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Plotino - Tratado 4,1 (IV, 2, 1) — A realidade da alma

Enéada IV, 2, 1

sábado 14 de maio de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

    

Capítulo 1: A realidade da alma   [psyche]

  • 1-10. Resumo das conclusões do Tratado 2 (Enéada IV, 7  ): a alma é uma realidade divina [theion  ] e inteligível [noeton  ].
  • 11-17. O sensível   [aisthesis] é dividido.
  • 17-29. O inteligível [noeton] é indivisível  .
  • 29-41. A alma é uma realidade intermediária [metaxu  ], ao mesmo tempo indivisível [ameriston] e divisível [meriston].
  • 41-45. A alma é indivisível em si.
  • 45-76. A alma é divisível nos corpos [soma].
    

Míguez

1. En lo que hemos investigado sobre la esencia del alma   pudimos mostrar que no es un cuerpo, ni tan siquiera, entre los seres incorpóreos [asomato], lo que consideramos la armonía [harmonia  ] o la entelequia   [entelekia] de un cuerpo. Esto último no es verdad, tal como se dice, ni tampoco nos indica lo que es el alma, cuya investigación nosotros hemos abandonado. Si afirmamos que el alma es de naturaleza inteligible y de rango divino, veremos algo más claro en lo que atañe a su esencia. Pero, aún así, conviene todavía ir más lejos. [1]

Por entonces, dividíamos las cosas en cosas sensibles y cosas inteligibles, colocando al alma entre las cosas inteligibles. Daremos ahora por sentado, en efecto, que el alma se encuentra en el mundo inteligible y proseguiremos por otro camino la búsqueda de su naturaleza.

Decimos, pues, que hay cosas ya en principio divididas y dispersas por su misma naturaleza. En ellas, ninguna de sus partes es idéntica a otra, ni tampoco al conjunto  ; cada parte, por el contrario, ha de ser menor que el todo. Esto ocurre con las magnitudes sensibles y los cuerpos materiales, cada uno de los cuales ocupa un lugar apropiado, siendo así que no puede encontrarse a la vez en varios lugares. A todas estas cosas se opone una esencia, que no admite en modo alguno la división; indivisa e indivisible  , esta esencia no admite, como decimos, la división, ni siquiera por medio del pensamiento. No tiene, por tanto, necesidad de lugar, ni se encuentra en ningún ser particular, ya en parte, ya en totalidad. Cabalgando sobre todos los seres a la vez [2], no para fijarse en ellos sino para que todos ellos no puedan ni quieran prescindir de ella, resulta una esencia siempre idéntica a sí misma y un punto común a todas las cosas que vienen después de ella; algo así como el centro   en un círculo, pues todos los rayos   que van del centro a la circunferencia dejan al centro inmóvil, aunque realmente provengan de él y tengan de él su propio ser. Porque es indudable que participan del centro, punto indivisible que es su principio; pero avanzan desde él, bien que no puedan eludir su dependencia

Hay, por tanto, y en primer lugar, un ser indivisible que actúa como guía de las realidades inteligibles; pero, a la vez, se da otra esencia completamente dividida en las realidades sensibles. Y aun pudiéramos hablar de una tercera, que se halla antes de lo sensible  , muy cercana a él e incluso en él; esta naturaleza no se encuentra primitivamente dividida, como los cuerpos, sino que se divide cuando viene a los cuerpos. Al estar los cuerpos divididos, la forma que se da en ellos también se divide; no obstante, se aparece toda entera en cada una de las partes que resultan, como si la forma se multiplicase y cada una de sus partes se separase de las otras, dividiéndose de este modo al insertarse en los cuerpos. Esto es lo que ocurre con los colores, las cualidades y cada una de las formas; pues la forma puede encontrarse toda entera a la vez en varios cuerpos separados, sin que ocupe ninguna parte de un cuerpo que experimente lo que cualquier otro. De modo que aceptaremos que esta esencia se halla toda ella dividida. Al lado de la esencia indivisible, e inmediata a ella, se dará una esencia que proviene de aquélla. Y esta esencia recibe la indivisibilidad de la esencia indivisible, pero como, en su avance, tiende hacia la esencia divisible, resulta ser intermedia entre la esencia indivisible primera y la esencia que se divide en los cuerpos y se encuentra en ellos. No es ya, verdaderamente, como un color   o una cualidad que aparece la misma en varios cuerpos, pero presentando cada una de sus partes alejada de las otras, en la medida que cada cuerpo está también alejado de los otros.

