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Plotino - Tratado 44,16 (VI, 3, 16) — O que a qualidade é: uma "razão" (logos)
sábado 18 de junho de 2022, por
Igal
16 Ahora bien, cada razón considerada aparte de los restantes accesorios de la supuesta sustancia es significativa de la cualidad inherente a los sensibles, no de su quididad, ni de su cuantidad ni de su movimiento, sino de un carácter; y es denotativa de su talidad y de su cualidad, como por ejemplo, de la belleza o fealdad que hay en un cuerpo. Porque la belleza de acá y la de allá son la misma sólo de nombre; luego también la cualidad. La negrura y la blancura de acá son, en efecto, distintas de las de allá. Pero la cualidad que hay en el germen y en la razón seminal ¿es la misma que la sensible o sólo del mismo nombre? ¿Y hay que asignarla a las cosas de allá o a las de acá? ¿Y la fealdad del alma? (Porque que la belleza del alma es distinta de la de acá, ya está claro). Pero si aun la virtud se incluye en este tipo de cualidad, ¿se encuentra entre las cualidades de acá?
—Según, unas hay que incluirlas entre las cualidades de acá y otras entre las de allá. En efecto, también sobre las artes se podría discutir si, siendo como son razones, se cuentan entre las cualidades de acá. Porque aunque sean razones en la materia, la materia para ellas es el alma. Pero cuando están asociadas a la materia, en cierto modo están acá, por ejemplo, la citarística, porque tiene que ver con las cuerdas y porque el canto, voz sensible, es en cierto modo una parte del arte. A no ser que uno las considere actividades, y no partes, en todo caso son actividades sensibles. Porque también la belleza que hay en un cuerpo es incorporal, y sin embargo, siendo sensible, la hemos asignado a las cosas anejas al cuerpo y del cuerpo. Hay que distinguir dos clases de geometría y de aritmética: la que se ocupa de cosas de acá hay que incluirla en la cualidad de acá, y la que es una ocupación del alma misma dirigida a lo inteligible, hay que incluirla en lo inteligible. Asimismo, Platón distingue dos clases de música y de astronomía. Por lo tanto, las artes que se ocupan de los cuerpos y que se valen de instrumentos sensibles y de la sensación, si bien son disposiciones del alma, pero como son disposiciones del alma inclinándose hacia abajo, hay que incluirlas entre las cualidades de acá. Pues así también, nada impide colocar también acá las virtudes prácticas, las que con su modo de obrar aseguran un comportamiento cívico, es decir, todas las que no separan el alma del cuerpo elevándola a lo transcendente, sino que realizan acciones nobles considerándolas como algo preferente, no como algo necesario. Y por tanto, también la belleza que hay en la razón seminal, y con mucha mayor razón la negrura y la blancura, se incluyen entre las cualidades de acá.
—Entonces, la parte correspondiente del alma en la que residen estas razones ¿también la incluiremos en la sustancia sensible?
—No. Ni siquiera las cosas anteriores dijimos que fueran cuerpos, sino que, como las razones son actividades relacionadas con el cuerpo y del cuerpo, por eso las incluimos entre las cualidades de acá. Pero, por otra parte, puesto que concebíamos como sustancia sensible el compuesto de todos los componentes enumerados, de ningún modo incluiremos en ella ninguna sustancia incorpórea. En cambio, las cualidades, pese a que decimos que son todas incorpóreas, pero como son afecciones en el alma inclinadas a lo de acá y razones de un alma particular, las hemos incluido en la sustancia sensible. Porque como la afección está repartida entre dos cosas, entre el objeto en que actúa y el sujeto en que reside, que es el alma, por eso la hemos identificados con una cualidad que es incorpórea, pero que actúa en el cuerpo. El alma, en cambio, ya no la identificamos con la sustancia sensible, aunque hayamos identificado su afección relativa al cuerpo con una cualidad, sino que, como la concebimos exenta de afecciones y razones, la hemos devuelto al origen de donde procede, sin dejar acá ninguna sustancia que de alguna manera sea inteligible.
