Página inicial > Antiguidade > Neoplatonismo (245-529 dC) > Plotino (204-270 dC) – Tratados Enéadas > Plotino - Tratado 28,16 (IV, 4, 16) — A questão da sucessão: ela existe nos (...)

ENÉADAS

Plotino - Tratado 28,16 (IV, 4, 16) — A questão da sucessão: ela existe nos produtos da alma, mas não nela

Enéada IV, 4, 16

quinta-feira 5 de maio de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

    

Cap 15 a 17: Dificuldades relativas à alma   e à temporalidade

  • Cap 15: A questão da temporalidade: as almas não estão no tempo
  • Cap 16: A questão da sucessão: ela existe nos produtos da alma, mas não nela
  • Cap 17: A questão da sucessão das razões na alma: mais a alma é submetida a um princípio único, melhor ela é
    

Míguez

16. Pero si hay en el alma   universal   una cosa y luego otra, si esta alma produce una cosa antes y otra después, y si, además, actúa en el tiempo, es claro que mira hacia el futuro. Ahora bien, si mira hacia el futuro, también se inclina hacia el pasado. En las acciones del alma se dará, pues, lo anterior   y lo posterior; pero en el alma misma no hay posibilidad de pasado puesto que todas sus razones seminales, como ya se ha dicho, existen al mismo tiempo. Ahora bien, si las razones seminales son simultáneas, no puede decirse lo mismo de las acciones, que no se dan, además, en el mismo lugar. Así, las manos y los pies, que se dan juntamente en la razón seminal del hombre, aparecen aparte en el cuerpo humano. No obstante, también en el alma universal se ofrece separación de partes, aunque en un sentido diferente al de lugar; con lo cual, ¿no habrá que entender aquí en otro sentido lo que es anterior y lo que es posterior? Como partes separadas convendría entender lo que es de naturaleza diferente; pero, en este caso, ¿cómo se entendería rectamente lo que es anterior y lo que es posterior? De ninguna manera, si quien organizase el mundo no lo dirigiese a su vez; porque, verdaderamente, tendrá que disponerlo todo en un antes y en un después, ya que, de otro modo, ¿cómo no iban a existir simultáneamente todas las cosas? Se diría esto con razón, si uno fuese el organizador y otra la organización misma; pero si el ser   que dirige es la organización primera, ya no ordena en realidad las cosas, sino que las produce de manera sucesiva. Porque, caso de hablar, lo haría mirando a la organización misma y sería entonces distinto a ella. ¿De dónde, pues, la identidad? Consideremos que el organizador no es materia y forma, sino tan sólo forma pura, esto es, el alma, potencia y acto que vienen después de la inteligencia. Y en la realidad se da la sucesión de unas y otras cosas cuando éstas no pueden verificarse a la vez.

El alma así entendida es algo digno de veneración, cual un círculo   perfectamente unido a su centro. El círculo, a su vez, constituye la magnitud más pequeña después del centro, con intervalos verdaderamente nulos. Tal es la relación misma de los principios: si se coloca el Bien en el centro, la Inteligencia comprenderá un círculo inmóvil y el alma, por su parte, un círculo movido por el deseo. Porque la Inteligencia posee el Bien inmediatamente y, además, le abarca, en tanto el alma desea el Bien que está más allá del ser. La esfera del mundo posee el alma que desea el Bien, y es movida porque el deseo resulta apropiado a su naturaleza. Ahora bien, como es un cuerpo, desea naturalmente un ser que se encuentre fuera de ella; por eso le rodea y gira alrededor de él, esto es, se mueve de manera circular.

Bouillet

XVI. Mais [dira-t-on], si l’Âme universelle contient les choses dans l’ordre où elles sont successivement produites, elle les contient par cela même comme antérieures et postérieures. Si elle les produit dans le temps, elle incline vers l’avenir, par conséquent, elle incline aussi vers le passé.

Il n’y a [répondrons-nous] d’antérieur et de postérieur que dans ce qui devient ; dans l’Âme, il n’y a point de passé ; toutes les raisons lui sont présentes à la fois, comme nous l’avons déjà dit (39). Au contraire, dans les choses engendrées, les parties n’existent pas toutes à la fois parce qu’elles n’y existent pas toutes ensemble, quoiqu’elles existent toutes ensemble dans les raisons : les pieds par exemple, ou les mains existent ensemble dans la raison séminale, mais ce sont des parties séparées les unes des autres dans les corps ; cependant ces parties sont également séparées, mais d’une manière différente, dans la raison séminale, de même qu’elles y sont également antérieures les unes aux autres d’une manière différente (40). Si elles sont ainsi séparées dans la raison séminale, c’est qu’elles diffèrent par leur nature.

Mais comment sont-elles antérieures les unes aux autres? — C’est [dira-t-on] que celui qui ordonne est aussi celui qui commande; or, en commandant, il énonce telle chose après telle autre : car pourquoi toutes choses ne sont-elles pas ensemble? — [Il n’en est pas ainsi.] Si autre chose était l’ordre, autre chose celui qui ordonne, les choses seraient produites de la même manière qu’elles sont énoncées par la parole ; mais, comme celui qui commande est l’ordre premier, il n’énonce pas les choses par la parole, il les produit seulement l’une après l’autre. Pour énoncer ce qu’il fait, il faudrait qu’il considérât l’ordre, par conséquent, qu’il en fût différent. Comment celui qui ordonne peut-il être identique à l’ordre? C’est qu’il n’est pas à la fois la forme et la mati  ère, qu’il est la forme seule [c’est-à-dire l’ensemble des raisons qui lui sont présentes toutes à la fois] (41). De cette manière, l’Âme est la puissance et l’acte qui occupe le second rang après l’Intelligence. Avoir des parties antérieures les unes aux autres ne convient qu’aux objets qui ne peuvent être toutes choses à la fois.

