About Mixture to the Point of Total Penetration.
REFUTATION OF ANAXAGORAS AND DEMOCRITUS.
1. The subject of the present consideration is mixture to the point of total penetration of the different bodies. This has been explained in two ways: that the two liquids are mingled so as mutually to interpenetrate each other totally, or that only one of them penetrates the other. The difference between these two theories is of small importance. First we must set aside the opinion of (Anaxagoras (…)
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Guthrie / Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie
Matérias
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead II,7
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro -
Guthrie-Plotinus: affections
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThus, in her ascension towards divinity, the soul advances until, having risen above everything that is foreign to her, she alone with Him who is alone, beholds, in all His simplicity and purity, Him from whom all depends, to whom all aspires, from whom everything draws its existence, life and thought. He who beholds him is overwhelmed with love; with ardor desiring to unite himself with Him, entranced with ecstasy. Men who have not yet seen Him desire Him as the Good; those who have, admire (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead II,8
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf Sight; or of Why Distant Objects Seem Small.
(OF PERSPECTIVE.)
VARIOUS THEORIES OF PERSPECTIVE.
1. What is the cause that when distant visible objects seem smaller, and that, though separated by a great space, they seem to be close to each other, while if close, we see them in their true size, and their true distance? The cause of objects seeming smaller at a distance might be that light needs to be focussed near the eye, and to be accommodated to the size of the pupils; that the (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: substance
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe soul appreciates beauty by an especially ordered faculty, whose sole function it is to appreciate all that concerns beauty, even when the other faculties take part in this judgment. Often the soul makes her (aesthetic) decisions by comparison with the form of the beautiful which is within her, using this form as a standard by which to judge. But what agreement can anything corporeal have with what is incorporeal? For example, how can an architect judge a building placed before him as (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead II,9
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroAgainst the Gnostics; or, That the Creator and the World are Not Evil.
THE SUPREME PRINCIPLES MUST BE SIMPLE AND NOT COMPOUND.
1. We have already seen that the nature of the Good is simple and primary, for nothing that is not primary could be simple. We have also demonstrated that the nature of the Good contains nothing in itself, but is something unitary, the very nature of the One; for in itself the One is not some thing to which unity could be added, any more than the Good in itself (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: person
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIf everything that happens has a cause, it is possible to discover such fact’s proximate causes, and to them refer this fact. People go downtown, for example, to see a person, or collect a bill. In all cases it is a matter of choice, followed by decision, and the determination to carry it out. There are, indeed, certain facts usually derived from the arts; as for instance the re-establishment of health may be referred to medicine and the physician. Again, when a man has become rich, this is (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead III,1
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroConcerning Fate.
POSSIBLE THEORIES ABOUT FATE.
1. The first possibility is that there is a cause both for the things that become, and those that are; the cause of the former being their becoming, and that of the latter, their existence. Again, neither of them may have a cause. Or, in both cases, some may have a cause, and some not. Further, those that become might have a cause, while, of these that exist, some might partly have a cause. Contrariwise, all things that exist may have a (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: organ
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroBut how shall we train this interior vision? At the moment of its (first) awakening, it cannot contemplate beauties too dazzling. Your soul must then first be accustomed to contemplate the noblest occupations of man, and then the beautiful deeds, not indeed those performed by artists, but those (good deeds) done by virtuous men. Later contemplate the souls of those who perform these beautiful actions. Nevertheless, how will you discover the beauty which their excellent soul possesses? (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead III,2
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf Providence.
EPICURUS TAUGHT CHANCE AND THE GNOSTICS AN EVIL CREATOR.
1. When Epicurus derives the existence and constitution of the universe from automatism and chance, he commits an absurdity, and stultifies himself. That is self-evident, though the matter have elsewhere been thoroughly demonstrated. But (if the world do not owe its origin to chance) we will be compelled to furnish an adequate reason for the existence and creation of all these beings. This (teleological) question (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: intuition
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroSo much then for sense-beauties which, descending on matter like images and shadows, beautify it and thereby compel our admiration. 4. Now we shall leave the senses in their lower sphere, and we shall rise to the contemplation of the beauties of a superior order, of which the senses have no intuition, but which the soul perceives and expresses. [Ennead I,6 (1) 3]
To see these beauties, they must be contemplated by the faculty our soul has received; then, while contemplating them, we shall (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead III,3
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroContinuation of That on Providence.
