Jowett: Reason

  

Reason, faculty of the soul, Rep.   6. 511 D (cp. 7. 533 E); reason and appetite, ib. 4. 439-442, 9- 571 D (cp. Phaedr. 253 foil.; Tim. 69 E foil.; Laws 3.687, 689); reason should be the guide of pleasure, Rep. 9. 585-587; reason and pleasure, Phil. 65 ; reason and knowledge, Theaet. 201, 202; — the ’golden cord’ of reason, Laws 1. 644 E.

---

Certainly not ! For not in that way does the soul of a philosopher reason ; she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she may deliver herself up again to the thraldom of pleasures and pains, doing a work only to be undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope’s web. But she will make herself a calm of passion and follow Reason, and dwell in her, beholding the true and divine (which is not matter of opinion), and thence derive nourishment. Thus she seeks to live while she lives, and after death she hopes to go to her own kindred and to be freed from human ills. Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits, will at her departure from the body be scattered and blown away by the winds and be nowhere and nothing. PHAEDO  

Str. And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to what is fitting ; for we should only want such a length as is suited to give pleasure, if at all, as a secondary matter ; and reason tells us, that we should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an enquiry, not our first, but our second object ; the first and highest of all being to assert the great method of division according to species — whether the discourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. No offence should be taken at length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed indifferently, according as either of them is better calculated to sharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who censures the length of discourses on such occasions and cannot away with their circumlocution, that he should not be in such a hurry to have done with them, when he can only complain that they are tedious, but he should prove that if they had been shorter they would have made those who took part in them better dialecticians, and more capable of expressing the truth of things ; about any other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself — he should pretend not to hear them. But we have had enough of this, as you will probably agree with me in thinking. Let us return to our Statesman, and apply to his case the aforesaid example of weaving. STATESMAN

Reason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IX