La magnitud es una cualidad única, pero, aun siendo idéntica en cada parte de una masa, no proporciona a las partes ninguna comunidad de afectos, ya que, dejando a salvo la identidad, hay en cada parte una extensión diferente. Esta cualidad será, pues, algo idéntico y propio de las cosas, pero nunca una esencia.

Aquella naturaleza que, según decíamos, estaba próxima a la esencia indivisible, puede considerarse una esencia. Es una esencia, añadimos, que viene a los cuerpos y, accidentalmente, se divide en ellos; pero esta división no la experimentaba, en realidad, antes de ofrecerse a los cuerpos. Cuando viene a los cuerpos, y ello aunque se trate del mayor y del que se extiende a todas las cosas, se ofrece en totalidad y sin dejar por esto de ser una; su unidad, sin embargo, no debe entenderse como la unidad de un cuerpo. Porque la unidad de un cuerpo guarda cierta continuidad, aunque cada una de sus partes sea diferente en uno y otro punto. Mas, esa naturaleza a la que llamamos alma, a la vez divisible e indivisible, no es lo mismo que una unidad continua, con partes claramente diferentes. Es divisible, porque está en todas las partes del cuerpo en que se encuentra; y es indivisible, porque esta toda entera en todas partes y en una parte cualquiera de ese cuerpo.

Viendo esto, se podrá llegar a conocer la magnitud y la potencia del alma. Y quien lo observe podrá también comprobar qué cosa más divina y extraordinaria es el alma y cuán por encima se halla de todas las demás cosas. Aun sin tener magnitud alguna, el alma está en toda magnitud; se encuentra aquí y allá, pero no por ello es diferente, sino la misma en todas partes. De modo que aparece dividida y no está, sin embargo, dividida. Y aún más: no está dividida, ni puede siquiera estarlo alguna vez, ya que permanece toda entera consigo misma. Si se divide en los cuerpos es porque los cuerpos, a causa   de la división que les es propia, no pueden recibirla indivisiblemente. Con lo que debe concluirse que la división afecta a los cuerpos, pero no al alma.

Bouillet

I. En recherchant quelle est l’essence de l’âme, nous avons montré qu’elle n’est pas un corps, ni, parmi les choses incorporelles, une harmonie ; nous avons aussi écarté la dénomination d’entéléchie, parce qu’elle n’exprime pas une idée vraie, comme l’étymologie même l’indique, et qu’elle ne montre pas ce qu’est rame; enfin, nous avons dit que l’âme a une nature intelligible et est de condition divine ; nous avons ainsi, ce semble, déterminé clairement quelle est l’essence de l’âme (02). Cependant, il faut aller plus loin encore. Nous avons précédemment distingué la nature sensible de la nature intelligible et placé l’âme dans le monde intelligible. Maintenant, admettant que l’âme fait partie du monde intelligible, cherchons par une autre voie ce qui convient à sa nature.

D’abord, il y a des essences qui sont tout à fait divisibles et naturellement séparables : ce sont celles dont aucune n’est identique ni à une autre partie, ni au tout, dont chaque partie est nécessairement plus petite que le tout : telles sont les grandeurs sensibles, les masses corporelles, dont chacune occupe une place à part, sans pouvoir être à la fois la même en plusieurs lieux.

Il existe aussi une autre espèce d’essence, qui a une nature contraire aux précédentes   [aux essences tout à fait divisibles], qui n’admet aucune division, qui n’est ni divisée, ni divisible. Celle-ci ne comporte aucune étendue, pas même par la pensée; elle n’a pas besoin d’être en un lieu, elle n’est contenue dans aucun autre être, ni en partie ni en totalité; mais elle plane  , pour ainsi dire, à la fois sur tous les êtres, non qu’elle ait besoin d’être édifiée sur eux (03), mais parce qu’elle est indispensable à l’existence de tous; essence toujours identique à elle-même, elle est le commun soutien de tout ce qui est au-dessous d’elle. C’est comme dans le cercle, où le centre, demeurant immobile en lui-même, est néanmoins l’origine de tous les rayons qui en naissent et en tiennent l’être, et qui, participant ainsi tous de la nature du point, ont pour principe ce qui est indivisible et y restent attachés en s’avançant dans tous les sens (04).

