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Plotino - Tratado 33,1 (II, 9, 1) — Só existem três realidades inteligíveis

Enéada II, 9, 1

quarta-feira 19 de janeiro de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Capítulo 1: Só existem três realidade inteligíveis

  • 1-19. Lembrança da natureza e ordem das três realidades: o Uno, o Intelecto e a Alma.
  • 19-25. Nenhuma realidade pode se encontrar acima do Uno
  • 25-57. Não se pode multiplicar os Intelectos.
  • 57-63. Não pode existir um intermediário entre o Intelecto e a Alma.

Míguez

1. Nos ha parecido que la naturaleza del Bien es simple y primitiva, porque todo lo que no es primitivo no es simple. Esta naturaleza nada contiene en sí misma y es algo uno que no se diferencia tampoco de lo que llamamos el Uno. Porque el Uno no es algo de lo que se diga a continuación que es uno, cosa que no se dice igualmente del Bien.

Cuando hablemos del Uno o del Bien, conviene que pensemos en una misma naturaleza; si realmente afirmamos es una, nada en verdad le atribuimos, como no sea mostrárnosla lo mejor posible a nosotros mismos. Es, así lo primero, porque nada hay más simple; y es también suficiente, porque no proviene de varias cosas; en otro caso, dependería de todas ellas. Es lo que no se da en otra cosa, porque lo que se da en otra cosa depende siempre de ella. Al no depender de otra cosa, ni darse tampoco en otra cosa o producirse como una combinación, nada habrá necesariamente sobre el Bien. No cabe, pues, andar en busca de otros principios, sino poner al Bien por delante; luego a continuación de el, a la Inteligencia y a la actividad primera inteligente, y después de la Inteligencia al alma. Esa es la ordenación según la naturaleza; ni más ni menos que es se da en la realidad inteligible. Porque si se diese menos tendríamos que afirmar como cosas idénticas al alma y a la Inteligencia, o a la Inteligencia y a lo que es primero. Ahora bien, ya se ha demostrado repetidamente que son cosas diferentes. Nos queda por examinar en la presente ocasión si se da algo más que estos tres términos. Pero, ¿que naturalezas podrían tener que no fuesen las ya indicadas? Porque si el principio de todas las cosas es lo que queda dicho no podría encontrarse nada más simple ni nada que se sitúe más alto. No deberá hablarse verdaderamente de un principio en potencia y de un principio en acto, porque sería risible introducir esta división de ser en potencia y de ser en acto, al objeto de hacerlas más numerosas, en realidades que existen y que carecen de materia. Ni siquiera se encuentra esta división en los seres posteriores al Uno; y no debe pensarse en modo alguno que sé da una inteligencia en reposo y una inteligencia en movimiento. ¿Cómo concebir el reposo de la inteligencia, su movimiento y su palabra, o la indolencia en un caso y la actividad en otro? Pues la Inteligencia es siempre lo que es y en su acto se manifiesta como estable; al alma corresponde moverse hacia ella y alrededor de ella, y a la razón, que proviene de la Inteligencia, hacer al alma realmente inteligente, y no a cualquier otra naturaleza situada entre la Inteligencia y el alma.

