How the Soul Mediates Between Indivisible and Divisible Essence.
OUTLINE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF IV. 7.
1. While studying the nature (”being”) of the soul, we have shown (against the Stoics) that she is not a body; that, among incorporeal entities, she is not a “harmony” (against the Pythagoreans); we have also shown that she is not an “entelechy” (against Aristotle), because this term, as its very etymology implies, does not express a true idea, and reveals nothing about the (…)
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Plotino (séc. III)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,2
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro -
Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,3
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroPsychological Questions.
A. ARE NOT ALL SOULS PARTS OR EMANATIONS OF A SINGLE SOUL?
PSYCHOLOGY OBEYS THE PRECEPT “KNOW THYSELF,” AND SHOWS HOW WE ARE TEMPLES OF THE DIVINITY.
1. Among the questions raised about the soul, we purpose to solve here not only such as may be solved with some degree of assurance, but also such as may be considered matters of doubt, considering our researches rewarded by even only a definition of this doubt. This should prove an interesting study. What indeed (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,4
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroQuestions About the Soul.
(Second Part.)
SPEECH OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.
1. When the soul will have risen to the intelligible world, what will she say, and what will she remember? She will contemplate the beings to which she will be united and she will apply her whole attention thereto; otherwise, she would not be in the intelligible world.
MEMORY OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.
Will she have no memory of things here below? Will she not, for instance, remember that she (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,5
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroPsychological Questions — III.
About the Process of Vision and Hearing.
IT IS UNCERTAIN WHETHER AN INTERMEDIARY BODY BE IMPLIED BY VISION.
1. Above we suggested the question whether it be possible to see without some medium such as the air or a diaphanous body; we shall now try to consider it. It has already been asserted that in general the soul cannot see or feel without the intermediation of some body; for, when completely separated from the body (the soul dwells in the intelligible (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,6
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf Sensation and Memory.
STOIC DOCTRINES OF SENSATIONS AND MEMORIES HANG TOGETHER.
If we deny that sensations are images impressed on the soul, similar to the impression of a seal, we shall also, for the sake of consistency, have to deny that memories are notions or sensations preserved in the soul by the permanence of the impression, inasmuch as, according to our opinion, the soul did not originally receive any impression. The two questions, therefore, hang together. Either we shall (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,7
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf the Immortality of the Soul: Polemic Against Materialism.
IS THE SOUL IMMORTAL?
1. Are we immortal, or does all of us die? (Another possibility would be that) of the two parts of which we are composed, the one might be fated to be dissolved and perish, while the other, that constitutes our very personality, might subsist perpetually. These problems must be solved by a study of our nature.
THE BODY AS THE INSTRUMENT OF THE SOUL.
Man is not a simple being; he contains a soul and a (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,8
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf the Descent of the Soul Into the Body.
THE EXPERIENCE OF ECSTASY LEADS TO QUESTIONS.
1. On waking from the slumber of the body to return to myself, and on turning my attention from exterior things so as to concentrate it on myself, I often observe an alluring beauty, and I become conscious of an innate nobility. Then I live out a higher life, and I experience atonement with the divinity. Fortifying myself within it, I arrive at that actualization which raises me above the (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead IV,9
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroWhether All Souls Form a Single One?
IF ALL SOULS BE ONE IN THE WORLD-SOUL, WHY SHOULD THEY NOT TOGETHER FORM ONE?
1. Just as the soul of each animal is one, because she is entirely present in the whole body, and because she is thus really one, because she does not have one part in one organ, and some other part in another; and just as the sense-soul is equally one in all the beings which feel, and just as the vegetative soul is everywhere entirely one in each part of the growing plants; (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead V,1
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe Three Principal Hypostases, or Forms of Existence.
AUDACITY THE CAUSE OF HUMAN APOSTASY FROM THE DIVINITY.
1. How does it happen that souls forget their paternal divinity? Having a divine nature, and having originated from the divinity, how could they ever misconceive the divinity or themselves? The origin of their evil is “audacity,” generation, the primary diversity, and the desire to belong to none but themselves. As soon as they have enjoyed the pleasure of an independent life, (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead V,2
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOf Generation, and of the Order of things that Rank Next After the First.
WHY FROM UNITY THIS MANIFOLD WORLD WAS ABLE TO COME FORTH.
1. The One is all things, and is none of these things. The Principle of all things cannot be all things. It is all things only in the sense that all things coexist within it. But in it, they “are” not yet, but only “will be.” How then could the manifoldness of all beings issue from the One, which is simple and identical, which contains no diversity or (…)