gr. αἲσθησις, aisthesis^?: percepção, sensação, experiência, percepção dos sentidos. A percepção sensível ou sensação (aisthesis) apresenta um duplo aspecto, pois ela estabelece uma relação entre um sujeito^?, que é um vivente^? provido de um corpo^? e de uma alma^?, e um objeto^? que se encontra no exterior^? dele.

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αἴσθησις, « sensation », associée à la passion (πάθημα, πάθος, 128) (1, 13 ; 2, 26 ; 3, 6-7 ; 4, 6-7 ; 5, 10-11) ; comme mouvement (κίνησις, 88) (6, 11) ; processus de la — (7, 10 ; 7, 12) ; associée à εἴδωλον (44) (8, 18) ; — et illusion (9, 11) ; — et contemplation (9, 19 ; 9, 20). κοινή αἴσθησις, « sens commun » (9, 12).

αἰσθάνομαι, « sentir » (6, 10 ; 6, 12 ; 6, 13-14 ; 7, 6) ; substantivé (τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι), « le fait de sentir, la sensation » (4, 5 ; 7, 5) ; avec δύναμις (7, 9). [Aubry  , Tratado 53]

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Aristotle   speaks of the αἰσθητóν, he never means something objective with the character of sense-data which are present through “sensations.” By αἴσθησις, he means the “perceiving” of beings in the natural^? mode, a perceiving distinguished by the fact that the senses are implicated in it by providing its access. It is the natural mode of seeing and speaking about things such as trees and the moon. There is a prevailing agreement that beings which are accessible through αἴσθησις have the character of οὐσία. Therefore, in the field of these beings the investigation to engage in primarily is the investigation of the structure of οὐσία itself. [Heidegger  , GA18:29]

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Αἴσθησις is not to be translated as “sensation,” for it simply means the “perceiving” of the world, the mode of having-it-there. The possibility of the extent to which the world matters to a being depends on this peculiar disclosedness. This disclosedness of the life of animals (i.e., the mode of cultivation, of cultivatedness, and manifestation of this disclosedness) is, for animals, characterized through φωνή, and for human beings through λóγος. For Aristotle, the disclosedness of the being of the world has its genuine basic possibility in λóγος, in the sense that, in λóγος, what is living-in-a-world appropriates the world, has it there, and genuinely is and moves in this having-it-there. [Heidegger, GA18:52

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But if it is in a different way that sense perception is changed by perceptibles, and the organs (aistheteria) do not serve as matter receiving the qualities of the perceptibles, it would no longer be such an impasse. For it is evident that sight does not serve as matter receiving the qualities, for we see that sight does not become black or white when it perceives these. But neither does the illuminated air, in spite of serving sight for the grasping of colours, do this through itself being first changed by the colours and itself becoming black or white (oude dia tou melas autos e leukos ginesthai). At least nothing prevents one person apprehending black and another white through the same air, when the white and black lie directly in front of the observers, but each looks at the colour lying not by himself but by the other person. Even if a black and a white person were to see each other, the intervening air is still not prevented from serving both of them simultaneously, because it is not changed by the colours qualitatively (pathetikos), and does not come to act as the matter (mede hos hule ginomenos) of the colours. [SorabjiPC1  :47-48]

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LÉXICO: aisthesis e afins; sensorium e afins; sensação e afins; sensibilidade e afins