Plotino - Tratado 30,1 (III, 8, 1) — Todas as coisas aspiram à contemplação

Se começamos por nos entreter, antes de nos pôr a falar seriamente, dizendo que todas as coisas aspiram à contemplação, que esta é o fim para o qual todas voltam seu olhar – não somente os seres vivos racionais, mas também aqueles que não são racionais, a natureza que está nas plantas e a terra que as engendra – e que todas aí chegam tanto quanto sua natureza permite, mas que algumas contemplam e conseguem ao final que delas é de uma maneira e de outras de uma outra maneira, algumas verdadeiramente, outras em não recebendo senão uma imitação ou uma imagem deste fim, se encontraria alguém para sustentar a bizarrice de nossa proposição? Mas posto que é a nós mesmos que a questão é dirigida, não há nenhum risco em nos entretermos de nossas próprias proposições.

E então, nós também que nos entretemos, não é verdade que estamos em vias de contemplar? Sim, é o que fazemos e é o que fazem todos aqueles que se entretêm, ou pelo menos é isto que aspiram quando se entretêm. E é mesmo provável, que seja uma criança ou um homem que se entretém ou que é sério, que é com vistas à contemplação que se entretém ou que é sério. E toda ação comporta um esforço para a contemplação: a ação contrita conduz bastante à contemplação para o que é exterior, e a ação que se diz voluntária aí conduz menos; portanto, assim como a precedente, ela nasce de um desejo de contemplação. Mas trataremos disso mais tarde. De imediato, falemos da terra ela mesma, das árvores e das plantas em geral, e nos demandemos: em que consiste sua contemplação? Que relação estabeleceremos entre o que produz e engendra a terra e sua atividade de contemplação? E como a natureza, da qual se diz que é desprovida de representação e de razão, pode possuir nela mesma a contemplação, e produzir o que ela produz, pela contemplação que ela não possui? Sim, como?

Si, badinant avant d’aborder la discussion sérieuse de la question, nous disions que tous les êtres, non-seulement les êtres raisonnables, mais encore les êtres irraisonnables, les végétaux ainsi que la terre qui les engendre, aspirent à la contemplation [à la pensée] et tendent à ce but, que même ils l’atteignent dans la mesure où il leur est donné naturellement de l’atteindre; que, par suite de la différence qui existe entre eux, les uns arrivent véritablement à la contemplation, tandis que les autres n’en ont qu’un reflet et qu’une image, ne regarderait-on pas notre assertion comme un paradoxe insoutenable ? Mais, comme nous discutons entre nous, nous pouvons sans crainte soutenir, en badinant, ce paradoxe. Nous-mêmes, en effet, tout en badinant, ne nous livrons-nous pas en ce moment même à la contemplation ? Et non-seulement nous, mais tous ceux qui badinent, n’en font-ils pas autant et n’aspirent-ils pas à la contemplation ? On pourrait dire que l’enfant qui badine, aussi bien que l’homme qui médite, ont tous deux pour but, l’un quand il badine, l’autre quand il médite, d’arriver à la contemplation ; qu’enfin toute action tend à la contemplation ; qu’elle détourne la contemplation plus ou moins vers les choses extérieures selon qu’elle est accomplie nécessairement ou librement ; qu’en tout cas, elle a toujours la contemplation pour fin dernière. Mais nous traiterons ce sujet plus loin [§ 4-7].

Commençons par expliquer quelle peut être la nature de la contemplation [de la pensée] que nous attribuons à la terre, aux arbres et aux plantes [ainsi que nous l’avons dit plus haut], de quelle manière se ramènent à l’acte de la contemplation les choses que ces êtres produisent et engendrent; comment la Nature, que l’on regarde comme privée de raison et d’imagination, est cependant elle-même capable d’une espèce de contemplation, et produit toutes ses œuvres en vertu de la contemplation, que cependant elle ne possède pas [à proprement parler].

1. Tous les événements arrivent et tous les êtres existent ou bien selon des causes, ou bien sans cause ; ou bien il y a des événements et des êtres qui sont sans cause, et d’autres qui ont des causes ; ou bien les événements ont tous une cause tandis que parmi les êtres, ou bien les uns ont une cause et les autres sont sans cause ou bien aucun n’a de cause ; ou bien inversement les êtres ont tous des causes, mais, parmi les événements, ou bien les uns ont des causes, et les autres n’en ont pas, ou bien aucun d’eux n’en a. Dans le cas des choses éternelles, il n’est pas possible de ramener les premières d’entre elles à des causes, puisqu’elles sont les premières ; mais toutes celles qui dépendent des premières tiennent de celles-ci leur être. Pour rendre compte de l’acte d’un être, qu’on ramène cet acte a son essence ; car son essence consiste précisément à produire tel ou tel acte. Quant aux événements ou à ceux des êtres éternels qui n’accomplissent pas toujours le même acte, il faut dire qu’il y en a toujours des causes, et il ne faut pas admettre la production sans cause ; il ne faut laisser place ni à de vaines « déclinaisons » -, ni à un « mouvement subit du corps qui a lieu sans que rien le précède », ni à une inclinaison inconstante de l’âme qui se produit sans que rien l’ait poussée à faire ce qu’elle ne faisait pas avant. Elle subirait, par là même, une nécessité bien plus forte, puisqu’elle ne s’appartiendrait pas et serait mue de mouvements involontaires et sans motifs. Car elle est mue ou bien par l’objet (extérieur ou intérieur) de la volonté, ou bien par l’objet du désir, et si elle n’était mue par la fin qu’elle désire, elle n’aurait pas du tout de mouvement. Tout événement ayant une cause, l’on peut facilement, pour chacun d’eux, saisir ses causes prochaines et le ramener à ces causes ; par exemple : je vais à la place publique parce que je pense que j’ai à voir quelqu’un, ou bien à recouvrer une dette, et en général parce que j’ai choisi tel ou tel parti, que j’ai eu tel ou tel désir et, par suite, qu’il m’a paru bon de faire tel acte. Certains événements peuvent être ramenés à des arts ; par exemple la cause de la guérison, c’est la médecine et le médecin. La cause de l’enrichissement, c’est la découverte d’un trésor, ou un don, ou le gain du commerce issu du travail et de l’industrie. La cause de l’enfant, c’est le père, avec les circonstances extérieures qui concourent à la génération, par exemple telle alimentation, ou encore, un peu plus tard, l’aptitude à la génération et une femme apte à enfanter ; d’une manière générale, toutes se ramènent à la nature.

