Jowett: ideas

  

Idea, the, prior to the reality, Phaedo   75:—idea of beauty, Euthyd. 301 A :—idea of good the source of truth, Rep.   6. 508 (cp. 505); a cause like the sun, ib. 6. 508 ; 7. 516, 517; must be apprehended by the lover of knowledge, ib. 7. 534 (cp. Phil.. 65 foil. ; Laws 12. 965) :—doctrine of ideas, Lysis   217 foil.; innate ideas, Euthyd. 296; recollection of ideas, Meno 81, 86 ; Phaedo 75; Phaedr. 249 (cp. Recollection); ideas and names, Crat. 389; existence of ideas, ib. 439 ; knowledge connected with ideas,«&440; loveliness of,Phaedr. 250; the cause of love, ib. 251 ; progress toward, Symp. 211; absolute ideas, Phaedo 65, 74; Rep. 5. 476; Parm. 133; association of ideas, Phaedo 73 D, 76 A ; knowledge of, must precede particular knowledge, ib. 75; ideas and immortality, ib. 76; the ideas unchangeable, ib. 78 ; a kind of stepping stones, ib. 100 ; are causes, ibid.; names of ideas, ib. 103 ; ideas and phenomena, Rep. 5.476 ; 6. 507 ; ideas and hypotheses, ib. 6. 510 ; origin of abstract ideas, ib. 7. 523 ; nature of ideas, ib. 10. 596 ; singleness of, ib. 597 (cp. Tim. 28, 51); ideas in the creation of the world, Tim. 30 foil. (cp. 37) ; ideas of likeness and unlikeness, Parm. 129; ideas distinguished from the things which partake of them, ibid.; ideas and moral qualities, ib. 130; one and many in, ib. 131; participation of things in, ib. 131-133, 135 ! infinite, ib. 132; exist in the mind, ibid. ; are patterns, ibid.; necessary to philosophy, ib. 135 ; = common notions, Soph. 240 ; ideas and being, ib. 246; general ideas, ib. 254; require examples, Statesm. 277; difficulties in the way of ideas, Phil. 15 foil.; ideas in individuals, ib. 16; knowledge and ideas, Laws 12. 965. Idea. [The Idea of Good is an abstraction, which, under that name at least, does not occur in any other of Plato’s writings except the Republic. But it is probably not essentially different from another abstraction, ’ the true being of things,’ which is mentioned in many of his dialogues. He has nowhere given an explanation of his meaning, not because he was ’regardless whether’we understood him or not] but rather, perhaps, because he was himself unable to state in precise terms the ideal which floated before his mind. He belonged to an age in which men felt too strongly the first pleasure of metaphysical speculation to be able to estimate the true value of the ideas which they conceived (cp. his own picture of the effect of dialectic on the youthful intellect, Rep- 7. 539). To him, as to the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, an abstraction seemed truer than a fact: he was impatient to shake off the shackles of sense and rise into the purer atmosphere of ideas. ’ Yet in the allegory of the cave (Republic vii), whose inhabitants must go up to the light of perfect knowledge-, but descend again into the obscurity of opinion^ he has shown that he was not unaware of the necessity of finding a firm starting-point for these flights of metaphysical imagination (cp. Rep. 6. 510). A passage in the Philebus   (65 A) will give the best insight into his meaning: ’ If we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with three we may take our prey,—Beauty, Symmetry, Truth! The three were inseparable to the Greek mind, and no conception of perfection could be formed in which they did not unite (cp. Introduction to Rep. p. lxix).]

