Besides, how could such a soul be a bond holding the four elements together when it is a later thing and rises from them? And this element - soul is described as possessing consciousness and will and the rest - what can we think? Furthermore, these teachers, in their contempt for this creation and this earth, proclaim that another earth has been made for them into which they are to enter when they depart. Now this new earth is the Reason-Form [the Logos] of our world. Why should they desire (…)
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MacKenna / Stephen MacKenna
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Logos
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads IV,4
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 28 Fourth Ennead. Fourth tractate. Problems of the soul (2).
1. What, then, will be the Soul’s discourse, what its memories in the Intellectual Realm, when at last it has won its way to that Essence?
Obviously from what we have been saying, it will be in contemplation of that order, and have its Act upon the things among which it now is; failing such Contemplation and Act, its being is not there. Of things of earth it will know nothing; it will not, for example, remember an act (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Essential Soul
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThis first enquiry obliges us to consider at the outset the nature of the Soul - that is whether a distinction is to be made between Soul and Essential Soul [between an individual Soul and the Soul-Kind in itself]. [NA: All matter shown in brackets is added by the translator for clearness’ sake and, therefore, is not canonical. S.M.] Enneads I,1,2
But if Soul [in man] and Essential Soul are one and the same, then the Soul will be an Ideal-Form unreceptive of all those activities which it (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads IV,5
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 29 Fourth Ennead. Fifth tractate. Problems of the soul (3). [also entitled "On sight"].
1. We undertook to discuss the question whether sight is possible in the absence of any intervening medium, such as air or some other form of what is known as transparent body: this is the time and place.
It has been explained that seeing and all sense-perception can occur only through the medium of some bodily substance, since in the absence of body the soul is utterly absorbed in the (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: soul and body
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroFor man, and especially the Sage, is not the Couplement of soul and body: the proof is that man can be disengaged from the body and disdain its nominal goods. Enneads I,4,14
Every living thing is a combination of soul and body-kind: the celestial sphere, therefore, if it is to be everlasting as an individual entity must be so in virtue either of both these constituents or of one of them, by the combination of soul and body or by soul only or by body only. Enneads II,1,2
In fact the Soul (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads IV,6
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 41 Fourth Ennead. Sixth tractate. Perception and memory.
1. Perceptions are no imprints, we have said, are not to be thought of as seal-impressions on soul or mind: accepting this statement, there is one theory of memory which must be definitely rejected.
Memory is not to be explained as the retaining of information in virtue of the lingering of an impression which in fact was never made; the two things stand or fall together; either an impression is made upon the mind and (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: higher soul
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOur own case is different: physically we are formed by that [inferior] soul, given forth [not directly from God but] from the divine beings in the heavens and from the heavens themselves; it is by way of that inferior soul that we are associated with the body [which therefore will not be persistent]; for the higher soul which constitutes the We is the principle not of our existence but of our excellence or, if also of our existence, then only in the sense that, when the body is already (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads IV,7
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 2 Fourth Ennead. Seventh tractate. The immortality of the soul.
1. Whether every human being is immortal or we are wholly destroyed, or whether something of us passes over to dissolution and destruction, while something else, that which is the true man, endures for ever - this question will be answered here for those willing to investigate our nature.
We know that man is not a thing of one only element; he has a soul and he has, whether instrument or adjunct in some other mode, (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: immortal soul
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThey hope to get the credit of minute and exact identification by setting up a plurality of intellectual Essences; but in reality this multiplication lowers the Intellectual Nature to the level of the Sense-Kind: their true course is to seek to reduce number to the least possible in the Supreme, simply referring all things to the Second Hypostasis - which is all that exists as it is Primal Intellect and Reality and is the only thing that is good except only for the first Nature - and to (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads IV,8
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 6 Fourth Ennead. Eighth tractate. The soul’s descent into body.
