama torn with struggle. The drama, of course, brings the conflicting elements to one final harmony, weaving the entire story of the clashing characters into one thing; while in the Logos the conflict of the divergent elements rises within the one element, the Reason-Principle: the comparison therefore is rather with a harmony emerging directly from the conflicting elements themselves, and the question becomes what introduces clashing elements among these Reason-Principles.

Now in the case of music, tones high and low are the product of Reason-Principles which, by the fact that they are Principles of harmony, meet in the unit of Harmony, the absolute Harmony, a more comprehensive Principle, greater than they and including them as its parts. Similarly in the Universe at large we find contraries - white and black, hot and cold, winged and wingless, footed and footless, reasoning and unreasoning - but all these elements are members of one living body, their sum-total; the Universe is a self-accordant entity, its members everywhere clashing but the total being the manifestation of a Reason-Principle. That one Reason-Principle, then, must be the unification of conflicting Reason-Principles whose very opposition is the support of its coherence and, almost, of its Being.

And indeed, if it were not multiple, it could not be a Universal Principle, it could not even be at all a Reason-Principle; in the fact of its being a Reason-Principle is contained the fact of interior difference. Now the maximum of difference is contrariety; admitting that this differentiation exists and creates, it will create difference in the greatest and not in the least degree; in other words, the Reason-Principle, bringing about differentiation to the uttermost degree, will of necessity create contrarieties: it will be complete only by producing itself not in merely diverse things but in contrary things.

These considerations oblige us to state the Logos [the Reason-Principle of the Universe] once again, and more clearly, and to justify its nature.

This Reason-Principle, then - let us dare the definition in the hope of conveying the truth - this Logos is not the Intellectual Principle unmingled, not the Absolute Divine Intellect; nor does it descend from the pure Soul alone; it is a dependent of that Soul while, in a sense, it is a radiation from both those divine Hypostases; the Intellectual Principle and the Soul - the Soul as conditioned by the Intellectual Principle engender this Logos which is a Life holding restfully a certain measure of Reason.

But this Reason-Principle which emanates from the complete unity, divine Mind, and the complete unity Life [= Soul] - is neither a uniate complete Life nor a uniate complete divine Mind, nor does it give itself whole and all-including to its subject. [By an imperfect communication] it sets up a conflict of part against part: it produces imperfect things and so engenders and maintains war and attack, and thus its unity can be that only of a sum-total not of a thing undivided. At war with itself in the parts which it now exhibits, it has the unity, or harmony, of a drama torn with struggle. The drama, of course, brings the conflicting elements to one final harmony, weaving the entire story of the clashing characters into one thing; while in the Logos the conflict of the divergent elements rises within the one element, the Reason-Principle: the comparison therefore is rather with a harmony emerging directly from the conflicting elements themselves, and the question becomes what introduces clashing elements among these Reason-Principles. Enneads  : III II. 16