No hemos de admitir por esto que se den varias inteligencias, una de las cuales piense, y la otra que piense que piensa. Porque, aun admitiendo que pensar y pensar que se piensa son cosas diferentes, la impresión que tiene la inteligencia de sus propios actos es una sola. Ridículo parece admitir eso en una inteligencia verdadera, ya que es la misma, en absoluto, la inteligencia que piensa y la que piensa que piensa. Si así no fuese, contaríamos con una inteligencia que sólo piensa y con otra que piensa que la primera inteligencia piensa; pero una y otra serían diferentes. ¿Y si admitiésemos la distinción de razón? Entonces se abandonaría de antemano la multiplicidad de las hipóstasis. Por otra parte, conviene examinar, incluso desde el punto de vista de una distinción de razón, si cabe tomar en cuenta una inteligencia que sólo piense y que en sí misma no tiene conciencia de ello. Lo cual no podría producirse en nosotros mismos, que somos siempre conocedores de nuestros impulsos y de nuestros pensamientos, ya que, en cualquier otra circunstancia, se nos calificaría de insensatos. Cuando la verdadera inteligencia piensa en sus pensamientos se piensa verdaderamente a si misma y no piensa en algo inteligible que provenga de fuera; su objeto de pensamiento es ella misma y, necesariamente, al pensarse, habrá de poseerse y de verse a sí misma; al verse, además, se ve no como irreflexiva, sino como inteligente. De modo que en el primer acto de pensar se contiene ya el pensamiento de que piensa, lo cual es una sola cosa, que no cabria desdoblar, ni aun con distinción de razón. Y, por lo demás, si la inteligencia siempre está pensando lo que es, ¿qué lugar habrá para esa distinción de razón entre el acto de pensar y el acto de pensar que piensa? Podría introducirse así, añadida a la segunda inteligencia que piensa que la primera piensa, una tercera y nueva inteligencia que dijese pensar que la segunda piensa que la primera piensa, lo cual nos enredaría aún más en una cadena absurda. ¿Por qué, entonces, no proseguir de este modo hasta el infinito? Cuando hacemos que la razón provenga de la inteligencia, y luego que de ella se origine otra razón en el alma, para que la primera razón resulte algo intermedio entre el alma y la inteligencia, privamos al alma del pensamiento, si es que ella recibe la razón no de la inteligencia, sino de otra razón intermedia entre ella misma y la inteligencia. He aquí que tendrá una imagen de la razón, pero no la verdadera razón; no conocerá en modo alguno la inteligencia, ni siquiera pensará.

Bouillet

Nous avons déjà démontré ailleurs que la nature du Bien est une nature simple et première (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀπλῆ φύσις καὶ πρώτη) : car toute chose qui n’est pas première ne saurait être simple. Nous avons également démontré que la nature du Bien ne contient rien en soi (οὐδὲν εἰχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ) (03), qu’elle est quelque chose d’un (ἕν τι), qu’elle est la nature même de l’Un (τοῦ ἑνὸς λεγομένου ἡ φύσις ἡ αὐτή) ; car l’Un n’est pas en soi une chose à laquelle vienne s’ajouter l’unité, pas plus que le Bien n’est en soi une chose à laquelle vienne s’ajouter la bonté. Par conséquent [l’Un et le Bien étant tous deux la simplicité même], quand nous disons l’Un (τὸ ἕν), et quand nous disons le Bien (τὸ ἀγαθόν), ces deux mots n’expriment qu’une seule et même nature; ils n’en affirment rien, et ne servent qu’à nous la désigner à nous-mêmes autant que la chose est possible. Nous appelons cette nature le Premier (τὸ πρῶτον), parce elle est très simple ; et l’Absolu (τὸ αὔταρκες), parce qu’elle n’est pas composée : sinon, elle dépendrait des choses dont elle serait composée. Enfin elle n’est pas non plus dans une autre chose [comme un attribut dans un sujet] : car tout ce qui est dans une autre chose provient aussi d’une autre chose. Si donc cette nature n’est pas dans une autre chose et ne provient pas d’une autre chose, s’il n’y a en elle aucune composition, elle doit n’avoir rien au-dessus d’elle.

Il en résulte qu’il ne faut pas recourir à d’autres principes [que les trois hypostases divines], mais assigner le premier rang à l’Un, le deuxième à l’Intelligence, qui est le premier principe pensant, puis le troisième à l’Âme. Tel est en effet l’ordre naturel, ordre qui ne permet d’admettre ni plus ni moins de principes dans le monde intelligible. Si l’on en admet moins, c’est que l’on confond l’Âme avec l’Intelligence, ou l’Intelligence avec le Premier; or nous avons souvent démontré que ce sont autant de principes différents [v. Trinité]. Il nous reste maintenant à examiner si l’on peut en admettre plus, et, dans le cas où l’on supposerait qu’il y eût d’autres principes que ces trois hypostases, quelle serait leur nature.

Le Principe de toutes choses, tel que nous l’avons décrit, est le plus simple, le plus élevé qu’on puisse trouver. On [1] ne saurait dire qu’en lui autre chose est la puissance, autre chose est l’acte: car il serait ridicule de vouloir appliquer à des principes, qui sont immatériels et qui sont en acte, la distinction de l’acte et de la puissance, et d’augmenter ainsi le nombre [des hypostases divines, en distinguant dans chacune d’elles la puissance et l’acte].