Bouillet
XVI. [Qualité.] Quand nous considérons séparément chacune des choses qui composent la substance sensible et que nous voulons désigner la qualité qui se trouve parmi elles, nous ne devons pas l’appeler quiddité (τὸ τί) (64), non plus que la quantité et le mouvement, mais la nommer un caractère (χαρακτήρ), employer les expressions tel (το τοιόνδε), quel (το οἷον), de cette sorte (τό ὁποῖον) (65); c’est ainsi que nous indiquons le beau et le laid, tels qu’ils sont dans le corps. En effet, le beau sensible n’est que l’homonyme du beau intelligible; il en est de même pour la qualité, puisque le blanc et le noir sont aussi complètement différents [de leur raison ou de leur idée].
Mais ce qui se trouve dans une raison séminale et dans une raison telle ou telle est-il identique à ce qui apparaît ou en est-il seulement l’homonyme? Faut-il le compter au nombre des choses intelligibles ou au nombre des choses sensibles? Dans laquelle de ces deux classes faut-il ranger le laid (car pour le beau sensible, il est évident qu’il diffère du beau intelligible) ? Faut-il placer la vertu au nombre des qualités intelligibles ou des qualités sensibles, ou bien placer certaines vertus dans la première classe et certaines autres dans la seconde, puisqu’on peut demander si les arts mêmes, qui sont des raisons, doivent être mis au nombre des qualités sensibles? — Si ces raisons sont unies à une matière, elles ont pour matière l’âme même. — Mais, lorsqu’elles sont unies à une matière, dans quelle condition sont-elles ici-bas? — Il en est de ces raisons comme d’un chant accompagné de la lyre (66) : ce chant, étant formé par une voix sensible, se rapporte aux cordes de la lyre et en même temps il est une partie de l’art [lequel est une raison]. On pourrait également dire que les vertus sont des actes et non des parties [de l’âme]. Sont-ce des actes sensibles? [On est porté à le croire: ] car, bien que le beau qui se trouve dans le corps soit incorpore], nous le mettons parmi les choses qui se rapportent au corps et lui appartiennent. Quant à l’arithmétique et à la géométrie, il en faut reconnaître deux espèces : l’arithmétique et la géométrie de la première espèce s’appliquent aux objets visibles et doivent être rangées parmi les qualités sensibles; l’arithmétique et la géométrie de la seconde espèce sont des études propres à l’âme et doivent être rangées parmi les choses intelligibles. Platon dit qu’il en est de même pour la musique et l’astronomie (67). Ainsi, les arts qui sont en rapport avec le corps, qui se servent des organes et consultent les sens, sont des dispositions de l’âme, mais de Pâme appliquée aux objets corporels, et, par conséquent, ils doivent être mis au nombre des qualités sensibles (68). On peut placer aussi dans ce genre les vertus pratiques, qui se renferment dans les devoirs civils, et qui, au lieu d’élever l’âme vers les choses intelligibles, cherchent la perfection dans les actes de la vie politique, les regardent, non comme une nécessité de notre condition, mais comme une occupation préférable à tout le reste (69). Nous compterons également au nombre de ces qualités le beau qui se trouve dans la raison séminale, et, à plus forte raison, le blanc et le noir.
