gr. φαντασία, phantasía (he): imaginação, impressão. týpôsis: imprimir, impressão ver aisthesis^?, noesis^?. Faculdade^? da alma^? humana de criar imagens imanentes. Platão   emprega incidentemente essa palavra^?, ora no sentido^? de aparência (Deus^? é simples^? e não nos engana com simulacros, Rep.  , II, 382c), ora no sentido de faculdade imaginativa (imaginação e sensação são uma mesma coisa^?, Teeteto  , 152c). Aristóteles   a trata essencialmente como faculdade em De anima (III, 3) insistindo no fato^? de que ela é diferente da sensação (aísthesis) e do pensamento^? (diánoia): ela é "movimento^? nascido da sensação". Para Epicuro  , a phantasía é sempre verdadeira (Sexto Empírico, Adv. math., VII, 203). Os estoicos empregam a palavra phantasía em dois sentidos. Por um lado, é ela aparência (enganosa) que se opõe ao fenômeno (phainómenon), que é o fato normal^? (Epicteto  , Manual, I, 5).

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He says that phantasia^? is neither perception, nor opinion, nor something constituted of both. [Sorabji  ] / Ele [Aristóteles] diz que a phantasia não é percepção, nem opinião, nem algo constituído de ambas. [Filopono  ]

The word phantasia (from which came our fantasy and fancy) is connected with the verb phainesthai, to appear. I believe that in the earlier ‘Hellenistic’ period ‘appearance’ brings out the meaning more often than any other translation, and this includes the appearance that something is the case. It is because appearance can take the form of imagination, or of entertaining mental^? images, that phantasia can also refer to those activities, or to the capacity for them. But, this chapter will suggest, in the centuries after Christ, as Platonism and Neopythagoreanism progressed, phantasia took on more and more roles of the imagination.

Plato made phantasia into doxa^? with sense perception, Sophist 263E-264D; Republic 603A. Aristotle distinguished doxa as calling for conviction (pistis^?) and hence reason(s) (logos^?). The Stoics offered the different distinction that judgment (krisis^?) and doxa involve giving the assent (sunkatathesis) of reason to the appearance. Alexander Stoicises, giving this as his view. [SorabjiPC1:61]

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It should then be obvious to anyone that the appearance (phantasia) is in the soul - both the first one that we call an opinion, and the one derived from it, which is no longer an opinion, but, based in the lower part, is a murky quasi-opinion and unevaluated appearance, like the activity inherent in so-called Nature, insomuch as it produces (as they say) each thing without appearance. [Plotinus   3.6 [26] 4 (18-23); SorabjiPC1:62]

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PHANTASÍA, PHANTASÍA KATALEPTIKE (apparence, apparition, représentation, représentation compréhensive ; chez Aristote, Imagination) [grec]

subs. fém., syntagme

Le mot phantasía vient de phaínomai, « j’apparais », « je parais (semble) », verbe dérivé ultimement du sanskrit bhati, d’où vient phàos (phôs) lumière. Dans son examen de la fiabilité des représentations sensorielles, Platon nomme phantasia une doxa (opinion, jugement) liée à la sensation (Soph. 264 a 1-6 ; v. aussi Théét. passim et Phil. 38 c,d) : d’où possibilité d’erreur. Pour Aristote, la phantasia est l’imagination, distincte de la perception (An. III, 3, 427 b 27 ss.) : elle est essentielle au désir (orexis^?). Chez les stoïciens, l’affection provoquée dans les organes des sens par un mouvement extérieur est une phantasia : si le logos y donne son assentiment elle devient cataleptique, et manifeste de manière authentique le caractère propre de l’objet (v. E. Bréhier  , Chrysippe  , p. 80-100). (M. Roussel) [NP  ]