Jowett: rhetoric

  

Rhetoric

Soc. But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer : for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic. GORGIAS

Soc. Very good then ; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned : I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not ?), with the making of garments ? GORGIAS

Soc. I am glad to hear it ; answer me in like manner about rhetoric : with what is rhetoric concerned ? GORGIAS

Soc. Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse ? GORGIAS

Soc. And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak ? GORGIAS

Soc. Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric ? GORGIAS

Gor. Because, Socrates  , the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand ; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse. GORGIAS

Soc. As to the arts generally, they are for the most part concerned with doing, and require little or no speaking ; in painting, and statuary, and many other arts, the work may proceed in silence ; and of such arts I suppose you would say that they do not come within the province of rhetoric. GORGIAS

Soc. But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium of language, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts ; in some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive with action, but in most of them the verbal element is greater — they depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power : and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter sort ? GORGIAS

Soc. And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these arts rhetoric ; although the precise expression which you used was, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse ; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say, "And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric." But I do not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by you. GORGIAS

Soc. Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer : — seeing that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned : — Suppose that a person asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now ; he might say, "Socrates, what is arithmetic ?" and I should reply to him, as you replied to me, that arithmetic is one of those arts which take effect through words. And then he would proceed to ask : "Words about what ?" and I should reply, Words about and even numbers, and how many there are of each. And if he asked again : "What is the art of calculation ?" I should say, That also is one of the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if he further said, "Concerned with what ?" I should say, like the clerks in the assembly, "as aforesaid" of arithmetic, but with a difference, the difference being that the art of calculation considers not only the quantities of odd and even numbers, but also their numerical relations to themselves and to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only word — he would ask, "Words about what, Socrates ?" and I should answer, that astronomy tells us about the motions of the stars and sun and moon, and their relative swiftness. GORGIAS

Soc. And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric : which you would admit (would you not ?) to be one of those arts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words ? GORGIAS

Soc. Words which do what ? I should ask. To what class of things do the words which rhetoric uses relate ? GORGIAS

Soc. Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric ; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion ? GORGIAS

Gor. No : the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates ; for persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric. GORGIAS

Soc. I will tell you : I am very well aware that do not know what, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric ; although I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to ask — what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what ? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you ? Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking this further question : If I asked, "What sort of a painter is Zeuxis ?" and you said, "The painter of figures," should I not be right in asking, What kind of figures, and where do you find them ?" GORGIAS

Soc. Now I was it to know about rhetoric in the same way ; — is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect ? I mean to say — Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not ? GORGIAS

Soc. Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion ? GORGIAS

Soc. Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion ? GORGIAS

Soc. Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has arisen which is a very fair one : Of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer, and about what ? — is not that a fair way of putting the question ? GORGIAS

Gor. I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust. GORGIAS

Soc. And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge ? GORGIAS

Soc. Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them ? GORGIAS

Soc. Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric ; for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel ? Surely not. For at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled ; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise ; or when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a proposition taken, then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians : what do you say, Gorgias ? Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn the nature of your art from you. And here let me assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own. For likely enough some one or other of the young men present might desire to become your pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. "What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias ? they will say about what will you teach us to advise the state ? — about the just and unjust only, or about those other things also which Socrates has just mentioned ? How will you answer them ? GORGIAS

Gor. I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the harbour were devised in accordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the suggestion of the builders. GORGIAS

Soc. I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness. GORGIAS

Gor. A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or apply a knife or hot iron to him ; and I have persuaded him to do for me what he would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would have no chance ; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished ; and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other competitive art, not against everybody — the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of fence ; because he has powers which are more than a match either for friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends. Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful boxer — he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or friends ; but that is no reason why the trainers or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from the city — surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself ; I should rather say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument holds good of rhetoric ; for the rhetorician can speak against all men and upon any subject — in short, he can persuade the multitude better than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power ; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation or banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his instructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and not his instructor. GORGIAS

Soc. You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of disputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not always terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either party of the subjects which they are discussing ; but disagreements are apt to arise — somebody says that another has not spoken truly or clearly ; and then they get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both parties conceiving that their opponents are arguing from personal feeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in the question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever listening to such fellows. Why do I say this ? Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone. And what is my sort ? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute — I for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are speaking and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have done, no matter — let us make an end of it. GORGIAS

Soc. And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts ; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things ; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know ? GORGIAS

