Of Nature, Contemplation and Unity.
(These three subjects are discussed in paragraphs 1-4, 5-7, and 8-16. The plain paragraph numbers are those of the Teubner edition; those in parenthesis are the Creuzer (Didot) edition.)
A. OF NATURE.
INTRODUCTION: AS A JOKE, IT MAY BE SAID THAT EVEN PLANTS ASPIRE TO CONTEMPLATION.
1. If as a preliminary pleasantry, we said that all beings, not only reasonable ones, but even the irrational, plants as well as the earth that begets them, aspire to (…)
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Guthrie / Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie
Matérias
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead III,8
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro -
Guthrie-Plotinus: interior
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe soul appreciates beauty by an especially ordered faculty, whose sole function it is to appreciate all that concerns beauty, even when the other faculties take part in this judgment. Often the soul makes her (aesthetic) decisions by comparison with the form of the beautiful which is within her, using this form as a standard by which to judge. But what agreement can anything corporeal have with what is incorporeal? For example, how can an architect judge a building placed before him as (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead III,9
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroFragments About the Soul, the Intelligence, and the Good.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE EXISTING ANIMAL.
1. Plato says, “The intelligence sees the ideas comprised within the existing animal.” He adds, “The demiurge conceived that this produced animal was to comprise beings similar and equally numerous to those that the intelligence sees in the existing animal.” Does Plato mean that the ideas are anterior to intelligence, and that they already exist when intelligence thinks (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: inanimate
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro(a.) (Neither a material molecule, nor a material aggregation of material atoms could possess life and intelligence.) First, let us consider the nature of this alleged soul-body. As every soul necessarily possesses life, and as the body, considered as being the soul, must obtain at least two molecules, if not more (there are three possibilities): either only one of them possesses life, or all of them possess it, or none of them. If one molecule alone possesses life, it alone will be the (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,1
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf the Being of the Soul.
It is in the intelligible world that dwells veritable being. Intelligence is the best that there is on high; but there are also souls; for it is thence that they descended thither. Only, souls have no bodies, while here below they inhabit bodies and are divided there. On high, all the intelligences exist together, without separation or division; all the souls exist equally together in that world which is one, and there is no local distance between them. (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: contemplating
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTo see these beauties, they must be contemplated by the faculty our soul has received; then, while contemplating them, we shall experience far more pleasure, astonishment and admiration, than in contemplation of the sense-beauties, because we will have the intuition of veritable beauties. The sentiments inspired by beauty are admiration, a gentle charm, desire, love, and a pleasurable impulse. [Ennead I,6 (1) 3]
But reason is not yet satisfied; reason wonders why these veritable beings (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,2
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroHow the Soul Mediates Between Indivisible and Divisible Essence.
OUTLINE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF IV. 7.
1. While studying the nature (”being”) of the soul, we have shown (against the Stoics) that she is not a body; that, among incorporeal entities, she is not a “harmony” (against the Pythagoreans); we have also shown that she is not an “entelechy” (against Aristotle), because this term, as its very etymology implies, does not express a true idea, and reveals nothing about the (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: circumstances
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro(11). (If, as Stoics claim, man first was a certain nature called habit, then a soul, and last an intelligence, the perfect would have arisen from the imperfect, which is impossible). To say that the first nature of the soul is to be a spirit, and that this spirit became soul only after having been exposed to cold, and as it were became soaked by its contact, because the cold subtilized it; this is an absurd hypothesis. Many animals are born in warm places, and do not have their soul exposed (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,3
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroPsychological Questions.
A. ARE NOT ALL SOULS PARTS OR EMANATIONS OF A SINGLE SOUL?
PSYCHOLOGY OBEYS THE PRECEPT “KNOW THYSELF,” AND SHOWS HOW WE ARE TEMPLES OF THE DIVINITY.
1. Among the questions raised about the soul, we purpose to solve here not only such as may be solved with some degree of assurance, but also such as may be considered matters of doubt, considering our researches rewarded by even only a definition of this doubt. This should prove an interesting study. What indeed (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: Socrates
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIf the intelligible world contains the idea of Man, it must also contain that of the reasonable man, and of the artist; and consequently the idea of the arts that are begotten by Intelligence. We must therefore insist that the intelligible world contains the ideas of the universals, the idea of Man as such, and not, for instance, that of Socrates. Still we shall have to decide whether the intelligible world does not also contain the idea of the individual man, that is, of the man considered (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,4
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroQuestions About the Soul.
