Plotino - Tratado 10,9 (V, 1, 9) — Exame dos filósofos anteriores: Anaxágoras, Heráclito, Empédocles, Aristóteles e os pitagóricos

9. Anaxágoras  , al hablar de la simplicidad de la inteligencia, pura y sin mezcla [1], considera también al Uno como término primero y separado; pero, por su misma antigüedad, desdeñó la exactitud. Y Heráclito   conoció el Uno eterno e inteligible, porque según él, los cuerpos están en un devenir y en un flujo constantes [2]. Para Empédocles   cuentan la Discordia, que separa, y la Amistad, identificada con el Uno. El Uno es también para él algo incorpóreo en tanto los elementos son considerados como la materia [3]. Más tarde, Aristóteles   dijo que el ser primero es algo “separado e inteligible” [4], aunque al afirmar que “se piensa a sí mismo” hace nuevamente que no sea el primero [5]. Aristóteles habla de diferente manera que Platón   cuando admite tantos seres inteligibles como esferas celestes para que cada una de las esferas pueda ser movida pero no tiene razones que dar e invoca entonces la necesidad. Mas, aunque hablase con todo fundamento, podría objetársele que es más razonable que todas las esferas, puesto que colaboran en una misma ordenación, miren hacía el Uno y hacia el Primero. Podría, incluso, preguntársele si, para él, los seres inteligibles múltiples provienen de un solo y primer término, o si se dan varios principios en estos seres. Si ocurre lo primero, estará claro, por analogía con las esferas del cielo sensible, en donde una encierra a las demás y la esfera exterior domina a todas las otras que el ser primero de lo alto envuelve también todas las cosas y que, a su vez, existe realmente un mundo inteligible. Pero, lo mismo que aquí las esferas no están vacías, sino que la primera se encuentra llena de astros y las otras llevan igualmente el suyo, así también en el mundo inteligible los seres que actúan de motores encerrarán en sí mismos una multiplicidad y serán, sin duda alguna, los seres más verdaderos. Si ocurre lo segundo esto es, si cada motor es un principio, los distintos principios se regirán por el azar, y entonces ¿Cómo podrán reunirse y ponerse de acuerdo para producir esta obra única que es la armonía del cielo? ¿Cómo es posible, por otra parte, que los seres sensibles que hay en el cielo constituyan un número igual al de los motores inteligibles? ¿Y por qué estos motores son múltiples e incorpóreos y carecen de materia que les distinga?

Así se explica que aquellos de los antiguos que siguieron a Pitágoras  , a sus discípulos y a Ferécides se hayan mantenido firmemente con respecto a esta naturaleza; pero unos la hicieron explícita en sus escritos, otros la dieron a conocer en lecciones no escritas y otros, en fin, la desdeñaron completamente.

[9] Anaxagore, qui reconnaît une Intelligence pure et sans mélange (46) admet aussi que le premier principe est
simple et que l’Un est séparé des choses sensibles. Mais, venu dans des temps trop anciens, il n’a pas traité nettement cette question.

Héraclite a connu l’Un éternel et intelligible : car il professe que les corps deviennent sans cesse et sont dans un état d’écoulement perpétuel (47).

Dans le système d’Empédocle, la Discorde divise et la Concorde unit ; or, ce second principe est posé comme incorporel, et les éléments jouent le rôle de matière (48).