Ideas. [No part of Plato’s philosophy has been more commonly associated with his name than ’the doctrine of ideas.’ But his meaning has been often misunderstood, or he has been supposed to be formulating a system when he is only ’guessing at truth! His opinions did not always remain the same, and in his later works the ideas are not so prominent as in the Phaedo or Phaedrus  . He is his own best critic in the Parmenides   and the Sophist, and has there shown how fully he appreciates the difficulties of the argument.—The ideas are one phase of a conception which he has expressed in many forms in his various writings: — That there is a truth which is beyond sense, and which is perceived by the mind alone when freed from the ’disturbing element’ of the body (Phaedo 65 ; Tim. 51 ; and cp. Theaet. 185 foil.). In this spirit the subjects of the higher education are discussed in the Republic (Book vii), and the sciences are declared to be valuable only in proportion as they enable us to attain true being. The ideas may be gained by association, which Plato calls ’the reminiscence of knowledge acquired in a previous state] when we beheld them ’shining in brightness’ (Phaedr. 250), and makes a proof of immortality (Phaedo 73, 76): or they may be reached by the ’gracious aid’ of dialectic, which uses the objects of sense as steps by which we are able to mount to the sphere of the absolute (Symp. 211, and cp. Rep. 5. 476; 6. 510). They are unchangeable and invisible, and therefore akin to the divine element in us, that is, the soul (Phaedo 78 E). By participation in them things are what they are : the beautiful is beautiful because it shares in the idea of beauty, that which is just is just because it partakes of the nature of justice (Phaedo 100-105 ; Parm. 130). Nor could names ever have been found for things, unless the legislator, who was the original name giver, had been acquainted with the ideas which they represent (Crat. 389). Again, the ideas afford an argument against the Heraclitean doctrine of flux : for that which is absolute and true cannot change, but must always abide and exist (ib. 439, 440). The ideas are the work of God, and the artist only imitates them at second- or even third-hand : for there cannot be two or more ideas of the same thing (Rep. 10.596 foil.; Tim.28). The Creator when the worlds were made had such a single, perfect idea of the universe, in accordance with which He contrived all His work (Tim. 31). They are almost unintelligible to human apprehension, unless they are expressed by examples, or translated into the language of facts (Statesm. 277). — In the Philebus Plato begins to discuss the ’ troublesome questions’ which are raised by the doctrine of ideas. How can the one be predicated of the many t Have the ideas, real existence? His reply is somewhat crude and unsatisfactory:—There are four categories, the infinite, the finite, that which is intermediate between them, and the cause which unites them. The intermediate element is ’law’ or ’order’ or ’proportion’; and since all things share in it, the finite is thus joined with the infinite, the one with the many, and ideas are proved to be real and connected with phenomena. The cause of union is explained to be mind or God.—In the Parmenides the criticism of the ideas is carried still further; nor can Plato apparently provide a sufficient answer to his own objections. He is applying the test of logic to the vague thoughts and dreams which had filled his mind at an earlier period; and we cannot wonder that they are not always able to endure the trial. He does not know how to prove to the sceptic the existence of the ideas, which seem to dwell apart in the sphere of the absolute; or how these unknown, unknowable conceptions can be brought from heaven to earth.— Zeno   has denied the ’ being of m any’; for if being is many, it must be both like and unlike, which is impossible. And when Socrates   in reply distinguishes between the idea and the object, and says that the two ideas of likeness and unlikeness, which are incompatible, may yet inhere in the same individual, he is met by the ’inevitable question ’ :— What is the nature of this participation in the idea :—does the individual share in the whole of the idea or in a part only ? Socrates replies that the idea may be like the day, which is one and the same in many places and yet continuous with itself, or like a sail which covers several persons and still is one. But he cannot meet the objection that the idea, which is in itself an inseparable whole, is thus regarded also as divisible into parts.—Another difficulty is then started. Ideas are formed by abstractions made from some class of objects: e.g. the idea of greatness is drawn from the contemplation of a number of things which have greatness. But then the idea of greatness must itself be added to the class of great things, and a new idea which embraces them all will be required, and this process will go on ad infinitum.—Although Plato cannot find a reply to these and similar objections, he is still convinced that without abstract ideas thought and reasoning are impossible, and he hints by the mouth of Parmenides that a more searching analysis of them both from the negative and the positive side will at last conduct us to a sound doctrine of ideas (cp. Soph. 259).—In- the Sophist he once more seeks to prove the connexion of ideas. He is attacking the Eleatic doctrine that there is no such thing as falsehood, because not-being is not and therefore cannot exist. He shows that the entire separation of the spheres of the absolute and the relative, of being and not-being, cannot be maintained. It is not true that all ideas are incompatible, although some are. And it is the business of dialectic, which is the art of division into classes, to teach us under what category a particular idea is included. Being, for instance, has communion with rest and motion; but rest and motion are inconsistent. Not-being is only the negation of being, just as no motion or rest is the negation of motion.—In the Statesman   and the Laws the doctrine of ideas occupies a subordinate place, and seems to have lost its former attractiveness to Plato. Yet at the very end of the Laws he exhibits a trace of the old feeling in the final injunction that the guardians must be men who are able to see ’the one in many’ and to order all things accordingly (13. 96S B).]

---

Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and essence in general, and to this, which is now discovered to be a previous condition of our being, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them — assuming this to have a prior existence, then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument ? There can be no doubt that if these absolute ideas existed before we were born, then our souls must have existed before we were born, and if not the ideas, then not the souls. PHAEDO

I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell me, Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in itself, and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term many, participate — things which participate in likeness become in that degree and manner like ; and so far as they participate in unlikeness become in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both ? And may not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation ? — Where is the wonder ? Now if a person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would indeed be a wonder ; but there is nothing extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that the things which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience both. Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at the same time many by partaking of many, would that be very astonishing. But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute many one, I should be truly amazed. And so of all the rest : I should be surprised to hear that the natures or ideas themselves had these opposite qualities ; but not if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude ; when, on the other hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one. In both instances he proves his case. So again, if a person shows that such things as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he shows the coexistence the one and many, but he does not show that the many are one or the one many ; he is uttering not a paradox but a truism. If however, as I just now suggested, some one were to abstract simple notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, and then to show that these admit of admixture and separation in themselves, I should be very much astonished. This part of the argument appears to be treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner ; but, as I was saying, I should be far more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves which are apprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have shown to exist in visible objects. PARMENIDES

Certainly not, said Socrates ; visible things like these are such as they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think that there is nothing without an idea ; but then again, when I have taken up this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish ; and so I return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with them. PARMENIDES

Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea existing in each of them ? PARMENIDES

Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes ? PARMENIDES

But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides ? For in that case each idea may still be one, and not experience this infinite multiplication. PARMENIDES

Then, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else participates in the ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of thoughts, and that all things think ; or that they are thoughts but have no thought ? PARMENIDES

The latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous one. In my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and other things are like them, and resemblances of them — what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them. PARMENIDES

The theory, then that other things participate in the ideas by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation devised ? PARMENIDES

Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the ideas to be absolute ? PARMENIDES

True, he said ; and therefore when ideas are what they are in relation to one another, their essence is determined by a relation among themselves, and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or whatever they are to be termed, which are in our sphere, and from which we receive this or that name when we partake of them. And the things which are within our sphere and have the same names with them, are likewise only relative to one another, and not to the ideas which have the same names with them, but belong to themselves and not to them. PARMENIDES

But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have ? PARMENIDES

Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge ? PARMENIDES

Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas are not valid in relation to human things ; nor human things in relation to them ; the relations of either are limited to their respective spheres. PARMENIDES

But, then, what is to become of philosophy ? Whither shall we turn, if the ideas are unknown ? PARMENIDES

Yes, said Parmenides ; and I think that this arises, Socrates, out of your attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas generally, without sufficient previous training. I noticed your deficiency, when I heard you talking here with your friend Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is assuredly noble and divine ; but there is an art which is called by the vulgar idle talking, and which is of imagined to be useless ; in that you must train and exercise yourself, now that you are young, or truth will elude your grasp. PARMENIDES

Ath. Shall we make a law that the poet shall compose nothing contrary to the ideas of the lawful, or just, or beautiful, or good, which are allowed in the state ? nor shall he be permitted to communicate his compositions to any private individuals, until he shall have shown them to the appointed judges and the guardians of the law, and they are satisfied with them. As to the persons whom we appoint to be our legislators about music and as to the director of education, these have been already indicated. Once more then, as I have asked more than once, shall this be our third law, and type, and model — What do you say ? LAWS BOOK VII

The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen. THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

Thus : There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images ; the inquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upward to a principle descends to the other end ; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves. THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in accordance with the idea — that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances — but no artificer makes the ideas themselves : how could he ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK X