Plotino - Tratado 12,6 (II, 4, 6) — A matéria sensível existe

6. Tratemos ahora de la materia de los cuerpos, llamada también receptáculo (de las formas), Conviene que haya, para los cuerpos, un sujeto que sea diferente de ellos: así lo prueba la continua transformación de los elementos. Por que ha de hacerse notar que la transformación de un elemento no significa su total destrucción. Una sustancia cualquiera no puede dejar de ser y destruirse, y, a su vez, el elemento que ha sido engendrado no puede pasar de la nada absoluta al ser. Toda transformación es un paso de una a otra forma; bien entendido que a través de ella permanece un sujeto que recibe la nueva forma y pierde la antigua. Tenemos también para esto la prueba de la corrupción: porque la corrupción afecta a un ser compuesto, esto es, a un ser que está hecho de materia y de forma. E, igualmente, el razonamiento por inducción testimonia que el ser que se corrompe es compuesto: así, por ejemplo, la vasija se transforma en oro, y el oro pasa a ser agua, y el agua, por su parte, exige una corrupción por el estilo. Necesariamente, el elemento ha de ser o una forma o una materia prima, o compuesto de materia y de forma. No es posible, desde luego que sea forma, porque, ¿cómo imaginar una masa y una magnitud sin materia de ninguna clase? Tampoco podrá ser materia prima, puesto que se corrompe. Estará hecho, pues, de materia y de forma; de una forma que nos da su cualidad y su apariencia especifica de una materia que es un Sujeto indefinido porque no es forma.

VI. Parlons maintenant du sujet des corps. La transformation des éléments les uns dans les autres démontre qu’ils doivent avoir un sujet. Leur transformation n’est pas une destruction complète ; sinon il y aurait une essence (19) qui irait se perdre dans le non-être. D’un autre côté, ce qui est engendré ne passe pas du non-être absolu à l’être : tout changement n’est que le passage d’une forme à une autre (20): Il suppose un sujet permanent qui reçoive la forme de la chose engendrée et perde la forme antérieure. C’est ce que démontre la destruction : en effet, elle n’atteint que le composé ; donc chaque objet dissous est composé d’une forme et d’une matière. L’induction prouve encore que l’objet détruit est composé. La dissolution le montre également : un vase en se dissolvant donne de l’or ; l’or, de l’eau ; et l’eau, quelque autre chose analogue à sa nature. Enfin, les éléments sont nécessairement ou la forme, ou la matière première, ou le composé de la forme et de la matière : ils ne peuvent être la forme parce qu’ils ne sauraient, sans la matière, avoir ni masse ni étendue; ils ne peuvent être non plus la matière première puisqu’ils sont soumis à la destruction. Ils sont donc composés de forme et de matière : la forme constitue l’essence et la qualité ; la matière, le sujet qui est indéterminé, parce qu’il n’est pas une forme.

SUBSTRATE IS DEMANDED BY TRANSFORMATION OF ELEMENTS, BY THEIR DESTRUCTION AND DISSOLUTION.

6. Now let us speak of bodies. The mutual transformation of elements demonstrates that they must have a substrate. Their transformation is not a complete destruction; otherwise (a general) "being" would perish in nonentity. Whereas, what is begotten would have passed from absolute non-entity to essence; and all change is no more than the passing of one form into another (as thought Aristotle  ). It presupposes the existence of permanent (subject) which would receive the form of begotten things only after having lost the earlier form. This is demonstrated by destruction, which affects only something composite; therefore every dissolved object must have been a composite. Dissolution proves it also. For instance, where a vase is dissolved, the result is gold; on being dissolved, gold leaves water; and so analogy would suggest that the dissolution of water would result in something else, that is analogous to its nature. Finally, elements necessarily are either form, or primary matter, or the composites of form and matter. However, they cannot be form, because, without matter, they could not possess either mass nor magnitude. Nor can they be primary matter, because they are subject to destruction. They must therefore be composites of form and matter; form constituting their shape and quality, and matter a substrate that is indeterminate, because it is not a form.

VI. Of the receptacle of bodies, however, we must speak as follows: That it is necessary then, there should be a certain subject to bodies, which is different from them, the mutation of the elements into each other manifests. For there is not a perfect corruption of that which is changed ; since if there was, there would be a certain essence which would be dissolved into nonentity. Nor again, does that which is generated proceed into being from that which in every respect is not; but there is a mutation from one form into another. That, however, remains, which receives the form of the thing generated, and casts aside another form. This, therefore, in short, corruption manifests; for corruption is of that which is a composite. But if this be the case, each sensible thing consists of matter and form. This, too, induction testifies, demonstrating that the thing which is corrupted is a composite. Analysis, likewise, evinces the same thing; as if, for instance, a pot should be resolved into gold; but gold into water; and the water being corrupted, will require an analogous process. It is necessary, also, that the elements should either be form, or the first matter, or that which consists of matter and form. But it is impossible, indeed, that they should be form. For how, without matter, could they have bulk and magnitude ? Nor are they the first matter; for they are corrupted. Hence, they consist of matter and form. And form, indeed, subsists according to quality and morphe; but matter according to the subject, which is indefinite, because it is not form.

6. We are led thus to the question of receptivity in things of body.

An additional proof that bodies must have some substratum different from themselves is found in the changing of the basic-constituents into one another. Notice that the destruction of the elements passing over is not complete - if it were we would have a Principle of Being wrecked in Non-being - nor does an engendered thing pass from utter non-being into Being: what happens is that a new form takes the place of an old. There is, then, a stable element, that which puts off one form to receive the form of the incoming entity.

The same fact is clearly established by decay, a process implying a compound object; where there is decay there is a distinction between Matter and Form.

And the reasoning which shows the destructible to be a compound is borne out by practical examples of reduction: a drinking vessel is reduced to its gold, the gold to liquid; analogy forces us to believe that the liquid too is reducible.

The basic-constituents of things must be either their Form-Idea or that Primal Matter [of the Intelligible] or a compound of the Form and Matter.

Form-Idea, pure and simple, they cannot be: for without Matter how could things stand in their mass and magnitude?

Neither can they be that Primal Matter, for they are not indestructible.

They must, therefore, consist of Matter and Form-Idea - Form for quality and shape, Matter for the base, indeterminate as being other than Idea.