Jowett: Mind

  

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Mind, the disposer and cause of all [Anaxagoras], Crat. 400 A, 413; Phaedr. 270 A; Phaedo   97 C; Phil. 30 D; Laws 12. 966 foil. ; the cause of names, Crat. 416; = beauty ; ibid. (cp. Phil 65 E); to be distinguished from true opinion, Tim. 52 D; mind and motion, Soph. 249 (cp. Laws 10. 897 foil.); the life of mind, Phil. 21 E; mind and wisdom, ib. 28 foil.; Laws 1. 631 C, 632 C; 10. 897; 12. 963 A; mind belongs to the cause, Phil. 31 ; should be engaged in the contemplation of true being, ib. 59; as a good, ib. 66; not the absolute good, ib. 67; above law, Laws 9. 875 C (cp. Statesm. 293 foil.); mind and virtue, Laws 10. 900 C (cp. 12. 961-963); mind, the salvation of all things, ib. 12. 961:—’the fair mind in the fair body,’ Tim. 87 E :—mind political, Laws 12. 963 foil.:—the mind compared to a block of wax, Theaet, 191 C, 193-196, 200 C ;— the ’aviary’ of the mind, ib. 197, 200 C :—the minds of men different, ib. 171.

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Soc. All the great arts require discussion and high speculation about the truths of nature ; hence come loftiness of thought and completeness of execution. And this, as I conceive, was the quality which, in addition to his natural gifts, Pericles acquired from his intercourse with Anaxagoras whom he happened to know. He was thus imbued with the higher philosophy, and attained the knowledge of Mind and the negative of Mind, which were favourite themes of Anaxagoras, and applied what suited his purpose to the art of speaking. PHAEDRUS  

Thus far in what we have been saying, with small exception, the works of intelligence have been set forth ; and now we must place by the side of them in our discourse the things which come into being through necessity — for the creation is mixed, being made up of necessity and mind. Mind, the ruling power, persuaded necessity to bring the greater part of created things to perfection, and thus and after this manner in the beginning, when the influence of reason got the better of necessity, the universe was created. But if a person will truly tell of the way in which the work was accomplished, he must include the other influence of the variable cause as well. Wherefore, we must return again and find another suitable beginning, as about the former matters, so also about these. To which end we must consider the nature of fire, and water, and air, and earth, such as they were prior to the creation of the heaven, and what was happening to them in this previous state ; for no one has as yet explained the manner of their generation, but we speak of fire and the rest of them, whatever they mean, as though men knew their natures, and we maintain them to be the first principles and letters or elements of the whole, when they cannot reasonably be compared by a man of any sense even to syllables or first compounds. And let me say thus much : I will not now speak of the first principle or principles of all things, or by whatever name they are to be called, for this reason — because it is difficult to set forth my opinion according to the method of discussion which we are at present employing. Do not imagine, any more than I can bring myself to imagine, that I should be right in undertaking so great and difficult a task. Remembering what I said at first about probability, I will do my best to give as probable an explanation as any other — or rather, more probable ; and I will first go back to the beginning and try to speak of each thing and of all. Once more, then, at the commencement of my discourse, I call upon God, and beg him to be our saviour out of a strange and unwanted enquiry, and to bring us to the haven   of probability. So now let us begin again. TIMAEUS