Mais l’âme qui est disposée de telle façon et qui contient de telles raisons [c’est-à-dire des facultés, des vertus, des sciences et des arts qui se rapportent au corps et qui sont des qualités sensibles], est-elle une substance sensible (70)? — Nous avons déjà expliqué que ces raisons elles-mêmes ne sont pas corporelles ; mais, comme elles se rapportent au corps et aux actions qu’il produit, nous les avons placées au nombre des qualités sensibles. D’un autre côté, comme nous faisons consister la substance sensible dans la réunion de toutes les choses que nous avons énumérées, nous ne mettrons pas la substance incorporelle dans le même genre qu’elle. Quant aux qualités de l’âme, elles sont sans doute toutes incorporelles, mais comme elles sont des passions qui se rapportent aux choses terrestres, nous les plaçons dans le genre delà qualité, ainsi que les raisons de l’âme individuelle. Nous attribuons ainsi à l’âme la passion, mais en partageant celle-ci en deux éléments, dont l’un se rapporte à l’objet auquel elle s’applique, et l’autre au sujet dans lequel elle existe (71): nous ne regardons pas les passions comme des qualités corporelles, mais nous admettons qu’elles se rapportent au corps (72). D’un autre côté, quoique nous placions les passions dans le genre de la qualité, nous ne rapportons pas l’âme elle-même à la substance corporelle. Enfin, quand l’âme est conçue sans les passions et sans les raisons dont nous venons de parler, nous la rapportons au monde dont elle descend (73), et nous ne laissons ici-bas aucune essence intelligible, de quelque sorte qu’elle soit.
Guthrie
THE VARIOUS TERMS EXPRESSING QUALITY.
16. When we separately consider each of the things which compose sense-being and when we wish to designate the quality which exists among them, we must not call it “whatness,” any more than quantity or movement, but rather name it a characteristic, employing the expressions “such,” “as,” and “this kind.” We are thus enabled to indicate beauty and ugliness, such as they are in the body. Indeed, sense-beauty is no more than a figure of speech, in respect to intelligible beauty; it is likewise with quality, since black and white are also completely different (from their “reason,” or their idea).
THE SEMINAL REASON HARMONIZES WITH ITS APPEARING ACTUALIZATION.
Is the content of (”seminal) reason” and of a particular reason, identical with what appears, or does it apply thereto only by a figure of speech? Should it properly be classified among the intelligible, or the sense-objects? Sensual beauty of course evidently differs from intelligible beauty; but what of ugliness — in which classification does it belong? Must virtue be classified among intelligible or sensual qualities, or should we locate some in each class? (All this uncertainty is excusable, inasmuch) as it may be asked whether even the arts, which are “reasons,” should be classified among sense-qualities? If these reasons be united to a matter, they must have matter as their very soul. But what is their condition here below, when united to some matter? These reasons are in a case similar to song accompanied by a lyre; this song, being uttered by a sense-voice, is in relation with the strings of the lyre, while simultaneously being part of the art (which is one of these “seminal reasons”). Likewise, it might be said that virtues are actualizations, and not parts (of the soul). Are they sense-actualizations? (This seems probable), for although the beauty contained in the body be incorporeal, we still classify it among the things which refer to the body, and belong to it. As to arithmetic, and geometry, two different kinds must be distinguished: the first kind deals with visible objects, and must be classified among sense-objects; but the second kind deals with studies suitable to the soul, and should therefore be classified among intelligible entities. Plato considers that music and astronomy are in the same condition.
MANY OTHER CONCEPTIONS BELONG AMONG SENSE-QUALITIES.
Thus the arts which relate to the body, which make use of the organs, and which consult the senses, are really dispositions of the soul, but only of the soul as applied to corporeal objects; and consequently, they should be classified among sense-qualities. Here also belong practical virtues, such as are implied by civil duties, and which, instead of raising the soul to intelligible entities, fructify in the actions of political life, and refer to them, not as a necessity of our condition, but as an occupation preferable to everything else. Among these qualities we shall have to classify the beauty contained in the (”seminal) reason,” and, so much the more, black and white.
IN SPITE OF THIS CLASSIFICATION THE SOUL HERSELF REMAINS INCORPOREAL.