On ne saurait non plus imaginer au-dessous du Premier deux Intelligences, l’une en repos, et l’autre en mouvement ? Que serait en effet le repos de la première, que seraient le mouvement et la parole (προφορὰ) de la seconde? En quoi consisteraient l’inaction de l’une et l’action de l’autre? Par son essence, l’Intelligence est éternellement et identiquement un acte permanent. S’élever à l’Intelligence et se mouvoir autour d’elle est la fonction propre de l’Âme. Quant à la Raison (λόγος), qui descend de l’Intelligence dans l’Âme et la rend intellectuelle, elle ne constitue pas une nature distincte de l’Âme et de l’Intelligence et intermédiaire entre elles.

Il ne convient pas non plus d’admettre qu’il y ait plusieurs Intelligences en disant que l’une pense, et que l’autre pense que la première pense : car si penser et penser que l’on pense sont [pour l’esprit] deux choses différentes, cependant il n’y a là qu’une seule intuition qui a conscience de ses actes (μία προσβολὴ οὐκ ἀναίσθητος τῶν ἐνεργημάτων ἑαυτῆς)

Il est ridicule de supposer que l’Intelligence véritable n’ait pas une telle conscience. C’est donc la même Intelligence qui pense et qui pense qu’elle pense; sinon, il y aurait deux principes, dont l’un aurait la pensée, et l’autre, la conscience de la pensée; le second différerait du premier sans doute, mais ne serait pas le véritable principe pensant. Si l’on objecte que la pensée et la conscience de la pensée sont deux choses logiquement distinctes, nous répondrons qu’on n’établit pas ainsi que ce soient deux hypostases différentes. Ensuite, nous examinerons s’il est possible de concevoir une Intelligence qui penserait seulement sans avoir conscience de sa pensée (νοῦν μὴ παρακολουθοῦντα ἑαθτῷ ὅτι νοεῖ). Si nous nous trouvions nous-mêmes dans un tel état, nous qui sommes tout entiers à l’activité pratique et à la raison discursive, nous serions regardés comme insensés, fussions-nous d’ailleurs passablement raisonnables. Mais, comme l’Intelligence véritable se pense elle-même dans ses pensées, et que l’Intelligible, loin d’être hors de l’Intelligence, est l’Intelligence même, l’Intelligence, en pensant, se possède et se voit elle-même nécessairement. Or, en se voyant elle-même, elle ne se voit pas inintelligente, mais intelligente. Ainsi dans le premier acte de la pensée, l’Intelligence a la pensée et la conscience de la pensée, deux choses qui n’en font qu’une; il n’y a là aucune dualité, même logiquement. Si l’Intelligence pense toujours ce qu’elle est, y a-t-il lieu de séparer, même par une simple distinction logique, la pensée et la conscience de la pensée? L’absurdité de la doctrine que nous combattons sera plus évidente encore si l’on suppose qu’une troisième Intelligence ait conscience que la deuxième Intelligence a conscience de la pensée de la première : car il n’y a pas de raison pour qu’on n’aille ainsi à l’infini.

Enfin, si l’on suppose que de la Raison, qui découle de l’Intelligence, naît dans l’Âme universelle une autre Raison, de sorte que la première Raison constitue un principe intermédiaire entre l’Intelligence et l’Âme, on enlève à l’Âme le pouvoir de penser : car, au lieu de recevoir de l’Intelligence la Raison, elle la recevra d’un principe intermédiaire; elle n’aura ainsi qu’une ombre de la Raison au lieu de posséder la Raison même ; elle ne connaîtra pas l’Intelligence et elle ne pourra pas penser.

Guthrie

THE SUPREME PRINCIPLES MUST BE SIMPLE AND NOT COMPOUND.

1. We have already seen that the nature of the Good is simple and primary, for nothing that is not primary could be simple. We have also demonstrated that the nature of the Good contains nothing in itself, but is something unitary, the very nature of the One; for in itself the One is not some thing to which unity could be added, any more than the Good in itself is some thing to which goodness could be added. Consequently, as both the One and the Good are simplicity itself, when we speak of the One and the Good, these two words express but one and the same nature; they affirm nothing, and only represent it to us so far as possible. This nature is called the First, because it is very simple, and not composite; it is the absolute as self-sufficient, because it is not composite; otherwise it would depend on the things of which it was composed. Neither is it predicable of anything (as an attribute in a subject) for all that is in another thing comes from something else. If then this nature be not in anything else, nor is derived from anything else, if it contain nothing composite, it must not have anything above it.