L’Âme, telle que nous considérons ici, est quelque chose de vénérable ; elle ressemble à un cercle qui est uni au centre et qui se développe sans s’en éloigner, en formant une étendue indivisible   (διάστημα ἀδιάστατον). Pour concevoir l’ordre des trois principes, on peut se représenter le Bien comme un centre, l’Intelligence comme un cercle immobile, et l’Ame comme un cercle mobile, mû par le désir (42).

En effet, l’Intelligence possède et embrasse le Bien immédiatement ; l’Âme aspire à ce qui est placé au-dessus de l’Intelligence [au Bien]. La sphère du monde, possédant l’Âme qui aspire ainsi [au Bien], se meut en obéissant à son aspiration naturelle ; or, son aspiration naturelle est d’aspirer, comme le peut un corps, au principe hors duquel elle est, c’est-à-dire de s’étendre autour de lui, de tourner, par conséquent, de se mouvoir circulairement (43).

Guthrie

QUESTION: EVEN THE PRIORITY OF ORDER IMPLIES A TEMPORAL CONCEPTION.

16. It may however be objected that if the (universal Soul) contain things in the order in which they were successively produced, she thereby contains them as earlier and later. Then, if she produce them within time, she inclines towards the future, and consequently, also conversely to the past.

EARLIER AND LATER EXIST ONLY IN WHAT IS BEGOTTEN; NOT IN THEIR SEMINAL REASON.

It may be answered that the conceptions of earlier and later apply only to things which are becoming; in the Soul, on the contrary, there is no past; all the («seminal) reasons» are simultaneously present to her, as has already been said. On the contrary, in begotten things, the parts do not exist simultaneously, because they do not all exist together, although they all exist together within the («seminal) reasons.» For instance, the feet or the hands exist together in the («seminal) reasons,» but in the body they are separate. Nevertheless, these parts are equally separated, but in a different manner, in the («seminal) reason,» as they are equally anterior to each other in a different manner. If however they be thus separate in the («seminal) reason,» they then differ in nature.

THINGS WHICH ARE ANTERIOR CAN BE ONLY IN LOWER PRINCIPLES.

But how are they anterior to each other? It must be because here he who commands is identical with him who is commanded. Now in commanding he expresses one thing after another; for why are all things not together? (Not so). If the command and he who commands were separate entities, the things would have been produced in the same manner as they have been expressed (by speech) ; but as the commander is himself the first command, he does not express things (by speech), he only produces them one after the other. If he were (by speech) to express what he actually does, he would have to consider the order; consequently, he would have to be separate from it. Is it asked, how can the commander be identical with the command? He is not simultaneously form and matter, but form alone (that is, the totality of the reasons which are simultaneously present to him). Thus, the Soul is both the potentiality and the actualization which occupy the second rank after Intelligence. To have parts some of which are prior to others suits only such objects as cannot be everything simultaneously.

DIAGRAM OF THE UNIVERSE.

The Soul, such as we are considering her here, is something venerable; she resembles a circle which is united to the centre, and which develops without leaving (its base of operations, the centre), thus forming an undivided extension. To gain a conception of the order of the three principles, the Good may be considered as a centre, the Intelligence as an immovable circle, and the Soul as an external movable circle impelled by desire.

CIRCULAR MOVEMENT OF THE SOUL.

Indeed, intelligence possesses and embraces the Good immediately; while the Soul can only aspire to (the Good), which is located above the Intelligence. The whole world-sphere possessing the Soul which thus aspires (to the Good), is moved by the promptings of its natural aspirations. Its natural aspiration, however, is to rise in bodily aspiration to the principle on the outside of which it is; namely, to extend around it, to turn, and consequently to move in a circle.

MacKenna

16. But if in the soul thing follows thing, if there is earlier and later in its productions, if it engenders or creates in time, then it must be looking towards the future; and if towards the future, then towards the past as well  ?

No: prior and past are in the things its produces; in itself nothing is past; all, as we have said, is one simultaneous grouping of Reason-Principles. In the engendered, dissimilarity is not compatible with unity, though in the Reason-Principles supporting the engendered such unity of dissimilars does occur - hand and foot are in unity in the Reason-Principle [of man], but apart in the realm of sense  . Of course, even in that ideal realm there is apartness, but in a characteristic mode, just as in a mode, there is priority.

Now, apartness may be explained as simply differentiation: but how account for priority unless on the assumption of some ordering principle arranging from above, and in that disposal necessarily affirming a serial order?

There must be such a principle, or all would exist simultaneously; but the indicated conclusion does not follow unless order and ordering principle are distinct; if the ordering principle is Primal Order, there is no such affirmation of series; there is simply making, the making of this thing after that thing. The affirmation would imply that the ordering principle looks away towards Order and therefore is not, itself, Order.

But how are Order and this orderer one and the same?

Because the ordering principle is no conjoint of matter and idea   but is soul, pure idea, the power and energy second only to the Intellectual-Principle: and because the succession is a fact of the things themselves, inhibited as they are from this comprehensive unity. The ordering soul remains august, a circle, as we may figure it, in complete adaptation to its centre, widening outward, but fast upon it still, an outspreading without interval.

The total scheme may be summarized in the illustration of The Good as a centre, the Intellectual-Principle as an unmoving circle, the Soul as a circle in motion, its moving being its aspiration: the Intellectual-Principle possesses and has ever embraced that which is beyond being; the soul must seek it still: the sphere of the universe, by its possession of the soul thus aspirant, is moved to the aspiration which falls within its own nature; this is no more than such power as body may have, the mode of pursuit possible where the object pursued is debarred from entrance; it is the motion of coiling about, with ceaseless return upon the same path - in other words, it is circuit.