But is the soul herself a sense-being, if she be disposed in a particular way, and if she contain particular “reasons” (that is, faculties, virtues, sciences and arts, all of which refer to the body, and which have been classified as sense-qualities)? It has already been explained that these “reasons” themselves are not corporeal; but that they have been classified among sense-qualities only because they referred to the body, and to the actions thereby produced. On the other hand, as sense-quality has been defined as the meeting of all the above enumerated entities, it is impossible to classify incorporeal Being in the same genus as the sensual being. As to the qualities of the soul, they are all doubtless incorporeal, but as they are experiences (or, sufferings, or, passions) which refer to terrestrial things, they must be classified in the genus of quality, just as the reasons of the individual soul. Of the soul we must therefore predicate experience, however dividing the latter in two elements, one of which would refer to the object to which it is applied, and the other to the subject in which it exists. Though then these experiences cannot be considered as corporeal qualities, yet it must be admitted they relate to the body. On the other hand, although we classify these experiences in the genus of quality, still the soul herself should not be reduced to the rank of corporeal being. Last, when we conceive of the soul as without experiences, and without the “reasons” above-mentioned, we are thereby classifying her along with the World from which she descends, and we leave here below no intelligible being, of any kind whatever.
MacKenna
16. When each of the entities bound up with the pseudo-substance is taken apart from the rest, the name of Quality is given to that one among them, by which without pointing to essence or quantity or motion we signify the distinctive mark, the type or aspect of a thing - for example, the beauty or ugliness of a body. This beauty - need we say? - is identical in name only with Intellectual Beauty: it follows that the term "Quality" as applied to the Sensible and the Intellectual is necessarily equivocal; even blackness and whiteness are different in the two spheres.
But the beauty in the germ, in the particular Reason-Principle - is this the same as the manifested beauty, or do they coincide only in name? Are we to assign this beauty - and the same question applies to deformity in the soul - to the Intellectual order, or to the Sensible? That beauty is different in the two spheres is by now clear. If it be embraced in Sensible Quality, then virtue must also be classed among the qualities of the lower. But merely some virtues will take rank as Sensible, others as Intellectual qualities.
It may even be doubted whether the arts, as Reason-Principles, can fairly be among Sensible qualities; Reason-Principles, it is true, may reside in Matter, but "matter" for them means Soul. On the other hand, their being found in company with Matter commits them in some degree to the lower sphere. Take the case of lyrical music: it is performed upon strings; melody, which may be termed a part of the art, is sensuous sound - though, perhaps, we should speak here not of parts but of manifestations [Acts]: yet, called manifestations, they are nonetheless sensuous. The beauty inherent in body is similarly bodiless; but we have assigned it to the order of things bound up with body and subordinate to it.
Geometry and arithmetic are, we shall maintain, of a twofold character; in their earthly types they rank with Sensible Quality, but in so far as they are functions of pure Soul, they necessarily belong to that other world in close proximity to the Intellectual. This, too, is in Plato’s view the case with music and astronomy.
The arts concerned with material objects and making use of perceptible instruments and sense-perception must be classed with Sensible Quality, even though they are dispositions of the Soul, attendant upon its apostasy.
There is also every reason for consigning to this category the practical virtues whose function is directed to a social end: these do not isolate Soul by inclining it towards the higher; their manifestation makes for beauty in this world, a beauty regarded not as necessary but as desirable.
On this principle, the beauty in the germ, and still more the blackness and whiteness in it, will be included among Sensible Qualities.
Are we, then, to rank the individual soul, as containing these Reason-Principles, with Sensible Substance? But we do not even identify the Principles with body; we merely include them in Sensible Quality on the ground that they are connected with body and are activities of body. The constituents of Sensible Substance have already been specified; we have no intention whatever of adding to them Substance bodiless.
As for Qualities, we hold that they are invariably bodiless, being affections arising within Soul; but, like the Reason-Principles of the individual soul, they are associated with Soul in its apostasy, and are accordingly counted among the things of the lower realm: such affections, torn between two worlds by their objects and their abode, we have assigned to Quality, which is indeed not bodily but manifested in body.
But we refrain from assigning Soul to Sensible Substance, on the ground that we have already referred to Quality [which is Sensible] those affections of Soul which are related to body. On the contrary, Soul, conceived apart from affection and Reason-Principle, we have restored to its origin, leaving in the lower realm no substance which is in any sense Intellectual.
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