Intellectual Beings
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MacKenna / Stephen MacKenna
Matérias
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Intellectual beings
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro -
MacKenna-Plotinus: belief
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe belief is that the planets in their courses actually produce not merely such conditions as poverty, wealth, health and sickness but even ugliness and beauty and, gravest of all, vices and virtue and the very acts that spring from these qualities, the definite doings of each moment of virtue or vice. We are to suppose the stars to be annoyed with men - and upon matters in which men, moulded to what they are by the stars themselves, can surely do them no wrong. 616 Enneads: II III. 1
The (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Intellectual sphere
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIntellectual Sphere
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MacKenna-Plotinus: faith
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThis natural tendency must be made the starting-point to such a man; he must be drawn by the tone, rhythm and design in things of sense: he must learn to distinguish the material forms from the Authentic-Existent which is the source of all these correspondences and of the entire reasoned scheme in the work of art: he must be led to the Beauty that manifests itself through these forms; he must be shown that what ravished him was no other than the Harmony of the Intellectual world and the (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Intellectual substance
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIntellectual Substance
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MacKenna-Plotinus: emanation
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroBut it has been observed that the Couplement, too especially before our emancipation is a member of this total We, and in fact what the body experiences we say We experience. This then covers two distinct notions; sometimes it includes the brute-part, sometimes it transcends the brute. The body is brute touched to life; the true man is the other, going pure of the body, natively endowed with the virtues which belong to the Intellectual-Activity, virtues whose seat is the Separate Soul, the (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Intellectual nature
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIntellectual Nature
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MacKenna-Plotinus: irradiation
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro11. In childhood the main activity is in the Couplement and there is but little IRRADIATION from the higher principles of our being: but when these higher principles act but feebly or rarely upon us their action is directed towards the Supreme; they work upon us only when they stand at the mid-point. Enneads I,1,11
But how does it thus contain the good within itself? It is, itself, of the nature of the good and it has been strengthened still towards the perception of all that is good by (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Intellectual Beauty
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIt is a principle with us that one who has attained to the vision of the Intellectual Beauty and grasped the beauty of the Authentic Intellect will be able also to come to understand the Father and Transcendent of that Divine Being. It concerns us, then, to try to see and say, for ourselves and as far as such matters may be told, how the Beauty of the divine Intellect and of the Intellectual Kosmos may be revealed to contemplation. Enneads V,8,1
When each of the entities bound up with the (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Ordenação Intelectual
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIntellectual order
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MacKenna-Plotinus: aspirations
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroNone the less, in spite of physical resemblance and similar environment, we observe the greatest difference in temperament and in ideas: this side of the human being, then, derives from some quite other Principle [than any external causation or destiny]. A further confirmation is found in the efforts we make to correct both bodily constitution and mental aspirations. Enneads III,1,5
How then do we explain desire and other forms of aspiration? Aspiration must be a motion having its origin (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Objecto Intelectual
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIntellectual Object
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MacKenna-Plotinus: triad
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroSuccession or repetition gives us Number dyad, TRIAD, etc. and the extent traversed is a matter of Magnitude; thus we have Quantity of Movement in the form of number, dyad, TRIAD, decade, or in the form of extent apprehended in what we may call the amount of the Movement: but, the idea of Time we have not. That definite Quantity is merely something occurring within Time, for, otherwise Time is not everywhere but is something belonging to Movement which thus would be its substratum or (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Intellectual Pyramid
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroBut where does this thing lie? Is it existent only in the defining thought, so to speak? No; it is also a thing, though a thing of the Intellectual. All that belongs to that order is at once an Intellectual and in some degree the concrete thing. There is a position, as well as a manner of being, for all configurations, for surface, for solid. And certainly the configurations are not of our devising; for example, the configurations of the universe are obviously antecedent to ourselves; so it (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: hypostasis
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroFor what could be added to the fullest life to make it the best life? If anyone should answer, “The nature of Good” [The Good, as a Divine HYPOSTASIS], the reply would certainly be near our thought, but we are not seeking the Cause but the main constituent. Enneads I,4,3
In what substantial-form [HYPOSTASIS] then is all this to be found not as accident but as the very substance itself? For if Evil can enter into other things, it must have in a certain sense a prior existence, even though (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Man in the Intellectual
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroBut, at this, sense-perception - even in its particular modes - is involved in the Idea by eternal necessity, in virtue of the completeness of the Idea; Intellectual-Principle, as all-inclusive, contains in itself all by which we are brought, later, to recognise this perfection in its nature; the cause, There, was one total, all-inclusive; thus Man in the Intellectual was not purely intellect, sense-perception being an addition made upon his entry into birth: all this would seem to imply a (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: soul (Enneads I)
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro1. Pleasure and distress, fear and courage, desire and aversion, where have these affections and experiences their seat? Clearly, either in the SOUL alone, or in the SOUL as employing the body, or in some third entity deriving from both. And for this third entity, again, there are two possible modes: it might be either a blend or a distinct form due to the blending. Enneads I,1,1
2. This first enquiry obliges us to consider at the outset the nature of the SOUL that is whether a distinction (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: intellectual act
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTo deny Evil a place among realities is necessarily to do away with the Good as well, and even to deny the existence of anything desirable; it is to deny desire, avoidance and all intellectual act; for desire has Good for its object, aversion looks to Evil; all intellectual act, all Wisdom, deals with Good and Bad, and is itself one of the things that are good. Enneads I,8,12
All knowledge comes by Reason and the Intellectual Act; in this case Reason conveys information in any account it (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: the One
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro2. The born lover, to whose degree the musician also may attain and then either come to a stand or pass beyond has a certain memory of beauty but, severed from it now, he no longer comprehends it: spellbound by visible loveliness he clings amazed about that. His lesson must be to fall down no longer in bewildered delight before some, one embodied form; he must be led, under a system of mental discipline, to beauty everywhere and made to discern THE ONE Principle underlying all, a Principle (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: intellectual objects
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroBut if each of the two phases of the soul, as we have said, possesses memory, and memory is vested in the imaging faculty, there must be two such faculties. Now that is all very well as long as the two souls stand apart; but, when they are at one in us, what becomes of the two faculties, and in which of them is the imaging faculty vested? If each soul has its own imaging faculty the images must in all cases be duplicated, since we cannot think that one faculty deals only with intellectual (…)