Jowett: memory

Socrates   : Come now, Hippias, consider generally in this way concerning all the sciences, [368b] whether this is the case, or not. Certainly you are the wisest of men in the greatest number of arts, as I once heard you boast, recounting your great and enviable wisdom in the market-place at the tables of the moneychangers. You said that once, when you went to Olympia, everything you had on your person was your own work ; first the ring — for you began with that — [368c] which you had was your own work, showing that you knew how to engrave rings, and another seal was your work, and a strigil and an oil-flask were your works ; then you said that you yourself had made the sandals you had on, and had woven your cloak and tunic ; and, what seemed to every one most unusual and proof of the most wisdom, was when you said that the girdle you wore about your tunic was like the Persian girdles of the costliest kind, and that you had made it yourself. And in addition you said that you brought with you poems, both epics and tragedies and dithyrambs, and many writings of all sorts composed in prose ; [368d] and that you were there excelling all others in knowledge of the arts of which I was speaking just now, and of the correctness of rhythms and harmonies and letters, and many other things besides, as I seem to remember ; and yet I forgot your art of MEMORY, as it seems, in which you think you are most brilliant ; [368e] and I fancy I have forgotten a great many other things. But, as I say, look both at your own arts — and there are plenty of them — and at those of others, and tell me if you find, in accordance with the agreements you and I have reached, any point where one man is true and another false, where they are separate and not the same. Look for this in any branch whatsoever of wisdom or shrewdness or whatever you choose to call it ; [369a] but you will not find it, my friend, for it does not exist ; just tell me. LESSER HIPPIAS

Socrates : No, for perhaps you are not using your art of MEMORY ; for you evidently think it is not necessary ; but I will remind you. Do you remember that you said that Achilles was true [369b] and Odysseus was false and wily ? LESSER HIPPIAS

Socrates : True, but I did not understand that you possess the science of MEMORY ; and so I understand that the Lacedaemonians naturally enjoy you as one who knows many things, and they make use of you [286a] as children make use of old women, to tell stories agreeably. GREATER HIPPIAS

Socrates : Well, I do prefer. For we, my friend, were so stupid, before you spoke, as to have an opinion concerning you and me, that each of us was one, but that we were not both that which each of us was — for we are not one, but two [301e] — so foolish were we. But now we have been taught by you that if we are both two, then each of us is inevitably two, and if each is one, then both are inevitably one ; for it is impossible, by the continuous doctrine of reality according to Hippias, that it be otherwise, but what we both are, that each is, and what each is, both are. So now I have been convinced by you, and I hold this position. But first, Hippias, refresh my MEMORY : Are you and I one, or are you two and I two ? GREATER HIPPIAS

Socrates : See if what I say is true. For it was said, if my MEMORY serves me, that this “pleasant” was beautiful, not all “pleasant,” but that which is through sight and hearing. GREATER HIPPIAS

Soc. Not all, Ion  , surely. Have you already forgotten what you were saying ? A rhapsode ought to have a better MEMORY. ION

When he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said : Protagoras, I have a wretched MEMORY, and when any one makes a long speech to me I never remember what he is talking about. As then, if I had been deaf, and you were going to converse with me, you would have had to raise your voice ; so now, having such a bad MEMORY, I will ask you to cut your answers shorter, if you would take me with you. PROTAGORAS

Here Alcibiades interposed, and said : That, Callias, is not a true statement of the case. For our friend Socrates admits that he cannot make a speech — in this he yields the palm to Protagoras : but I should be greatly surprised if he yielded to any living man in the power of holding and apprehending an argument. Now if Protagoras will make a similar admission, and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in argumentative skill, that is enough for Socrates ; but if he claims a superiority in argument as well, let him ask and answer — not, when a question is asked, slipping away from the point, and instead of answering, making a speech at such length that most of his hearers forget the question at issue (not that Socrates is likely to forget — I will be bound for that, although he may pretend in fun that he has a bad MEMORY). And Socrates appears to me to be more in the right than Protagoras ; that is my view, and every man ought to say what he thinks. PROTAGORAS

Sees a thing when he is alone, he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he may show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them. And I would rather hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that no man has a better understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there, but you ? — who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many are this, and yet have not the power of making others good whereas you are not only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others. Moreover such confidence have you in yourself, that although other Sophists conceal their profession, you proclaim in the face of Hellas that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are the first who demanded pay in return. How then can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and consult with you ? I must, indeed. And I should like once more to have my MEMORY refreshed by you about the questions which I was asking you at first, and also to have your help in considering them. If I am not mistaken the question was this : Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names of the same thing ? or has each of the names a separate underlying essence and corresponding thing having a peculiar function, no one of them being like any other of them ? And you replied that the five names were not the names of the same thing, but that each of them had a separate object, and that all these objects were parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts of gold are like each other and the whole of which they are parts, but as the parts of the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another, and have each of them a distinct function. I should like to know whether this is still your opinion ; or if not, I will ask you to define your meaning, and I shall not take you to task if you now make a different statement. For I dare say that you may have said what you did only in order to make trial of me. PROTAGORAS

Lys. But this is our proper business ; and yours as well as ours, for I reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and find out from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of the youths, and talk and consult with them : for I am old, and my MEMORY is bad ; and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or the answers to them ; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost. I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by yourselves ; and I will listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your conclusions. LACHES

Soc. There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead of refuting me ; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But please to refresh my MEMORY a little ; did you say — “in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant” ? GORGIAS