Gor. Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort ? — not to have learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no way inferior to the professors of them ? GORGIAS

Soc. Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any service to us ; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts ; I mean to say, does he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them ; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more about these things than some. one else who knows ? Or must the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric ? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him — it is not your business ; but you will make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not know them ; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of these things first ? What is to be said about all this ? By heavens, Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying that you would. GORGIAS

Soc. But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art ; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his teacher, who is not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his rhetoric — he is to be banished — was not that said ? GORGIAS

Soc. And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric treated of discourse, not [like arithmetic] about odd and even, but about just and unjust ? Was not this said ? GORGIAS

Soc. I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen ; and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this. GORGIAS

Polus. And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying about rhetoric ? What ! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a contradiction — the thing which you dearly love, and to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your captious questions — [do you seriously believe that there is any truth in all this ?] For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of justice ? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass. GORGIAS

Pol. I will ask ; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer : What is rhetoric ? GORGIAS

Pol. Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric ? GORGIAS

Pol. Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience ? GORGIAS

Pol. And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing ? GORGIAS

Soc. What are you saying, Polus ? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is ? GORGIAS

Pol. Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience ? GORGIAS

Pol. Then are cookery and rhetoric the same ? GORGIAS

Soc. I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous ; and I hesitate to answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of his own profession. For whether or no this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practises I really cannot tell : — from what he was just now saying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole. GORGIAS

Soc. In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to manage mankind : this habit I sum up under the word "flattery" ; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not an art : — another part is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry are two others : thus there are four branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric : he did not see that I had not yet answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question : Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing ? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first answered, "What is rhetoric ?" For that would not be right, Polus ; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric ? GORGIAS

Pol. I will ask and do you answer ? What part of flattery is rhetoric ? GORGIAS

Gor. Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics. GORGIAS

Soc. I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the existence of bodies and of souls ? GORGIAS

as cookery : medicine : : rhetoric : justice. And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be jumbled up together ; neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would prevail far and wide : "Chaos" would come again, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what cookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may be excused, because you did not understand me, and could make no use of my answer when I spoke shortly, and therefore I had to enter into explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use of yours, I hope that you will speak at equal length ; but if I am able to understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair : And now you may do what you please with my answer. GORGIAS

Pol. What do you mean ? do you think that rhetoric is flattery ? GORGIAS

Soc. Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery — and so you will have refuted me ; but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what they think best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon which to congratulate themselves, if as you say, power be indeed a good, admitting at the same time that what is done without sense is an evil. GORGIAS

Soc. Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of rhetoric ? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil ? GORGIAS

Soc. Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or children or country ; but may be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing he ought to accuse — himself above all, and in the next degree his family or any of his friends who may be doing wrong ; he should bring to light the iniquity and not conceal it, that so the wrong-doer may suffer and be made whole ; and he should even force himself and others not to shrink, but with closed eyes like brave men to let the physician operate with knife or searing iron, not regarding the pain, in the hope of attaining the good and the honourable ; let him who has done things worthy of stripes, allow himself to be scourged, if of bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to be fined, if of exile, to be exiled, if of death, to die, himself being the first to accuse himself and his relations, and using rhetoric to this end, that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest, and that they themselves may be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say "Yes" or "No" to that ? GORGIAS

Soc. And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty to harm another, whether an enemy or not — I except the case of self-defence — then I have to be upon my guard — but if my enemy injures a third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the judge ; and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and not suffer punishment : if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep what he has stolen and spend it on him and his, regardless of religion and justice ; and if he has done things worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness ; or, if this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of any use to him who is not intending to commit injustice ; at least, there was no such use discovered by us in the previous discussion. GORGIAS

Cal. O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be running riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because Polus has fallen into the same error himself of which he accused Gorgias : — for he said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if some one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him justice, Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he thought that mankind in general would be displeased if he answered "No" ; and then in consequence of this admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, that being just the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed at you deservedly, as I think ; but now he has himself fallen into the same trap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded to you that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was the admission which led to his being entangled by you ; and because he was too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are generally at variance with one another : and hence, if a person is too modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself ; and you, in your ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which is to be determined by the rule of nature ; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you slip away to custom : as, for instance, you did in this very discussion about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of nature ; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the greater disgrace because the greater evil ; but conventionally, to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering of injustice is hot the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die than live ; since when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are weak ; and they, make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own interests ; and they : terrify the stronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them in order that they may not get the better of them ; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and unjust ; meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to have more than his neighbours ; for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they are too glad of equality. And therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker ; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the Scythians ? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay, but these are the men who act according to nature ; yes, by Heaven, and according to the law of nature : not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, which we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young lions, — charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them, that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honourable and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off and break through, and escape from all this ; he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws which are against nature : the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of Pindar  , when he says in his poem, that GORGIAS