THE ONLY SUPREME PRINCIPLES MUST THEN BE UNITY, INTELLIGENCE AND SOUL.

Consequently there are no principles other (than the three divine hypostatic substances); and the first rank will have to be assigned to Unity, the second to Intelligence, as the first thinking principle, and the third to the Soul. Such indeed is the natural order, which admits of no further principles, in the intelligible world. If less be claimed, it is because of a confusion between the Soul and Intelligence, or Intelligence with the First; but we have often pointed out their mutual differences. The only thing left is to examine if there might not be more than these three hypostatic substances; and in this case, what their nature might be.

THE ARISTOTELIAN DISTINCTION OF POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO DIVINITY.

The Principle of all things, such as we have described it, is the most simple and elevated possible. The (Gnostics) are wrong in distinguishing within that (supreme Principle) potentiality from actualization; for it would be ridiculous to seek to apply to principles that are immaterial and are actualizations, that (Aristotelian) distinction, and thus to increase the number (of the divine hypostatic substances.)

THE DISTINCTION OF REST AND MOVEMENT ALSO INAPPLICABLE.

Neither could we, below the Supreme, distinguish two intelligences, one at rest, and the other in motion. We should have to define the resting of the First, and the movement or utterance of the second. The inaction of the one and the action of the other would be equally mysterious. By its being (or, nature), Intelligence is eternally and identically a permanent actualization. To rise to Intelligence and to move around it is the proper function of the soul.

AN INTERMEDIARY LOGOS (OR AEON JESUS  ), ALSO UNACCOUNTABLE.

Reason (logos) which descends from Intelligence, into the Soul, and intellectualizes her, does not constitute a nature distinct from the Soul and Intelligence, and intermediary between them.

CONSCIOUSNESS IS UNITARY THOUGH CONTAINING THINKER, OBJECT AND THOUGHT.

Nor should we admit the existence of several intelligences, merely because we distinguish a thinker from a consciousness of the thinker. Though there be a difference between thinking, and thinking that one thinks, these two nevertheless constitute a single intuitive consciousness of its actualizations. It would be ridiculous to deny such a consciousness to veritable Intelligence. It is therefore the same Intelligence that thinks, and that thinks that it thinks. Otherwise there would be two principles, of which the one would have thought, and the other consciousness of thought. The second would doubtless differ from the first, but would not be the real thinking principle. A mere logical distinction between thought and consciousness of thought would not establish the (actual) differences between two (hypostatic substances). Further, we shall have to consider whether it be possible to conceive of an Intelligence which would exclusively think, without any accompanying consciousness of its thought. If we ourselves who are entirely devoted to practical activity and discursive reason were in such a condition, we would, even if otherwise considered sensible, be insane. But as true Intelligence thinks itself in its thoughts, and as the intelligible, far from being outside of Intelligence, is Intelligence itself, Intelligence, by thinking, possesses itself, and necessarily sees itself. When Intelligence sees itself, it does not see itself as unintelligent, but as intelligent. Therefore in the first actualization of thought, Intelligence has the thought and consciousness of thought, two things that form but a single one; not even logically is this a duality. If Intelligence always think what it is, is there any reason to separate, even by a simple logical distinction, thought from the consciousness of thought? The absurdity of the doctrine we are controverting will be still more evident if we suppose that a third intelligence is conscious that the second intelligence is conscious of the thought of the first; we might thus go on to infinity.

A DIFFERENTIATED REASON WOULD DEPRIVE THE SOUL OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

Last, if we suppose that Reason is derived from Intelligence, and then from reason in the soul derive another reason which would be derived from Reason in itself, so as to constitute a principle intermediary between Intelligence and Soul, the Soul would be deprived of the power of thought. For thus the Soul, instead of receiving reason from Intelligence, would receive reason from an intermediary principle. Instead of possessing Reason itself, the Soul would possess only an adumbration of Reason; the Soul would not know Intelligence, and would not be able to think.

MacKenna

1. We have seen elsewhere that the Good, the Principle, is simplex, and, correspondingly, primal - for the secondary can never be simplex - that it contains nothing: that it is an integral Unity.