Who knows if life be not death and death life ; and that we are very likely dead ; I have heard a philosopher say that at this moment we are actually dead, and that the body (soma) is our tomb (sema), and that the part of the soul which is the seat of the desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown up and down ; and some ingenious person, probably a Sicilian or an Italian, playing with the word, invented a tale in which he called the soul — because of its believing and make-believe nature — a vessel, and the ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel full of holes, because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your way of thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades, meaning the invisible world these uninitiated or leaky persons are the most miserable, and that they pour water into a vessel which is full of holes out of a colander which is similarly perforated. The colander, as my informer assures me, is the soul, and the soul which he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is likewise full of holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad MEMORY and want of faith. These notions are strange enough, but they show the principle which, if I can, I would fain prove to you ; that you should change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate life, choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due provision for daily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the opinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate ? Or do I fail to persuade you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you continue of the same opinion still ? GORGIAS

Menexenus   : Could you repeat from MEMORY that speech of Aspasia ? MENEXENUS

“In respect of deeds, these men have received at our hands what is due unto them, endowed wherewith they travel their predestined road ; for they have been escorted forth in solemn procession publicly by the City and privately by their kinsfolk. But in respect of words, the honor that remains still due to these heroes the law enjoins us, and it is right, to pay in full. [236e] For it is by means of speech finely spoken that deeds nobly done gain for their doers from the hearers the meed of MEMORY and renown. And the speech required is one which will adequately eulogize the dead and give kindly exhortation to the living, appealing to their children and their brethren to copy the virtues of these heroes, and to their fathers and mothers and any still surviving ancestors offering consolation. [237a] Where then could we discover a speech like that ? Or how could we rightly commence our laudation of these valiant men, who in their lifetime delighted their friends by their virtue, and purchased the safety of the living by their deaths ? We ought, in my judgement, to adopt the natural order in our praise, even as the men themselves were natural in their virtue. And virtuous they were because they were sprung from men of virtue. MENEXENUS

By the action of all these men the greatest and most formidable danger was warded off, and because of this their valor [241d] we pronounce their eulogy now, as our successors will in the time to come. But, in the period that followed, many cities of the Greeks were still in league with the barbarian, and of the king himself it was reported that he was purposing to renew his attempt against the Greeks. Wherefore it is right that we should make mention also of those men who put the finishing touch to the work of salvation executed by their predecessors by sweeping away the whole of the barbarian power and driving it clean off the seas. These were the men who fought [241e] the sea-fight at the Eurymedon, the men who served in the expedition against Cyprus, the men who voyaged to Egypt and to many another quarter, — men whom we ought to hold in MEMORY and render them thanks, seeing that they put the king in fear and caused him to give his whole mind to his own safety in place of plotting the destruction of Greece. Now this war was endured to the end by all our citizens who warred against the barbarians [242a] in defence of all the other Greek-speaking peoples as well as themselves. MENEXENUS

So firmly-rooted and so sound is the noble and liberal character of our city, and endowed also [245d] with such a hatred of the barbarian, because we are pure-blooded Greeks, unadulterated by barbarian stock. For there cohabit with us none of the type of Pelops, or Cadmus, or Aegyptus or Danaus, and numerous others of the kind, who are naturally barbarians though nominally Greeks ; but our people are pure Greeks and not a barbarian blend ; whence it comes that our city is imbued with a whole-hearted hatred of alien races. None the less, we were isolated once again because of our refusal to perform the dishonorable and unholy act of surrendering Greeks to barbarians. [245e] And thus we found ourselves in the same position which had previously led to our military overthrow ; but, by the help of God, we brought the war to a more favorable conclusion than on that occasion. For we still retained our ships, our walls, and our own colonies, when we ceased from the war, — so welcome to our enemies also was its cessation. Yet truly in this war also we suffered the loss of valiant men, — the men who had difficult ground to cope with at Corinth and treachery at Lechaeum ; [246a] valiant, too, were the men who rescued the King and drove the Lacedaemonians off the seas. These men I recall to your MEMORY, and you it becomes to join in praising and celebrating men such as these. MENEXENUS

Soc. I have not a good MEMORY, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and that you know what he said : please, therefore, to remind me of what he said ; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view ; for I suspect that you and he think much alike. MENO

Soc. Next, let us consider the goods of the soul : they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, MEMORY, magnanimity, and the like ? MENO

What followed, Crito  , how can I rightly narrate ? For not slight is the task of rehearsing infinite wisdom, and therefore, like the poets, I ought to commence my relation with an invocation to MEMORY and the Muses. Now Euthydemus  , if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows : O Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant ? EUTHYDEMUS

Soc. Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than going round with them ; and therefore we should leave the beginning as at present, and not reject the e, but make an insertion of an instead of an i (not pioteme, but epiisteme). Take another example : bebaion (sure) is clearly the expression of station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word istoria (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (istanai) of the stream ; and the word piston (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion ; then, again, mneme (MEMORY), as any one may see, expresses rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as amartia and sumphora, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of their etymologies will be the same as sunesis and episteme and other words which have a good sense (i.e., omartein, sunienai, epesthai, sumphersthai) and much the same may be said of amathia and akolaia, for amathia may be explained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the names which in these instances we find to have the worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the same principle as those which have the best. And any one I believe who would take the trouble might find many other examples in which the giver of names indicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that they are at rest ; which is the opposite of motion. CRATYLUS  

I was astonished at her words, and said : “Is this really true, O thou wise Diotima ?” And she answered with all the authority of an accomplished sophist : “Of that, Socrates, you may be assured ; — think only of the ambition of men, and you will wonder at the senselessness of their ways, unless you consider how they are stirred by the love of an immortality of fame. They are ready to run all risks greater far than they would have for their children, and to spend money and undergo any sort of toil, and even to die, for the sake of leaving behind them a name which shall be eternal. Do you imagine that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus, or Achilles to avenge Patroclus, or your own Codrus in order to preserve the kingdom for his sons, if they had not imagined that the MEMORY of their virtues, which still survives among us, would be immortal ? Nay,” she said, “I am persuaded that all men do all things, and the better they are the more they do them, in hope of the glorious fame of immortal virtue ; for they desire the immortal. SYMPOSIUM  

