Jowett: soul (Cratylus, Ion, Euthydemus, Meno, Apology)

Soc. I perceive, Ion   ; and I will proceed to explain to you what I imagine to be the reason of this. The gift which you possess of speaking excellently about Homer is not an art, but, as I was just saying, an inspiration ; there is a divinity moving you, like that contained in the stone which Euripides calls a magnet, but which is commonly known as the stone of Heraclea. This stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings ; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain : and all of them derive their power of suspension from the original stone. In like manner the Muse first of all inspires men herself ; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration. For all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not by art, but because they are inspired and possessed. And as the Corybantian revellers when they dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric poets are not in their right mind when they are composing their beautiful strains : but when falling under the power of music and metre they are inspired and possessed ; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers when they are under the influence of Dionysus but not when they are in their right mind. And the SOUL of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves say ; for they tell us that they bring songs from honeyed fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dells of the Muses ; they, like the bees, winging their way from flower to flower. And this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him : when he has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles. Many are the noble words in which poets speak concerning the actions of men ; but like yourself when speaking about Homer, they do not speak of them by any rules of art : they are simply inspired to utter that to which the Muse impels them, and that only ; and when inspired, one of them will make dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another choral strains, another epic or iambic verses — and he who is good at one is not good any other kind of verse : for not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine. Had he learned by rules of art, he would have known how to speak not of one theme only, but of all ; and therefore God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers, as he also uses diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them may know them to be speaking not of themselves who utter these priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that God himself is the speaker, and that through them he is conversing with us. And Tynnichus the Chalcidian affords a striking instance of what I am saying : he wrote nothing that any one would care to remember but the famous paean which ; in every one’s mouth, one of the finest poems ever written, simply an invention of the Muses, as he himself says. For in this way, the God would seem to indicate to us and not allow us to doubt that these beautiful poems are not human, or the work of man, but divine and the work of God ; and that the poets are only the interpreters of the Gods by whom they are severally possessed. Was not this the lesson which the God intended to teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the best of songs ? Am I not right, Ion ? ION

Ion. Yes, indeed, Socrates  , I feel that you are ; for your words touch my SOUL, and I am persuaded that good poets by a divine inspiration interpret the things of the Gods to us. ION

Soc. I wish you would frankly tell me, Ion, what I am going to ask of you : When you produce the greatest effect upon the audience in the recitation of some striking passage, such as the apparition of Odysseus leaping forth on the floor, recognized by the suitors and casting his arrows at his feet, or the description of Achilles rushing at Hector, or the sorrows of Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam, — are you in your right mind ? Are you not carried out of yourself, and does not your SOUL in an ecstasy seem to be among the persons or places of which you are speaking, whether they are in Ithaca or in Troy or whatever may be the scene of the poem ? ION

Soc. Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings which, as I am saying, receive the power of the original magnet from one another ? The rhapsode like yourself and the actor are intermediate links, and the poet himself is the first of them. Through all these the God sways the souls of men in any direction which he pleases, and makes one man hang down from another. Thus there is a vast chain of dancers and masters and undermasters of choruses, who are suspended, as if from the stone, at the side of the rings which hang down from the Muse. And every poet has some Muse from whom he is suspended, and by whom he is said to be possessed, which is nearly the same thing ; for he is taken hold of. And from these first rings, which are the poets, depend others, some deriving their inspiration from Orpheus, others from Musaeus ; but the greater number are possessed and held by Homer. Of whom, Ion, you are one, and are possessed by Homer ; and when any one repeats the words of another poet you go to sleep, and know not what to say ; but when any one recites a strain of Homer you wake up in a moment, and your SOUL leaps within you, and you have plenty to say ; for not by art or knowledge about Homer do you say what you say, but by divine inspiration and by possession ; just as the Corybantian revellers too have a quick perception of that strain only which is appropriated to the God by whom they are possessed, and have plenty of dances and words for that, but take no heed of any other. And you, Ion, when the name of Homer is mentioned have plenty to say, and have nothing to say of others. You ask, “Why is this ?” The answer is that you praise Homer not by art but by divine inspiration. ION

Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens, if I who, when I was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, remained where they placed me, like any other man, facing death ; if, I say, now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulfil the philosopher’s mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear ; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death : then I should be fancying that I was wise when I was not wise. For this fear of death is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being the appearance of knowing the unknown ; since no one knows whether death, which they in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good. Is there not here conceit of knowledge, which is a disgraceful sort of ignorance ? And this is the point in which, as I think, I am superior to men in general, and in which I might perhaps fancy myself wiser than other men, — that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know : but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonorable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil. And therefore if you let me go now, and reject the counsels of Anytus, who said that if I were not put to death I ought not to have been prosecuted, and that if I escape now, your sons will all be utterly ruined by listening to my words — if you say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind Anytus, and will let you off, but upon one condition, that are to inquire and speculate in this way any more, and that if you are caught doing this again you shall die ; — if this was the condition on which you let me go, I should reply : Men of Athens, I honor and love you ; but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting anyone whom I meet after my manner, and convincing him, saying : O my friend, why do you who are a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens, care so much about laying up the greatest amount of money and honor and reputation, and so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the SOUL, which you never regard or heed at all ? Are you not ashamed of this ? And if the person with whom I am arguing says : Yes, but I do care ; I do not depart or let him go at once ; I interrogate and examine and cross-examine him, and if I think that he has no virtue, but only says that he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less. And this I should say to everyone whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren. For this is the command of God, as I would have you know ; and I believe that to this day no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons and your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the SOUL. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue come money and every other good of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, my influence is ruinous indeed. But if anyone says that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not ; but whatever you do, know that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times. APOLOGY

Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great reason to hope that death is a good, for one of two things : — either death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the SOUL from this world to another. Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by the sight of dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the night in which his sleep was undisturbed even by dreams, and were to compare with this the other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many days and nights he had passed in the course of his life better and more pleasantly than this one, I think that any man, I will not say a private man, but even the great king, will not find many such days or nights, when compared with the others. Now if death is like this, I say that to die is gain ; for eternity is then only a single night. But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the dead are, what good, O my friends and judges, can be greater than this ? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world, and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos   and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who were righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer ? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. I, too, shall have a wonderful interest in a place where I can converse with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and other heroes of old, who have suffered death through an unjust judgment ; and there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall be able to continue my search into true and false knowledge ; as in this world, so also in that ; I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise, and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition ; or Odysseus or Sisyphus  , or numberless others, men and women too ! What infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions ! For in that world they do not put a man to death for this ; certainly not. For besides being happier in that world than in this, they will be immortal, if what is said is true. APOLOGY

Men. O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were always doubting yourself and making others doubt ; and now you are casting your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and am at my wits’ end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For my SOUL and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you ; and though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and to many persons — and very good ones they were, as I thought — at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that. you are very wise in not voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other places as do in Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician. MENO

Soc. Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how they might be able to give a reason of their profession : there, have been poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar  , and many others who were inspired. And they say — mark, now, and see whether their words are true — they say that the SOUL of man is immortal, and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always in perfect holiness. MENO

The SOUL, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, rand having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all ; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything ; for as all nature is akin, and the SOUL has learned all things ; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single recollection — all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint ; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of enquiry : for it will make us idle ; and is sweet only to the sluggard ; but the other saying will make us active and inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the nature of virtue. MENO

Soc. And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his SOUL must have always possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man ? MENO

Soc. And if the truth of all things always existed in the SOUL, then the SOUL is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember. MENO

Soc. Next, let us consider the goods of the SOUL : they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like ? MENO

Soc. If then virtue is a quality of the SOUL, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the SOUL are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly ; and therefore and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence ? MENO

Soc. And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the SOUL guides and uses them rightly or wrongly ; just as the things of the SOUL herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly ? MENO

Soc. And the wise SOUL guides them rightly, and the foolish SOUL wrongly. MENO

Soc. And is not this universally true of human nature ? All other things hang upon the SOUL, and the things of the SOUL herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good ; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits — and virtue, as we say, is profitable ? MENO

Soc. I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves ; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions : while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human SOUL, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause ; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge ; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain. MENO

With what I know ; and I suppose that you mean with my SOUL ? EUTHYDEMUS  

Yes, I said ; I know with my SOUL. EUTHYDEMUS

Soc. Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration from the great Euthyphro   of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long lecture which commenced at dawn : he talked and I listened, and his wisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession of my SOUL,and to-day I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the investigation of names — that will be the way ; but to-morrow, if you are so disposed, we will conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can only find some priest or sophist who is skilled in purifications of this sort. CRATYLUS  

