MacKenna-Plotinus: Form-Idea

The basic-constituents of things must be either their Form-Idea or that Primal Matter [of the Intelligible] or a compound of the Form and Matter. Enneads   II,4,6

Form-Idea, pure and simple, they cannot be: for without Matter how could things stand in their mass and magnitude? Neither can they be that Primal Matter, for they are not indestructible. Enneads II,4,6

They must, therefore, consist of Matter and Form-Idea - Form for quality and shape, Matter for the base, indeterminate as being other than Idea. Enneads II,4,6

The actualized entity is not the Matter [the Potentiality, merely] but a combination, including the Form-Idea upon the Matter. Enneads II,5,2

But after what mode does Actualization exist in the Intellectual Realm? Is it the Actualization of a statue, where the combination is realized because the Form-Idea has mastered each separate constituent of the total? No: it is that every constituent there is a Form-Idea and, thus, is perfect in its Being. Enneads II,5,3

Being, the most firmly set of all things, that in virtue of which all other things receive Stability, possesses this Stability not as from without but as springing within, as inherent. Stability is the goal of intellection, a Stability which had no beginning, and the state from which intellection was impelled was Stability, though Stability gave it no impulsion; for Motion neither starts from Motion nor ends in Motion. Again, the Form-Idea has Stability, since it is the goal of Intellect: intellection is the Form’s Motion. Enneads VI,2,8

We may be told that Man [the universal] is Form alone, Socrates   Form in Matter. But on this very ground Socrates will be less fully Man than the universal; for the Reason-Principle will be less effectual in Matter. If, on the contrary, Man is not determined by Form alone, but presupposes Matter, what deficiency has Man in comparison with the material manifestation of Man, or the Reason-Principle in isolation as compared with its embodiment in a unit of Matter? Besides, the more general is by nature prior; hence, the Form-Idea is prior to the individual: but what is prior by nature is prior unconditionally. How then can the Form take a lower rank? The individual, it is true, is prior in the sense of being more readily accessible to our cognisance; this fact, however, entails no objective difference. Enneads VI,3,9

We have remarked that its apparent subsistence is in fact an assemblage of Sensibles, their existence guaranteed to us by sense-perception. But since their combination is unlimited, our division must be guided by the Form-Ideas of living beings, as for example the Form-Idea of Man implanted in Body; the particular Form acts as a qualification of Body, but there is nothing unreasonable in using qualities as a basis of division. Enneads VI,3,10