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MacKenna-Plotinus: Intelligibles

quinta-feira 1º de fevereiro de 2024, por Cardoso de Castro

  

The faculty of perception in the Soul cannot act by the immediate grasping of sensible objects, but only by the discerning of impressions printed upon the Animate by sensation: these impressions are already Intelligibles while the outer sensation is a mere phantom of the other [of that in the Soul] which is nearer to Authentic-Existence as being an impassive reading of Ideal-Forms. Enneads   I,1,7

The first degree is the conversion from the lower life; the second - held by those that have already made their way to the sphere of the Intelligibles, have set as it were a footprint there but must still advance within the realm - lasts until they reach the extreme hold of the place, the Term attained when the topmost peak of the Intellectual realm is won. Enneads I,3,1

And yet - what reflection of that world could be conceived more beautiful than this of ours? What fire could be a nobler reflection of the fire there than the fire we know here? Or what other earth than this could have been modelled after that earth? And what globe more minutely perfect than this, or more admirably ordered in its course could have been conceived in the image of the self-centred circling of the World of Intelligibles? And for a sun figuring the Divine sphere, if it is to be more splendid than the sun visible to us, what a sun it must be. Enneads II,9,4

This implies the distinction of Matter and Form in it - as there must be in all actual seeing - the Matter in this case being the Intelligibles which the Intellectual-Principle contains and sees. All actual seeing implies duality; before the seeing takes place there is the pure unity [of the power of seeing]. That unity [of principle] acquires duality [in the act of seeing], and the duality is [always to be traced back to] a unity. Enneads III,8,10

Similarly, that self-intellection is an act upon a reality and upon a life; therefore, before the Life and Real-Being concerned in the intellection, there must be another Being and Life. In a word, intellection is vested in the activities themselves: since, then, the activities of self-intellection are intellective-forms, We, the Authentic We, are the Intelligibles and self-intellection conveys the Image of the Intellectual Sphere. Enneads III,9,3