Plotino - Tratado 47,18 (III, 2, 18) — As almas não são todas iguais

18- Las almas son, pues, buenas y malas y por motivos diferentes; unas lo son así ya desde un principio y no coinciden con las restantes. Porque ellas mismas constituyen partes desiguales con respecto a la razón, dado que las almas se mantienen separadas. Hemos de pensar a tal fin que existen almas de segundo y tercer grado y que un alma no actúa siempre por las mismas partes. Pero volvamos de nuevo a la cuestión y, como el tema exige todavía muchas aclaraciones para su perfecta comprensión, digamos: no conviene que entren en la representación actores que reciten otro texto distinto al del poeta, cual si, pretextando que el drama está incompleto, hubiesen de completar lo que le falta y llenar las lagunas dejadas por el poeta. Esto equivaldría a que el poeta contase con actores que no son tales, sino meros sustitutos suyos, pero sustitutos que saben de antemano lo que deben decir, para suplir lo que no se ha dicho y hacer posible de esta manera la continuación del drama. Porque en el universo todo lo que se sigue y es consecuencia de las malas acciones constituye la razón misma y está de acuerdo con la razón. Así, por ejemplo, de un adulterio pueden nacer hijos naturales que lleguen tal vez a hombres esclarecidos; lo mismo que de una deportación de prisioneros de guerra pueden surgir ciudades mejores que las que han sido saqueadas por hombres perversos.

No es lógico, pues, que entren las almas en escena, haciendo unas el mal y otras el bien; porque así privamos a la razón de hacer el bien sólo por evitarle la paternidad del mal. Mas, ¿qué impide que el bien y su contrario sean en el universo partes de la razón, lo mismo que las acciones de los actores son en la escena partes del drama? En el drama del universo cada uno de los actores se atiene tanto más a la razón cuanto más completo está el drama y todo en él depende de la razón. ¿Para qué entonces realizar el mal? Digamos que todas las almas, incluso las divinas, no son otra cosa en el universo que partes de la razón. Todas las razones son verdaderamente almas; ¿por qué entonces una de ellas iban a ser almas y las otras, en cambio, razones, si toda la razón es realmente un alma?

XVIII. La différence qui existe entre les âmes sous le rapport du vice et de la vertu a plusieurs causes, entre autres l’inégalité qui existe entre ces âmes dès le principe. Cette inégalité est conforme à l’essence de la Raison universelle, dont elles sont des parties inégales parce qu’elles diffèrent les unes des autres. Il faut réfléchir qu’il y a en effet trois rangs pour les âmes (131), et que la même âme n’exerce pas toujours les mêmes facultés. Mais reprenons la comparaison que nous avons choisie pour éclaircir la discussion. Figurons-nous des acteurs qui prononcent des paroles que le poète n’avait pas écrites : comme si le drame était incomplet, ils suppléent d’eux-mêmes ce qui manque et remplissent les lacunes que le poète avait laissées; ils semblent moins des acteurs que des parties du poète, qui a prévu ce qu’ils devaient dire afin d’y rattacher le reste autant que cela était en son pouvoir (132). En effet, dans l’univers, toutes les choses qui sont les conséquences et les résultats des mauvaises oeuvres sont produites par des raisons, et sont conformes à la Raison universelle : ainsi, d’un adultère, d’un viol, naissent des enfants naturels qui peuvent être des hommes très distingués ; de même, de cités détruites par des hommes pervers naissent d’autres cités florissantes.

On dira peut-être : il est absurde d’introduire dans le monde des âmes qui font, les unes le bien, les autres le mal : car c’est enlever à la Raison universelle le mérite du bien qui se fait, en la déchargeant de la responsabilité du mal. Qui empêche d’admettre que les choses que font les acteurs soient des parties du drame, dans l’univers comme sur la scène, et de rapporter ainsi à la Raison Universelle le bien et le mal qui se font ici bas? car la Raison universelle exerce son influence sur chacun des acteurs avec d’autant puis de force que le drame est plus parfait et que tout dépend d’elle (133). - Mais pourquoi imputer à la Raison universelle les mauvaises oeuvres ? Les âmes contenues dans l’univers n’en seront pas plus divines elles resteront toutes des parties de la Raison Universelle [et, par conséquent, des âmes] : car il faut admettre que toutes les raisons sont des âmes; sinon, qu’on nous dise pourquoi, la Raison de l’univers étant une âme, certaines raisons seraient des âmes et les autres seraient seulement des raisons (134) ?