Or, entre l’essence qui est tout à fait indivisible, qui occupe le premier rang parmi les êtres intelligibles, et l’essence qui est tout à fait divisible dans les choses sensibles, il y a, au-dessus du monde sensible, près de lui et en lui, une essence d’une autre nature, qui n’est point complètement divisible comme les corps, mais qui cependant devient divisible dans les corps (05). Par suite, quand les corps sont partagés, la forme qui est en eux se divise aussi, mais de telle sorte qu’elle soit tout entière dans chaque partie. Cette essence identique, en devenant ainsi multiple, a des parties complètement séparées les unes des autres : car elle est alors une forme divisible comme les couleurs, comme toutes les qualités, comme toute forme qui peut être tout entière à la fois en plusieurs choses complètement éloignées et étrangères les unes aux autres par les affections qu’elles subissent. Il faut donc admettre que cette forme [qui réside dans les corps] est aussi divisible (06).

Ainsi, l’essence absolument indivisible n’existe pas seule; il y a une autre essence placée immédiatement au-dessous d’elle et dérivée d’elle. D’un côté, cette essence inférieure participe de l’indivisibilité de son principe; de l’autre, elle en descend vers une autre nature par sa procession (προόδῳ) ; par là elle occupe une position intermédiaire entre l’essence indivisible et première [l’intelligence], et l’essence divisible qui est dans les corps. Elle n’est pas d’ailleurs dans les mêmes conditions d’existence que la couleur et les autres qualités : car, bien que celles-ci soient les mêmes dans toutes les masses corporelles, cependant la qualité qui est dans un corps est complètement séparée de celle qui est dans un autre, comme les masses corporelles sont elles-mêmes séparées l’une de l’autre (07). Quoique la grandeur de ces corps soit une [par son essence], cependant ce qu’il y a ainsi d’identique dans chaque partie n’a pas cette communauté d’affection qui constitue la sympathie (08), parce qu’à l’identité se joint la différence ; c’est que cette identité n’est qu’une simple modification des corps et non une essence. Tout au contraire, la nature qui approche de l’essence absolument indivisible est une véritable essence. [Telle est l’âme.] Elle s’unit aux corps, il est vrai, et par suite se divise avec eux ; mais cela ne lui arrive que lorsqu’elle se communique aux corps; d’un autre côté, lorsqu’elle s’unit aux corps, même au plus grand et au plus étendu de tous, elle ne cesse pas d’être une, bien qu’elle se donne à lui tout entier.

L’unité de cette essence ne ressemble en rien à celle du corps : car l’unité du corps consiste dans la continuité des parties, dont chacune est différente des autres et occupe un lieu différent. L’unité de l’âme ne ressemble pas davantage à l’unité des qualités. Ainsi, cette essence à la fois divisible et indivisible, que nous appelons âme, n’est pas une comme le continu [qui a ses parties les unes hors des autres] : elle est divisible, parce qu’elle anime toutes les parties du corps dans lequel elle se trouve ; et elle est indivisible, parce qu’elle est tout entière dans tout le corps et dans chacune de ses parties (09). Quand on considère ainsi la nature de l’âme, on voit sa grandeur et sa puissance, on comprend combien sont admirables et divines une telle essence et les essences supérieures. Sans avoir d’étendue, l’âme est présente dans toute étendue; elle est dans un lieu, et elle n’est cependant pas dans ce lieu (10) ; elle est à la fois divisée et indivise ; ou plutôt, elle n’est jamais divisée réellement, elle ne se divise jamais : car elle demeure tout entière en elle-même. Si elle semble se diviser, ce n’est que par rapport aux corps, qui, en vertu de leur propre divisibilité, ne peuvent la recevoir d’une manière indivisible. Ainsi la division est le fait du corps et non le caractère propre de l’âme (11).

Guthrie

OUTLINE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF IV, 7.

1. While studying the nature («being») of the soul, we have shown (against the Stoics) that she is not a body; that, among incorporeal entities, she is not a «harmony» (against the Pythagoreans); we have also shown that she is not an «entelechy» (against Aristotle  ), because this term, as its very etymology implies, does not express a true idea  , and reveals nothing about the soul’s (nature itself); last, we said that the soul has an intelligible nature, and is of divine condition; the «being» or nature of the soul we have also, it would seem, clearly enough set forth. Still, we have to go further. We have formerly established a distinction between intelligible and sense nature, assigning the soul to the intelligible world. Granting this, that the soul forms part of the intelligibe world, we must, in another manner, study what is suitable to her nature.

EXISTENCE OF DIVISIBLE BEINGS.

