The dematerialisation of the sensory process encouraged the idea^? found in Avicenna   and Averroes   of an intentional object of perception (Arabic ma’na, translated into medieval Latin as intentio). Philoponus   (in DA 309,15-29; 438,32-433,11; 438,6-15) and ‘Simplicius  ’ (in DA 125,21-3; 167,1-11) take the view that the reception of form in Aristotle  ’s theory of perception is a merely cognitive (gnostikos) reception, and already Alexander denies, DA 62,1-5 (cf. Quaestio 3.9), that it involves the eye jelly taking on colours. His reason is a physical one, the need to avoid collisions of colour. Many other physical considerations were raised in comparing the different degrees of corporeality of different senses. These physical considerations were exploited by Averroes, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas   and others in ascribing an intentional object to perception; the forms of perceptibles will be contrasted with objects of [52] intellectual thought (nous). The Neoplatonists treat the latter as real^?, not intentional. As Victor Caston has shown, Latin writers, notably Augustine  , describing mental^? acts in general in On the Trinity, especially Book 11 (a work later translated into Byzantine Greek), and Calcidius, describing the perceptual theories of Heraclitus   and the Stoics (in Tim. 237 Waszink), use the term intentio. But it has a different meaning, viz. attention (or probing), not intentional object. [SorabjiPC1  :52-53]