“Those who are pregnant in the body only, betake themselves to women and beget children — this is the character of their love ; their offspring, as they hope, will preserve their MEMORY and giving them the blessedness and immortality which they desire in the future. But souls which are pregnant — for there certainly are men who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive or contain. And what are these conceptions ? — wisdom and virtue in general. And such creators are poets and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor. But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice. And he who in youth has the seed of these implanted in him and is himself inspired, when he comes to maturity desires to beget and generate. He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring — for in deformity he will beget nothing — and naturally embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed body ; above all when he finds fair and noble and well-nurtured soul, he embraces the two in one person, and to such an one he is full of speech about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man ; and he tries to educate him ; and at the touch of the beautiful which is ever present to his MEMORY, even when absent, he brings forth that which he had conceived long before, and in company with him tends that which he brings forth ; and they are married by a far nearer tie and have a closer friendship than those who beget mortal children, for the children who are their common offspring are fairer and more immortal. Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones ? Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their MEMORY and given them everlasting glory ? Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say ? There is Solon, too, who is the revered father of Athenian laws ; and many others there are in many other places, both among hellenes and barbarians, who have given to the world many noble works, and have been the parents of virtue of every kind ; and many temples have been raised in their honour for the sake of children such as theirs ; which were never raised in honour of any one, for the sake of his mortal children. SYMPOSIUM

Then I will tell you, said Socrates. When I was young, Cebes, I had a prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called Natural Science ; this appeared to me to have lofty aims, as being the science which has to do with the causes of things, and which teaches why a thing is, and is created and destroyed ; and I was always agitating myself with the consideration of such questions as these : Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which the hot and cold principle contracts, as some have said ? Is the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire ? or perhaps nothing of this sort — but the brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing and sight and smell, and MEMORY and opinion may come from them, and science may be based on MEMORY and opinion when no longer in motion, but at rest. And then I went on to examine the decay of them, and then to the things of heaven and earth, and at last I concluded that I was wholly incapable of these inquiries, as I will satisfactorily prove to you. For I was fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to things that I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite well ; and I forgot what I had before thought to be self-evident, that the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking ; for when by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes larger and the small man greater. Was not that a reasonable notion ? PHAEDO  

Phaedr. What do you mean, my good Socrates ? How can you imagine that my unpractised MEMORY can do justice to an elaborate work, which the greatest rhetorician of the age spent a long time in composing. Indeed, I cannot ; I would give a great deal if I could. PHAEDRUS  

Soc. Yes, my sweet one ; but you must first of all show what you have in your left hand under your cloak, for that roll, as I suspect, is the actual discourse. Now, much as I love you, I would not have you suppose that I am going to have your MEMORY exercised at my expense, if you have Lysias himself here. PHAEDRUS

Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the true beauty ; he would like to fly away, but he cannot ; he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below ; and he is therefore thought to be mad. And I have shown this of all inspirations to be the noblest and highest and the offspring of the highest to him who has or shares in it, and that he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it. For, as has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being ; this was the condition of her passing into the form of man. But all souls do not easily recall the things of the other world ; they may have seen them for a short time only, or they may have been unfortunate in their earthly lot, and, having had their hearts turned to unrighteousness through some corrupting influence, they may have lost the MEMORY of the holy things which once they saw. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them ; and they, when they behold here any image of that other world, are rapt in amazement ; but they are ignorant of what this rapture means, because they do not clearly perceive. For there is no light of justice or temperance or any of the higher ideas which are precious to souls in the earthly copies of them : they are seen through a glass dimly ; and there are few who, going to the images, behold in them the realities, and these only with difficulty. There was a time when with the rest of the happy band they saw beauty shining in brightness — we philosophers following in the train of Zeus, others in company with other gods ; and then we beheld the beatific vision and were initiated into a mystery which may be truly called most blessed, celebrated by us in our state of innocence, before we had any experience of evils to come, when we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy, which we beheld shining impure light, pure ourselves and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster in his shell. Let me linger over the MEMORY of scenes which have passed away. PHAEDRUS

And now they are at the spot and behold the flashing beauty of the beloved ; which when the charioteer sees, his MEMORY is carried to the true beauty, whom he beholds in company with Modesty like an image placed upon a holy pedestal. He sees her, but he is afraid and falls backwards in adoration, and by his fall is compelled to pull back the reins with such violence as to bring both the steeds on their haunches, the one willing and unresisting, the unruly one very unwilling ; and when they have gone back a little, the one is overcome with shame and wonder, and his whole soul is bathed in perspiration ; the other, when the pain is over which the bridle and the fall had given him, having with difficulty taken breath, is full of wrath and reproaches, which he heaps upon the charioteer and his fellow-steed, for want of courage and manhood, declaring that they have been false to their agreement and guilty of desertion. Again they refuse, and again he urges them on, and will scarce yield to their prayer that he would wait until another time. When the appointed hour comes, they make as if they had forgotten, and he reminds them, fighting and neighing and dragging them on, until at length he, on the same thoughts intent, forces them to draw near again. And when they are near he stoops his head and puts up his tail, and takes the bit in his teeth. and pulls shamelessly. Then the charioteer is worse off than ever ; he falls back like a racer at the barrier, and with a still more violent wrench drags the bit out of the teeth of the wild steed and covers his abusive tongue and jaws with blood, and forces his legs and haunches to the ground and punishes him sorely. And when this has happened several times and the villain has ceased from his wanton way, he is tamed and humbled, and follows the will of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one he is ready to die of fear. And from that time forward the soul of the lover follows the beloved in modesty and holy fear. PHAEDRUS