To begin with, there are (beings) which are quite divisible and naturally separable. No one part of any one of them is identical with any other part, nor with the whole, of which each part necessarily is smaller than the whole. Such are sense-magnitudes, or physical masses, of which each occupies a place apart, without being able to be in several places simultaneously.

DESCRIPTION OF INDIVISIBLE ESSENCE.

On the other hand, there exists another kind of essence («being»), whose nature differs from the preceding (entirely divisible beings), which admits of no division, and is neither divided nor divisible. This has no extension, not even in thought. It does not need to be in any place, and is not either partially or wholly contained in any other being. If we dare say so, it hovers simultaneously over all beings, not that it needs to be built up on them, but because it is indispensable to the existence of all. It is ever identical with itself, and is the common support of all that is below it. It is as in the circle, where the centre, remaining immovable in itself, nevertheless is the origin of all the radii originating there, and drawing their existence thence. The radii by thus participating in the existence of the centre, the radii’s principle, depend on what is indivisible, remaining attached thereto, though separating in every direction.

BETWEEN THEM IS AN INDIVISIBLE ESSENCE WHICH BECOMES DIVISIBLE WITHIN BODIES.

Now between entirely indivisible («Being») which occupies the first rank amidst intelligible beings, and the (essence) which is entirely divisible in its sense-objects, there is, above the sense-world, near it, and within it, a «being» of another nature, which is not, like bodies, completely divisible, but which, nevertheless, becomes divisible within bodies. Consequently, when you separate bodies, the form within them also divides, but in such a way that it remains entire in each part. This identical (essence), thus becoming manifold, has parts that are completely separated from each other; for it then is a divisible form, such as colors, and all the qualities, like any form which can simultaneously remain entire in several things entirely separate, at a distance, and foreign to each other because of the different ways in which they are affected. We must therefore admit that this form (that resides in bodies) is also divisible.

BY PROCESSION THE SOUL CONNECTS THE TWO.

Thus the absolutely divisible (essence) does not exist alone; there is another one located immediately beneath it, and derived from it. On one hand, this inferior   (essence) participates in the indivisibility of its principle; on the other, it descends towards another nature by its procession. Thereby it occupies a position intermediary between indivisible and primary (essence), (that is, intelligence), and the divisible (essence) which is in the bodies. Besides it is not in the same condition of existence as color and the other qualities; for though the latter be the same in all corporeal masses, nevertheless the quality in one body is completely separate from that in another, just as physical masses themselves are separate from each other. Although (by its essence) the magnitude of these bodies be one, nevertheless that which thus is identical in each part does not exert that community of affection which constitutes sympathy, because to identity is added difference. This is the case because identity is only a simple modification of bodies, and not a «being.» On the contrary, the nature that approaches the absolutely indivisible «Being» is a genuine «being» (such as is the soul). It is true that she unites with the bodies and consequently divides with them; but that happens to her only when she communicates herself to the bodies. On the other hand, when she unites with the bodies, even with the greatest and most extended of all (the world), she does not cease to be one, although she yield herself up to it entirely.

DIVISION AS THE PROPERTY OF BODIES. BUT NOT THE CHARACTERISTIC OF SOUL.

In no way does the unity of this essence resemble that of the body; for the unity of the body consists in the unity of parts, of which each is different from the others, and occupies a different place. Nor does the unity of the soul bear any closer resemblance to the unity of the qualities. Thus this nature that is simultaneously divisible and indivisible, and that we call soul is not one in the sense of being continuous (of which each part is external to every other); it is divisible, because it animates all the parts of the body it occupies, but is indivisible because it entirely inheres in the whole body, and in each of its parts. When we thus consider the nature of the soul, we see her magnitude and power, and we understand how admirable and divine are these and superior natures. Without any extension, the soul is present throughout the whole of extension; she is present in a location, though she be not present therein. She is simultaneously divided and undivided, or rather, she is never really divided, and she never really divides; for she remains entire within herself. If she seem to divide, it is not in relation with the bodies, which, by virtue of their own divisibility, cannot receive her in an indivisible manner. Thus division is the property of the body, but not the characteristic of the soul.

