Jowett: not-being

Soc. Yes, Theaetetus   ; and there are plenty of other proofs which will show that motion is the source of what is called being and becoming, and inactivity of not-being and destruction ; for fire and warmth, which are supposed to be the parent and guardian of all other things, are born of movement and friction, which is a kind of motion ; — is not this the origin of fire ? THEAETETUS

Soc. Very good ; and now tell me what is the power which discerns, not only in sensible objects, but in all things, universal notions, such as those which are called being and not-being, and those others about which we were just asking — what organs will you assign for the perception of these notions ? THEAETETUS

Soc. Suppose that we remove the question out of the sphere of knowing or not knowing, into that of being and not-being. THEAETETUS

And if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then according to you, being could not be many ; for this would involve an impossibility. In all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of the many ? and is not each division of your treatise intended to furnish a separate proof of this, there being in all as many proofs of the not-being of the many as you have composed arguments ? Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you ? PARMENIDES  

I mean, for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis of Zeno  ’s about the many, you should inquire not only what will be the consequences to the many in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in relation to itself and the many, on the hypothesis of the being of the many, but also what will be the consequences to the one and the many in their relation to themselves and to each other, on the opposite hypothesis. Or, again, if likeness is or is not, what will be the consequences in either of these cases to the subjects of the hypothesis, and to other things, in relation both to themselves and to one another, and so of unlikeness ; and the same holds good of motion and rest, of generation and destruction, and even of being and not-being. In a word, when you suppose anything to be or not to be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at the consequences in relation to the thing itself, and to any other things which you choose — to each of them singly, to more than one, and to all ; and so of other things, you must look at them in relation to themselves and to anything else which you suppose either to be or not to be, if you would train yourself perfectly and see the real truth. PARMENIDES

And it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes, when it passes from being into cessation of being, or from not-being into becoming — then it passes between certain states of motion and rest, and, neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor is destroyed. PARMENIDES

Then, as would appear, the one, when it is not, is ; for if it were not to be when it is not, but were to relinquish something of being, so as to become not-being, it would at once be. PARMENIDES

Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have the being of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its own being ; for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the not-being of not being is when being partakes of the being of being, and not of the being of not-being — that is, the perfection of being ; and when not-being does not partake of the not-being of not-being but of the being of not-being — that is the perfection of not-being. PARMENIDES

Since then what is partakes of not-being, and what is not of being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be ? PARMENIDES

And has not-being also, if it is not ? PARMENIDES

Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it changes from being to not-being ? PARMENIDES

Because the others have no sort or manner or way of communion with any sort of not-being, nor can anything which is not, be connected with any of the others ; for that which is not has no parts. PARMENIDES

Nor is there an opinion or any appearance of not-being in connection with the others, nor is not-being ever in any way attributed to the others. PARMENIDES

Str. He who says that falsehood exists has the audacity to assert the being of not-being ; for this is implied in the possibility of falsehood. But, my boy, in the days when I was a boy, the great Parmenides protested against this doctrine, and to the end of his life he continued to inculcate the same lesson — always repeating both in verse and out of verse : SOPHIST

Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show that not-being is. SOPHIST

Str. Then we must not attempt to attribute to not-being number either in the singular or plural ? SOPHIST

Str. When we speak of things which are not attributing plurality to not-being ? SOPHIST

Str. Nevertheless, we maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute being to not-being ? SOPHIST

Str. Do you see, then, that not-being in itself can neither be spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable ? SOPHIST

Str. Well, I am surprised, after what has been said already, that you do not see the difficulty in which he who would refute the notion of not-being is involved. For he is compelled to contradict himself as soon as he makes the attempt. SOPHIST

Str. Do not expect clearness from me. For I, who maintain that not-being has no part either in the one or many, just now spoke and am still speaking of not-being as one ; for I say "not-being." Do you understand ? SOPHIST

Str. And a little while ago I said that not-being is unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable : do you follow ? SOPHIST

Str. And in using the singular verb, did I not speak of not-being as one ? SOPHIST

Str. And when I spoke of not-being as indescribable and unspeakable and unutterable, in using each of these words in the singular, did I not refer to not-being as one ? SOPHIST

Str. How, then, can any one put any faith in me ? For now, as always, I am unequal to the refutation of not-being. And therefore, as I was saying, do not look to me for the right way of speaking about not-being ; but come, let us try the experiment with you. SOPHIST

