Plotino - Tratado 49,6 (V, 3, 6) — O Intelecto que se pensa ele mesmo

6. Se ha probado con este razonamiento que hay un ser que se piensa a sí mismo en términos rigurosamente inteligibles. Pero en cuanto al alma, el pensamiento de sí mismo tiene otro sentido que no puede ser el que, con toda propiedad, se aplica a la Inteligencia. Porque el alma se piensa a si misma por ser algo que depende de la inteligencia, aunque sea diferente a ella. En tanto la Inteligencia se piensa a sí misma por ser, precisamente, inteligencia y poder pensarse tal como es y según es, atendiendo a su propia naturaleza y a la facultad que posee de volverse hacia sí misma. Porque la Inteligencia ve los seres y, al verlos, se ve a sí misma; lo que ve en acto no es, pues, otra cosa que su acto, esto es, ella misma, puesto que la Inteligencia y el acto de la Inteligencia son una y la misma cosa. Ve toda ella y por toda ella, no una parte de sí misma por medio de otra parte. Tal es lo que se ha demostrado, aunque, a decir verdad, ¿estamos convencidos de ello? Porque la demostración implica la necesidad, pero no la convicción. La necesidad se encuentra, en efecto, en la Inteligencia, mientras que la convicción se da en el alma. Pero, según parece, tratamos de convencemos a nosotros mismos antes que de contemplar la verdad por medio de la inteligencia pura. Muy al contrario, cuando nos hallábamos en lo alto, esto es, en la Inteligencia, nos sentíamos plenamente satisfechos porque comprobábamos y veíamos por la Inteligencia que todas las cosas se reunían en la unidad; era, entonces, la Inteligencia la que actuaba y la que hablaba por sí misma, en tanto el alma, permaneciendo en reposo, daba su consentimiento a la actividad de aquélla. Mas una vez venidos a este mundo, esto es, al alma, tratábamos por todos los medios de convencernos, cual si quisiésemos ver un modelo en su imagen. Quizá sea conveniente enseñar al alma cómo la Inteligencia se contempla a sí misma, al menos, mostrarlo a la parte inteligente del alma, esto es, a la razón discursiva, que ya indica por su mismo nombre que se trata de una inteligencia y que recibe todo su poder de la misma Inteligencia. Conviene, pues, que la razón discursiva conozca que conoce todo aquello que ve que conozca, a la vez, todo lo que ella dice. Si lo que dice es ella misma, entonces, naturalmente, se conocerá a sí misma. Pero lo que ella dice proviene en realidad de lo alto o le viene de lo alto, de donde también proviene ella misma; y, siendo un verbo, aprehende las cosas vecinas de la inteligencia y las adapta a las huellas de la Inteligencia que se contienen en ella con lo cual se conoce de algún modo a sí misma. Esta imagen es lo que ella traslada a la inteligencia verdadera la cual es idéntica a sus propios pensamientos, como seres reales y primeros que son. De modo que no es posible que la Inteligencia salga de sí misma. Y si está en sí misma y consigo misma, o lo que es igual, si es verdaderamente inteligencia — si es así no podría encerrar insensatez —, deberá poseer necesariamente el conocimiento de sí misma, porque para ello se encuentra en sí misma y su acto y su sustancia no son otra cosa que el ser de la Inteligencia. Lo que ocurre es que no se trata de una inteligencia práctica que es la inteligencia que mira a los objetos exteriores y no permanece en sí misma cuando se da en ella esta clase de conocimiento; porque, en efecto, no le es necesario conocerse a sí misma, si se entrega por entero a la práctica. La inteligencia que no tiene necesidad de actuar — porque al carecer de objeto exterior la inteligencia pura carece de deseos — es en cambio, la inteligencia que se vuelve hacia sí misma; para la cual no sólo es verosímil, sino, Incluso, necesario que su conversión sea realmente un conocimiento de sí misma. De otro modo, ¿cómo concebir la vida de un ser que ha sido liberado de la acción y que permanece en la Inteligencia?

