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Plotino - Tratado 28,1 (IV, 4, 1) — A memória em sua relação à união da alma e do corpo (1)
terça-feira 18 de janeiro de 2022, por
Míguez
1. ¿Qué es lo que podrá decir y qué recuerdos conservará un alma que se encuentra en el mundo inteligible y a inmediaciones de la sustancia? Se afirmará en consecuencia que contempla los seres inteligibles, como objetos que son de su actividad por hallarse en medio de ellos; o, en otro caso, no se encontraría en el mundo inteligible. No recuerda, pues, ninguna de las cosas de este mundo, ni recuerda siquiera que ya filosofaba y que, desde aquí mismo, contemplaba los seres inteligibles. Pero, no es posible, para esa alma, cuando su pensamiento se aplica a los seres inteligibles, hacer otra cosa que pensarlos y contemplarlos. Lo que ahora tenga en el pensamiento no implica para nada el recuerdo de haber pensado, ya que si así ocurriese, podría decir al final: he pensado, con lo cual el cambio quedaría manifiesto.
El alma que contempla en toda su pureza la región de los inteligibles no podrá tener en la memoria los acontecimientos de este mundo. Además, si, como parece, todo pensamiento se sitúa fuera del tiempo, dado que los inteligibles mismos se encuentran en la eternidad y no en el tiempo, es imposible que haya memoria alguna en aquella región, no sólo de las cosas ocurridas en la tierra, sino incluso de cualquier otro hecho, sea éste el que sea. Porque para esa alma todo está presente y no necesita verificar ningún recorrido ni pasar de una cosa a otra. ¿Pues qué? ¿No se da entre los inteligibles una división del género en especies y un paso de lo que está abajo a lo universal y, en definitiva, al término superior? Y si suponemos que la inteligencia no procede de este modo, puesto que se encuentra toda ella en acto, ¿por qué no decir lo mismo del alma, una vez en el mundo inteligible? ¿Hay algo que le impida su visión conjunta de todos los inteligibles? ¿Y no es ella como la de un solo objeto visto de una vez? En realidad se trata de un espectáculo en el que se reúnen pensamientos y cosas múltiples, algo verdaderamente variado y objeto también de un pensamiento variado, esto es, de pensamientos múltiples que se producen simultáneamente, al modo como en la percepción de un rostro tenemos las distintas sensaciones de los ojos, de la nariz y de las otras partes. Pero, ¿y cuándo divide un género y lo desenvuelve en sus especies? La división se verifica ya en la inteligencia y constituye para ella como una impronta. Por otra parte, ni lo anterior ni lo posterior que se encuentra en los conceptos se refiere para nada al tiempo; con lo cual tampoco el pensamiento de lo anterior precede en el tiempo al de lo posterior. Hay una ordenación de pensamientos, semejante a la que se da en una planta: también aquí las raíces y la parte superior de las ramas no guardan otra relación de primacía con respecto a las demás partes de la planta que la que pueda haber, según un determinado orden, para quien contempla la planta toda de una vez. Pero cuando el alma mira hacia un solo género, luego hacia algunas de sus especies y por fin hacia todas ellas, ¿cómo podrá aprehenderlas si no es de manera sucesiva? Digamos que la potencia de un género se aparece como una, e igualmente como múltiple, cuando se halla en otra cosa; entonces, sin embargo, todos los términos del género no se recogen en un solo pensamiento. Porque los actos (de esa potencia) tampoco responden a una unidad, sino que existen desde siempre por la potencia misma del género, ofreciéndose a la vez en las cosas más diversas. Porque el ser inteligible no es en verdad como el Uno y puede admitirse en él una naturaleza múltiple que antes no existía.