Str. Make a noble effort, as becomes youth, and endeavour with all your might to speak of not-being in a right manner, without introducing into it either existence or unity or plurality. SOPHIST

Str. Say no more of ourselves ; but until we find some one or other who can speak of not-being without number, we must acknowledge that the Sophist is a clever rogue who will not be got out of his hole. SOPHIST

Theaet. In what a strange complication of being and not-being we are involved ! SOPHIST

Str. Strange ! I should think so. See how, by his reciprocation of opposites, the many-headed Sophist has compelled us, quite against our will, to admit the existence of not-being. SOPHIST

Theaet. Of course he will say that we are contradicting ourselves when we hazard the assertion, that falsehood exists in opinion and in words ; for in maintaining this, we are compelled over and over again to assert being of not-being, which we admitted just now to be an utter impossibility. SOPHIST

Str. Because, in self-defence, I must test the philosophy of my father Parmenides, and try to prove by main force, that in a certain sense not-being is, and that being, on the other hand, is not. SOPHIST

Str. And very likely we have been getting into the same perplexity about "being," and yet may fancy that when anybody utters the word, we understand him quite easily, although we do not know about not-being. But we may be ; equally ignorant of both. SOPHIST

Str. Upon this view, again, being, having a defect of being, will become not-being ? SOPHIST

Str. We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed to view those who speak less precisely ; and we shall find as the result of all, that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of not-being. SOPHIST

Str. When we were asked to what we were to assign the appellation of not-being, we were in the greatest difficulty : — do you remember ? SOPHIST

Str. Then let us acknowledge the difficulty ; and as being and not-being are involved in the same perplexity, there is hope that when the one appears more or less distinctly, the other will equally appear ; and if we are able to see neither there may still be a chance of steering our way in between them, without any great discredit. SOPHIST

Str. Because the Sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered because of the darkness of the place. is not that true ? SOPHIST

Str. Since, then, we are agreed that some classes have a communion with one another, and others not, and some have communion with a few and others with many, and that there is no reason why some should not have universal communion with all, let us now pursue the enquiry, as the argument suggests, not in relation to all ideas, lest the multitude of them should confuse us, but let us select a few of those which are reckoned to be the principal ones, and consider their several natures and their capacity of communion with one another, in order that if we are not able to apprehend with perfect clearness the notions of being and not-being, we may at least not fall short in the consideration of them, so far as they come within the scope of the present enquiry, if peradventure we may be allowed to assert the reality of not-being, and yet escape unscathed. SOPHIST

Str. Then not-being necessarily exists in the case of motion and of every class ; for the nature of the other entering into them all, makes each of them other than being, and so non-existent ; and therefore of all of them, in like manner, we may truly say that they are not — and again, inasmuch as they partake of being, that they are and are existent. SOPHIST

Str. Every class, then, has plurality of being and infinity of not-being. SOPHIST

Str. Then we may infer that being is not, in respect of as many other things as there are ; for not-being these it is itself one, and is : not the other things, which are infinite in number. SOPHIST

Str. When we speak of not-being, we speak, I suppose, not of something opposed to being, but only different. SOPHIST

Theaet. Clearly, not-being ; and this is the very nature for which the Sophist compelled us to search. SOPHIST

Str. And has not this, as you were saying, as real an existence as any other class ? May I not say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence, and a nature of its own ? just as the great was found to be great and the beautiful beautiful, and the not-great not-great, and the not-beautiful not-beautiful, in the same manner not-being has been found to be and is not-being, and is to be reckoned one among the many classes of being. Do you, Theaetetus, still feel any doubt of this ? SOPHIST

Str. Whereas, we have not only proved that things which are not are, but we have shown what form of being not-being is ; for we have shown that the nature of the other is, and is distributed over all things in their relations to one another, and whatever part of the other is contrasted with being, this is precisely what we have ventured to call not-being. SOPHIST