1. Many times it has happened: Lifted out of the body into myself; becoming external to all other things and self-encentered; beholding a marvellous beauty; then, more than ever, assured of community with the loftiest order; enacting the noblest life, acquiring identity with the divine; stationing within It by having attained that activity; poised above whatsoever within the Intellectual is less than the Supreme: yet, (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: human soul
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOur opponents will probably deny the validity of our arguments against the theory that the human soul is a mere segment of the All-Soul - the considerations, namely, that it is of identical scope, and that it is intellective in the same degree, supposing them, even, to admit that equality of intellection. Enneads IV,3,1
We might be led to think that all soul must always inhabit body; this would seem especially plausible in the case of the soul of the universe, not thought of as ever (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads IV,9
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 8 Fourth Ennead. Ninth tractate. Are all souls one?
1. That the Soul of every individual is one thing we deduce from the fact that it is present entire at every point of the body - the sign of veritable unity - not some part of it here and another part there. In all sensitive beings the sensitive soul is an omnipresent unity, and so in the forms of vegetal life the vegetal soul is entire at each several point throughout the organism.
Now are we to hold similarly that your soul (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: collective soul
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThey will object that parts must necessarily fall under one ideal-form with their wholes. And they will adduce Plato as expressing their view where, in demonstrating that the All is ensouled, he says "As our body is a portion of the body of the All, so our soul is a portion of the soul of the All." It is admitted on clear evidence that we are borne along by the Circuit of the All; we will be told that - taking character and destiny from it, strictly inbound with it - we must derive our (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads V,1
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 10 The Fifth Ennead First tractate. The three initial hypostases.
1. What can it be that has brought the souls to forget the father, God, and, though members of the Divine and entirely of that world, to ignore at once themselves and It?
The evil that has overtaken them has its source in self-will, in the entry into the sphere of process, and in the primal differentiation with the desire for self ownership. They conceived a pleasure in this freedom and largely indulged their own (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: nature of the Soul
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThis first enquiry obliges us to consider at the outset the nature of the Soul - that is whether a distinction is to be made between Soul and Essential Soul [between an individual Soul and the Soul-Kind in itself]. [NA: All matter shown in brackets is added by the translator for clearness’ sake and, therefore, is not canonical. S.M.] Enneads I,1,2
It is in this sense that we read of the Soul: "We saw it as those others saw the sea-god Glaukos." "And," reading on, "if we mean to discern the (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads V,2
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 11 Fifth Ennead. Second tractate. The origin and order of the beings. Following on the first.
1. The One is all things and no one of them; the source of all things is not all things; all things are its possession - running back, so to speak, to it - or, more correctly, not yet so, they will be.
But a universe from an unbroken unity, in which there appears no diversity, not even duality?
It is precisely because that is nothing within the One that all things are from it: in (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: kosmic soul
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroWhat, by this explanation, would be the essential movement of the kosmic soul? A movement towards itself, the movement of self-awareness, of self-intellection, of the living of its life, the movement of its reaching to all things so that nothing shall lie outside of it, nothing anywhere but within its scope. Enneads II,2,1
Our opponents after first admitting the unity go on to make our soul dependent on something else, something in which we have no longer the soul of this or that, even of (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads V,3
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 49 Fifth Ennead. Third tractate. The knowing hypostases and the transcendent.
1. Are we to think that a being knowing itself must contain diversity, that self-knowledge can be affirmed only when some one phase of the self perceives other phases, and that therefore an absolutely simplex entity would be equally incapable of introversion and of self-awareness?
No: a being that has no parts or phases may have this consciousness; in fact there would be no real self-knowing in an (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: individual soul
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroNext there is the conception of the individual soul as a part in the sense in which we speak of some single proposition as a part of the science entire. Enneads IV,3,2
So it is with the individual souls; the appetite for the divine Intellect urges them to return to their source, but they have, too, a power apt to administration in this lower sphere; they may be compared to the light attached upwards to the sun, but not grudging its presidency to what lies beneath it. In the Intellectual, (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads V,4
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 7 Fifth Ennead. Fourth tractate. How the Secondaries rise from the First: and on the One.
1. Anything existing after The First must necessarily arise from that First, whether immediately or as tracing back to it through intervenients; there must be an order of secondaries and tertiaries, in which any second is to be referred to The First, any third to the second.
Standing before all things, there must exist a Simplex, differing from all its sequel, self-gathered not (…)