Soc. Yes ; and he tells how refutation or further refutation is to be managed, whether in accusation or defence. I ought also to mention the illustrious Parian, Evenus, who first invented insinuations and indirect praises ; and also indirect censures, which according to some he put into verse to help the MEMORY. But shall I “to dumb forgetfulness consign” Tisias and Gorgias, who are not ignorant that probability is superior to truth, and who by : force of argument make the little appear great and the great little, disguise the new in old fashions and the old in new fashions, and have discovered forms for everything, either short or going on to infinity. I remember Prodicus laughing when I told him of this ; he said that he had himself discovered the true rule of art, which was to be neither long nor short, but of a convenient length. PHAEDRUS

Soc. At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth ; the bird which is called the Ibis is sacred to him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice, but his great discovery was the use of letters. Now in those days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt ; and he dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes call Egyptian Thebes, and the god himself is called by them Ammon. To came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of the he enumerated them, and Thamus enquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them. It would take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts. But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories ; it is a specific both for the MEMORY and for the wit. Thamus replied : O most ingenious Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance, you who are the father of letters, from a paternal love of your own children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have ; for this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners’ souls, because they will not use their memories ; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to MEMORY, but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth ; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing ; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing ; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality. PHAEDRUS

Euc. No, indeed, not offhand ; but I took notes of it as soon as I got home ; these I filled up from MEMORY, writing them out at leisure ; and whenever I went to Athens, I asked Socrates about any point which I had forgotten, and on my return I made corrections ; thus I have nearly the whole conversation written down. THEAETETUS  

Soc. Some one will say, Can a man who has ever known anything, and still has and preserves a MEMORY of that which he knows, not know that which he remembers at the time when he remembers ? I have, I fear, a tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know ? THEAETETUS

Soc. And you would admit that there is such a thing as MEMORY ? THEAETETUS

Soc. And is MEMORY of something or of nothing ? THEAETETUS

Soc. He will repeat all those things which we have been urging on his behalf, and then he will close with us in disdain, and say : — The worthy Socrates asked a little boy, whether the same man could remember and not know the same thing, and the boy said No, because he was frightened, and could not see what was coming, and then Socrates made fun of poor me. The truth is, O slatternly Socrates, that when you ask questions about any assertion of mine, and the person asked is found tripping, if he has answered as I should have answered, then I am refuted, but if he answers something else, then he is refuted and not I. For do you really suppose that any one would admit the MEMORY which a man has of an impression which has passed away to be the same with that which he experienced at the time ? Assuredly not. Or would he hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing ? Or, if he is afraid of making this admission, would he ever grant that one who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike ? Or would he admit that a man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite as the changes which take place in him ? I speak by the card in order to avoid entanglements of words. But, O my good sir, he would say, come to the argument in a more generous spirit ; and either show, if you can, that our sensations are not relative and individual, or, if you admit them to be so, prove that this does not involve the consequence that the appearance becomes, or, if you will have the word, is, to the individual only. As to your talk about pigs and baboons, you are yourself behaving like a pig, and you teach your hearers to make sport of my writings in the same ignorant manner ; but this is not to your credit. For I declare that the truth is as I have written, and that each of us is a measure of existence and of non-existence. Yet one man may be a thousand times better than another in proportion as different things are and appear to him. THEAETETUS

Soc. You conceive truly. And now, my friend, Please to begin again at this point ; and having wiped out of your MEMORY all that has preceded, see if you have arrived at any clearer view, and once more say what is knowledge. THEAETETUS

Soc. Let us say that this tablet is a gift of MEMORY, the mother of the Muses ; and that when we wish to remember anything which we have seen, or heard, or thought in our own minds, we hold the wax to the perceptions and thoughts, and in that material receive the impression of them as from the seal of a ring ; and that we remember and know what is imprinted as long as the image lasts ; but when the image is effaced, or cannot be taken, then we forget and do not know. THEAETETUS

Soc. The only possibility of erroneous opinion is, when knowing you and Theodorus, and having on the waxen block the impression of both of you given as by a seal, but seeing you imperfectly and at a distance, I try to assign the right impression of MEMORY to the right visual impression, and to fit this into its own print : if I succeed, recognition will take place ; but if I fad and transpose them, putting the foot into the wrong shoe — that is to say, putting the vision of either of you on to the wrong impression, or if my mind, like the sight in a mirror, which is transferred from right to left, err by reason of some similar affection, then “heterodoxy” and false opinion ensues. THEAETETUS

Str. I see that you enter into my meaning ; — no, that blessed and spontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world, but to the previous one, in which God superintended the whole revolution of the universe ; and the several parts the universe were distributed under the rule. certain inferior deities, as is the way in some places still There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various species and herds of animals, and each one was in all respects sufficient for those of whom he was the shepherd ; neither was there any violence, or devouring of one another or war or quarrel among them ; and I might tell of ten thousand other blessings, which belonged to that dispensation. The reason why the life of man was, as tradition says, spontaneous, is as follows : In those days God himself was their shepherd, and ruled over them, just as man, over them, who is by comparison a divine being, still rules over the lower animals. Under him there were no forms of government or separate possession of women and children ; for all men rose again from the earth, having no MEMORY, of the past. And although they had nothing of this sort, the earth gave them fruits in abundance, which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden, and were not planted by the hand of man. And they dwelt naked, and mostly in the open air, for the temperature of their seasons, was mild ; and they had no beds, but lay on Soft couches of grass, which grew plentifully out of : the earth. Such was the life of man in the days of Cronos, Socrates ; the character of our present life which is said to be under Zeus, you know from your own experience. Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem the happier ? STATESMAN

Bone was composed by him in the following manner. Having sifted pure and smooth earth he kneaded it and wetted it with marrow, and after that he put it into fire and then into water, and once more into fire and again into water — in this way by frequent transfers from one to the other he made it insoluble by either. Out of this he fashioned, as in a lathe, a globe made of bone, which he placed around the brain, and in this he left a narrow opening ; and around the marrow of the neck and back he formed vertebrae which he placed under one another like pivots, beginning at the head and extending through the whole of the trunk. Thus wishing to preserve the entire seed, he enclosed it in a stone-like casing, inserting joints, and using in the formation of them the power of the other or diverse as an intermediate nature, that they might have motion and flexure. Then again, considering that the bone would be too brittle and inflexible, and when heated and again cooled would soon mortify and destroy the seed within — having this in view, he contrived the sinews and the flesh, that so binding all the members together by the sinews, which admitted of being stretched and relaxed about the vertebrae, he might thus make the body capable of flexion and extension, while the flesh would serve as a protection against the summer heat and against the winter cold, and also against falls, softly and easily yielding to external bodies, like articles made of felt ; and containing in itself a warm moisture which in summer exudes and makes the surface damp, would impart a nature coolness to the whole body ; and again in winter by the help of this internal warmth would form a very tolerable defence against the frost which surrounds it and attacks it from without. He who modelled us, considering these things, mixed earth with fire and water and blended them ; and making a ferment of acid and salt, he mingled it with them and formed soft and succulent flesh. As for the sinews, he made them of a mixture of bone and unfermented flesh, attempered so as to be in a mean, and gave them a yellow colour ; wherefore the sinews have a firmer and more glutinous nature than flesh, but a softer and moister nature than the bones. With these God covered the bones and marrow, binding them together by sinews, and then enshrouded them all in an upper covering of flesh. The more living and sensitive of the bones he enclosed in the thinnest film of flesh, and those which had the least life within them in the thickest and most solid flesh. So again on the joints of the bones, where reason indicated that no more was required, he placed only a thin covering of flesh, that it might not interfere with the flexion of our bodies and make them unwieldy because difficult to move ; and also that it might not, by being crowded and pressed and matted together, destroy sensation by reason of its hardness, and impair the MEMORY and dull the edge of intelligence. Wherefore also the thighs and the shanks and the hips, and the bones of the arms and the forearms, and other parts which have no joints, and the inner bones, which on account of the rarity of the soul in the marrow are destitute of reason — all these are abundantly provided with flesh ; but such as have mind in them are in general less fleshy, except where the creator has made some part solely of flesh in order to give sensation — as, for example, the tongue. But commonly this is not the case. For the nature which comes into being and grows up in us by a law of necessity, does not admit of the combination of solid bone and much flesh with acute perceptions. More than any other part the framework of the head would have had them, if they could have co-existed, and the human race, having a strong and fleshy and sinewy head, would have had a life twice or many times as long as it now has, and also more healthy and free from pain. TIMAEUS  

Soc. Philebus   was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight, and the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living being, whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and intelligence and MEMORY, and their kindred, right opinion and true reasoning, are better and more desirable than pleasure for all who are able to partake of them, and that to all such who are or ever will be they are the most advantageous of all things. Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement of the two sides of the argument ? PHILEBUS

Soc. But if you had neither mind, nor MEMORY, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence. PHILEBUS

Soc. And similarly, if you had no MEMORY you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you ; and if you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were ; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster or pulmo marinus. Could this be otherwise ? PHILEBUS

Soc. I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and MEMORY of all things, but having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like feelings ? PHILEBUS

Soc. The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is purely mental, is entirely derived from MEMORY. PHILEBUS

Soc. I must first of all analyse MEMORY, or rather perception which is prior to, MEMORY, if the subject of our discussion is ever to be properly cleared up. PHILEBUS

Soc. When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness in a literal sense ; for forgetfulness is the exit of MEMORY, which in this case has not yet entered ; and to speak of the loss of that which is not yet in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction ; do you see ? PHILEBUS

Soc. And MEMORY may, I think, be rightly described as the preservation of consciousness ? PHILEBUS

Soc. But do we not distinguish MEMORY from recollection ? PHILEBUS

Soc. But how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain either by perception or MEMORY to any apprehension of replenishment, of which he has no present or past experience ? PHILEBUS

Soc. The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the replenishment by the help of MEMORY ; as is obvious, for what other way can there be ? PHILEBUS

Soc. And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is experiencing proves that he has a MEMORY of the opposite state. PHILEBUS

Soc. And the argument, having proved that MEMORY attracts us towards the objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the desires and the moving principle in every living being have their origin in the soul. PHILEBUS

Soc. And has he not the pleasure of MEMORY when he is hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain ? PHILEBUS

Soc. And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always spring from MEMORY and perception ? PHILEBUS

Soc. MEMORY and perception meet, and they and their attendant feelings seem to almost to write down words in the soul, and when the inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions which are the expressions of opinion come into our souls — but when the scribe within us writes falsely, the result is false. PHILEBUS

Soc. And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take up the enquiry again and set us right ; and assuming MEMORY and wisdom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire — I will not say pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any recollection, however momentary, of the feeling, — but would he desire to have anything at all, if these faculties were wanting to him ? And about wisdom I ask the same question ; can you conceive that any one would choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than with a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than with a certain degree of wisdom ? PHILEBUS

Soc. And we shall take up our parable and say : Do you wish to have the greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in addition to the true ones ? “Why, Socrates,” they will say, “how can we ? seeing that they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us ; they trouble the souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness ; they prevent us from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of the children which are born to us, causing them to be forgotten and unheeded ; but the true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to be of our family, and also those pleasures which accompany health and temperance, and which every Virtue, like a goddess has in her train to follow her about wherever she goes, — mingle these and not the others ; there would be great want of sense in any one who desires to see a fair and perfect mixture, and to find in it what is the highest good in man and in the universe, and to divine what is the true form of good — there would be great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, which are always in the company of folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the cup.” — Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well as on the behalf of MEMORY and true opinion ? PHILEBUS