VI. La raison démontre donc qu’il y a un principe qui doit se connaître lui-même essentiellement. Mais cette connaissance de soi-même est plus parfaite dans l’intelligence que dans l’âme. L’âme ne se connaît elle-même qu’en tant qu’elle sait qu’elle dépend d’une autre puissance ; l’intelligence, en se tournant vers elle-même, connaît naturellement son existence et son essence (13). En contemplant les réalités, elle se contemple elle-même; cette contemplation est un acte, et cet acte est l’intelligence : car l’intelligence et la pensée ne font qu’une seule chose; l’intelligence tout entière se voit elle-même tout entière, au lieu de voir une de ses parties par une autre partie. Est-il dans la nature de l’intelligence, telle que la conçoit la raison, de produire en nous une simple persuasion? Non. L’intelligence implique nécessité[certitude] et non simple persuasion : car la nécessité est propre à l’intelligence; la persuasion à l’âme. Ici-bas, il est vrai, nous cherchons plutôt à être persuadés qu’à voir la vérité par l’intelligence pure. Quand nous étions dans la région supérieure, satisfaits de l’intelligence, nous pensions et nous contemplions l’intelligible en ramenant toutes choses à l’unité. C’était l’intelligence qui pensait et qui parlait sur elle-même; Pâme se reposait, et laissait agir l’intelligence. Hais, depuis que nous sommes descendus ici-bas, nous cherchons à produire dans L’âme la persuasion, parce que nous voulons contempler l’exemplaire dans son image.

Il faut donc enseigner à notre âme comment l’intelligence se contemple elle-même ; il faut l’enseigner, dis-je, à cette partie de notre âme que, vu son caractère intellectuel (νοερόν πως), nous nommons raison ou intelligence discursive (διανοητικόν), pour indiquer que c’est une espèce d’intelligence (νοῦν τινα), qu’elle possède sa puissance par l’intelligence (διὰ νοῦ), qu’elle la tient de l’intelligence (παρὰ νοῦ). Cette partie de l’âme doit donc connaître qu’elle connaît ce qu’elle voit, qu’elle sait ce qu’elle énonce, et que, si elle était identique aux choses qu’elle énonce, elle se connaîtrait par là elle-même. Mais, puisque les choses intelligibles lui viennent du même principe dont elle vient elle-même, puisqu’elle est une raison (λόγος), et qu’elle reçoit de l’intelligence des choses congénères, en les rapprochant des vestiges de l’intelligence qu’elle a en elle, elle doit se connaître elle-même. Qu’elle transporte donc cette image qu’elle a en elle à l’Intelligence véritable, qui est identique aux vrais intelligibles, c’est-à-dire aux êtres premiers et vraiment réels : car il est impossible que cette Intelligence sorte d’elle-même? Si donc l’Intelligence reste en elle-même et avec elle-même, si elle est ce qu’il est dans son essence d’être, c’est-à-dire intelligence (car l’intelligence ne peut jamais être inintelligente!, e"e doit renfermer en elle la connaissance d’elle-même, puisqu’elle ne sort pas d’elle-même, que sa fonction et son essence consistent à être seulement intelligence (14). Ce n’est pas une intelligence qui se livre à l’action (une intelligence pratique, πρακτικός), obligée de regarder ce qui est hors d’elle et de sortir d’elle-même pour prendre connaissance des choses extérieures : car il n’est pas nécessaire qu’une intelligence qui se livre à l’action se connaisse elle-même. Ne se livrant pas à l’action (car, étant pure, elle n’a rien à désirer), elle opère une conversion vers elle-même, en vertu de laquelle il est, non seulement probable, mais encore nécessaire qu’elle se connaisse elle-même. Sinon, en quoi consisterait sa vie, puisqu’elle ne se livre pas à l’action et qu’elle demeure en elle-même?

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS MORE PERFECT IN INTELLIGENCE THAN IN THE SOUL.

6. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that there is a principle which must essentially know itself. But this self-consciousness is more perfect in intelligence than in the soul. The soul knows herself in so far as she knows that she depends on another power; while intelligence, by merely turning towards itself, naturally cognizes its existence and "being." By contemplating realities, it contemplates itself; this contemplation is an actualization, and this actualization is intelligence; for intelligence and thought form but a single entity. The entire intelligence sees itself entire, instead of seeing one of its parts by another of its parts. Is it in the nature of intelligence, such as reason conceives of it, to produce within us a simple conviction? No. Intelligence necessarily implies (certitude), and not mere persuasion; for necessity is characteristic of intelligence, while persuasion is characteristic of the soul. Here below, it is true, we rather seek to be persuaded, than to see truth by pure Intelligence. When we were in the superior region, satisfied with intelligence, we used to think, and to contemplate the intelligible, reducing everything to unity. It was Intelligence which thought and spoke about itself; the soul rested, and allowed Intelligence free scope to act. But since we have descended here below, we seek to produce persuasion in the soul, because we wish to contemplate the model in its image.

THE SOUL MUST BE TAUGHT SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS BY CONVERSION.

We must, therefore, teach our soui how Intelligence contemplates itself. This has to be taught to that part of our soul which, because of its intellectual character, we call reason, or discursive intelligence, to indicate that it is a kind of intelligence, that it possesses its power by intelligence, and that it derives it from intelligence. This part of the soul must, therefore, know that it knows what it sees, that it knows what it expresses, and that, if it were identical with what it describes, it would thereby know itself. But since intelligible entities come to it from the same principle from which it itself comes, since it is a reason, and as it receives from intelligence entities that are kindred, by comparing them with the traces of intelligence it contains, it must know itself. This image it contains must, therefore, be raised to true Intelligence, which is identical with the true intelligible entities, that is, to the primary and really true Beings; for it is impossible that this intelligence should originate from itself. If then intelligence remain in itself and with itself, if it be what it is (in its nature) to be, that is, intelligence — for intelligence can never be unintelligent — it must contain within it the knowledge of itself, since it does not issue from itself, and since its function and its "being" (or, true nature) consist in being no more than intelligence. It is not an intelligence that devotes itself to practical action, obliged to consider what is external to it, and to issue from itself to become cognizant of exterior things; for it is not necessary that an intelligence which devotes itself to action should know itself. As it does not give itself to action — for, being pure, it has nothing to desire — it operates a conversion towards itself, by virute of which it is not only probable, but even necessary for it to know itself. Otherwise, what would its life consist of, inasmuch as it does not devote itself to action, and as it remains within itself?

VI. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that there is something which properly and principally itself intellectually perceives itself. This, however, when it is in soul, intellectually sees in one way, but in intellect more principally. For soul, indeed, knows itself, that it is the progeny of another thing; but intellect knows that it is from itself, and what its nature is, and who it is; and this by a natural conversion to itself. For beholding beings it beholds itself and beholding is in energy; and the energy is itself. For intellect and intelligence are one. With the whole of itself also it perceives the whole, and not a part by a part. Does, therefore, reason demonstrate it to be a thing of such a kind as to have an energy which is merely an object of belief ; or is it indeed necessary that it should be such as it is, but that it should not have persuasion ? For necessity indeed is in intellect, but persuasion in sold. Hence we investigate as it seems, rather for the purpose of persuading ourselves, than to behold truth in a pure intellect. For as long as we continued on high, and adhered to the nature of intellect we were satisfied, energized intellectually, and contemplated, collecting all things into one. For it was intellect that then energized, and spoke of itself. But soul was quiet, yielding to the energy of intellect. When, however, we descended hither, we were desirous of producing persuasion in the soul, wishing to behold the archetype in an image. Perhaps, therefore, it is requisite to teach our soul, how its intellect once beheld itself; and to teach that part of the soul this, which is in a certain respect intellectual, and which we assume to be dianoetic; by this appellation latently signifying, that it is a certain intellect, or that it is a power through intellect, and that it derives its subsistence from intellect. It is fit, therefore, that this part should know, that it also knows such things as it sees, and such things as it says. And if it were the things which it says, it would after this manner know itself. Since, however, the things which it sees are present with, or are supernally imparted to it from that region whence it also originates, it happens to this part likewise since it is reason, and receives things allied to itself, that by an adaptation of the vestiges which it contains, it is enabled to know itself. It may, therefore, transfer the image to true intellect which is the same with the things that are truly the objects of intellectual perception, and which have a real and primary subsistence. For it is not possible that such an intellect as this should be external to itself. Hence, if it is in and with itself, and is [truly] that which it is, it is intellect. But intellect can never be deprived of intellect; so that the knowledge of itself is necessarily present with it; and this because it is in itself, and its employment and essence consist in being intellect alone. For this is not a practical intellect, as looking to that which pertains to external action, and which in consequence of not abiding in itself, is a certain knowledge of externals. There is, however, no necessity if intellect is practic, that it should know itself; but this is the province of that intellect which is not engaged in practical affairs. For appetite is not in pure intellect; but this being absent, the consequent conversion to itself, not only demonstrates that the knowledge of itself is reasonable, but also necessary. For otherwise what would be the life of it, when liberated from action, and established in intellect ?

