Página inicial > Antiguidade > Neoplatonismo > Plotino (séc. III) > Enéada IV > Enéada IV, 8 (6) > Plotino - Tratado 6,8 (IV, 8, 8) — Possibilidade para a alma de governar o corpo

Plotino - Tratado 6,8 (IV, 8, 8) — Possibilidade para a alma de governar o corpo

domingo 15 de maio de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

  

Míguez

8. Si hemos de atrevemos a manifestar nuestra opinión, contraria a la de los demás, diremos que no es verdad que ningún alma, ni siquiera la nuestra, se hunda por entero en lo sensible, ya que hay en ella algo que permanece siempre en lo inteligible. Si domina la parte que está hundida en lo sensible, o mejor, si ella es confundida de alguna manera, no permitirá que tengamos el sentimiento de las cosas que contemplamos con la parte superior del alma. Porque lo que ella piensa sólo llega hasta nosotros cuando ha descendido hasta nuestra sensación. No conocemos, pues, todo lo que pasa en una parte cualquiera del alma, si no hemos llegado a la contemplación completa de la misma. Así, por ejemplo, si el deseo permanece en la facultad apetitiva, no puede ser conocido por nosotros, lo que sólo ocurre cuando se le percibe por el sentido interior, o por la reflexión, o por ambas facultades a la vez.

Toda alma tiene una parte de sí misma vuelta hacia el cuerpo y otra parte vuelta hacia la inteligencia. A su vez, el alma del universo organiza el mundo por esa parte suya que mira hacia el cuerpo. Se muestra superior a todo y actúa infatigablemente porque lo que ella quiere lo desea, no por razonamiento, como nosotros, sino por una intuición intelectual a la manera del arte. Esa parte que mira hacia abajo es verdaderamente la que organiza el universo. Las almas particulares, que abarcan una parte del universo, constituyen también una parte superior de él, pero dominadas por las sensaciones e impresiones perciben muchas cosas que son contrarias a su naturaleza y que las hacen sufrir y perturbarse. Así, la parte de la que ellas cuidan está falta o necesitada de algo, encontrando por tanto a su alrededor muchas cosas que le son ajenas. No es, pues, extraño que desee muchas otras cosas y que la gane el placer de ellas; pero ese mismo placer la pierde. Ahora bien, el alma cuenta asimismo con otra parte a la que desagradan los placeres momentáneos. Es esta parte la que lleva una vida análoga a la del alma total.

Bouillet

[VIII] S’il convient que je déclare ici nettement ce qui me paraît vrai, dusse-je me mettre en contradiction avec l’opinion générale, je dirai que notre âme n’entre pas tout entière dans le corps (50): par sa partie supérieure, elle reste toujours unie au monde intelligible, comme, par sa partie inférieure, elle l’est au monde sensible. Si cette partie inférieure domine, ou plutôt, si elle est dominée et troublée, elle ne nous permet pas d’avoir le sentiment de ce que contemple la partie supérieure de l’âme. En effet, ce qui est pensé n’arrive à notre connaissance qu’à la condition de descendre jusqu’à nous et d’être senti. En général, nous ne connaissons tout ce qui se passe dans chaque partie de l’âme que lorsque cela est senti par l’âme entière : par exemple, la concupiscence, qui est l’acte de l’appétit concupiscible, ne nous est connue que lorsque nous la percevons par le sens intérieur (τῇν αἰσθητικῇ τῇ ἔνδον δυνάμαι), (51) ou par la raison discursive (τῇ διανοητικῇ, ou par toutes les deux à la fois. Toute âme a une partie inférieure tournée vers le corps, et une partie supérieure tournée vers l’Intelligence divine. L’Âme universelle administre l’univers par sa partie inférieure sans aucune espèce de peine, parce qu’elle gouverne son corps non par raisonnement, comme nous, mais par intelligence, par conséquent d’une tout autre manière que celle dont procède l’art. Quant aux âmes particulières, qui administrent chacune une partie de l’univers [c’est-à-dire le corps auquel chacune est unie], elles ont aussi une partie qui s’élève au-dessus du corps ; mais elles sont distraites de la pensée par la sensation et par la perception d’une foule de choses qui sont contraires à la nature, qui viennent les troubler et les affliger. En effet, le corps dont elles prennent soin, ne constituant qu’une partie de l’univers, étant d’ailleurs incomplet et se trouvant entouré d’objets extérieurs, a mille besoins, désire la volupté et est trompé par elle. La partie supérieure de l’âme est au contraire insensible à l’attrait de ces plaisirs passagers et mène une vie uniforme (52).

Guthrie

THE SOUL DOES NOT ENTIRELY ENTER INTO THE BODY.

8. Though I should set myself in opposition to popular views, I shall set down clearly what seems to me the true state of affairs. Not the whole soul enters into the body. By her higher part, she ever remains united to the intelligible world; as, by her lower part, she remains united to the sense-world. If this lower part dominates, or rather, if it be dominated (by sensation) and troubled, it hinders us from being conscious of what the higher part of the soul contemplates. Indeed that which is thought impinges on our consciousness only in case it descends to us, and is felt. In general, we are conscious of what goes on in every part of the soul only when it is felt by the entire soul. For instance, appetite, which is the actualization of lustful desire, is by us cognized only when we perceive it by the interior sense or by discursive reason, or by both simultaneously. Every soul has a lower part turned towards the body, and a higher part turned towards divine Intelligence. The universal Soul manages the universe by her lower part without any kind of trouble, because she governs her body not as we do by any reasoning, but by intelligence, and consequently in a manner entirely different from that adopted by art. The individual souls, each of whom administers a part of the universe, also have a part that rises above their body; but they are distracted from thought by sensation, and by a perception of a number of things which are contrary to nature, and which come to trouble them, and afflict them. Indeed, the body that they take care of constitutes but a part of the universe, is incomplete, and is surrounded by exterior objects. That is why it has so many needs, why it desires luxuriousness, and why it is deceived thereby. On the contrary, the higher part of the soul is insensible to the attraction of these transitory pleasures, and leads an undisturbed life.

MacKenna

8. And - if it is desirable to venture the more definite statement of a personal conviction clashing with the general view - even our human soul has not sunk entire; something of it is continuously in the Intellectual Realm, though if that part, which is in this sphere of sense, hold the mastery, or rather be mastered here and troubled, it keeps us blind to what the upper phase holds in contemplation.

The object of the Intellectual Act comes within our ken only when it reaches downward to the level of sensation: for not all that occurs at any part of the soul is immediately known to us; a thing must, for that knowledge, be present to the total soul; thus desire locked up within the desiring faculty remains unknown except when we make it fully ours by the central faculty of perception, or by the individual choice or by both at once. Once more, every soul has something of the lower on the body side and something of the higher on the side of the Intellectual-Principle.

The Soul of the All, as an entirety, governs the universe through that part of it which leans to the body side, but since it does not exercise a will based on calculation as we do - but proceeds by purely intellectual act as in the execution of an artistic conception - its ministrance is that of a labourless overpoising, only its lowest phase being active upon the universe it embellishes.

The souls that have gone into division and become appropriated to some thing partial have also their transcendent phase, but are preoccupied by sensation, and in the mere fact of exercising perception they take in much that clashes with their nature and brings distress and trouble since the object of their concern is partial, deficient, exposed to many alien influences, filled with desires of its own and taking its pleasure, that pleasure which is its lure.

But there is always the other, that which finds no savour in passing pleasure, but holds its own even way.


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