Ath. And are perception and MEMORY, and opinion and prudence, heightened and increased ? Do not these qualities entirely desert a man if he becomes saturated with drink ? LAWS BOOK I

Ath. Our young men break forth into dancing and singing, and we who are their elders deem that we are fulfilling our part in life when we look on at them. Having lost our agility, we delight in their sports and merry-making, because we love to think of our former selves ; and gladly institute contests for those who are able to awaken in us the MEMORY of our youth. LAWS BOOK II

Ath. He will say — “Give me a state which is governed by a tyrant, and let the tyrant be young and have a good MEMORY ; let him be quick at learning, and of a courageous and noble nature ; let him have that quality which, as I said before, is the inseparable companion of all the other parts of virtue, if there is to be any good in them.” LAWS BOOK IV

Cle. You would assume, as you say, a tyrant who was young, temperate, quick at learning, having a good MEMORY, courageous, of a noble nature ? LAWS BOOK IV

Ath. Well, then, let us give all the greater heed to one another’s words. The argument affirms that any change whatever except from evil is the most dangerous of all things ; this is true in the case of the seasons and of the winds, in the management of our bodies and the habits of our minds — true of all things except, as I said before, of the bad. He who looks at the constitution of individuals accustomed to eat any sort of meat, or drink any drink, or to do any work which they can get, may see that they are at first disordered by them, but afterwards, as time goes on, their bodies grow adapted to them, and they learn to know and like variety, and have good health and enjoyment of life ; and if ever afterwards they are confined again to a superior diet, at first they are troubled with disorders, and with difficulty become habituated to their new food. A similar principle we may imagine to hold good about the minds of men and the natures of their souls. For when they have been brought up in certain laws, which by some Divine Providence have remained unchanged during long ages, so that no one has any MEMORY or tradition of their ever having been otherwise than they are, then every one is afraid and ashamed to change that which is established. The legislator must somehow find a way of implanting this reverence for antiquity, and I would propose the following way : — People are apt to fancy, as I was saying before, that when the plays of children are altered they are merely plays, not seeing that the most serious and detrimental consequences arise out of the change ; and they readily comply with the child’s wishes instead of deterring him, not considering that these children who make innovations in their games, when they grow up to be men, will be different from the last generation of children, and, being different, will desire a different sort of life, and under the influence of this desire will want other institutions and laws ; and no one of them reflects that there will follow what I just now called the greatest of evils to states. Changes in bodily fashions are no such serious evils, but frequent changes in the praise and censure of manners are the greatest of evils, and require the utmost prevision. LAWS BOOK VII

Ath. And I do not faint ; I say, indeed, that we have a great many poets writing in hexameter, trimeter, and all sorts of measures — some who are serious, others who aim only at raising a laugh — and all mankind declare that the youth who are rightly educated should be brought up in them and saturated with them ; some insist that they should be constantly hearing them read aloud, and always learning them, so as to get by heart entire poets ; while others select choice passages and long speeches, and make compendiums of them, saying that these ought to be committed to MEMORY, if a man is to be made good and wise by experience and learning of many things. And you want me now to tell them plainly in what they are right and in what they are wrong. LAWS BOOK VII

In the second place, our citizens should have separate houses duly ordered, and this will be the order proper for men like them. There shall be twelve hamlets, one in the middle of each twelfth portion, and in each hamlet they shall first set apart a market-place, and the temples of the Gods, and of their attendant demigods ; and if there be any local deities of the Magnetes, or holy seats of other ancient deities, whose MEMORY has been preserved, to these let them pay their ancient honours. But Hestia, and Zeus, and Athene will have temples everywhere together with the God who presides in each of the twelve districts. And the first erection of houses shall be around these temples, where the ground is highest, in order to provide the safest and most defensible place of retreat for the guards. All the rest of the country they shall settle in the following manner : — They shall make thirteen divisions of the craftsmen ; one of them they shall establish in the city, and this, again, they shall subdivide into twelve lesser divisions, among the twelve districts of the city, and the remainder shall be distributed in the country round about ; and in each village they shall settle various classes of craftsmen, with a view to the convenience of the husbandmen. And the chief officers of the wardens of the country shall superintend all these matters, and see how many of them, and which class of them, each place requires ; and fix them where they are likely to be least troublesome, and most useful to the husbandman. And the wardens of the city shall see to similar matters in the city. LAWS BOOK VIII

Ath. And now I can define to you clearly, and without ambiguity, what I mean by the just and unjust, according to my notion of them : — When anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jealousies and desires, tyrannize over the soul, whether they do any harm or not — I call all this injustice. But when the opinion of the best, in whatever part of human nature states or individuals may suppose that to dwell, has dominion in the soul and orders the life of every man, even if it be sometimes mistaken, yet what is done in accordance therewith, the principle in individuals which obeys this rule, and is best for the whole life of man, is to be called just ; although the hurt done by mistake is thought by many to be involuntary injustice. Leaving the question of names, about which we are not going to quarrel, and having already delineated three sources of error, we may begin by recalling them somewhat more vividly to our MEMORY : — One of them was of the painful sort, which we denominate anger and fear. LAWS BOOK IX

