Whether All Souls Form a Single One?
IF ALL SOULS BE ONE IN THE WORLD-SOUL, WHY SHOULD THEY NOT TOGETHER FORM ONE?
1. Just as the soul of each animal is one, because she is entirely present in the whole body, and because she is thus really one, because she does not have one part in one organ, and some other part in another; and just as the sense-soul is equally one in all the beings which feel, and just as the vegetative soul is everywhere entirely one in each part of the growing plants; (…)
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Guthrie / Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie
Matérias
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,9
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro -
Guthrie-Plotinus: father
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThis indeed is the occasion to quote (from Homer) with peculiar force, “Let us fly unto our dear fatherland!” But how shall we fly? How escape from here? is the question Ulysses asks himself in that allegory which represents him trying to escape from the magic sway of Circe or Calypso, where neither the pleasure of the eyes, nor the view of fleshly beauty were able to hold him in those enchanted places. Our fatherland is the region whence we descend here below. It is there that dwells our (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead V,1
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe Three Principal Hypostases, or Forms of Existence.
AUDACITY THE CAUSE OF HUMAN APOSTASY FROM THE DIVINITY.
1. How does it happen that souls forget their paternal divinity? Having a divine nature, and having originated from the divinity, how could they ever misconceive the divinity or themselves? The origin of their evil is “audacity,” generation, the primary diversity, and the desire to belong to none but themselves. As soon as they have enjoyed the pleasure of an independent life, (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: reality
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro(14). It is absolutely necessary to postulate the existence of a nature different from bodies, by itself fully possessing genuine existence, which can neither be born nor perish. Otherwise, all other things would hopelessly disappear, as a result of the destruction of the existence which preserves both the individuals and the universe, as their beauty and salvation. The soul, indeed, is the principle of movement (as Plato thought, in the Phaedrus); it is the soul that imparts movement to (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead V,2
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf Generation, and of the Order of things that Rank Next After the First.
WHY FROM UNITY THIS MANIFOLD WORLD WAS ABLE TO COME FORTH.
1. The One is all things, and is none of these things. The Principle of all things cannot be all things. It is all things only in the sense that all things coexist within it. But in it, they “are” not yet, but only “will be.” How then could the manifoldness of all beings issue from the One, which is simple and identical, which contains no diversity or (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: perception
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThough I should set myself in opposition to popular views, I shall set down clearly what seems to me the true state of affairs. Not the whole soul enters into the body. By her higher part, she ever remains united to the intelligible world; as, by her lower part, she remains united to the sense-world. If this lower part dominates, or rather, if it be dominated (by sensation) and troubled, it hinders us from being conscious of what the higher part of the soul contemplates. Indeed that which is (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead V,3
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe Self-Consciousnesses, and What is Above Them.
IS KNOWLEDGE DEPENDENT ON THE COMPOSITENESS OF THE KNOWER?
1. Must thought, and self-consciousness imply being composed of different parts, and on their mutual contemplation? Must that which is absolutely simple be unable to turn towards itself, to know itself? ls it, on the contrary, possible that for that which is not composite to know itself? Self-consciousness, indeed, does not necessarily result from a thing’s knowing itself because (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: vice
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroBut how shall we train this interior vision? At the moment of its (first) awakening, it cannot contemplate beauties too dazzling. Your soul must then first be accustomed to contemplate the noblest occupations of man, and then the beautiful deeds, not indeed those performed by artists, but those (good deeds) done by virtuous men. Later contemplate the souls of those who perform these beautiful actions. Nevertheless, how will you discover the beauty which their excellent soul possesses? (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead V,4
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroHow What is After the First Proceeds Therefrom; of the One.
NECESSITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST.
1. Everything that exists after the First is derived therefrom, either directly or mediately, and constitutes a series of different orders such that the second can be traced back to the First, the third to the second, and so forth. Above all beings there must be Something simple and different from all the rest which would exist in itself, and which, without ever mingling with anything (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: ugly
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro(The Stoics), like almost everybody, insist that visual beauty consists in the proportion of the parts relatively to each other and to the whole, joined to the grace of colors. If then, as in this case, the beauty of bodies in general consists in the symmetry and just proportion of their parts, beauty could not consist of anything simple, and necessarily could not appear in anything but what was compound. Only the totality will be beautiful; the parts by themselves will possess no beauty; (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead V,5
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThat Intelligible Entities Are Not External to the Intelligence of the Good.