Taylor

I. In investigating the essence of soul, if we show that it is neither body, nor the harmony in incorporeal natures; and likewise if we omit what is said of its being the entelecheia, [3] or perfection of the body, as not true, as the words [taken literally] imply, and as not manifesting what the soul is; and if also we should say that it is of an intelligible nature, and a divine allotment, perhaps we shall assert something perspicuous concerning its essence. At the same time, however, it will be better to proceed still further than this. For this purpose, therefore, we shall make a division into a sensible and intelligible nature, and place soul in the intelligible. Hence, let it be at present admitted that it ranks among intelligibles: and let us in another way investigate that which is proximate to, or the peculiarity of, its nature. We say, therefore, that some things are primarily partible, and in their own nature dissipable; but these are such as have no part the same, either as another part, or as the whole; and in which it is necessary that the part should he less than all and the whole. These, however, are sensible magnitudes and masses, each of which has an appropriate place, nor is it possible among these, that the same thing should be in many places at once. But there is another essence opposed to this, which in no respect admits of a separation into parts, since it is without parts, and therefore impartible. It likewise admits of no interval, not even in conception, nor is indigent of place, nor is generated in a certain being, either according to parts, or according to wholes, because it is as it were at one and the same time carried in all beings as in a vehicle; not in order that it may be established in them, but because other things are neither able nor willing to exist without it. It likewise possesses an essence which subsists according to sameness, and is the foundation of all following natures, being as it were a centre in a circle, the lines drawn from which and terminating in the circumference, nevertheless permit it to abide   in itself. For they possess from the centre their generation and being, participate of the point, and have for their principle that which is impartible. They also proceed, suspending themselves from the centre. This, therefore, [of which the centre in a circle is an image] being primarily impartible in intelligibles, and the leader among beings, and again that which is in sensibles being in every respect partible, — this being the case, prior to that which is sensible, but which nevertheless is something near to and in it, there is another certain nature, which is partible indeed, yet not primarily so like bodies, but becomes partible in bodies. Hence, when bodies are divided, the form which is in them is also divided, though it still remains a whole in each of the divided parts ; the same thing in this case becoming many, each of which is perfectly distant from the other, in consequence of the form becoming entirely partible. Of this kind are colours, and all qualities, and each morphe, which is capable of being wholly at one and the same time in many things, that are separated from each other, and which has no part suffering the same thing with another part. Hence this must be admitted to be in every respect partible.

Again, besides the nature which is perfectly indivisible, there is another essence proximately suspended from it, and which has indeed from it the impartible, but by a progression from thence, hastening to another nature, is established in the middle of both; viz. in the middle of that which is impartible and primary, and that which is divisible about bodies, and is inherent in bodies. This nature does not subsist after the same manner as colour and every quality, which are indeed every where the same in many masses of bodies, yet the quality which is in one mass, is entirely separate from the quality in another, so far as one mass is also separate from another. And though the magnitude should be one, yet that which is the same in each part, has no communion whatever so as to produce co-passivity, because this sameness is at the same time attended with [a predominant] difference. For the sameness is passion, and is not itself also essence. That, however, in this middle nature which accedes to an impartible essence, is itself essence, and is ingenerated in bodies, about which also it happens to be divided; yet it does not suffer this, till it gives itself to bodies. When, therefore, it is inherent in bodies, though it should be inherent in the greatest body, and which is every where most extended, yet though it gives itself to the whole, it does not depart from the unity of its nature. Yet it is not one in the same manner as body. For body is one by continuity, but one part of it is different from another, and is situated in a different place. Nor again is it one, in the same manner as one quality. The nature, however, which is at once partible and impartible, and which we say is soul, is not one like that which is continued, having another and another part; but it is partible indeed, because it is in all the parts of that in which it subsists; and impartible, because the whole of it is in all the parts, and likewise in each of the parts. He, therefore, who perceives this, and beholds the power of it, will know what a divine and admirable thing soul is, and that it possesses a supernatural essence; not indeed having magnitude, but being present with all magnitude, and existing in this place, and again not existing in it, and this not by a different, but the same nature. So that it is divided into parts, and again not divided; or rather, it is neither divided, nor generated divisible. For it remains with itself a whole. But it is divided about bodies, because bodies in consequence of their proper partibihty, are not able to receive it impartibly. So that the distribution into parts, is the passion of bodies, and not of soul.

MacKenna

1. In our attempt to elucidate the Essence of the soul, we show it to be neither a material fabric nor, among immaterial things, a harmony. The theory that it is some final development, some entelechy, we pass by, holding this to be neither true as presented nor practically definitive.

No doubt we make a very positive statement about it when we declare it to belong to the Intellectual Kind, to be of the divine order; but a deeper penetration of its nature is demanded.