Ath. Do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are not the younger guardians, who are chosen for their natural gifts, placed in the head of the state, having their souls all full of eyes, with which they look about the whole city ? They keep watch and hand over their perceptions to the MEMORY, and inform the elders of all that happens in the city ; and those whom we compared to the mind, because they have many wise thoughts — that is to say, the old men — take counsel and making use of the younger men as their ministers, and advising with them — in this way both together truly preserve the whole state : — Shall this or some other be the order of our state ? Are all our citizens to be equal in acquirements, or shall there be special persons among them who have received a more careful training and education ? LAWS BOOK XII

[976a] And that which they call medicine is likewise, of course, an assistance in almost every case towards things of which animal nature is deprived by seasons of untimely cold and heat and all such visitations. But none of these is of high repute for the truest wisdom : for they are borne along by opinion, as inaccurate matter of conjecture. We may, I suppose, speak of pilots and sailors alike as giving assistance : yet you shall not report, to appease us, a single wise man from amongst them all ; for a man cannot know [976b] the wrath or amity of the wind, a desirable thing for all piloting. Nor again all those who say they can give assistance in law suits by their powers of speech, men who by MEMORY and exercise of opinion pay attention to human character, but are far astray from the truth of what is really just. EPINOMIS   BOOK XII

Athenian : On the most likely account there are to be reckoned five solid bodies, from which one might fashion things fairest and best ; but all the rest of creation has a single shape, for there is nothing that could come to be without a body and never possessing any color at all, except only that really most divine creature, the soul. And this alone, one may say, has the business of fashioning and manufacturing, [981c] whereas the body, as we call it, has that of being fashioned and produced and seen. But the other — let us repeat it, for not once only be it said — has to be invisible even to the inquiring, and merely thought, if he has got a share of MEMORY and reckoning by both odd and even variations. EPINOMIS BOOK XII

Now the gods — Zeus and Hera and all the rest — each man must regard in what light he pleases, though according to the same law, and must take this account as reliable. But as our visible gods, greatest and most honorable and having keenest vision every way, we must count first the order of the stars and all else that we perceive existing with them ; and after these, and [984e] next below these, the divine spirits, and air-born race, holding the third and middle situation, cause of interpretation, which we must surely honor with prayers for the sake of an auspicious journey across. We must say of either of these two creatures — that which is of ether and, next to it, of air — that it is not entirely plain to sight : when it is near by, it is not made manifest to us ; [985a] but partaking of extraordinary intelligence, as belonging to an order which is quick to learn and strong in MEMORY, we may say that they understand the whole of our thoughts, and show extraordinary kindness to anyone of us who is a good man and true, and hate him who is utterly evil, as one who already partakes of suffering. For we know that God, who has the privilege of the divine portion, is remote from these affections of pain and pleasure, but has a share of intelligence and knowledge in every sphere ; and the heaven being filled full of live creatures, [985b] they interpret all men and all things both to one another and to the most exalted gods, because the middle creatures move both to earth and to the whole of heaven with a lightly rushing motion. The kind which is of water, the fifth, we shall be right in representing as a semi-divine product of that element, and it is at one time seen, but at another is concealed through becoming obscure, presenting a marvel in the dimness of vision. EPINOMIS BOOK XII

Now the fact that the greatest part of virtue is not properly practiced is the cause of our condition, as is just now indicated — it seems clear to me — by what has been said. [989b] For let no one ever persuade us that there is a greater part of virtue, for the race of mortals, than piety ; and I must say it is owing to the greatest stupidity that this has not appeared in the best natures. And the best are they which can only become so with the greatest difficulty, and the benefit is greatest if they do become so : for a soul that admits of slowness and the opposite inclination moderately and gently will be good-tempered ; and if it admires courage, and is easily persuaded to temperance, and, most important of all, is enabled [989c] by these natural gifts to learn and has a good MEMORY, it will be able to rejoice most fully in these very things, so as to be a lover of learning. For these things are not easily engendered, but when once they are begotten, and receive due nourishment and education, they will be able to restrain the greater number of men, even the worse among us, in the most correct way by our every thought, every action, and every word about the gods, in due manner and due season, as regards both sacrifices and purifications in matters concerning gods and men alike, so that we are contriving no life of pretence, [989d] but truly honoring virtue, which indeed is the most important of all business for the whole state. That section of us, then, we say is naturally the most competent, and supremely able to learn the best and noblest lessons that it may be taught : but it cannot get this teaching either, unless God gives his guidance. If, however, it should be so taught, but should fail in some way to do accordingly, it were better for it not to learn. EPINOMIS BOOK XII

Practically continuous with the statement made just now there comes, I find, that other statement against which, as I said, [3.319a] I have to make my second defence. Consider now and pay the closest attention, in case I seem to you to be lying at all and not speaking the truth. I affirm that when Archedemus and Aristocritus were with us in the garden, some twenty days before I departed home from Syracuse, you made the same complaint against me that you are making now — that I cared more for Heracleides and for all the rest than for you. And in the presence of those men you asked me whether I remembered bidding you, when I first arrived, [3.319b] to plant settlers in the Greek cities. I granted you that I did remember, and that I still believed that this was the best policy. But, Dionysius, I must also repeat, the next observation that was made on this occasion. For I asked you whether this and this only was what I advised, or something else besides and you made answer to me in a most indignant and most mocking tone, as you supposed — and consequently the object of your mockery then has now turned out a reality instead of a dream ; for you said with a very artificial laugh, [3.319c] if my MEMORY serves me — “You bade me be educated before I did all these things or else not do them.” I replied that your MEMORY was excellent. You then said — “Did you mean educated in land-measuring or what ?” But I refrained from making the retort which it occurred to me to make, for I was alarmed about the homeward voyage I was hoping for, lest instead of having an open road I should find it shut, and all because of a short saying. Well then, the purpose of all I have said is this : do not slander me by declaring that I was hindering you from colonizing the Greek cities that were ruined by the barbarians, [3.319d] and from relieving the Syracusans by substituting a monarchy for a tyranny. For you could never bring any false accusation against me that was less appropriate than these ; and, moreover, in refutation of them I could bring still clearer statements if any competent tribunal were anywhere to be seen — showing that it was I who was urging you, and you who were refusing, to execute these plans. And, verily, it is easy to affirm frankly that these plans, if they had been executed, were the best both for you and the Syracusans, and for all the Siceliots. But, my friend, [3.319e] if you deny having said this, when you have said it, I am justified ; while if you confess it, you should further agree that Stesichorus was a wise man, and imitate his palinode, and renounce the false for the true tale. LETTERS LETTER III

On my arrival, I thought that first I must put to the test the question whether Dionysios had really been kindled with the fire of philosophy, or whether all the reports which had come to Athens were empty rumours. Now there is a way of putting such things to the test which is not to be despised and is well suited to monarchs, especially to those who have got their heads full of erroneous teaching, which immediately my arrival I found to be very much the case with Dionysios. One should show such men what philosophy is in all its extent ; what their range of studies is by which it is approached, and how much labour it involves. For the man who has heard this, if he has the true philosophic spirit and that godlike temperament which makes him a kin to philosophy and worthy of it, thinks that he has been told of a marvellous road lying before him, that he must forthwith press on with all his strength, and that life is not worth living if he does anything else. After this he uses to the full his own powers and those of his guide in the path, and relaxes not his efforts, till he has either reached the end of the whole course of study or gained such power that he is not incapable of directing his steps without the aid of a guide. This is the spirit and these are the thoughts by which such a man guides his life, carrying out his work, whatever his occupation may be, but throughout it all ever cleaving to philosophy and to such rules of diet in his daily life as will give him inward sobriety and therewith quickness in learning, a good MEMORY, and reasoning power ; the kind of life which is opposed to this he consistently hates. Those who have not the true philosophic temper, but a mere surface colouring of opinions penetrating, like sunburn, only skin deep, when they see how great the range of studies is, how much labour is involved in it, and how necessary to the pursuit it is to have an orderly regulation of the daily life, come to the conclusion that the thing is difficult and impossible for them, and are actually incapable of carrying out the course of study ; while some of them persuade themselves that they have sufficiently studied the whole matter and have no need of any further effort. This is the sure test and is the safest one to apply to those who live in luxury and are incapable of continuous effort ; it ensures that such a man shall not throw the blame upon his teacher but on himself, because he cannot bring to the pursuit all the qualities necessary to it. Thus it came about that I said to Dionysios what I did say on that occasion. LETTERS LETTER VII

In one word, the man who has no natural kinship with this matter cannot be made akin to it by quickness of learning or MEMORY ; for it cannot be engendered at all in natures which are foreign to it. Therefore, if men are not by nature kinship allied to justice and all other things that are honourable, though they may be good at learning and remembering other knowledge of various kinds — or if they have the kinship but are slow learners and have no MEMORY — none of all these will ever learn to the full the truth about virtue and vice. For both must be learnt together ; and together also must be learnt, by complete and long continued study, as I said at the beginning, the true and the false about all that has real being. After much effort, as names, definitions, sights, and other data of sense, are brought into contact and friction one with another, in the course of scrutiny and kindly testing by men who proceed by question and answer without ill will, with a sudden flash there shines forth understanding about every problem, and an intelligence whose efforts reach the furthest limits of human powers. Therefore every man of worth, when dealing with matters of worth, will be far from exposing them to ill feeling and misunderstanding among men by committing them to writing. In one word, then, it may be known from this that, if one sees written treatises composed by anyone, either the laws of a lawgiver, or in any other form whatever, these are not for that man the things of most worth, if he is a man of worth, but that his treasures are laid up in the fairest spot that he possesses. But if these things were worked at by him as things of real worth, and committed to writing, then surely, not gods, but men “have themselves bereft him of his wits.” LETTERS LETTER VII

Anyone who has followed this discourse and digression will know well that, if Dionysios or anyone else, great or small, has written a treatise on the highest matters and the first principles of things, he has, so I say, neither heard nor learnt any sound teaching about the subject of his treatise ; otherwise, he would have had the same reverence for it, which I have, and would have shrunk from putting it forth into a world of discord and uncomeliness. For he wrote it, not as an aid to MEMORY — since there is no risk of forgetting it, if a man’s soul has once laid hold of it ; for it is expressed in the shortest of statements — but if he wrote it at all, it was from a mean craving for honour, either putting it forth as his own invention, or to figure as a man possessed of culture, of which he was not worthy, if his heart was set on the credit of possessing it. If then Dionysios gained this culture from the one lesson which he had from me, we may perhaps grant him the possession of it, though how he acquired it — God wot, as the Theban says ; for I gave him the teaching, which I have described, on that one occasion and never again. LETTERS LETTER VII

I really do not understand, and therefore beg of you to assist my MEMORY. THE REPUBLIC   BOOK V

Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic natures ; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good MEMORY ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the gift of a good MEMORY, and is quick to learn — noble, gracious, the friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the philosopher’s virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage, magnificence, apprehension, MEMORY, were his natural gifts. And you objected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if you leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly depraved, we were then led to inquire into the grounds of these accusations, and have now arrived at the point of asking why are the majority bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the examination and definition of the true philosopher. THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

Then, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his calling to the end ? — and remember what we were saying of him, that he was to have quickness and MEMORY and courage and magnificence — these were admitted by us to be the true philosopher’s gifts. THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

You are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, MEMORY, sagacity, cleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and that persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a peaceful and settled manner ; they are driven any way by their impulses, and all solid principle goes out of them. THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good MEMORY, and be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labor in any line ; or he will never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go through all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of him. THE REPUBLIC BOOK VII