Jowett: dialecticians

Soc. All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal woman, or of a mortal man for a Goddess ; think of the word in the old Attic, and you will see better that the name heros is only a slight alteration of Eros, from whom the heroes sprang : either this is the meaning, or, if not this, then they must have been skilful as rhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the question (erotan), for eirein is equivalent to legein. And therefore, as I was saying, in the Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and questioners. All this is easy enough ; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of sophists and rhetors. But can you tell me why men are called anthropoi ? — that is more difficult. CRATYLUS  

Soc. I am myself a great lover of these processes of division and generalization ; they help me to speak and to think. And if I find any man who is able to see "a One and Many" in nature, him I follow, and "walk in his footsteps as if he were a god." And those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of calling dialecticians ; but God knows whether the name is right or not. And I should like to know what name you would give to your or to Lysias’ disciples, and whether this may not be that famous art of rhetoric which Thrasymachus and others teach and practise ? Skilful speakers they are, and impart their skill to any who is willing to make kings of them and to bring gifts to them. PHAEDRUS  

Phaedr. Yes, they are royal men ; but their art is not the same with the art of those whom you call, and rightly, in my opinion, dialecticians : — Still we are in the dark about rhetoric. PHAEDRUS

Str. Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some wise and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be, were, in imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes against all other animals to their own special glorification, at the same time jumbling together all the others, including man, under the appellation of brutes, — here would be the sort of error which we must try to avoid. STATESMAN

Str. And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to what is fitting ; for we should only want such a length as is suited to give pleasure, if at all, as a secondary matter ; and reason tells us, that we should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an enquiry, not our first, but our second object ; the first and highest of all being to assert the great method of division according to species — whether the discourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. No offence should be taken at length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed indifferently, according as either of them is better calculated to sharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who censures the length of discourses on such occasions and cannot away with their circumlocution, that he should not be in such a hurry to have done with them, when he can only complain that they are tedious, but he should prove that if they had been shorter they would have made those who took part in them better dialecticians, and more capable of expressing the truth of things ; about any other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself — he should pretend not to hear them. But we have had enough of this, as you will probably agree with me in thinking. Let us return to our Statesman, and apply to his case the aforesaid example of weaving. STATESMAN