All knowledge comes by Reason and the Intellectual Act; in this case Reason conveys information in any account it gives, but the act which aims at being intellectual is, here, not intellection but rather its failure: therefore the representation of Matter must be spurious, unreal, something sprung of the Alien, of the unreal, and bound up with the alien reason. Enneads II,4,10
Nor are we warranted in affirming a plurality of Intellectual Principles on the ground that there is one that (…)
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MacKenna / Stephen MacKenna
Matérias
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Ato Intelectual
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro -
MacKenna-Plotinus: infinite
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIf this "infinite" means "of endless extension" there is no infinite among beings; there is neither an infinity-in-itself [Infinity Abstract] nor an infinity as an attribute to some body; for in the first case every part of that infinity would be infinite and in the second an object in which the infinity was present as an attribute could not be infinite apart from that attribute, could not be simplex, could not therefore be Matter. II IV. 7
Thus a close enough definition of Eternity would (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Intellectum Principium
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIntellectual-Principle
There is in the Intellectual Principle no progression from some power capable of intellection to the Actuality of intellection: such a progression would send us in search of a Prior Principle not progressing from Power to Act; there all stands ever realized. Potentiality requires an intervention from outside itself to bring it to the actualization which otherwise cannot be; but what possesses, of itself, identity unchangeable for ever is an actualization: all the (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: planet
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroWhen the cold planet, we are told, is in opposition to the cold, both become meanacing: but the natural effect would be a compromise. II III. 5
Then there is the notion that the moon, in conjunction with a certain star, is softened at her full but is malignant in the same conjunction when her light has waned; yet, if anything of this order could be admitted, the very opposite would be the case. For when she is full to us she must be dark on the further hemisphere, that is to that star (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Intellectual Soul
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThey will scarcely urge upon us the doubling of the Principle in Act by a Principle in Potentiality. It is absurd to seek such a plurality by distinguishing between potentiality and actuality in the case of immaterial beings whose existence is in Act - even in lower forms no such division can be made and we cannot conceive a duality in the Intellectual-Principle, one phase in some vague calm, another all astir. Under what form can we think of repose in the Intellectual Principle as (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: representation
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroAll knowledge comes by Reason and the Intellectual Act; in this case Reason conveys information in any account it gives, but the act which aims at being intellectual is, here, not intellection but rather its failure: therefore the representation of Matter must be spurious, unreal, something sprung of the Alien, of the unreal, and bound up with the alien reason. II IV. 10
This All that has emerged into life is no amorphous structure - like those lesser forms within it which are born night (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Princípios Intelectuais
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroNor are we warranted in affirming a plurality of Intellectual Principles on the ground that there is one that knows and thinks and another knowing that it knows and thinks. For whatever distinction be possible in the Divine between its Intellectual Act and its Consciousness of that Act, still all must be one projection not unaware of its own operation: it would be absurd to imagine any such unconsciousness in the Authentic Intelligence; the knowing principle must be one and the selfsame with (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: active
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroBut, to begin with, men quite outside of the active life may attain the state of felicity, and not in a less but in a greater degree than men of affairs. 309 Enneads: I. V. 10
But that this same Mars, or Aphrodite, in certain aspects should cause adulteries - as if they could thus, through the agency of human incontinence, satisfy their own mutual desires - is not such a notion the height of unreason? And who could accept the fancy that their happiness comes from their seeing each other in (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Intellectual Kind
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroEven in the administration of the Universe there is no ground for such attack, for it affords manifest proof of the greatness of the Intellectual Kind. Enneads II,9,8
What definition are we to give to Eternity? Can it be identified with the [divine or] Intellectual Substance itself? This would be like identifying Time with the Universe of Heavens and Earth - an opinion, it is true, which appears to have had its adherents. No doubt we conceive, we know, Eternity as something most august; (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: passive
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe greater and most valuable among them have an important operation over a wide range: their contribution towards the life of the whole consists in acting, not in being acted upon; others, but feebly equipped for action, are almost wholly passive; there is an intermediate order whose members contain within themselves a principle of productivity and activity and make themselves very effective in many spheres or ways and yet serve also by their passivity. 667 Enneads: II III. 13
But Matter (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Intellectual Universe
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe very question can be entertained by no intelligent being but only by one so blind, so utterly devoid of perception and thought, so far from any vision of the Intellectual Universe as not even to see this world of our own. Enneads II,9,16
But: As one that looks up to the heavens and sees the splendour of the stars thinks of the Maker and searches, so whoever has contemplated the Intellectual Universe and known it and wondered for it must search after its Maker too. What Being has raised (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: one-and-many
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThis indeed is why we posit that which transcends Being, since Being and Substance cannot but be a plurality, necessarily comprising the genera enumerated and therefore forming a one-and-many. 3336 Enneads: VI II. 17
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Substância Intelectual
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroWhat definition are we to give to Eternity? Can it be identified with the [divine or] Intellectual Substance itself? This would be like identifying Time with the Universe of Heavens and Earth - an opinion, it is true, which appears to have had its adherents. No doubt we conceive, we know, Eternity as something most august; most august, too, is the Intellectual Kind; and there is no possibility of saying that the one is more majestic than the other, since no such degrees can be asserted in (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Um-e-múltiplo
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe Platonic Parmenides is more exact; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many and a third which is a One-and-many; thus he too is in accordance with our thesis of the Three Kinds. 2592 Enneads: V I. 8
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Intellectual Essence
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThey hope to get the credit of minute and exact identification by setting up a plurality of intellectual Essences; but in reality this multiplication lowers the Intellectual Nature to the level of the Sense-Kind: their true course is to seek to reduce number to the least possible in the Supreme, simply referring all things to the Second Hypostasis - which is all that exists as it is Primal Intellect and Reality and is the only thing that is good except only for the first Nature - and to (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: One-and-All
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroWe may be told that this engendering Principle is the One-and-All. 2146 III Eighth 9
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Objeto Intelectual
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIt might be argued that the Intellectual-Principle is the Contemplator and therefore that the Living-Being contemplated is not the Intellectual-Principle but must be described as the Intellectual Object so that the Intellectual-Principle must possess the Ideal realm as something outside of itself. Enneads III,9,1
No: even though the Intellectual-Principle and the Intellectual Object are distinct, they are not apart except for just that distinction. Enneads III,9,1
Nothing in the (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: light
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroAnd this very examining principle, which investigates and decides in these matters, must be brought to light. 12 Enneads: I. I. 1
Next for the suggestion that the Soul is interwoven through the body: such a relation would not give woof and warp community of sensation: the interwoven element might very well suffer no change: the permeating soul might remain entirely untouched by what affects the body - as light goes always free of all it floods - and all the more so, since, precisely, we (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Entes Intelectuais
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroBut the Archetypes of all such qualities, the foundation in which they exist primarily, these are Activities of the Intellectual Beings. Enneads II,6,3
When we seize anything in the direct intellectual act there is room for nothing else than to know and to contemplate the object; and in the knowing there is not included any previous knowledge; all such assertion of stage and progress belongs to the lower and is a sign of the altered; this means that, once purely in the Intellectual, no one (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Luz
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroAll these noble qualities are to be reverenced and loved, no doubt, but what entitles them to be called beautiful? They exist: they manifest themselves to us: anyone that sees them must admit that they have reality of Being; and is not Real-Being, really beautiful? But we have not yet shown by what property in them they have wrought the Soul to loveliness: what is this grace, this splendour as of Light, resting upon all the virtues? Let us take the contrary, the ugliness of the Soul, and set (…)