Aristote, qui vécut à une époque postérieure, dit que le premier principe est séparé [des choses sensibles] et qu’il est intelligible (49). Mais,en affirmant qu’il se pense lui-même, il le fait déchoir du premier rang. Il admet aussi d’autres intelligibles en nombre égal à celui des sphères célestes, pour que chacune ait un moteur (50); il professe ainsi sur les intelligibles une autre théorie que Platon, et comme il n’a pas déraison plausible, il allègue la nécessité. On pourrait lui faire ici une objection fondée : il semble plus raisonnable d’admettre que toutes les sphères coordonnées par rapport à un seul plan se rapportent toutes à l’Un et au Premier. On aurait le droit de poser aussi cette question : les intelligibles [pour Aristote] dépendent-ils de l’Un, du Premier, ou bien y a-t-il plusieurs principes pour les intelligibles? — Si les intelligibles dépendent de l’Un, ils seront sans doute disposés symétriquement, comme le sont dans le monde sensible les sphères dont chacune en renferme une autre, et dont une seule, extérieure aux autres, les contient et les domine toutes. Ainsi, dans ce cas, le premier intelligible enveloppera toutes choses là-haut et sera le monde intelligible. De même que les sphères ne sont pas vides, que la première est pleine d’astres, que chacune des autres en est pleine aussi, de même là-haut les moteurs contiendront beaucoup de choses, et tout aura une existence plus réelle. — D’un autre côté, si chacun des intelligibles est principe, tous seront contingents. Comment alors uniront-ils leur action et concourront-ils par leur accorda produire tous un seul effet, qui est l’harmonie du ciel ? Pourquoi dans le ciel les choses sensibles sont-elles égales en nombre aux moteurs intelligibles? Enfin, pourquoi ceux-ci sont-ils plusieurs, puisqu’ils sont incorporels et que nulle matière ne les sépare les uns des autres?

Aussi, ceux des anciens qui ont le plus fidèlement suivi la doctrine de Pythagore, de ses disciples et de Phérécyde, se sont-ils surtout occupés de l’intelligible. Les uns ont consigné leurs opinions dans leurs ouvrages; d’autres les ont exposées seulement dans des entretiens que l’écriture n’a pas conservés. Il en est d’autres enfin qui ne nous ont rien laissé sur ce sujet.

ANAXÁGORAS TEACHES THE SAME THING.

9. Anaxágoras, who teaches a pure and unmingled Intelligence also insists that the first Principle is simple, and that the One is separated from sense-objects. But, as he lived in times too ancient, he has not treated this matter in sufficient detail.

HERACLITUS ALSO TAUGHT THE SAME THING.

Heraclitus also taught the eternal and intelligible One; for Heraclitus holds that bodies are ceaselessly "becoming" (that is, developing), and that they are in a perpetual state of flux.

EMPÉDOCLES TAUGHT THE SAME THING.

In the system of Empédocles, discord divides, and concord unites; now this second principle is posited as incorporeal, and the elements play the part of matter.

ARISTOTLE TAUGHT THE SAME THING.

Aristotle, who lived at a later period, says that the First Principle is separated from (sense-objects), and that it is intelligible. But when Aristotle says that He thinks himself, Aristotle degrades Him from the first rank. Aristotle also asserts the existence of other intelligible entities in a number equal to the celestial spheres, so that each one of them might have a principle of motion. About the intelligible entities, therefore, Aristotle advances a teaching different from that of Plato, and as he has no plausible reason for this change, he alleges necessity. A well-grounded objection might here be taken against him. It seems more reasonable to suppose that all the spheres co-ordinated in a single system should, all of them, stand in relation to the One and the First. About Aristotle’s views this question also might be raised: do the intelligible entities depend on the One and First, or are there several principles for the intelligible entities? If the intelligible entities depend on the One, they will no doubt be arranged symmetrically, as, in the sense-sphere, are the spheres, each of which contains another, and of which a single One, exterior to the others, contains them, and dominates them all. Thus, in this case, the first intelligible entity will contain all entities up there, and will be the intelligible world. Just as the spheres are not empty, as the first is full of stars, and as each of the others also is full of them, so above their motors will contain many entities, and everything will have a more real existence. On the other hand, if each of the intelligible entities is a principle, all will be contingent. How then will they unite their action, and will they, by agreement, contribute in producing a single effect, which is the harmony of heaven? Why should sense-objects, in heaven, equal in number their intelligible motors? Again, why are there several of these, since they are incorporeal, and since no matter separates them from each other?

WHAT THE PYTHAGOREANS TAUGHT ON THE SUBJECT.

Among ancient philosophers, those who most faithfully followed the doctrine of Pythagoras, of his disciples, and of Pherecydes, have specially dealt with the intelligible. Some of them have committed their opinions to their written works; others have set them forth only in discussions that have not been preserved in writing. There are others of them, also, who have left us nothing on the subject.