(Second Part.)
SPEECH OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.
1. When the soul will have risen to the intelligible world, what will she say, and what will she remember? She will contemplate the beings to which she will be united and she will apply her whole attention thereto; otherwise, she would not be in the intelligible world.
MEMORY OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.
Will she have no memory of things here below? Will she not, for instance, remember that she (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: model
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro(18). If intelligible entities are separated from sense objects, how does it happen that the soul descends into a body? So long as the soul is a pure and impassible intelligence, so long as she enjoys a purely intellectual life like the other intelligible beings, she dwells among them; for she has neither appetite nor desire. But that part which is inferior to intelligence and which is capable of desires, follows their impulsion, “proceeds” and withdraws from the intelligible world. Wishing (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,5
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroPsychological Questions — III.
About the Process of Vision and Hearing.
IT IS UNCERTAIN WHETHER AN INTERMEDIARY BODY BE IMPLIED BY VISION.
1. Above we suggested the question whether it be possible to see without some medium such as the air or a diaphanous body; we shall now try to consider it. It has already been asserted that in general the soul cannot see or feel without the intermediation of some body; for, when completely separated from the body (the soul dwells in the intelligible (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: irrational
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe most irrational theory of all is that an aggregation of molecules should produce life, that elements without intelligence should beget intelligence. Others (like Alexander of Aphrodisia) insist that to produce life these elements must be mingled in a certain manner. That would, however, imply (as thought Gallen and Hippocrates) the existence of a principle which produces order, and which should be the cause of mixture or, temperament, and that should alone deserve being considered as (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,6
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf Sensation and Memory.
STOIC DOCTRINES OF SENSATIONS AND MEMORIES HANG TOGETHER.
If we deny that sensations are images impressed on the soul, similar to the impression of a seal, we shall also, for the sake of consistency, have to deny that memories are notions or sensations preserved in the soul by the permanence of the impression, inasmuch as, according to our opinion, the soul did not originally receive any impression. The two questions, therefore, hang together. Either we shall (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: infinity
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroBut how shall we train this interior vision? At the moment of its (first) awakening, it cannot contemplate beauties too dazzling. Your soul must then first be accustomed to contemplate the noblest occupations of man, and then the beautiful deeds, not indeed those performed by artists, but those (good deeds) done by virtuous men. Later contemplate the souls of those who perform these beautiful actions. Nevertheless, how will you discover the beauty which their excellent soul possesses? (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,7
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf the Immortality of the Soul: Polemic Against Materialism.
IS THE SOUL IMMORTAL?
1. Are we immortal, or does all of us die? (Another possibility would be that) of the two parts of which we are composed, the one might be fated to be dissolved and perish, while the other, that constitutes our very personality, might subsist perpetually. These problems must be solved by a study of our nature.
THE BODY AS THE INSTRUMENT OF THE SOUL.
Man is not a simple being; he contains a soul and a (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: creator
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroApplying this conception to the universe, we rise to Intelligence, recognizing therein the demiurgic creator of the world. It was in receiving from it its shapes by the intermediation of another principle, the universal Soul, that the (material) substances became water, air, earth and fire. On the one hand, the Soul shapes the four elements of the world; on the other, she receives from Intelligence the (seminal) reasons, as the souls of the artists themselves receive from the arts the (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,8
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf the Descent of the Soul Into the Body.
THE EXPERIENCE OF ECSTASY LEADS TO QUESTIONS.
1. On waking from the slumber of the body to return to myself, and on turning my attention from exterior things so as to concentrate it on myself, I often observe an alluring beauty, and I become conscious of an innate nobility. Then I live out a higher life, and I experience atonement with the divinity. Fortifying myself within it, I arrive at that actualization which raises me above the (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: category
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIf there were no body, the soul could not have any procession, since the body is the natural locality of her development. As the soul must extend, she will beget a receiving locality, and will, consequently, produce the body. The soul’s rest is based, and depends for growth on (the intellectual category of) rest itself. The soul thus resembles an immense light which weakens as it becomes more distant from its source, so that at the extremity of its radiation, it has become no more than an (…)