INTRODUCTION: AS A JOKE, IT MAY BE SAID THAT EVEN PLANTS ASPIRE TO CONTEMPLATION.

1. If as a preliminary pleasantry, we said that all beings, not only reasonable ones, but even the irrational, plants as well as the earth that begets them, aspire to contemplation, and are directed towards that end; that, as a result of the difference existing between them, some really achieve contemplation, while others only accomplish a reflection or image of it, we would no doubt be told that this was an absurd paradox. But as we are here engaged in a private study, we may, as an indulgence, support this paradox. While thus trifling, are we ourselves not actually engaging in contemplation ? Besides, it would be not only we, but any who thus trifle, who aspire to contemplation. We might even say that a joking child, as well as a meditating man both aim at reaching contemplation when the former jokes, and the later meditates. Indeed, there is not a single action that does not tend towards contemplation; more or less externalizing it according as it is carried out strictly or freely. In any case its ultimate aim is always contemplation; but of this later.

ENUMERATION OF THE LOWER FORMS OF CONTEMPLATION.

(1). Let us begin by explaining what could be the nature of contemplation (thought) that we attribute to the earth, to the trees, and to the plants (as we promised), and how the things produced and begotten by these beings can be reduced to the actuality of contemplation; how nature, that is usually considered to lack reason and imagination, nevertheless is quite capable of some kind of contemplation, thereby producing all its works, although speaking strictly, it is incapable thereof.

I. If, previous to a serious inquiry into nature, we should jocosely, as it were, affirm, that all things desire contemplation, and verge to this as their end, not only rational animals, but those destitute of reason, the nature of plants, and earth, the mother of them all; likewise that all things pursue contemplation, as far as the natural capacity of each permits, but that some things contemplate and pursue contemplation differently from others, some in reality and some by imitation beholding only the image; if we should affirm all this, shall we not appear to advance a doctrine entirely new? Perhaps, if this were the case, we shall incur no danger while we trifle in our own concerns; or may we not say that we w*ho trifle and joke in the present case contemplate? and that we and all others who joke and trifle perform this through a desire of contemplation? So that it will appear, whether it is a boy or a man who trifles, or seriously studies, the one studies, and the other trifles and jokes, for the sake of contemplation; as also that every action earnestly tends to contemplation, such as are necessary protracting for a longer time speculation to externals, but more liberal actions leading to it in a shorter time; and that both together operate through a desire of speculation. But this more opportunely afterwards. Let us now consider what is the speculation of earth, and trees, and plants, and after what manner we may be able to reduce that which is produced in these into the energy of speculation; and lastly, how nature, which is said to be void of imagination and reason, possesses contemplation in herself, and yet operates from contemplation which she does not possess.

1. Supposing we played a little before entering upon our serious concern and maintained that all things are striving after Contemplation, looking to Vision as their one end - and this, not merely beings endowed with reason but even the unreasoning animals, the Principle that rules in growing things, and the Earth that produces these - and that all achieve their purpose in the measure possible to their kind, each attaining Vision and possessing itself of the End in its own way and degree, some things in entire reality, others in mimicry and in image - we would scarcely find anyone to endure so strange a thesis. But in a discussion entirely among ourselves there is no risk in a light handling of our own ideas.

Well - in the play of this very moment am I engaged in the act of Contemplation?

Yes; I and all that enter this play are in Contemplation: our play aims at Vision; and there is every reason to believe that child or man, in sport or earnest, is playing or working only towards Vision, that every act is an effort towards Vision; the compulsory act, which tends rather to bring the Vision down to outward things, and the act thought of as voluntary, less concerned with the outer, originate alike in the effort towards Vision.

The case of Man will be treated later on; let us speak, first, of the earth and of the trees and vegetation in general, asking ourselves what is the nature of Contemplation in them, how we relate to any Contemplative activity the labour and productiveness of the earth, how Nature, held to be devoid of reason and even of conscious representation, can either harbour Contemplation or produce by means of the Contemplation which it does not possess.