Soc. Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus ; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better and worse, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you ; do not answer at random and contrary to your real opinion — for you will observe that we are arguing about the way of human life ; and to a man who has any sense at all, what question can be more serious than this ? — whether he should follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles now in vogue ; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy — and in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distinguish them, as I did before, and when we have come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean ? GORGIAS

Soc. Then, poetry is a sort of rhetoric ? GORGIAS

Soc. Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves. And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having the nature of flattery. GORGIAS

Soc. Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states ? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or are they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse for this ? GORGIAS

Soc. I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts ; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation ; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience ; but have you ever known such a rhetoric ; or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, who is he ? GORGIAS

And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods and to men ; — for he would not be temperate if he did not ? Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he will do what is just ; See and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy ; and he who does what is just and holy must be just and holy ? Very true. And must he not be courageous ? for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure when he ought ; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does ; and he who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable : now this latter is he whom you were applauding — the intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate. Such is my position, and these things I affirm to be true. And if they are true, then I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him : he had better order his life so as not to need punishment ; but if either he or any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire satisfy them leading a robber’s life. Such ; one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men ; you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care about geometry. — Well, then, either the principle that the happy are made happy by the possession of justice and temperance, and the miserable the possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the consequences ? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I was in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he should use his rhetoric — all those consequences are true. And that which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz., that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that degree worse ; and the other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be true. GORGIAS

Soc. Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows : do you think that all our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger always ; like that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and which you advise me to cultivate ? GORGIAS

Soc. And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, there are occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the swimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the pilot, who not only saves the souls of men, but also their bodies and properties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. Yet his art is modest and unpresuming : it has no airs or pretences of doing anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation which is given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings us from Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt, at the utmost two drachmae, when he has saved, as I was just now saying, the passenger and his wife and children and goods, and safely disembarked them at the Piraeus — this is the payment which he asks in return for so great a boon ; and he who is the master of the art, and has done all this, gets out and walks about on the sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is able to reflect and is aware that he cannot tell which of his fellow-passengers he has benefited, and which of them he has injured in not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they are just the same when he has disembarked them as when they embarked, and not a whit better either in their bodies or in their souls ; and he considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way benefited by him in having been saved from drowning, much less he who has great and incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul, which is the more valuable part of him ; neither is life worth having nor of any profit to the bad man, whether he be delivered from the sea, or the law-courts, or any other devourer — and so he reflects that such a one had better not live, for he cannot live well. GORGIAS

Soc. Well, but if so, the truth is as I have said already, that in the Athenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good statesman — you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but not true of former ones, and you preferred them to the others ; yet they have turned out to be no better than our present ones ; and therefore, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of rhetoric or of flattery, or they would not have fallen out of favour. GORGIAS

Soc. I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city : — do you think that there is any difference between one and the other ? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same ; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, sophistry a thing to be despised ; whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law, or gymnastic to medicine. The orators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are the only class who cannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact ? GORGIAS

Soc. Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have often acknowledged he should have — if he be his own defence, and have never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men ; and this has been repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of defence. And if anyone could convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone ; and if I died from want of ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death. For no man who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below having one’s soul full of injustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I say, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story. GORGIAS

Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife’s tale, which you will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, if by searching we could find out anything better or truer : but now you see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the Greeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all things, as well in public as in private life ; and that when any one has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be chastised and punished ; also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as well as of others, of the few or of the many : and rhetoric and any other art should be used by him, and all his actions should be done always, with a view to justice. GORGIAS

Socrates : That I should be able to make the speech would be nothing wonderful, Menexenus   ; for she who is my instructor is by no means weak in the art of rhetoric ; on the contrary, she has turned out many fine orators, and amongst them one who surpassed all other Greeks, Pericles, the son of Xanthippus. MENEXENUS