UNIVERSAL REASON TRIES TO PATCH UP “GAGS” BY UNDISCIPLINED ACTORS.

18. The difference that exists between souls in respect to vice and virtue has several causes; among others, the inequality that exists between souls from the very beginning. This inequality conforms to the essence of universal Reason, of which they are unequal parts, because they differ from each other. We must indeed remember that souls have three ranks (the intellectual, rational, and sense lives), and that the same soul does not always exercise the same faculties. But, to explain our meaning, let us return to our former illustration. Let us imagine actors who utter words not written by the poet; as if the drama were incomplete, they themselves supply what is lacking, and fill omissions made by the poet. They seem less like actors than like parts of the poet, who foresaw what they were to say, so as to reattach the remainder so far as it was in his power. In the universe, indeed, all things that are the consequences and results of bad deeds are produced by reasons, and conform to the universal Reason. Thus, from an illicit union, or from a rape, may be born natural children that may become very distinguished men; likewise, from cities destroyed by perverse individuals, may rise other flourishing cities.

THIS ILLUSTRATION OF DRAMA ALLOWS BOTH GOOD AND EVIL TO BE ASCRIBED TO REASON.

It might indeed be objected that it is absurd to introduce into the world souls some of which do good, and others evil; for when we absolve universal Reason from the responsibility of evil, we are also simultaneously taking from it the merit for the good. What, however, hinders us from considering deeds done by actors as parts of a drama, in the universe as well as on the stage, and thus to derive from universal Reason both the good and the evil that are done here below? For universal Reason exercises its influence on each of the actors with so much the greater force as the drama is more perfect, and as everything depends on it.

INTRODUCTION TO THE NEXT BOOK.

But why should we at all impute evil deeds to universal Reason? The souls contained in the universe will not be any more divine for that. They will still remain parts of the universal Reason (and consequently, remain souls): for we shall have to acknowledge that all reasons are souls. Otherwise if the Reason of the universe be a Soul, why should certain “reasons” be souls, and others only (”seminal) reasons”?

18. Souls vary in worth; and the difference is due, among other causes, to an almost initial inequality; it is in reason that, standing to the Reason-Principle, as parts, they should be unequal by the fact of becoming separate.

We must also remember that every Soul has its second grade and its third, and that, therefore, its expression may take any one of three main forms. But this point must be dealt with here again: the matter requires all possible elucidation.

We may perhaps think of actors having the right to add something to the poet’s words: the drama as it stands is not perfectly filled in, and they are to supply where the Author has left blank spaces here and there; the actors are to be something else as well; they become parts of the poet, who on his side has a foreknowledge of the word they will add, and so is able to bind into one story what the actors bring in and what is to follow.

For, in the All, the sequences, including what follows upon wickedness, become Reason-Principles, and therefore in right reason. Thus: from adultery and the violation of prisoners the process of nature will produce fine children, to grow, perhaps, into fine men; and where wicked violence has destroyed cities, other and nobler cities may rise in their place.

But does not this make it absurd to introduce Souls as responsible causes, some acting for good and some for evil? If we thus exonerate the Reason-Principle from any part in wickedness do we not also cancel its credit for the good? Why not simply take the doings of these actors for representative parts of the Reason-Principle as the doings of stage-actors are representative parts of the stage-drama? Why not admit that the Reason-Principle itself includes evil action as much as good action, and inspires the precise conduct of all its representatives? Would not this be all the more Plausible in that the universal drama is the completer creation and that the Reason-Principle is the source of all that exists?

But this raises the question: "What motive could lead the Logos to produce evil?"

The explanation, also, would take away all power in the Universe from Souls, even those nearest to the divine; they would all be mere parts of a Reason-Principle.

And, further - unless all Reason-Principles are Souls - why should some be souls and others exclusively Reason-Principles when the All is itself a Soul?