6. Thus we have shown that there exists that which in the strictest sense possesses self-knowing.

This self-knowing agent, perfect in the Intellectual-Principle, is modified in the Soul.

The difference is that, while the soul knows itself as within something else, the Intellectual-Principle knows itself as self-depending, knows all its nature and character, and knows by right of its own being and by simple introversion. When it looks upon the authentic existences it is looking upon itself; its vision as its effective existence, and this efficacy is itself since the Intellectual-Principle and the Intellectual Act are one: this is an integral seeing itself by its entire being, not a part seeing by a part.

But has our discussion issued in an Intellectual-Principle having a persuasive activity [furnishing us with probability]?

No: it brings compulsion not persuasion; compulsion belongs to the Intellectual-Principle, persuasion to the soul or mind, and we seem to desire to be persuaded rather than to see the truth in the pure intellect.

As long as we were Above, collected within the Intellectual nature, we were satisfied; we were held in the intellectual act; we had vision because we drew all into unity - for the thinker in us was the Intellectual-Principle telling us of itself - and the soul or mind was motionless, assenting to that act of its prior. But now that we are once more here - living in the secondary, the soul - we seek for persuasive probabilities: it is through the image we desire to know the archetype.

Our way is to teach our soul how the Intellectual-Principle exercises self-vision; the phase thus to be taught is that which already touches the intellective order, that which we call the understanding or intelligent soul, indicating by the very name that it is already of itself in some degree an Intellectual-Principle or that it holds its peculiar power through and from that Principle. This phase must be brought to understand by what means it has knowledge of the thing it sees and warrant for what it affirms: if it became what it affirms, it would by that fact possess self-knowing. All its vision and affirmation being in the Supreme or deriving from it - There where itself also is - it will possess self-knowledge by its right as a Reason-Principle, claiming its kin and bringing all into accord with the divine imprint upon it.

The soul therefore [to attain self-knowledge] has only to set this image [that is to say, its highest phase] alongside the veritable Intellectual-Principle which we have found to be identical with the truths constituting the objects of intellection, the world of Primals and Reality: for this Intellectual-Principle, by very definition, cannot be outside of itself, the Intellectual Reality: self-gathered and unalloyed, it is Intellectual-Principle through all the range of its being - for unintelligent intelligence is not possible - and thus it possesses of necessity self-knowing, as a being immanent to itself and one having for function and essence to be purely and solely Intellectual-Principle. This is no doer; the doer, not self-intent but looking outward, will have knowledge, in some kind, of the external, but, if wholly of this practical order, need have no self-knowledge; where, on the contrary, there is no action - and of course the pure Intellectual-Principle cannot be straining after any absent good - the intention can be only towards the self; at once self-knowing becomes not merely plausible but inevitable; what else could living signify in a being immune from action and existing in Intellect?