IX. But Anaxagoras, when he says that there is a pure and un mingled intellect, admits also that the first [principle of things] is simple, and that the one is separate. On account of antiquity, however, he omits the accurate discussion of these things. Heraclitus, also, knew an eternal and intelligible one. For he says, that bodies are always rising into existence, or becoming to be, and flowing. With Empedocles, strife indeed divides, but friendship is the one; and this according to him is incorporeal. But the elements are arranged by him analogous to matter. Aristotle, however, afterwards asserts that the first principle is separate and intelligible. But when he says that it intellectually perceives itself, again he makes it not to be the first. [6] When also he introduces many other intelligibles, and as many as there are spheres in the heavens, in order that each of these may move each of the spheres, he speaks of intelligibles in a way different from Plato, and not being able to assign probable reasons, adduces necessity. It may also be opportunely observed, that it is more reasonable to refer all the spheres to one co-ordination, and to assert that they look to one thing, and the first cause of all. Moreover, it may likewise be asked, whether according to him the many intelligibles are from one first cause, or whether there are many principles in intelligibles ? And if indeed they are from one first, they will be analogously arranged, like the spheres in the sensible universe, one comprehending another, but one external to them ruling over all of them. So that the first will there comprehend the rest, and there will be an intelligible world. As here, likewise, the spheres are not empty, but the first is full of stars, and all the rest have stars; so there also the moving causes will contain many things in themselves, and what is there contained will have a more true subsistence. But if each is a principle, the principles will subsist fortuitously. And it may be asked, why they subsist and accord in accomplishing one work, viz. the concord of all heaven. How, likewise, are the sensible natures in the heavens equal to the intelligible and motive causes. And how are they thus many being incorporeal, since matter does not separate them from each other. Hence,, those ancients who especially embraced the doctrines of Pythagoras and his followers, and of Pherecydes, were investigators of this intelligible essence. Some of them, however, committed discussions of these things to writing, but others delivered them not in writing, but unfolded them in unwritten discourses, or wholly dismissed the consideration of them.

9. Anaxagoras, again, in his assertion of a Mind pure and unmixed, affirms a simplex First and a sundered One, though writing long ago he failed in precision.

Heraclitus, with his sense of bodily forms as things of ceaseless process and passage, knows the One as eternal and intellectual.

In Empedocles, similarly, we have a dividing principle, "Strife," set against "Friendship" - which is The One and is to him bodiless, while the elements represent Matter.

Later there is Aristotle; he begins by making the First transcendent and intellective but cancels that primacy by supposing it to have self-intellection. Further he affirms a multitude of other intellective beings - as many indeed as there are orbs in the heavens; one such principle as in - over to every orb - and thus his account of the Intellectual Realm differs from Plato’s and, failing reason, he brings in necessity; though whatever reasons he had alleged there would always have been the objection that it would be more reasonable that all the spheres, as contributory to one system, should look to a unity, to the First.

We are obliged also to ask whether to Aristotle’s mind all Intellectual Beings spring from one, and that one their First; or whether the Principles in the Intellectual are many.

If from one, then clearly the Intellectual system will be analogous to that of the universe of sense-sphere encircling sphere, with one, the outermost, dominating all - the First [in the Intellectual] will envelop the entire scheme and will be an Intellectual [or Archetypal] Kosmos; and as in our universe the spheres are not empty but the first sphere is thick with stars and none without them, so, in the Intellectual Kosmos, those principles of Movement will envelop a multitude of Beings, and that world will be the realm of the greater reality.

If on the contrary each is a principle, then the effective powers become a matter of chance; under what compulsion are they to hold together and act with one mind towards that work of unity, the harmony of the entire heavenly system? Again what can make it necessary that the material bodies of the heavenly system be equal in number to the Intellectual moving principles, and how can these incorporeal Beings be numerically many when there is no Matter to serve as the basis of difference?

For these reasons the ancient philosophers that ranged themselves most closely to the school of Pythagoras and of his later followers and to that of Pherekudes, have insisted upon this Nature, some developing the subject in their writings while others treated of it merely in unwritten discourses, some no doubt ignoring it entirely.