(The subject of the quarrel between Amelius and Porphyry.)
KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES IMPLIES THEIR PRESENCE.
1. Surely, nobody could believe that the veritable and real Intelligence could be deceived, and admit the existence of things that do not exist? Its very name guarantees its intelligent nature. It therefore possesses knowledge without being subject to forgetfulness, and its knowledge is (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: privation
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThus, in her ascension towards divinity, the soul advances until, having risen above everything that is foreign to her, she alone with Him who is alone, beholds, in all His simplicity and purity, Him from whom all depends, to whom all aspires, from whom everything draws its existence, life and thought. He who beholds him is overwhelmed with love; with ardor desiring to unite himself with Him, entranced with ecstasy. Men who have not yet seen Him desire Him as the Good; those who have, admire (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead V,6
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe Superessential Principle Does Not Think; Which is the First Thinking Principle, and Which is the Second?
BY THINKING, INTELLIGENCE PASSES FROM UNITY TO DUALITY.
1. One may think oneself, or some other object. What thinks itself falls least into the duality (inherent to thought). That which thinks some other object approaches identity less; for though it contain what it contemplates, it nevertheless differs therefrom (by its nature). On the contrary, the principle that thinks itself (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: physical
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroHow can both sensible and intelligible objects be beautiful? Because, as we said, sensible objects participate in a form. While a shapeless object, by nature capable of receiving shape (physical) and form (intelligible), remains without reason or form, it is ugly. That which remains completely foreign to all divine reason (a reason proceeding from the universal Soul), is absolute ugliness. Any object should be considered ugly which is not entirely molded by informing reason, the matter, not (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead V,7
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroDo Ideas of Individuals Exist?
TWO POSSIBLE HYPOTHESES OF IDEAS OF INDIVIDUALS.
1. Do ideas of individuals (as well as of classes of individuals), exist? This means that if I, in company with some other man, were to trace ourselves back to the intelligible world, we would there find separate individual principles corresponding to each of us. (This might imply either of two theories.) Either, if the individual named Socrates be eternal, and if the soul of Socrates be Socrates himself, (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: immovable
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe function of the rational soul is to think, but she does not limit herself to thinking. Otherwise there would be no difference between her and intelligence. Besides her intellectual characteristics, the soul’s characteristic nature, by virtue of which she does not remain mere intelligence, has a further individual function, such as is possessed by every other being. By raising her glance to what is superior to her, she thinks; by bringing them down to herself, she preserves herself; by (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead V,8
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroConcerning Intelligible Beauty.
ART MAKES A STATUE OUT OF ROUGH MARBLE.
1. Since he who rises to the contemplation of the intelligible world, and who conceives the beauty of true intelligence, can also, as we have pointed out, by intuition grasp the superior Principle, the Father of Intelligence, let us, so far as our strength allows us, try to understand and explain to ourselves how it is possible to contemplate the beauty of Intelligence and of the intelligible world. Let us imagine (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: future
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro(20). This, then, is our answer to those who seek a philosophical demonstration. Those who are satisfied with the testimony of faith and sense, may be referred to those extracts from history which furnish numerous proofs thereof. We may also refer to the oracles given by the divinities who order an appeasement of the souls who were victims of some injustice, and to honor the dead, and to the rites observed by all towards those who live no more; which presupposes that their souls are still (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead V,9
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf Intelligence, Ideas and Essence.
THE SENSUAL MAN, THE MORAL, AND THE SPIRITUAL.
1. From their birth, men exercise their senses, earlier than their intelligence, and they are by necessity forced to direct their attention to sense-objects. Some stop there, and spend their life without progressing further. They consider suffering as evil, and pleasure as the good, judging it to be their business to avoid the one and encompass the other. That is the content of wisdom for those of them (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: colors
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro(The Stoics), like almost everybody, insist that visual beauty consists in the proportion of the parts relatively to each other and to the whole, joined to the grace of colors. If then, as in this case, the beauty of bodies in general consists in the symmetry and just proportion of their parts, beauty could not consist of anything simple, and necessarily could not appear in anything but what was compound. Only the totality will be beautiful; the parts by themselves will possess no beauty; (…)