Jowett: unjust acts

Socrates   : Then he who voluntarily errs and does disgraceful and unjust acts, Hippias, if there be such a man, would be no other than the good man. LESSER HIPPIAS

Cle. I agree with you, Stranger ; for one of two things is certain : either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary, or we must show the meaning and truth of this statement. LAWS BOOK IX

Ath. What else can he say who declares that the Gods are always lenient to the doers of unjust acts, if they divide the spoil with them ? As if wolves were to toss a portion of their prey to the dogs, and they, mollified by the gift, suffered them to tear the flocks. Must not he who maintains that the Gods can be propitiated argue thus ? LAWS BOOK X

Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them ; there is no other way ; and how is the isolation to be effected ? I answer : Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just man entirely just ; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft ; like the skilful pilot or physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice (he who is found out is nobody) : for the highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice ; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself ; he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is required by his courage and strength, and command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honored and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honor and rewards ; therefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering ; and he must be imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst ; then he will have been put to the proof ; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death ; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two. THE REPUBLIC   BOOK II