Her. I will take that which appears to me to follow next in order. You know the distinction of SOUL and body ? CRATYLUS

Soc. You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the word psnche (SOUL), and then of the word soma (body) ? CRATYLUS

Soc. If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should imagine that those who first use the name psnche meant to express that the SOUL when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and revival (anapsuchon), and when this reviving power fails then the body perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called psyche. But please stay a moment ; I fancy that I can discover something which will be more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid that they will scorn this explanation. What do you say to another ? CRATYLUS

Soc. What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body ? What else but the SOUL ? CRATYLUS

Soc. And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or SOUL is the ordering and containing principle of all things ? CRATYLUS

Soc. That may be variously interpreted ; and yet more variously if a little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave (sema) of the SOUL which may be thought to be buried in our present life ; or again the index of the SOUL, because the SOUL gives indications to (semainei) the body ; probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and they were under the impression that the SOUL is suffering the punishment of sin, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the SOUL is incarcerated, kept safe (soma, sozetai), as the name ooma implies, until the penalty is paid ; according to this view, not even a letter of the word need be changed. CRATYLUS

Soc. In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of always being with him after death, and of the SOUL denuded of the body going to him, my belief is that all is quite consistent, and that the office and name of the God really correspond. CRATYLUS

Soc. And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to him, is willing to come back to us ? Even the Sirens, like all the rest of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, is the God able to infuse into his words. And, according to this view, he is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the inhabitants of the other world ; and even to us who are upon earth he sends from below exceeding blessings. For he has much more than he wants down there ; wherefore he is called Pluto (or the rich). Note also, that he will have nothing to do with men while they are in the body, but only when the SOUL is liberated from the desires and evils of the body. Now there is a great deal of philosophy and reflection in that ; for in their liberated state he can bind them with the desire of virtue, but while they are flustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronos himself would suffice to keep them with him in his own far-famed chains. CRATYLUS

Soc. Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony. In the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and SOUL. CRATYLUS

Soc. Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify Phoras kai rhou noesis (perception of motion and flux), or perhaps Phoras onesis (the blessing of motion), but is at any rate connected with Pheresthai (motion) ; gnome (judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or consideration (nomesis) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider ; or, if you would rather, here is noesis, the very word just now mentioned, which is neou esis (the desire of the new) ; the word neos implies that the world is always in process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express his longing of the SOUL, for the original name was neoesis, and not noesis. The word sophrosune is the salvation (soteria) of that wisdom (phronesis) which we were just now considering. Epioteme (knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the SOUL which is good for anything follows (epetai) the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind them ; wherefor the word should rather be read as epistemene, inserting en. Sunesis (understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of conclusion ; the word is derived from sunienai (to go along with), and, like epistasthai (to know), implies the progression of the SOUL in company with the nature of things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be of native growth ; the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things. You must remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid motion, often use the word esuthe (he rushed) ; and there was a famous Lacedaemonian who was named Sous (Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and the touching (epaphe) of motion is expressed by sophia, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good (agathon) is the name which is given to the admirable (agasto) in nature ; for, although all things move, still there are degrees of motion ; some are swifter, some slower ; but there are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is called agathon. Dikaiosune (justice) is clearly dikaiou sunesis (understanding of the just) ; but the actual word dikaion is more difficult : men are only agreed to a certain extent about justice, and then they begin to disagree. CRATYLUS

Soc. And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a precisian, or “you will unnerve me of my strength.” When you have allowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall be at the top of my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great accomplishment — anein ; for mekos the meaning of greatness, and these two, mekos and anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was saying, being now at the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words arete (virtue) and kakia (vice) arete I do not as yet understand, but kakia is transparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded, for all things being in a flux (ionton), kakia is kakos ion (going badly) ; and this evil motion when existing in the SOUL has the general name of kakia or vice, specially appropriated to it. The meaning of kakos ienai may be further illustrated by the use of deilia (cowardice), which ought to have come after andreia, but was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word which has been passed over. Deilia signifies that the SOUL is bound with a strong chain (desmos), for lian means strength, and therefore deilia expresses the greatest and strongest bond of the SOUL ; and aporia (difficulty) is an evil of the same nature (from a not, and poreuesthai to go), like anything else which is an impediment to motion and movement. Then the word kakia appears to mean kakos ienai, or going badly, or limping and halting ; of which the consequence is, that the SOUL becomes filled with vice. And if kakia is the name of this sort of thing, arete will be the opposite of it, signifying in the first place ease of motion, then that the stream of the good SOUL is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called arete, or, more correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may perhaps have had another form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is more eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete. I daresay that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think that if the previous word kakia was right, then arete is also right. CRATYLUS