Socrates : I do ; and also Connus the son of Metrobius ; [236a] for these are my two instructors, the one in music, the other in rhetoric. So it is not surprising that a man who is trained like me should be clever at speaking. But even a man less well taught than I, who had learnt his music from Lamprus and his rhetoric from Antiphon the Rhamnusian, — even such a one, I say, could none the less win credit by praising Athenians before an Athenian audience. MENEXENUS

Cri. Truly, Socrates, though I am curious and ready to learn, yet I fear that I am not like minded with Euthydemus  , but one of the other sort, who, as you were saying, would rather be refuted by such arguments than use them in refutation of others. And though I may appear ridiculous in venturing to advise you, I think that you may as well hear what was said to me by a man of very considerable pretensions — he was a professor of legal oratory — who came away from you while I was walking up and down. "Crito  ," said he to me, "are you giving no attention to these wise men ?" "No, indeed," I said to him ; "I could not get within hearing of them — there was such a crowd." "You would have heard something worth hearing if you had." "What was that ?" I said. "You would have heard the greatest masters of the art of rhetoric discoursing." "And what did you think of them ?" I said. "What did I think of them ?" he said : — "theirs was the sort of discourse which anybody might hear from men who were playing the fool, and making much ado about nothing." That was the expression which he used. "Surely," I said, "philosophy is a charming thing." "Charming !" he said ; "what simplicity ! philosophy is nought ; and I think that if you had been present you would have been ashamed of your friend — his conduct was so very strange in placing himself at the mercy of men who care not what they say, and fasten upon every word. And these, as I was telling you, are supposed to be the most eminent professors of their time. But the truth is, Crito, that the study itself and the men themselves are utterly mean and ridiculous." Now censure of the pursuit, Socrates, whether coming from him or from others, appears to me to be undeserved ; but as to the impropriety of holding a public discussion with such men, there, I confess that, in my opinion, he was in the right. EUTHYDEMUS

Soc. Dear Crito, do you not know that in every profession the inferior sort are numerous and good for nothing, and the good are few and beyond all price : for example, are not gymnastic and rhetoric and money-making and the art of the general, noble arts ? EUTHYDEMUS

Why, my dear friend, said Socrates, must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak after he has heard such a rich and varied discourse ? I am especially struck with the beauty of the concluding words — who could listen to them without amazement ? When I reflected on the immeasurable inferiority of my own powers, I was ready to run away for shame, if there had been a possibility of escape. For I was reminded of Gorgias, and at the end of his speech I fancied that Agathon was shaking at me the Gorginian or Gorgonian head of the great master of rhetoric, which was simply to turn me and my speech, into stone, as Homer says, and strike me dumb. And then I perceived how foolish I had been in consenting to take my turn with you in praising love, and saying that I too was a master of the art, when I really had no conception how anything ought to be praised. For in my simplicity I imagined that the topics of praise should be true, and that this being presupposed, out of the true the speaker was to choose the best and set them forth in the best manner. And I felt quite proud, thinking that I knew the nature of true praise, and should speak well. Whereas I now see that the intention was to attribute to Love every species of greatness and glory, whether really belonging to him not, without regard to truth or falsehood — that was no matter ; for the original, proposal seems to have been not that each of you should really praise Love, but only that you should appear to praise him. And so you attribute to Love every imaginable form of praise which can be gathered anywhere ; and you say that "he is all this," and "the cause of all that," making him appear the fairest and best of all to those who know him not, for you cannot impose upon those who know him. And a noble and solemn hymn of praise have you rehearsed. But as I misunderstood the nature of the praise when I said that I would take my turn, I must beg to be absolved from the promise which I made in ignorance, and which (as Euripides would say) was a promise of the lips and not of the mind. Farewell then to such a strain : for I do not praise in that way ; no, indeed, I cannot. But if you like to here the truth about love, I am ready to speak in my own manner, though I will not make myself ridiculous by entering into any rivalry with you. Say then, Phaedrus  , whether you would like, to have the truth about love, spoken in any words and in any order which may happen to come into my mind at the time. Will that be agreeable to you ? SYMPOSIUM  

Soc. And when the orator instead of putting an ass in the place of a horse puts good for evil being himself as ignorant of their true nature as the city on which he imposes is ignorant ; and having studied the notions of the multitude, falsely persuades them not about "the shadow of an ass," which he confounds with a horse, but about good which he confounds with evily — what will be the harvest which rhetoric will be likely to gather after the sowing of that seed ? PHAEDRUS

Soc. But perhaps rhetoric has been getting too roughly handled by us, and she might answer : What amazing nonsense you are talking ! As if I forced any man to learn to speak in ignorance of the truth ! Whatever my advice may be worth, I should have told him to arrive at the truth first, and then come to me. At the same time I boldly assert that mere knowledge of the truth will not give you the art of persuasion. PHAEDRUS

Soc. Quite true ; if only the other arguments which remain to be brought up bear her witness that she is an art at all. But I seem to hear them arraying themselves on the opposite side, declaring that she speaks falsely, and that rhetoric is a mere routine and trick, not an art. Lo ! a Spartan appears, and says that there never is nor ever will be a real art of speaking which is divorced from the truth. PHAEDRUS

Soc. Is not rhetoric, taken generally, a universal art of enchanting the mind by arguments ; which is practised not only in courts and public assemblies, but in private houses also, having to do with all matters, great as well as small, good and bad alike, and is in all equally right, and equally to be esteemed — that is what you have heard ? PHAEDRUS

Soc. Then I suppose that you have only heard of the rhetoric of Nestor and Odysseus, which they composed in their leisure hours when at Troy, and never of the rhetoric of Palamedes ? PHAEDRUS

Soc. He then, who being ignorant of the truth aims at appearances, will only attain an art of rhetoric which is ridiculous and is not an art at all ? PHAEDRUS

Soc. In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power ? PHAEDRUS

Soc. Well, I will say no more about your friend’s speech lest I should give offence to you ; although I think that it might furnish many other examples of what a man ought rather to avoid. But I will proceed to the other speech, which, as I think, is also suggestive to students of rhetoric. PHAEDRUS

Soc. I am myself a great lover of these processes of division and generalization ; they help me to speak and to think. And if I find any man who is able to see "a One and Many" in nature, him I follow, and "walk in his footsteps as if he were a god." And those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of calling dialecticians ; but God knows whether the name is right or not. And I should like to know what name you would give to your or to Lysias’ disciples, and whether this may not be that famous art of rhetoric which Thrasymachus and others teach and practise ? Skilful speakers they are, and impart their skill to any who is willing to make kings of them and to bring gifts to them. PHAEDRUS

Phaedr. Yes, they are royal men ; but their art is not the same with the art of those whom you call, and rightly, in my opinion, dialecticians : — Still we are in the dark about rhetoric. PHAEDRUS

Phaedr. There is a great deal surely to be found in books of rhetoric ? PHAEDRUS

Soc. I have now said all that I have to say of the art of rhetoric : have you anything to add ? PHAEDRUS

Soc. Leave the unimportant and let us bring the really important question into the light of day, which is : What power has this art of rhetoric, and when ? PHAEDRUS

Soc. And if Adrastus the mellifluous or Pericles heard of these wonderful arts, brachylogies and eikonologies and all the hard names which we have been endeavouring to draw into the light of day, what would they say ? Instead of losing temper and applying uncomplimentary epithets, as you and I have been doing, to the authors of such an imaginary art, their superior wisdom would rather censure us, as well as them. "Have a little patience, Phaedrus and Socrates, they would say ; you should not be in such a passion with those who from some want of dialectical skill are unable to define the nature of rhetoric, and consequently suppose that they have found the art in the preliminary conditions of it, and when these have been taught by them to others, fancy that the whole art of rhetoric has been taught by them ; but as to using the several instruments of the art effectively, or making the composition a whole, — an application of it such as this is they regard as an easy thing which their disciples may make for themselves." PHAEDRUS

Phaedr. I quite admit, Socrates, that the art of rhetoric which these men teach and of which they write is such as you describe — there I agree with you. But I still want to know where and how the true art of rhetoric and persuasion is to be acquired. PHAEDRUS

Soc. The perfection which is required of the finished orator is, or rather must be, like the perfection of anything else ; partly given by nature, but may also be assisted by art. If you have the natural power and add to it knowledge and practice, you will be a distinguished speaker ; if you fall short in either of these, you will be to that extent defective. But the art, as far as there is an art, of rhetoric does not lie in the direction of Lysias or Thrasymachus. PHAEDRUS

Soc. Why, because medicine has to define the nature of the body and rhetoric of the soul — if we would proceed, not empirically but scientifically, in the one case to impart health and strength by giving medicine and food in the other to implant the conviction or virtue which you desire, by the right application of words and training. PHAEDRUS

Soc. Then clearly, Thrasymachus or any one else who teaches rhetoric in earnest will give an exact description of the nature of the soul ; which will enable us to see whether she be single and same, or, like the body, multiform. That is what we should call showing the nature of the soul. PHAEDRUS

Soc. Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls — they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis, he will next divide speeches into their different classes : — "Such and such persons," he will say, "are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way," and he will tell you why. The pupil must have a good theoretical notion of them first, and then he must have experience of them in actual life, and be able to follow them with all his senses about him, or he will never get beyond the precepts of his masters. But when he understands what persons are persuaded by what arguments, and sees the person about whom he was speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows that it is he, and can say to himself, "This is the man or this is the character who ought to have a certain argument applied to him in order to convince him of a certain opinion" ; — he who knows all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain, and when he should use pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other modes of speech which he has learned ; — when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art ; but if he fail in any of these points, whether in speaking or teaching or writing them, and yet declares that he speaks by rules of art, he who says "I don’t believe you" has the better of him. Well, the teacher will say, is this, and Socrates, your account of the so-called art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another ? PHAEDRUS

Phaedr. That is what the professors of rhetoric do actually say, Socrates. I have not forgotten that we have quite briefly touched upon this matter already ; with them the point is all-important. PHAEDRUS

Soc. Let us tell him that, before he appeared, you and I were saying that the probability of which he speaks was engendered in the minds of the many by the likeness of the truth, and we had just been affirming that he who knew the truth would always know best how to discover the resemblances of the truth. If he has anything else to say about the art of speaking we should like to hear him ; but if not, we are satisfied with our own view, that unless a man estimates the various characters of his heaters and is able to divide all things into classes and to comprehend them under single ideas he will never be a skilful rhetorician even within the limits of human power. And this skill he will not attain without a great deal of trouble, which a good man ought to undergo, not for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable to God and always to act acceptably to Him as far as in him lies ; for there is a saying of wiser men than ourselves, that a man of sense should not try to please his fellow-servants (at least this should not be his first object) but his good and noble masters ; and therefore if the way is long and circuitous, marvel not at this, for, where the end is great, there we may take the longer road, but not for lesser ends such as yours. Truly, the argument may say, Tisias, that if you do not mind going so far, rhetoric has a fair beginning here. PHAEDRUS

Soc. Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to God ? PHAEDRUS

Soc. And now the play is played out ; and of rhetoric enough. Go and tell Lysias that to the fountain and school of the Nymphs we went down, and were bidden by them to convey a message to him and to other composers of speeches — to Homer and other writers of poems, whether set to music or not ; and to Solon and others who have composed writings in the form of political discourses which they would term laws — to all of them we are to say that if their compositions are based on knowledge of the truth, and they can defend or prove them, when they are put to the test, by spoken arguments, which leave their writings poor in comparison of them, then they are to be called, not only poets, orators, legislators, but are worthy of a higher name, befitting the serious pursuit of their life. PHAEDRUS

Soc. I think that he has a genius which soars above the orations of Lysias, and that his character is cast in a finer mould. My impression of him is that he will marvelously improve as he grows older, and that all former rhetoricians will be as children in comparison of him. And I believe that he will not be satisfied with rhetoric, but that there is in him a divine inspiration which will lead him to things higher still. For he has an element of philosophy in his nature. This is the message of the gods dwelling in this place, and which I will myself deliver to Isocrates  , who is my delight ; and do you give the other to Lysias, who is yours. PHAEDRUS

Soc. Too true, my friend, as I well know ; there is, however, one peculiarity in their case : when they begin to reason in private about their dislike of philosophy, if they have the courage to hear the argument out and do not run away, they grow at last strangely discontented with themselves ; their rhetoric fades away, and they become helpless as children. These however are digressions from which we must now desist, or they will overflow, and drown the original argument ; to which, if you please, we will now return. THEAETETUS  

Y. Soc. That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to rhetoric. STATESMAN

For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just, profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistakable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house ; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, recommends. But I hear someone exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often difficult ; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we would be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed. With a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies ; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods ? or, suppose them to have no care of human things — why in either case should we mind about concealment ? And even if there are gods, and they do care about us, yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets ; and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and turned by "sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings." Let us be consistent, then, and believe both or neither. If the poets speak truly, why, then, we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice ; for if we are just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice ; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished. "But there is a world below in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds." Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty cities declare ; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony. THE REPUBLIC   BOOK II