Now the same Nature belongs to the Principle we know as The One. just as the goodness of The Good is essential and not the outgrowth of some prior substance so the Unity of The One is its essential.

Therefore:

When we speak of The One and when we speak of The Good we must recognize an Identical Nature; we must affirm that they are the same - not, it is true, as venturing any predication with regard to that [unknowable] Hypostasis but simply as indicating it to ourselves in the best terms we find.

Even in calling it "The First" we mean no more than to express that it is the most absolutely simplex: it is the Self-Sufficing only in the sense that it is not of that compound nature which would make it dependent upon any constituent; it is "the Self-Contained" because everything contained in something alien must also exist by that alien.

Deriving, then, from nothing alien, entering into nothing alien, in no way a made-up thing, there can be nothing above it.

We need not, then, go seeking any other Principles; this - the One and the Good - is our First; next to it follows the Intellectual Principle, the Primal Thinker; and upon this follows Soul. Such is the order in nature. The Intellectual Realm allows no more than these and no fewer.

Those who hold to fewer Principles must hold the identity of either Intellectual-Principle and Soul or of Intellectual-Principle and The First; but we have abundantly shown that these are distinct.

It remains for us to consider whether there are more than these Three.

Now what other [Divine] Kinds could there be? No Principles of the universe could be found at once simpler and more transcendent than this whose existence we have affirmed and described.

They will scarcely urge upon us the doubling of the Principle in Act by a Principle in Potentiality. It is absurd to seek such a plurality by distinguishing between potentiality and actuality in the case of immaterial beings whose existence is in Act - even in lower forms no such division can be made and we cannot conceive a duality in the Intellectual-Principle, one phase in some vague calm, another all astir. Under what form can we think of repose in the Intellectual Principle as contrasted with its movement or utterance? What would the quiescence of the one phase be as against the energy of the others?

No: the Intellectual-Principle is continuously itself, unchangeably constituted in stable Act. With movement - towards it or within it - we are in the realm of the Soul’s operation: such act is a Reason-Principle emanating from it and entering into Soul, thus made an Intellectual Soul, but in no sense creating an intermediate Principle to stand between the two.

Nor are we warranted in affirming a plurality of Intellectual Principles on the ground that there is one that knows and thinks and another knowing that it knows and thinks. For whatever distinction be possible in the Divine between its Intellectual Act and its Consciousness of that Act, still all must be one projection not unaware of its own operation: it would be absurd to imagine any such unconsciousness in the Authentic Intelligence; the knowing principle must be one and the selfsame with that which knows of the knowing.

The contrary supposition would give us two beings, one that merely knows, and another separate being that knows of the act of knowing.

If we are answered that the distinction is merely a process of our thought, then, at once, the theory of a plurality in the Divine Hypostasis is abandoned: further, the question is opened whether our thought can entertain a knowing principle so narrowed to its knowing as not to know that it knows - a limitation which would be charged as imbecility even in ourselves, who if but of very ordinary moral force are always master of our emotions and mental processes.

No: The Divine Mind in its mentation thinks itself; the object of the thought is nothing external: Thinker and Thought are one; therefore in its thinking and knowing it possesses itself, observes itself and sees itself not as something unconscious but as knowing: in this Primal Knowing it must include, as one and the same Act, the knowledge of the knowing; and even the logical distinction mentioned above cannot be made in the case of the Divine; the very eternity of its self-thinking precludes any such separation between that intellective act and the consciousness of the act.

The absurdity becomes still more blatant if we introduce yet a further distinction - after that which affirms the knowledge of the knowing, a third distinction affirming the knowing of the knowledge of the knowing: yet there is no reason against carrying on the division for ever and ever.

To increase the Primals by making the Supreme Mind engender the Reason-Principle, and this again engender in the Soul a distinct power to act as mediator between Soul and the Supreme Mind, this is to deny intellection to the Soul, which would no longer derive its Reason from the Intellectual-Principle but from an intermediate: the Soul then would possess not the Reason-Principle but an image of it: the Soul could not know the Intellectual-Principle; it could have no intellection.

