But if this is the true account of the unity of soul, we must be able to meet the problems that ensue: firstly, the difficulty of one thing being present at the same moment in all things; and, secondly, the difficulty of soul in body as against soul not embodied. Enneads IV,3,4
Anyone who rejects this view, and holds that either atoms or some entities void of part coming together produce soul, is refuted by the very unity of soul and by the prevailing sympathy as much as by the very (…)
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MacKenna / Stephen MacKenna
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MacKenna-Plotinus: unity of soul
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads V,5
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 32 Fifth Ennead. Fifth tractate. That the intellectual beings are not outside the intellectual-principle: and on the nature of the good.
1. The Intellectual-Principle, the veritably and essentially intellective, can this be conceived as ever falling into error, ever failing to think reality?
Assuredly no: it would no longer be intelligent and therefore no longer Intellectual-Principle: it must know unceasingly - and never forget; and its knowledge can be no guesswork, no (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: soul of the universe
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroNow even in the universal Intellect [Divine Mind] there was duality, so that we would expect differences of condition in things of part: how some things rather than others come to be receptacles of the divine beings will need to be examined; but all this we may leave aside until we are considering the mode in which soul comes to occupy body. For the moment we return to our argument against those who maintain our souls to be offshoots from the soul of the universe [parts and an identity (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads V,6
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate Fifth Ennead. Sixth tractate. That the principle transcending being has no intellectual act. What being has intellection primally and what being has it secondarily.
1. There is a principle having intellection of the external and another having self-intellection and thus further removed from duality.
Even the first mentioned is not without an effort towards the pure unity of which it is not so capable: it does actually contain its object, though as something other than itself. (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: body and Soul
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroLet us take first the Couplement of body and Soul. How could suffering, for example, be seated in this Couplement? It may be suggested that some unwelcome state of the body produces a distress which reaches to a Sensitive-Faculty which in turn merges into Soul. But this account still leaves the origin of the sensation unexplained. Enneads I,1,
Here, however, we must distinguish between a centre in reference to the two different natures, body and Soul. Enneads II,2,
While body and soul (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads V,7
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 18 Fifth Ennead. Seventh tractate. Is there an ideal archetype of particular beings?
1. We have to examine the question whether there exists an ideal archetype of individuals, in other words whether I and every other human being go back to the Intellectual, every [living] thing having origin and principle There.
If Socrates, Socrates’ soul, is external then the Authentic Socrates - to adapt the term - must be There; that is to say, the individual soul has an existence in the (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: state of the body
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroLet us take first the Couplement of body and Soul. How could suffering, for example, be seated in this Couplement? It may be suggested that some unwelcome state of the body produces a distress which reaches to a Sensitive-Faculty which in turn merges into Soul. But this account still leaves the origin of the sensation unexplained. Enneads I,1,
Is it any explanation to say that desire is vested in a Faculty-of-desire and anger in the Irascible-Faculty and, collectively, that all tendency is (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads V,8
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 31 Fifth Ennead. Eighth tractate. On the intellectual beauty.
1. It is a principle with us that one who has attained to the vision of the Intellectual Beauty and grasped the beauty of the Authentic Intellect will be able also to come to understand the Father and Transcendent of that Divine Being. It concerns us, then, to try to see and say, for ourselves and as far as such matters may be told, how the Beauty of the divine Intellect and of the Intellectual Kosmos may be revealed to (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: organized body
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroNo; from the organized body and something else, let us say a light, which the Soul gives forth from itself, it forms a distinct Principle, the Animate; and in this Principle are vested Sense-Perception and all the other experiences found to belong to the Animate. Enneads I,1,
But is it not a paradox that, while Matter, the Substrate, is to them an existence, bodies should not have more claim to existence, the universe yet more, and not merely a claim grounded on the reality of one of its (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads V,9
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 5 Fifth Ennead. Ninth tractate. The intellectual-principle, the ideas, and the authentic existence.
1. All human beings from birth onward live to the realm of sense more than to the Intellectual.
Forced of necessity to attend first to the material, some of them elect to abide by that order and, their life throughout, make its concerns their first and their last; the sweet and the bitter of sense are their good and evil; they feel they have done all if they live along pursuing (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: dissolution of the body
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroBut when a man contrives the dissolution of the body, it is he that has used violence and torn himself away, not the body that has let the Soul slip from it. And in loosing the bond he has not been without passion; there has been revolt or grief or anger, movements which it is unlawful to indulge. Enneads I,8,
But whatever we may think on this doubtful point, if, as long as the bodies remain unaltered, the light is constant and unsevered, then it would seem natural that, on the dissolution (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads VI,1
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 41 The Sixth Ennead First tractate. On the kinds of being - (1).
1. Philosophy at a very early stage investigated the number and character of the Existents. Various theories resulted: some declared for one Existent, others for a finite number, others again for an infinite number, while as regards the nature of the Existents - one, numerically finite, or numerically infinite - there was a similar disagreement. These theories, in so far as they have been adequately examined by later (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: character of body
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThus we have marked off what belongs to the Couplement from what stands by itself: the one group has the character of body and never exists apart from body, while all that has no need of body for its manifestation belongs peculiarly to Soul: and the Understanding, as passing judgement upon Sense-Impressions, is at the point of the vision of Ideal-Forms, seeing them as it were with an answering sensation (i.e, with consciousness) this last is at any rate true of the Understanding in the (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads VI,2
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 43 Sixth Ennead. Second tractate. On the kinds of being (2).
1. We have examined the proposed "ten genera": we have discussed also the theory which gathers the total of things into one genus and to this subordinates what may be thought of as its four species. The next step is, naturally, to expound our own views and to try to show the agreement of our conclusions with those of Plato.
Now if we were obliged to consider Being as a unity, the following questions would be (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: animated body
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroBut how do we explain likings and aversions? Sorrow, too, and anger and pleasure, desire and fear – are these not changes, affectings, present and stirring within the Soul? This question cannot be ignored. To deny that changes take place and are intensely felt is in sharp contradiction to obvious facts. But, while we recognize this, we must make very sure what it is that changes. To represent the Soul or Mind as being the seat of these emotions is not far removed from making it blush or turn (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads VI,3
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 44 Sixth Ennead. Third tractate. On the kinds of being (3).
1. We have now explained our conception of Reality [True Being] and considered how far it agrees with the teaching of Plato. We have still to investigate the opposed principle [the principle of Becoming].
There is the possibility that the genera posited for the Intellectual sphere will suffice for the lower also; possibly with these genera others will be required; again, the two series may differ entirely; or perhaps (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: body of the All
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThey will object that parts must necessarily fall under one ideal-form with their wholes. And they will adduce Plato as expressing their view where, in demonstrating that the All is ensouled, he says "As our body is a portion of the body of the All, so our soul is a portion of the soul of the All." It is admitted on clear evidence that we are borne along by the Circuit of the All; we will be told that – taking character and destiny from it, strictly inbound with it – we must derive our (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads VI,4
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 22 Sixth Ennead. Fourth tractate. On the integral omnipresence of the authentic existent (1).
1. How are we to explain the omnipresence of the soul? Does it depend upon the definite magnitude of the material universe coupled with some native tendency in soul to distribute itself over material mass, or is it a characteristic of soul apart from body?
In the latter case, soul will not appear just where body may bring it; body will meet soul awaiting it everywhere; wheresoever body (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: living body
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroNow in the case of music, tones high and low are the product of Reason-Principles which, by the fact that they are Principles of harmony, meet in the unit of Harmony, the absolute Harmony, a more comprehensive Principle, greater than they and including them as its parts. Similarly in the Universe at large we find contraries – white and black, hot and cold, winged and wingless, footed and footless, reasoning and unreasoning – but all these elements are members of one living body, their (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads VI,5
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTractate 23 Sixth Ennead. Fifth tractate On the integral omnipresence of the authentic existent (2).
1. The integral omnipresence of a unity numerically identical is in fact universally received; for all men instinctively affirm the god in each of us to be one, the same in all. It would be taken as certain if no one asked How or sought to bring the conviction to the test of reasoning; with this effective in their thought, men would be at rest, finding their stay in that oneness and (…)