Plotino - Tratado 49,14 (V, 3, 14) — O discurso apofântico do primeiro princípio

14. ¿Cómo, entonces, podremos hablar de él? Podemos hacerlo, ciertamente, pero con ello no lo expresamos, ni tenemos conocimiento o pensamiento de él. ¿Cómo, pues, podremos hablar de él si no lo poseemos? Digamos que si no lo poseemos por el conocimiento, no dejamos de aprehenderlo de algún modo y lo aprehendemos, en efecto, como para poder hablar de él, aunque nuestras palabras no lo alcancen en sí mismo. Decimos de él lo que no es, no decimos en cambio, lo que es, porque hablamos de él partiendo de cosas que le son inferiores. Sin embargo, nada impide que le poseamos, aunque no acertemos a expresarlo en palabras. Así, los inspirados y los posesos ven en un cierto grado que tienen en sí mismos algo más grande que ellos, pero no ven lo que es; no obstante, de sus movimientos y de sus palabras obtienen el sentimiento de la causa que los ha movido, aunque esta causa sea muy distinta a ellos. Una parecida relación mantenemos nosotros con él, de tal modo que, cuando alcanzamos la inteligencia pura y hacemos uso de ella, vemos que él es lo más íntimo de la Inteligencia, lo que ha dado la esencia y todas las demás cosas del mismo rango; pero esto no quiere decir que sea ninguna de estas cosas, puesto que es superior a lo que nosotros llamamos ser y es mayor y se encuentra, también, a más altura que lo que nosotros llamamos ser. El mismo es superior al verbo, a la Inteligencia y a la sensación, porque nos ha dado todas estas cosas y no es en absoluto ninguna de ellas.

XIV. Comment se fait-il alors que nous parlions de lui ?

— Nous pouvons énoncer quelque chose de lui, mais non l’énoncer lui-même par la parole. Nous ne saurions le connaître ni le saisir par la pensée. —Gomment donc en parlons-nous puisque nous ne le saisissons pas?— C’est que, s’il échappe à notre connaissance, il ne nous échappe pas complètement. Nous l’embrassons assez pour énoncer quelque chose de lui sans l’énoncer lui-même, pour dire ce qu’il n’est pas, sans dire ce qu’il est; voilà pourquoi nous employons en parlant de lui des termes qui ne sont propres à designer que des choses inférieures. Nous pouvons d’ailleurs l’embrasser (ἔχειν) sans être cependant capables de l’énoncer, semblables aux hommes qui, transportés par un enthousiasme divin, sentent qu’ils ont en eux quelque chose de supérieur sans pouvoir s’en rendre compte. Ils parlent de ce qui les agile, et ils ont ainsi quelque sentiment de celui qui les émeut, quoiqu’ils en diffèrent. Telle est à peu près notre relation avec Lui : quand nous nous élevons à Lui en faisant usage de l’intelligence pure, nous sentons qu’il est le fond de l’intelligence, le principe qui donne l’essence et les autres choses de cet ordre; nous sentons qu’il est meilleur, plus grand et plus relevé que l’être, parce qu’il est supérieur à la raison, à l’intelligence et aux sens, qu’il donne ces choses sans être ce qu’elles sont.

WE COME SUFFICIENTLY NEAR TO HIM TO TALK ABOUT HIM.

14. How then do we speak of Him? Because we can assert something about Him, though we cannot express Him by speech. We could not know Him, nor grasp Him by thought. How then do we speak of Him, if we cannot grasp Him? Because though He does escape our knowledge, He does not escape us completely. We grasp Him enough to assert something about Him without expressing Him himself, to say what He is not, without saying what He is; that is why in speaking of Him we use terms that are suitable to designate only lower things. Besides we can embrace Him without being capable of expressing Him, like men who, transported by a divine enthusiasm, feel that they contain something superior without being able to account for it. They speak of what agitates them, and they thus have some feeling of Him who moves them, though they differ therefrom. Such is our relation with Him; when we rise to Him by using our pure intelligence, we feel that He is the foundation of our intelligence, the principle that furnishes "being" and other things of the kind; we feel that He is better, greater, and more elevated than we, because He is superior to reason, to intelligence, and to the senses, because He gives these things without being what they are.

XIV. How, therefore, can we speak of it ? We are able indeed to say something of it, but we do not speak it. Nor have we either any knowledge, or intellectual perception of it. How, therefore, do we speak of it, if we do not possess it? May we not say, that though we do not possess it by knowledge, yet we are not entirely deprived of the possession of it; but we possess it in such a way that we can speak of it, but cannot speak it ? For we can say what it is not, but we cannot say what it is; so that we speak of it from things posterior to it. We are not, however, prevented from possessing it, though we cannot say what it is. But in the same manner as those who energize enthusiastically, and become divinely inspired, perceive indeed, that they have something greater in themselves, though they do not know what it is; but of the things by which they are excited they speak, and from these receive a certain sensation of the moving power, which is different from them; — in this manner also we appear to be affected about that which is perfectly simple, when possessing a pure intellect we employ it, and conclude that this is the inward intellect which is the source of essence, and of other things which belong to this arrangement. We are sensible, therefore, that the nature which is perfectly simple is not these things, but that it is something more excellent, more ample, and great, than that which we denominate being, because it is also superior to reason, intellect, and sense, imparting, but not being these.

14. How, then, do we ourselves come to be speaking of it?

No doubt we deal with it, but we do not state it; we have neither knowledge nor intellection of it.

But in what sense do we even deal with it when we have no hold upon it?

We do not, it is true, grasp it by knowledge, but that does not mean that we are utterly void of it; we hold it not so as to state it, but so as to be able to speak about it. And we can and do state what it is not, while we are silent as to what it is: we are, in fact, speaking of it in the light of its sequels; unable to state it, we may still possess it.

Those divinely possessed and inspired have at least the knowledge that they hold some greater thing within them though they cannot tell what it is; from the movements that stir them and the utterances that come from them they perceive the power, not themselves, that moves them: in the same way, it must be, we stand towards the Supreme when we hold the Intellectual-Principle pure; we know the divine Mind within, that which gives Being and all else of that order: but we know, too, that other, know that it is none of these, but a nobler principle than any-thing we know as Being; fuller and greater; above reason, mind and feeling; conferring these powers, not to be confounded with them.