Soc. The meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may discover for yourself by the light of the previous examples, — for it is a sister word to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora) of the SOUL accompanying the world, and things which are done upon this principle are called sumphora or sumpheronta, because they are carried round with the world. CRATYLUS

Soc. I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty about them — edone is e onesis, the action which tends to advantage ; and the original form may be supposed to have been eone, but this has been altered by the insertion of the d. Lupe appears to be derived from the relaxation (luein) which the body feels when in sorrow ; ania (trouble) is the hindrance of motion (a and ienai) ; algedon (distress), if I am not mistaken, is a foreign word, which is derived from aleinos (grievous) ; odune (grief) is called from the putting on (endusis) sorrow ; in achthedon (vexation) “the word too labours,” as any one may see ; chara (joy) is the very expression of the fluency and diffusion of the SOUL (cheo) ; terpsis (delight) is so called from the pleasure creeping (erpon) through the SOUL, which may be likened to a breath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has been altered by time into terpnon ; eupherosune (cheerfulness) and epithumia explain themselves ; the former, which ought to be eupherosune and has been changed euphrosune, is named, as every one may see, from the SOUL moving (pheresthai) in harmony with nature ; epithumia is really e epi ton thumon iousa dunamis, the power which enters into the SOUL ; thumos (passion) is called from the rushing (thuseos) and boiling of the SOUL ; imeros (desire) denotes the stream (rous) which most draws the SOUL dia ten esin tes roes — because flowing with desire (iemenos), and expresses a longing after things and violent attraction of the SOUL to them, and is termed imeros from possessing this power ; pothos (longing) is expressive of the desire of that which is not present but absent, and in another place (pou) ; this is the reason why the name pothos is applied to things absent, as imeros is to things present ; eros (love) is so called because flowing in (esron) from without ; the stream is not inherent, but is an influence introduced through the eyes, and from flowing in was called esros (influx) in the old time when they used o (short) for o (long), and is called eros, now that o (long) is substituted for o (short). But why do you not give me another word ? CRATYLUS

Soc. Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses the march of the SOUL in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a bow (toxon) ; the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis (thinking), which is only oisis (moving), and implies the movement of the SOUL to the essential nature of each thing — just as boule (counsel) has to do with shooting (bole) ; and boulesthai (to wish) combines the notion of aiming and deliberating — all these words seem to follow doxa, and all involve the idea of shooting, just as aboulia, absence of counsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of the mark, or aim, or proposal, or object. CRATYLUS

Soc. I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which must be just what they are, or not be at all ; for example, the number ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other number : but this does not apply to that which is qualitative or to anything which is represented under an image. I should say rather that the image, if expressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let us suppose the existence of two objects : one of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus ; and we will suppose, further, that some God makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and colour, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness ; and into this infuses motion, and SOUL, and mind, such as you have, in a word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form ; would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two Cratyluses ? CRATYLUS

Soc. Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the SOUL at things than going round with them ; and therefore we should leave the beginning as at present, and not reject the e, but make an insertion of an instead of an i (not pioteme, but epiisteme). Take another example : bebaion (sure) is clearly the expression of station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word istoria (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (istanai) of the stream ; and the word piston (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion ; then, again, mneme (memory), as any one may see, expresses rest in the SOUL, and not motion. Moreover, words such as amartia and sumphora, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of their etymologies will be the same as sunesis and episteme and other words which have a good sense (i.e., omartein, sunienai, epesthai, sumphersthai) and much the same may be said of amathia and akolaia, for amathia may be explained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the names which in these instances we find to have the worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the same principle as those which have the best. And any one I believe who would take the trouble might find many other examples in which the giver of names indicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that they are at rest ; which is the opposite of motion. CRATYLUS