SOULS SHOW KINSHIP TO WORLD-SOUL BY FIDELITY TO THEIR OWN NATURE.
1. The question (why some reasons are souls, while others are reasons merely, when at the same time universal Reason is a certain Soul), may be answered as follows. Universal Reason (which proceeds from the universal Soul) embraces both good and bad things, which equally belong to its parts; it does not engender them, but exists with them in its universality. In fact, these “logoses” (or (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: happy
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro(15). The soul has affinities with the divine and eternal nature. This is evident, because, as we have demonstrated it, she is not a body, has neither figure nor color, and is impalpable. Consider the following demonstration. It is generally granted that everything that is divine and that possesses genuine existence enjoys a happy and wise life. Now let us consider the nature of our soul, in connection with that of the divine. Let us take a soul, not one inside of a body, which is undergoing (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead III,4
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf Our Individual Guardian.
OUTLINE OF NATURES IN THE UNIVERSE.
Other principles remain unmoved while producing and exhibiting their (”hypostases,” substantial acts, or) forms of existence. The (universal) Soul, however, is in motion while producing and exhibiting her (”substantial act,” or) forms of existence, namely, the functions of sensation and growth, reaching down as far as (the sphere of the) plants. In us also does the Soul function, but she does not dominate us, constituting (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: wise
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThus, according to the ancient (Platonic or Empedoclean) maxim, “courage, temperance, all the virtues, nay, even prudence, are but purifications.” The mysteries were therefore wise in teaching that the man who has not been purified will, in hell, dwell at the bottom of a swamp; for everything that is not pure, because of its very perversity, delights in mud, just as we see the impure swine wallow in the mud with delight. And indeed, what would real temperance consist of, if it be not to (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead III,5
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf Love, or “Eros.”
LOVE AS GOD, GUARDIAN AND PASSION.
1. Is Love a divinity, a guardian, or a passion of the human soul? Or is it all three under different points of view? In this case, what is it under each of these points of view? These are the questions we are to consider, consulting the opinions of men, but chiefly those of the philosophers. The divine Plato, who has written much about love, here deserves particular attention. He says that it is not only a passion capable of being (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: notion
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroSince the thought is something essentially one (?), the form, which is the object of thought, and the idea, are one and the same thing. Which is this thing? Intelligence and the intellectual “being,” for no idea is foreign to intelligence; each form is intelligence, and the whole intelligence is all the forms; every particular form is a particular intelligence. Likewise science, taken in its totality, is all the notions it embraces; every notion is a part of the total science; it is not (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead III,6
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf the Impassibility of Incorporeal Entities (Soul and and Matter).
A. OF THE SOUL.
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PASSIBILITY OF JUDGMENT AND THE SOUL.
1. Sensations are not affections, but actualizations, and judgments, relative to passions. The affections occur in what is other (than the soul); that is, in the organized body, and the judgment in the soul. For if the judgment were an affection, it would itself presuppose another judgment, and so on to infinity. Though accepting this statement, (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: source
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroLet us now propound a question about experiences to these men who feel love for incorporeal beauties. What do you feel in presence of the noble occupations, the good morals, the habits of temperance, and in general of virtuous acts and sentiments, and of all that constitutes the beauty of souls? What do you feel when you contemplate your inner beauty? What is the source of your ecstasies, or your enthusiasms? Whence come your desires to unite yourselves to your real selves, and to refresh (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead III,7
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf Time and Eternity.
A. ETERNITY.
INTRODUCTION. ETERNITY EXISTS PERPETUALLY, WHILE TIME BECOMES.
(1.) When saying that eternity and time differ, that eternity refers to perpetual existence, and time to what “becomes” (this visible world), we are speaking off-hand, spontaneously, intuitionally, and common language supports these forms of expression. When however we try to define our conceptions thereof in greater detail, we become embarrassed; the different opinions of ancient (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: production
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroUnity was not to exist alone; for if unity remained self-enclosed, all things would remain hidden in unity without having any form, and no beings would achieve existence. Consequently, even if constituted by beings born of unity, plurality would not exist, unless the inferior natures, by their rank destined to be souls, issued from those beings by the way of procession. Likewise, it was not sufficient for souls to exist, they also had to reveal what they were capable of begetting. It is (…)