Bouillet
I. Que dira l’âme et de quoi se souviendra-t-elle quand elle se sera élevée au monde intelligible ? — Elle y contemplera les essences auxquelles elle sera unie et y appliquera toute son attention ; sinon, elle ne serait pas dans le monde intelligible. — N’aura-t-elle donc aucun souvenir des choses d’ici-bas? Ne se rappellera-t-elle pas qu’elle s’est livrée à l’étude de la philosophie, par exemple, et qu’elle a contemplé le monde intelligible pendant son séjour sur la terre? — Non : car une intelligence, tout entière à son objet, ne peut en même temps contempler l’intelligible et penser à une autre chose. L’acte de la pensée n’implique pas le souvenir d’avoir pensé. — Ce souvenir, dira-t-on, est postérieur à la pensée. — Dans ce cas, l’esprit dans lequel il se produit a changé d’état. Il est donc impossible que celui qui est tout entier à la contemplation pure de l’intelligible se rappelle en même temps les choses qui lui sont arrivées autrefois ici-bas. Si, comme il le paraît, la pensée est en dehors du temps, parce que toutes les essences intelligibles, étant éternelles, n’ont pas de relation avec le temps, évidemment il est impossible que l’intelligence qui s’est élevée au monde intelligible ait aucun souvenir des choses d’ici-bas, qu’elle ait même absolument aucun souvenir : car chacune des essences du monde intelligible est toujours présente à l’intelligence [1], qui n’est pas obligée de les parcourir successivement, de passer de l’une à l’autre. — Quoi ? l’intelligence ne divisera-t-elle pas en descendant du genre aux espèces ? — Non : car elle remonte à l’universel et au principe supérieur. — Admettons qu’il n’y ait pas de division dans l’intelligence qui possède tout à la fois : n’y aura-t-il pas au moins de division dans l’âme qui s’est élevée au monde intelligibles ? — Mais, rien n’empêche que la totalité des intelligibles unis ensemble ne soit saisie par une intuition également une et totale. — Cette intuition est-elle semblable à l’intuition d’un objet aperçu d’un seul coup d’œil dans son ensemble, ou comprend-elle toutes les pensées des intelligibles contemplés à la fois? — Puisque les intelligibles offrent un spectacle varié, la pensée qui les saisit doit évidemment être également multiple et variée [2], comprendre plusieurs pensées, comme la perception d’un seul objet sensible, d’un visage, par exemple, comprend plusieurs perceptions, parce que l’oeil, en apercevant le visage, voit en même temps le nez et les autres parties.
Mais [dira-t-on] il arrive que l’âme divise et développe une chose qui était unique.—Nous répondrons que cette chose est déjà divisée dans l’intelligence, qu’elle y a comme un fondement particulier, mais que, s’il y a antériorité et postériorité dans les idées, cette antériorité et cette postériorité ne se rapportent cependant pas au temps. Si la pensée arrive à distinguer l’antérieur et le postérieur, ce n’est pas sous le rapport du temps, mais sous le rapport de l’ordre [qui préside aux choses intelligibles] : ainsi, quand on considère dans une plante l’ordre qui s’étend des racines au sommet, il n’y a antériorité et postériorité que sous le rapport de l’ordre, puisqu’on aperçoit la plante entière d’un seul coup d’œil.
Mais [dira-t-on encore], quand l’âme contemple l’Un, si elle embrasse plusieurs choses ou plutôt toutes choses, comment se peut-il que l’une soit antérieure, l’autre postérieure? — C’est que la puissance qui est une [l’Un] est une de telle sorte qu’elle est multiple quand elle est contemplée par un autre principe [l’Intelligence], parce qu’alors elle n’est pas toutes choses à la fois dans une seule pensée. En effet, les actes [de l’Intelligence] ne sont pas une unité ; mais ils sont produits tous par une puissance toujours permanente ; ils deviennent donc multiples dans les autres principes [les intelligibles] : car l’Intelligence, n’étant pas l’unité même, peut recevoir en son sein la nature du multiple qui n’existait pas auparavant [dans l’Un].
Guthrie
SPEECH OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.
1. When the soul will have risen to the intelligible world, what will she say, and what will she remember ? She will contemplate the beings to which she will be united and she will apply her whole attention thereto; otherwise, she would not be in the intelligible world.
MEMORY OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.
Will she have no memory of things here below? Will she not, for instance, remember that she devoted herself to philosophy; and that, during her residence on the earth, she contemplated the intelligible world? No: for an intelligence entirely devoted to the object of its thought, cannot simultaneously contemplate the intelligible and think something else. The act of thought does not imply the memory of having thought.
IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD ALL THINGS ARE SIMULTANEOUS; HENCE NOT REMEMBERED.
But this memory is posterior to thought! In this case, the mind in which it occurs has changed condition. It is therefore impossible that he who is entirely devoted to the pure contemplation of the intelligible should simultaneously remember the things that formerly happened to him here below. If, as it seems, thought is outside of time, because all the intelligible essences, being eternal, have no relation with time, it is evidently impossible that the intelligence which has raised itself to the intelligible world should have any memory of the things here below, or even have absolutely any memory whatever; for each (of the essences of the intelligible world) are always present to the intelligence which is not obliged to go through them successively, passing from one to the other.
INTELLIGENCE UNITES AS IT RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE.
Will not the intelligence divide itself in descending (from the genera) to the species (or forms) ? No: for she reascends to the universal and the superior Principle.
NOT EVEN THE ASCENDED SOUL NEED BE DIVIDED.
Granting then that there is no division in the intelligence which possesses everything simultaneously; will there not at least be division in the soul which has risen to the intelligible world? Nothing however forbids that the totality of the united intelligibles be grasped by an intuition equally unitary and total.
THE UNITY OF APPERCEPTION IS MANIFOLD.
Is this intuition similar to the intuition of an object grasped In its entirety by a single glance, or does it contain all the thoughts of the intelligibles contemplated simultaneously? Since the intelligibles offer a varied spectacle, the thought which grasps them must evidently be equally multiple and varied, comprehending several thoughts, like the perception of a single sense-object, as for instance that of a face comprehends several perceptions because the eye, on perceiving the face, simultaneously sees the nose and the other features.
IN THE INTELLIGIBLE ANTERIORITY REFERS TO ORDER, NOT TO TIME.
It may be objected that it may happen that the soul will divide and develop something which was unitary. This thing must then already have been divided in intelligence, but such a division is more like an impression. As anteriority or posteriority in ideas does not refer to time, so also will the mental conception of anteriority and posteriority not be subject to temporal conditions, but refer to order (which presides over intelligible things). For instance, on considering a tree’s order that extends from the roots to the tree-top, priority and posteriority exists only under the relation of order, inasmuch as the whole plant is perceived at one single glance.
INTELLIGENCE IS NOT A UNITY; BUT ITS MANIFOLD IS PRODUCED BY A UNITY.
How can things be prior or posterior, if the soul that contemplates the One embrace all things? The potentiality which is One is one in such a manner that it is multiple when it is contemplated by another principle (Intelligence), because then it is not simultaneously all things in one single thought. Indeed, the actualizations (of Intelligence) are not a unity; but they are all produced by an ever permanent potentiality; they therefore become multiple in the other principles (the intelligibles); for Intelligence, not being unity itself, can receive within its breast the nature of the multiple which did not formerly exist (in the One).
MacKenna
1. What, then, will be the Soul’s discourse, what its memories in the Intellectual Realm, when at last it has won its way to that Essence?
Obviously from what we have been saying, it will be in contemplation of that order, and have its Act upon the things among which it now is; failing such Contemplation and Act, its being is not there. Of things of earth it will know nothing; it will not, for example, remember an act of philosophic virtue, or even that in its earthly career it had contemplation of the Supreme.
When we seize anything in the direct intellectual act there is room for nothing else than to know and to contemplate the object; and in the knowing there is not included any previous knowledge; all such assertion of stage and progress belongs to the lower and is a sign of the altered; this means that, once purely in the Intellectual, no one of us can have any memory of our experience here. Further; if all intellection is timeless - as appears from the fact that the Intellectual beings are of eternity not of time - there can be no memory in the intellectual world, not merely none of earthly things but none whatever: all is presence There; for nothing passes away, there is no change from old to new.
This, however, does not alter the fact that distinction exists in that realm - downwards from the Supreme to the Ideas, upward from the Ideas to the Universal and to the Supreme. Admitting that the Highest, as a self-contained unity, has no outgoing effect, that does not prevent the soul which has attained to the Supreme from exerting its own characteristic Act: it certainly may have the intuition, not by stages and parts, of that Being which is without stage and part.
But that would be in the nature of grasping a pure unity?
No: in the nature of grasping all the intellectual facts of a many that constitutes a unity. For since the object of vision has variety [distinction within its essential oneness] the intuition must be multiple and the intuitions various, just as in a face we see at the one glance eyes and nose and all the rest.
But is not this impossible when the object to be thus divided and treated as a thing of grades, is a pure unity?
No: there has already been discrimination within the Intellectual-Principle; the Act of the soul is little more than a reading of this.
First and last is in the Ideas not a matter of time, and so does not bring time into the soul’s intuition of earlier and later among them. There is a grading by order as well: the ordered disposition of some growing thing begins with root and reaches to topmost point, but, to one seeing the plant as a whole, there is no other first and last than simply that of the order.
Still, the soul [in this intuition within the divine] looks to what is a unity; next it entertains multiplicity, all that is: how explain this grasping first of the unity and later of the rest?
The explanation is that the unity of this power [the Supreme] is such as to allow of its being multiple to another principle [the soul], to which it is all things and therefore does not present itself as one indivisible object of intuition: its activities do not [like its essence] fall under the rule of unity; they are for ever multiple in virtue of that abiding power, and in their outgoing they actually become all things.
For with the Intellectual or Supreme - considered as distinct from the One - there is already the power of harbouring that Principle of Multiplicity, the source of things not previously existent in its superior.
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[1] Dans ses Confessions (X, 25, 26), saint Augustin démontre de la même manière que, pour concevoir Dieu, il faut s’élever au-dessus des images des choses sensibles et des souvenirs que l’on peut avoir de ses propres actes, que la conception de Dieu n’est pas un souvenir, mais une intuition toujours présente à notre esprit dès qu’il y réfléchit : « Sed ubi manes in memoria mea, Domine?... Transcendi enim partes ejus, quas habent et bestiae, quum te recordarer, quia non ibi te inveniebam inter imagines corporalium ; et veni ad partes ejus, ubi commendavi affectiones animi mei, nec illic inveni te... Ubi ergo te inveni ut discerem te, nisi in te supra me? Et nusquam locus. Et recedimus, et accedimus, et nusquam locus. Ubique Veritas praesides omnibus consulentibus te, simulque respondes omnibus etiam diversa consulentibus. » Voy. encore ci-après, p. 337, note 2.
[2] Platon dit dans le Timée (p. 30 ; p. 89 de la trad. de M. II. Martin) : « Ce modèle contient et comprend en lui-même tous les animaux intelligibles, de même que dans ce monde-ci nous sommes renfermés nous-mêmes ainsi que tous les animaux produits et visibles. » Voy. aussi Enn. V, 3, 5.
- Plotino - Tratado 28,2 (IV, 4, 2) — A memória em sua relação à união da alma e do corpo (2)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,3 (IV, 4, 3) — A memória em sua relação à união da alma e do corpo (3)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,4 (IV, 4, 4) — A memória em sua relação à união da alma e do corpo (4)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,5 (IV, 4, 5) — A memória em sua relação à união da alma e do corpo (5)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,6 (IV, 4, 6) — A memória não pertence senão às almas que mudam de lugar e se transformam
- Plotino - Tratado 28,9 (IV, 4, 9) — Zeus como demiurgo
- Plotino - Tratado 28,10 (IV, 4, 10) — Zeus enquanto alma do mundo (1)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,11 (IV, 4, 11) — Zeus enquanto alma do mundo (2)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,13 (IV, 4, 13) — Zeus enquanto alma do mundo (4)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,14 (IV, 4, 14) — Zeus enquanto alma do mundo (5)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,15 (IV, 4, 15) — A questão da temporalidade: as almas não estão no tempo
- Plotino - Tratado 28,16 (IV, 4, 16) — A questão da sucessão: ela existe nos produtos da alma, mas não nela
- Plotino - Tratado 28,17 (IV, 4, 17) — A questão da sucessão das razões na alma: mais a alma é submetida a um princípio único, melhor ela é
- Plotino - Tratado 28,18 (IV, 4, 18) — A união da alma e do corpo comparada ao ar aquecido (alma vegetativa) ou iluminado (alma descida)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,19 (IV, 4, 19) — O prazer e a dor
- Plotino - Tratado 28,20 (IV, 4, 20) — O desejo (1)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,21 (IV, 4, 21) — O desejo (2)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,22 (IV, 4, 22) — Questão: É que a terra pode ter sensações?
- Plotino - Tratado 28,23 (IV, 4, 23) — Sabe-se que a sensação não pode se fazer sem órgãos (1)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,24 (IV, 4, 24) — Sabe-se que a sensação não pode se fazer sem órgãos (2)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,25 (IV, 4, 25) — Sabe-se que a sensação não pode se fazer sem órgãos (3)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,26 (IV, 4, 26) — Sabe-se que a sensação não pode se fazer sem órgãos (4)
- Plotino - Tratado 28,27 (IV, 4, 27) — A terra tem um poder vegetativo, um poder sensitivo e um intelecto
- Plotino - Tratado 28,28 (IV, 4, 28) — A cólera
- Plotino - Tratado 28,29 (IV, 4, 29) — A separação da alma e do corpo
- Plotino - Tratado 28,30 (IV, 4, 30) — A influência dos astros é devida à simpatia. A Memória, a Sensação e a Magia
- Plotino - Tratado 28,31 (IV, 4, 31) — Classificação das ações e das paixões
- Plotino - Tratado 28,32 (IV, 4, 32) — O universo é um vivente onde reina a simpatia
- Plotino - Tratado 28,33 (IV, 4, 33) — Há um acordo neste vivente. A analogia da dança
- Plotino - Tratado 28,34 (IV, 4, 34) — A influência do cosmo sobre o homem é moderada
- Plotino - Tratado 28,35 (IV, 4, 35) — Os poderes dos astros
- Plotino - Tratado 28,36 (IV, 4, 36) — O universo é um vivente que guarda vários poderes
- Plotino - Tratado 28,37 (IV, 4, 37) — Efeitos ordinários e extraordinários
- Plotino - Tratado 28,38 (IV, 4, 38) — Resultados
- Plotino - Tratado 28,39 (IV, 4, 39) — Aplicações concretas. Presságios. Mal
- Plotino - Tratado 28,40 (IV, 4, 40) — A Magia
- Plotino - Tratado 28,41 (IV, 4, 41) — As orações. Simpatia.
- Plotino - Tratado 28,42 (IV, 4, 42) — Não há memória nos astros
- Plotino - Tratado 28,43 (IV, 4, 43) — A influência da magia sobre o homem
- Plotino - Tratado 28,44 (IV, 4, 44) — Só a contemplação é livre, não a ação
- Plotino - Tratado 28,45 (IV, 4, 45) — Conclusões gerais