Plotino - Tratado 24,2 (V, 6, 2) — O Primeiro não intelige

2. Contamos, pues, con dos seres pensantes, de un lado ser pensante primitivo, y de otro el ser pensante diferente a aquél. En cuanto al ser que está más allá del ser pensante primitivo, no es ya un ser que piensa, porque para pensar se necesita una inteligencia con la que se piense, y, por añadidura, que esta misma inteligencia posea un objeto inteligible. Además, si se trata del ser pensante primitivo, tal inteligencia poseerá ese objeto en sí misma. Si se trata de algo enteramente inteligible, no es necesario que posea en sí mismo una inteligencia que piense, ni tampoco que sea un ser que piensa; porque, si así fuese, ya no sería tan sólo un ser inteligible, sino también un ser que piensa, y no sería igualmente un ser primero, puesto que sería doble.

Ahora bien, la inteligencia que posee un objeto inteligible no podría realmente existir de no existir también una esencia puramente inteligible; quiere decirse, una esencia inteligible por su relación con la Inteligencia, aunque, en sí misma, no tenga que ser ni un ser primitivamente inteligible ni un ser que piensa. Porque no es objeto inteligible sino por el hecho de que ha de aprehenderla la Inteligencia para no caer así en el vacío, caso de que no tuviese un objeto inteligible que pensase captar y aprehender. Pues, claro que la Inteligencia no podría pensar de no poseer un objeto inteligible, ya que es más perfecta cuando lo posee. Conviene, sin embargo, que este objeto sea perfecto por sí mismo y antes de que se lo piense. Si es así, nada le añade el pensar, ni tiene necesidad de que el pensamiento exista, dado que se basta a sí mismo. Esto es, en definitiva, no piensa. Con lo cual habrá algo que no piensa, un ser pensante primitivo y un ser pensante de segundo género. Si, por otra parte, el ser primitivo pensase, en algo recaería su pensamiento. No sería, pues, el ser primero, sino el segundo. Ni sería uno, sino que sería múltiple y pensaría en sí todas cuantas cosas existen; porque, si sólo se piensa a sí mismo, tiene que ser múltiple.

II. Puisqu’on distingue deux principes pensants, l’un qui est le premier principe pensant [l’Intelligence], et l’autre qui est le second [l’Âme], le principe supérieur au premier principe pensant ne doit pas lui-même penser. Pour penser, il faudrait qu’il fut intelligence ; pour être intelligence, qu’il eût un objet; pour être le premier principe pensant, qu’il eût cet objet en lui-même. Or, il n’est pas nécessaire que tout intelligible possède l’intelligence et pense; sinon, il serait non seulement intelligible, mais encore intelligence ; se trouvant être ainsi deux choses, il ne serait pas le Premier. D’un autre côté, l’Intelligence ne peut subsister s’il n’y a une essence purement intelligible, qui soit intelligible pour l’Intelligence, mais qui en elle-même ne soit aucunement intelligence ni intelligible. En effet, ce qui est intelligible est intelligible pour un autre. Quant à l’Intelligence, le pouvoir qu’elle a de penser est tout à fait vain si elle ne perçoit et ne saisit l’intelligible qu’elle pense : car elle ne peut penser si elle n’a un objet à penser, et elle n’est parfaite que quand elle le possède. Or, elle doit, avant de penser, être parfaite par elle-même dans son essence. Donc le principe par lequel l’Intelligence est parfaite doit lui-même être ce qu’il est avant de penser : par conséquent, il n’a pas besoin de penser, puisque avant de penser il se suffit à lui-même. Il ne pensera donc pas (04).

Il résulte de là que le premier principe [l’Un] ne pense pas ; le second [l’Intelligence] est le premier principe pensant ; le troisième [l’Âme] est le second principe pensant. Si le premier principe pensait, il posséderait un attribut; par suite, au lieu d’occuper le premier rang, il n’occuperait que le second ; au lieu d’être un, il serait multiple, il serait toutes les choses qu’il penserait : car se bornât-il à se penser lui-même, il serait déjà multiple.

2. Il y a donc deux sortes d’êtres pensants : l’être pensant au sens primitif du terme, et l’être pensant en un autre sens. Mais ce qui est au delà de l’être pensant pris au premier sens, ce n’est plus un être qui pense ; car pour penser, il faut d’abord une intelligence qui pense, il faut ensuite que cette intelligence ait un objet intelligible, et enfin, s’il s’agit de l’être pensant au premier sens, qu’elle ait cet objet en elle-même. En revanche, si une chose est tout entière intelligible, il n’est pas nécessaire qu’elle ait en elle-même une intelligence qui pense et qu’elle soit elle-même un être qui pense; sinon, elle ne se bornerait pas à être une chose intelligible, elle serait aussi un être qui pense ; de plus, elle ne serait pas première, puisqu’elle serait double. Or l’intelligence qui possède un objet intelligible ne pourrait exister, si l’on n’admettait l’existence d’une chose purement intelligible ; je veux dire intelligible, en tant qu’elle est l’objet de l’intelligence, bien que, en elle-même, elle ne soit pas plus, primitivement, un être intelligible qu’un être qui pense. Elle n’est objet intelligible que pour autre chose qu’elle, à savoir pour l’intelligence, qui appliquerait sa pensée à vide, si elle n’avait à comprendre et à saisir une chose intelligible. L’intelligence ne pourrait pas penser sans cette chose intelligible ; et sa pensée se parfait, lorsqu’elle la possède. Mais il faut bien que, avant qu’on ne la pense, cette chose soit parfaite de par sa propre essence. Si la perfection lui appartient, elle est parfaite avant qu’il existe une pensée ; elle n’a nullement besoin que la pensée existe ; avant toute pensée, elle se suffit à elle-même. Donc elle ne pense pas. Il y a donc une chose qui ne pense pas, un être pensant primitif, et un être pensant postérieur.