In that allocation we were distinguishing things as they fall under the Intellectual or the sensible, and we placed the soul in the former class; now, taking its membership of the Intellectual for granted, we must investigate by another path the more specific characteristics of its nature.

There are, we hold, things primarily apt to partition, tending by sheer nature towards separate existence: they are things in which no part is identical either with another part or with the whole, while, also their part is necessarily less than the total and whole: these are magnitudes of the realm of sense, masses, each of which has a station of its own so that none can be identically present in entirety at more than one point at one time.

But to that order is opposed Essence [Real-Being]; this is in no degree susceptible of partition; it is unparted and impartible; interval is foreign to it, cannot enter into our idea of it: it has no need of place and is not, in diffusion or as an entirety, situated within any other being: it is poised over all beings at once, and this is not in the sense of using them as a base but in their being neither capable nor desirous of existing independently of it; it is an essence eternally unvaried: it is common to all that follows upon it: it is like the circle’s centre to which all the radii are attached while leaving it unbrokenly in possession of itself, the starting point of their course and of their essential being, the ground in which they all participate: thus the indivisible is the principle of these divided existences and in their very outgoing they remain enduringly in contact with that stationary essence.

So far we have the primarily indivisible - supreme among the Intellectual and Authentically Existent - and we have its contrary, the Kind definitely divisible in things of sense; but there is also another Kind, of earlier rank than the sensible yet near to it and resident within it - an order, not, like body, primarily a thing of part, but becoming so upon incorporation. The bodies are separate, and the ideal form which enters them is correspondingly sundered while, still, it is present as one whole in each of its severed parts, since amid that multiplicity in which complete individuality has entailed complete partition, there is a permanent identity; we may think of colour, qualities of all kinds, some particular shape, which can be present in many unrelated objects at the one moment, each entire and yet with no community of experience among the various manifestations. In the case of such ideal-forms we may affirm complete partibility.

But, on the other hand, that first utterly indivisible Kind must be accompanied by a subsequent Essence, engendered by it and holding indivisibility from it but, in virtue of the necessary outgo from source, tending firmly towards the contrary, the wholly partible; this secondary Essence will take an intermediate Place between the first substance, the undivided, and that which is divisible in material things and resides in them. Its presence, however, will differ in one respect from that of colour and quantity; these, no doubt, are present identically and entire throughout diverse material masses, but each several manifestation of them is as distinct from every other as the mass is from the mass.

The magnitude present in any mass is definitely one thing, yet its identity from part to part does not imply any such community as would entail common experience; within that identity there is diversity, for it is a condition only, not the actual Essence.

The Essence, very near to the impartible, which we assert to belong to the Kind we are now dealing with, is at once an Essence and an entrant into body; upon embodiment, it experiences a partition unknown before it thus bestowed itself.

In whatsoever bodies it occupies - even the vastest of all, that in which the entire universe is included - it gives itself to the whole without abdicating its unity.

This unity of an Essence is not like that of body, which is a unit by the mode of continuous extension, the mode of distinct parts each occupying its own space. Nor is it such a unity as we have dealt with in the case of quality.

The nature, at once divisible and indivisible, which we affirm to be soul has not the unity of an extended thing: it does not consist of separate sections; its divisibility lies in its presence at every point of the recipient, but it is indivisible as dwelling entire in the total and entire in any part.

To have penetrated this idea is to know the greatness of the soul and its power, the divinity and wonder of its being, as a nature transcending the sphere of Things.

Itself devoid of mass, it is present to all mass: it exists here and yet is There, and this not in distinct phases but with unsundered identity: thus it is «parted and not parted,» or, better, it has never known partition, never become a parted thing, but remains a self-gathered integral, and is «parted among bodies» merely in the sense that bodies, in virtue of their own sundered existence, cannot receive it unless in some partitive mode; the partition, in other words, is an occurrence in body not in soul.


[1La investigación a que Plotino hace referencia puede seguirse en detalle en el tratado séptimo de esta misma Enéada, dedicado a la Inmortalidad del alma. Apoya Plotino directamente en el Timeo de Platón, especialmente en los pasajes 34c-35a.

[2Dice literalmente el texto griego: ...paon omon onso epokonene. El verbo epokonai en este caso, da muy gráficamente la Idea de montar o cabalgar.

[3The cause, according to Aristotle, by which the animal is vitally moved, is the rational soul, but the cause by which the animal thus moved is defined or bounded, is entelecheia, or form, which imparts to it perfection. See my Introduction to, and translation of, Aristotle’s treatise «On the Soul.»