Betanzos (FBPL:83-91) – citações de Baader (conhecimento, fé e revelação)

  

As far as the mysteries of religion are concerned, they are by no means absolutely incapable of investigation but only relatively (“Do what I tell you and in that way you shall learn that my teaching is from God.”). (2,327—28)

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Whoever would maintain with Haller and Kant   that we are simply unable to know anything in itself (Ding an sich) is saying that we can know no thing (or no person) in itself (in sich): i.e. as it (or he) is - which is fundamentally the same as saying that we do not know anything at all. (4,385)

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. . . there is no contradiction when one person says: the concept comes into being only through annulment (Aufhebung) of feeling and imagination, and another person says: this concept stays alive only by means of continual nourishment from feeling and imagination; however, one must not confuse feeling and imagination previous to and apart from the concept with their state after and inside of the concept produced. (2,141; see also 2,240)

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. . . every being or existing thing falls into a threefold category, namely: (a) as a knowing, willing, and acting being that is not known, willed, or acted upon by some other (prior or higher) thing; or (b) as a being that is known, willed, and acted upon by another (higher) being, but that itself knows, wills, and acts; or finally (c) as an existing thing that is merely known, willed, and acted upon, without itself knowing, willing or acting. Under the first heading, falls the concept of God; under the second, that of mind, to the extent that one distinguishes mind from God; and finally, under the third, that of non-intelligent self-less nature. (5,252)

Nota: Baader   finds a parallel division in John Scotus Erigena’s triad: natura creans nec creata; natura creata et creans; natura creata nec creans; in Baader’s terms, God, mind, and nature (13,113). Hegel’s division of reality into mind and nature is inadequate (BAADER: Sämtliche Werke 10,185 fn.; 14,119). The three realms are distinct but must not be separated:

One who seeks in nature for nature but not for mind, and one who seeks in mind only the latter and not God, or one who seeks for mind outside of and apart from nature, or for God without and apart from mind - will find neither nature, nor mind, nor God, but will instead lose all three. (14,316 fn.)

Nature’s goal is to rise to the level of mind; mind’s object is to rise to the level of God. The process does not involve annihilation of the lower entity, but sublation of the lower into the higher, so that the lower does not lose its identity (6,80). Hegel is the usual scapegoat when Baader requires an example of confused thinking in this matter. (See, for example, BAADER: Sämtliche Werke 10,118; 12,226, 230, 447; 13,209 and passim.)

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. . .a cause (as producing) is able to express (really externalize) itself only through its ground ... In those primitive concepts of cause and ground we have thus a primitive dualism without which in fact we are unable to declare anything . . . (5,11)

Nota: The fact is that “that which reveals itself always differentiates and sets apart something in itself in order to reveal itself in and through that” (9,310). This notion of differentiating and setting apart is of central significance for both Jacob Böhme and Baader: a thing can be known only in conjunction with its opposite; every existing thing consists essentially in polarity (9,214).65 Thus, the paradoxical law of manifestation “consists in the fact that every manifestation is conditioned and mediated by occultation (sublation [Aufhebung]) ...” (4,227; 7,104). Baader adopts Böhme’s view that “all things (i.e., purely temporal ones) consist in and pass away in yes and no” (9,189). Affirmation and negation are but two sides of every unity: “J. Böhme says in his last writing . . . that affirmation without negation is not possible, nor is negation without affirmation. ‘In yes and no consists the life of all things’ ” (13,80). Thus, there is no yes without a no, no light without darkness, no one without an other - this is basic.

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This is precisely J. Böhme’s great merit - that he conceives this innerness and outerness of God in immanent fashion and does not immediately conceive of the outerness of God’s existence as creaturely existence, as the pantheists do, to whom God, as soon as he wishes to be or should be a really existing being, immediately takes leave of himself and steps into or falls into creation. The God of these philosophers is a centaur or hybrid being, consisting of a center that is divine and a periphery that is creaturely or non-divine . . . (13,168; see also 8,78)