En outre, si le Premier pensait, il aurait un attribut ; il ne serait donc pas le Premier, mais le second ; il ne serait pas un, mais multiple. Il serait tout ce qu’il pense ; ne pensât-il que lui-même, il serait multiple.

A SUPRA-THINKING PRINCIPLE IS NECESSARY TO THE WORKING OF INTELLIGENCE.

2. Since we have distinguished two principles, the one which is the first thinking principle (the Intelligence), and the other which is the second (the Soul), the Principle superior to the first thinking principle must itself not think. In order to think, it would have to be Intelligence; to be Intelligence, it would have to think an object; to be the first thinking principle, it would have to contain this object. Now it is not necessary that every intelligible entity should possess intelligence, and should think; otherwise it would not only be intelligible, but even Intelligence; being thus dual, it would not be the first. On the other hand, intelligence cannot subsist, if there be not a purely intelligible nature ("being"), which is intelligible for Intelligence, but which in itself should be neither intelligence nor intelligible. Indeed, that which is intelligible must be intelligible for something else. As to Intelligence, its power is quite vain, if it does not perceive and does not grasp the intelligible that it thinks; for it cannot think, if it have no object to think; and it is perfect only when it possesses this. Now, before thinking, it must by itself be perfect by nature ("being"). Therefore, the principle through which intelligence is perfect must itself be what it is before it thinks; consequently, it has no need to think, since, before thinking, it suffices to itself. It will, therefore, not think.

THE FIRST THINKING PRINCIPLE IS THE SECOND PRINCIPLE.

Therefore, the First principle (the One) does not think; the second (Intelligence) is the first thinking principle; the third (the Soul) is the second thinking principle. If the first Principle thought, it would possess an attribute; consequently, instead of occupying the first rank, it would occupy only the second; instead of being One, it would be manifold, and would be all the things that it thought; for it would already be manifold, even if it limited itself to thinking itself.

II. If, therefore, there is that which is primarily intellective, and also that which is after another manner [i.e. secondarily] intellective, that which is beyond the first intelligent nature, will not perceive intellectually. For it is necessary that it should become intellect in order that it may have intellectual perception. But being intellect it will also have the intelligible. And if it is primarily intellective, it will have the intelligible in itself. It is not, however, necessary that whatever is intelligible should have that which is intellective in itself, and perceive intellectually. For in this case, it will not only be intelligible, but also intellective. But being two things it will not be that which is first. Intellect, likewise, which possesses the intelligible, could not subsist without the existence of an essence which is purely intelligible; and which with respect to intellect, indeed, will be intelligible, but with reference to itself will be properly neither intellective, nor intelligible. For that which is intelligible, is intelligible to another thing. And intellect which darts itself forward by intelligence would have a vacuum, unless it received and comprehended in itself the intelligible which it intellectually perceives. For it is not intellective without the intelligible. Hence it is then perfect when it possesses the intelligible. It is necessary, however, prior to its perceiving intellectually, that it should have with itself a perfect essence. Hence, that with which the perfect is essentially1 present, will be perfect prior to intellectual perception. To this, therefore, nothing of intellectual perception is necessary. For prior to this it is sufficient to itself. Hence it does not perceive intellectually. There is, therefore, that which is not intellective; there is also that which is primarily-intellective; and there is that which is intellective in a secondary degree. Farther still, if that which is first perceives intellectually, something is present with it. Hence it is not the first, but that which is second. It is also not one, but is now many; and is all such things as it intellectually perceives. For if it only intellectually perceived itself, it would be many. [1]

2. Thus there is the primally intellective and there is that in which intellection has taken another mode; but this indicates that what transcends the primarily intellective has no intellection; for, to have intellection, it must become an Intellectual-Principle, and, if it is to become that, it must possess an intellectual object and, as primarily intellective, it must possess that intellectual object as something within itself.

But it is not inevitable that every intellectual object should both possess the intellective principle in itself and exercise intellection: at that, it would be not merely object but subject as well and, besides, being thus dual, could not be primal: further, the intellectual principle that is to possess the intellectual object could not cohere unless there existed an essence purely intellectual, something which, while standing as intellectual object to the intellectual principle, is in its own essence neither an agent nor an object of intellection. The intellectual object points to something beyond itself [to a percipient]; and the intellectual agent has its intellection in vain unless by seizing and holding an object - since, failing that, it can have no intellection but is consummated only when it possesses itself of its natural term.

There must have been something standing consummate independently of any intellectual act, something perfect in its own essence: thus that in which this completion is inherent must exist before intellection; in other words it has no need of intellection, having been always self-sufficing: this, then, will have no intellectual act.

Thus we arrive at: a principle having no intellection, a principle having intellection primarily, a principle having it secondarily.

It may be added that, supposing The First to be intellective, it thereby possesses something [some object, some attribute]: at once it ceases to be a first; it is a secondary, and not even a unity; it is a many; it is all of which it takes intellectual possession; even though its intellection fell solely upon its own content, it must still be a manifold.