Taylor

I. Since it has appeared to us that the nature of the good is simple and the first; for every thing which is not the first is not simple; and since it has nothing in itself, but is one alone, and the nature of what is called the one, is the same with the good; for it is not first something else, and afterwards one, — nor is the good something else, and afterwards the good ; this being the case, when we say the one, and when we say the good, it is necessary to think that we speak of one and the same nature; not predicating any thing of it, but manifesting it to ourselves as much as possible. It is also called the first, because it is most simple ; and sufficient to itself, because it does not consist of many things. For if it did, it would be suspended from the things of which it consists. It likewise is not in any thing else, because every thing which is in another, is also derived from another. If, therefore, it is neither from, nor in another, and has not any composition in its nature, it is necessary that there should not be any thing superior to it. Hence, it is not requisite to proceed to other principles, but having admitted this, and next to this intellect which is primarily intellect, we ought afterwards to place soul, as the next in rank. For this is the order according to nature, neither to admit more, nor fewer than these in the intelligible. For those who admit fewer than these, must either say that soul and intellect are the same, or that intellect and that which is first are the same. It has, however, been frequently demonstrated by us, that these are different from each other.

II. It remains, therefore, that we should consider at present, if there are more than these three, what the natures are which exist besides these. For since the principle of all things subsists in the way we have shown, it is not possible for any one to find a more simple and elevated principle. For they [the Gnostics] will not say1 that there is one principle in capacity, but another in energy; since it is ridiculous in things which are in energy, and immaterial, to make many natures by dividing into capacity and energy. But neither in the natures posterior to these, is it to be supposed that there is a certain intellect established in quiet, but that another is as it were moved. For what is the quiet of intellect, what the motion and language of it ? And what will be the leisure of one intellect, and the work of the other? For intellect always possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, being constituted in a stable energy. But motion directed to, and subsisting about it, is now the employment of soul. Reason also proceeding from intellect into soul, causes soul to be intellectual, and does not produce a certain other nature between intellect and soul. Moreover, neither, is it necessary to make many intellects on this account, that one of them perceives intellectually, but another sees that it sees intellectually. For if in these, to perceive intellectually is one thing, but another to perceive that it sees intellectually, yet there must be one intuitive perception in these which is not insensible of its own energies. For it would be ridiculous to form any other conception than this of true intellect. But the intellect will be entirely the same, which perceives intellectually, and which sees that it sees intellectually. For if this were not the case, the one would be alone intelligent but the other would perceive that it was intelligent, and the former would be different from the latter. If, however, they say that these two [only] differ from each other in conceptions, in the first place indeed, they will be deprived of many hypostases ; and in the next place it is necessary to consider, whether any conception of ours can admit the subsistence of an intellect which is alone intelligent, and which does not perceive that it sees intellectually. For when a thing of this kind happens to us who are always attentive to impulses and cogitations, if we are moderately worthy, it becomes the cause to us of folly.

When, therefore, that which is truly intellect intellectually perceives itself in its intellections, and the intelligible of it is not externally posited, but intellect itself is also the intelligible, it necessarily follows that in intellectual perception it possesses itself, and sees itself. But seeing itself, it perceives itself not to be void of intelligence, but intelligent. So that in primarily energizing intellectually, it will also have a perception that it sees intellectually, both being as one; nor can there be any conception of duplicity there. If, likewise, always perceiving intellectually it is that which it is, what place can there be for the conception which separates intellectual perception from the perceiving that it sees intellectually ? If, however, some one should introduce a third conception to the second, which asserts that it perceives that it sees intellectually, and should say that it understands (i.e., sees intellectually), that what understands understands, the absurdity is still more apparent. And why may not assertions of this kind be made to infinity r The reason, likewise, proceeding from intellect which may be adduced, and from which afterwards another reason is generated in the soul, so as to become a medium between intellect and soul, deprives the soul of intellectual perception, if it does not derive this reason from intellect, but from some other intermediate nature. Hence it would possess an image of reason, but not reason itself. And in short, it would not have a knowledge of intellect, nor would it be intelligent.


Ver online : ENÉADAS I-II (Gredos)


[1Plotin ne nomme nulle part dans ce livre les sectaires qu’il combat ; il se contente de les désigner vaguement par αὐτοί, ou par un verbe à la troisième personne du pluriel, tel que φήρουσι dans la phrase qui est l’objet de cette note : le sujet sous-entendu est évidemment les Gnostiques. Voy. la Note, p. 494.