Str. Let not any one say, then, that while affirming the opposition of not-being to being, we still assert the being of not-being ; for as to whether there is an opposite of being, to that enquiry we have long said good-bye — it may or may not be, and may or may not be capable of definition. But as touching our present account of not-being, let a man either convince us of error, or, so long as he cannot, he too must say, as we are saying, that there is a communion of classes, and that being, and difference or other, traverse all things and mutually interpenetrate, so that the other partakes of being, and by reason of this participation is, and yet is not that of which it partakes, but other, and being other than being, it is clearly a necessity that not-being should be. again, being, through partaking of the other, becomes a class other than the remaining classes, and being other than all of them, is not each one of them, and is not all the rest, so that undoubtedly there are thousands upon thousands of cases in which being is not, and all other things, whether regarded individually or collectively, in many respects are, and in many respects are not. SOPHIST

Str. And thence arises the question, whether not-being mingles with opinion and language. SOPHIST

Str. If not-being has no part in the proposition, then all things must be true ; but if not-being has a part, then false opinion and false speech are possible, for think or to say what is not is falsehood, which thus arises in the region of thought and in speech. SOPHIST

Str. Into that region the Sophist, as we said, made his escape, and, when he had got there, denied the very possibility of falsehood ; no one, he argued, either conceived or uttered falsehood, inasmuch as not-being did not in any way partake of being. SOPHIST

Str. And now, not-being has been shown to partake of being, and therefore he will not continue fighting in this direction, but he will probably say that some ideas partake of not-being, and some not, and that language and opinion are of the non-partaking class ; and he will still fight to the death against the existence of the image-making and phantastic art, in which we have placed him, because, as he will say, opinion and language do not partake of not-being, and unless this participation exists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And, with the view of meeting this evasion, we must begin by enquiring into the nature of language, opinion, and imagination, in order that when we find them we may find also that they have communion with not-being, and, having made out the connection of them, may thus prove that falsehood exists ; and therein we will imprison the Sophist, if he deserves it, or, if not, we will let him go again and look for him in another class. SOPHIST

Theaet. Certainly, Stranger, there appears to be truth in what was said about the Sophist at first, that he was of a class not easily caught, for he seems to have abundance of defences, which he throws up, and which must every one of them be stormed before we can reach the man himself. And even now, we have with difficulty got through his first defence, which is the not-being of not-being, and lo ! here is another ; for we have still to show that falsehood exists in the sphere of language and opinion, and there will be another and another line of defence without end. SOPHIST

Str. Then, as I was saying, let us first of all obtain a conception of language and opinion, in order that we may have clearer grounds for determining, whether not-being has any concern with them, or whether they are both always true, and neither of them ever false. SOPHIST

Str. When other, then, is asserted of you as the same, and not-being as being, such a combination of nouns and verbs is really and truly false discourse. SOPHIST

Str. Well, then, as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the inference that not-being had an existence, because here was the point at which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must endeavour to show that the greater and, less are not only to be measured with one another, but also have to do with the production of the mean ; for if this is not admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man of action can be an undisputed master of his science. STATESMAN

Str. I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we may have experienced in the discussion about weaving, and the reversal of the universe, and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and the being of not-being. I know that they were felt to be too long, and I reproached myself with this, fearing that they might be not only tedious but irrelevant ; and all that I have now said is only designed to prevent the recurrence of any such disagreeables for the future. STATESMAN

And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to not-being, for that intermediate between being and not-being there has to be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if there be such ? THE REPUBLIC   BOOK V

Yes, something else. Well, then, is not-being the subject-matter of opinion ? or, rather, how can there be an opinion at all about not-being ? Reflect : when a man has an opinion, has he not an opinion about something ? Can he have an opinion which is an opinion about nothing ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK V

And not-being is not one thing, but, properly speaking, nothing ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK V

Of not-being, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative ; of being, knowledge ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK V

Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK V

But were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute not-being ; and that the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will be found in the interval between them ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK V

Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally of the nature of being and not-being, and cannot rightly be termed either, pure and simple ; this unknown term, when discovered, we may truly call the subject of opinion, and assign each to their proper faculty — the extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to the faculty of the mean. THE REPUBLIC BOOK V

He replied : They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or the children’s puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with what he hit him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was sitting. The individual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle, and have a double sense : nor can you fix them in your mind, either as being or not-being, or both, or neither. THE REPUBLIC BOOK V

Then what will you do with them ? I said. Can they have a better place than between being and not-being ? For they are clearly not in greater darkness or negation than not-being, or more full of light and existence than being. THE REPUBLIC BOOK V

Thus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the multitude entertain about the beautiful and about all other things are tossing about in some region which is halfway between pure being and pure not-being ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK V